State v. D. Rounsville

2023 MT 10N, 522 P.3d 813

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: January 17, 2023
• Docket: DA 21-0132
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

01/17/2023

DA 21-0132 Case Number: DA 21-0132

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2023 MT 10N

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

DUSTIN JAMES ROUNSVILLE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Lincoln, Cause No. DC-16-62 Honorable Matthew J. Cuffe, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Deborah S. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Marcia Jean Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: December 7, 2022

Decided: January 17, 2023

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Dustin James Rounsville appeals from the sentence imposed upon revocation of his

original sentence for felony stalking, challenging conditions of the written sentence as

differing from the oral pronouncement and beyond the District Court’s sentencing

authority. The State partially concedes to Rounsville’s argument, and we reverse and

remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentence.

¶3 In 2016, Rounsville pled guilty to one count of felony stalking. The District Court

sentenced him to a five-year commitment to the Department of Corrections (DOC), with

all but two years suspended, and recommended other conditions if Rounsville was released

on parole or conditional release. One of those recommended conditions included payment

of seven separate costs, fees, and surcharges (financial conditions).

¶4 In 2018, the District Court revoked the two-year suspended portion of Rounsville’s

sentence, and imposed a two-year DOC commitment, with the two years suspended. This

sentence imposed the identical conditions for community release that the original sentence

had merely recommended for parole or conditional release, including the financial

conditions. 2 ¶5 In 2020, the District Court revoked Rounsville’s two-year suspended sentence, and

imposed a two-year DOC commitment, with no time suspended, less credit for time served

and “street time.” At disposition, the District Court orally stated, “in the event there is any

community supervision or anything like that I am recommending all the terms and

conditions from the November 16, 2018 judgment on the first revocation.” (Emphasis

added.) However, in contrast, the written judgment stated that Rounsville “shall pay” the

financial conditions imposed in the prior 2018 judgment, and that he “shall comply with”

28 listed terms and conditions.

¶6 The oral pronouncement of sentence is the legally effective sentence and controls

in the event there is a conflict between the oral and written judgments. State v. Hammer,

2013 MT 203, 371 Mont. 121, 305 P.3d 843. Rounsville thus argues his written revocation

sentence is illegal because it affirmatively imposes conditions that were merely

recommended in the oral pronouncement. He argues the written sentence substantively

increases his sentence by imposing a financial obligation, even if he is never released to

community supervision, and that the court had no authority to outright impose the other 28

conditions on his unsuspended sentence, rather than as recommendations.

¶7 The State agrees the 28 conditions were unlawfully imposed as probation

conditions, and that remand is necessary to either strike the conditions or redesignate them

as recommended conditions in the event of community release. However, the State argues

the financial conditions were properly imposed because Rounsville was on notice from

3 their imposition in his prior 2018 judgment, and they would not substantially increase his

loss of liberty or property.

¶8 We agree with Rounsville’s argument he would have understood from the District

Court’s oral pronouncement that the financial conditions were not a mandatory part of his

sentence, which may have required incarceration for the entire time. While the parties offer

that the conditions may be stricken, it is appropriate for the written sentence to comport

with the oral pronouncement, and that all of the subject conditions, including the financial

conditions and the other 28 conditions, be designated as recommendations for community

release.

¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents

no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent

or modify existing precedent. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question

controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶10 Reversed and remanded for entry of an amended judgment in accordance herewith.

/S/ JIM RICE

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON