State v. Cyphers

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-43
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Cyphers, 2026-Ohio-2200.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-43 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 25-CR-0015 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas HARLEY CYPHERS : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on June 12, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-43

CHARLYN BOHLAND, Attorney for Appellant JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Harley Cyphers appeals his conviction of murder, which

followed his guilty plea. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} In September 2024, Cyphers shot and killed his father. Because he was 16

years old at the time of the shooting, Cyphers was charged in juvenile court with crimes that

would have constituted murder and felonious assault had he been an adult. Following a

probable cause hearing, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction and transferred the

matter to the General Division of the Clark County Court of Common Pleas. Thereafter,

Cyphers was indicted on three counts of murder and two counts of felonious assault. All of

the counts had attached firearm specifications.

{¶ 3} Prior to trial, defense counsel filed several motions, including a motion for funds

to hire an expert to determine whether Cypher had the capacity to have waived his Miranda

rights prior to being interviewed by the police, a motion to suppress statements made during

the police interview, and a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem. Relevant to this appeal,

counsel also filed a motion requesting funds to retain Dr. Robert Stinson to conduct an expert

evaluation regarding battered child syndrome. The trial court granted the motion for funds to

determine Cypher’s capacity to waive his Miranda rights but denied the remaining motions.

{¶ 4} Following plea negotiations, Cyphers entered a guilty plea to one count of

murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), as well as the attached firearm specification.

2 The remaining charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Cyphers to a prison term

of 15 years to life plus a consecutive term of 3 years on the firearm specification for a total

term of 18 years to life.

{¶ 5} Cyphers appeals.

II. Analysis

{¶ 6} Cyphers’s four assignments of error are as follows:

The trial court committed plain error and abused its discretion when it

failed to properly consider indigent-child Harley Cyphers’ particularized

request for funds to hire a battered child expert.

The trial court violated Harley Cyphers’ right to due process when it

deprived him of the ability to present a complete defense.

The trial court exceeded its authority and erred in its understanding of

what constitutes self-defense.

The trial court’s misconceptions about battered child syndrome and

proving self-defense infected its decision-making in assessing the

particularized request.

{¶ 7} At the outset, we note that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt. State

v. Faulkner, 2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). As such, a guilty plea waives all appealable

errors, including claims of error in pre-trial rulings made by the trial court and claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, unless they implicate the validity of the plea. State v.

Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 83; State v. Montgomery, 2007-Ohio-439, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.); State

v. Stivender, 2011-Ohio-247, ¶ 15 (2d. Dist.). In other words, such claims may be raised on

appeal only if the actions of the trial court and trial counsel rendered the plea other than

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Riddle, 2017-Ohio-1199, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.).

3 {¶ 8} In order to be constitutionally valid and comport with due process, a guilty plea

must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Bateman, 2011-Ohio-5808,

¶ 5 (2d Dist.), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). “‘In considering whether a

guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, an appellate court examines

the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the

trial court complied with constitutional and procedural safeguards.’” State v. Redavide, 2015-

Ohio-3056, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Barner, 2012-Ohio-4584, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.).

{¶ 9} “In order for a plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the trial court must

comply with Crim.R. 11(C).” (Citation omitted.) State v. Russell, 2011-Ohio-1738, ¶ 6

(2d Dist.). “Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that a trial court must use before accepting a

felony plea of guilty.” State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 8. “By following this rule, a court

ensures that the plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Cole, 2015-Ohio-3793,

¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing Redavide at ¶ 12.

{¶ 10} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides that a trial court may not accept a defendant’s guilty

plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty

involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for

the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court,

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to

4 confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove

the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

The Guilty Plea was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary and Cyphers’s Due Process

Rights Were Not Violated

{¶ 11} Cyphers does not argue that the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11.

And our review of the plea colloquy confirms that it was complete and without incident.

Instead, Cyphers asserts the trial court’s decision revealed a fundamental misunderstanding

of how battered child syndrome can, with expert testimony, support a self-defense claim.

See State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202 (1998). Cyphers claims that this misunderstanding

resulted in the funding motion being improperly denied and that, without an expert, he was

left with no viable defense. Cyphers, from this, posits that the trial court’s erroneous ruling

made his plea less than knowing and intelligent and that, with his only possible defense

eliminated, his plea was coerced and, thus, involuntary.

{¶ 12} Cyphers’s argument must be analyzed under the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent

decision in State v. Gowdy, 2025-Ohio-5575. Gowdy was indicted on two counts of felonious

assault, with the first count including two firearm specifications. Before trial, Gowdy indicated

his intent to assert a self-defense claim. On the scheduled trial date, the trial court had a

long and, at times, contentious discussion with Gowdy concerning whether a self-defense

jury instruction would be appropriate. During this discussion, the trial court made incorrect

statements concerning application of R.C. 2901.05(B), Ohio’s self-defense statute, and also

prematurely indicated that a self-defense instruction would not be given. Id. at ¶ 14. Gowdy,

after indicating that he had been “put in a box” and that he was “physically and mentally

5 exhausted,” pleaded guilty to the inferior offense of aggravated assault along with a three-

year firearm specification. Id. at ¶ 7, 9. The trial court imposed a four-year prison term. Id. at

¶ 13.

{¶ 13} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed Gowdy’s conviction, finding that

the trial court’s misstatements and too-early rejection of a self-defense instruction did not

make the plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at ¶ 14. The Supreme Court

accepted Gowdy’s appeal on the following two propositions of law:

I. A guilty plea must be vacated when it is not made knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently because the trial court coerced the defendant into

entering a plea of guilty by telling him prior to trial . . . that [the court] would not

give a jury instruction on self-defense without having heard all the evidence.

II. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Mr. Gowdy by denying him his

constitutional right to a jury trial.

Gowdy at ¶ 15.

{¶ 14} The Supreme Court first concluded that the trial court’s “misstatements of law

did not affect Gowdy to the point that they obscured his knowledge of the charges against

him or the rights he was waiving.” Moreover, the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11

ensured that Gowdy “understood the effects of his plea, including that he was waiving his

right to a jury trial.” Id. at ¶ 34. Based on these determinations, the Supreme Court concluded

that Gowdy’s guilty plea was knowing and intelligent.

{¶ 15} The Supreme Court then turned to Gowdy’s argument that the plea was

coerced and thus involuntary. Underpinning Gowdy’s coercion argument was the reality that,

without a self-defense instruction, a not-guilty verdict was virtually impossible, explaining his

lament that he had been “put in a box.” Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated

6 that while Gowdy may have understandably been dissatisfied with his situation, such

dissatisfaction did not render the plea involuntary. Gowdy, 2025-Ohio-5575, at ¶ 41, citing

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-751 (1970). The Supreme Court reached this

conclusion because Gowdy was able to “rationally weigh” the situation, and the trial “judge’s

conduct was not so overbearing that it clouded Gowdy’s choice.” Id. at ¶ 42.

{¶ 16} The Gowdy decision concluded with the following language:

Gowdy faced a difficult decision: plead guilty to a lesser charge or go to trial

and risk receiving a potentially longer sentence. Gowdy made his choice. He

may not now assert that the trial court’s misstatements of law, which had no

effect on the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, rendered his plea unknowing and

unintelligent and that the court’s expressions of its disinclination to give a self-

defense jury instruction coerced him into pleading guilty, thereby rendering his

plea involuntary. Gowdy was free to go to trial and request the self-defense

jury instruction then, but he did not. The trial court complied with the

requirements of Crim.R. 11, and Gowdy has not shown otherwise.

Id. at ¶ 44.

{¶ 17} Turning to Cyphers’s appeal, we first note that the trial court’s expert funding

decision did exhibit a misunderstanding regarding the necessity for expert testimony to

support a battered child syndrome self-defense claim, and further, the decision articulated

premature factual conclusions regarding the viability of a self-defense claim. Thus, for

purposes of this decision, and putting aside that it is unknown whether Dr. Stinson would

have supported a self-defense claim, we assume the trial court erred when it denied the

funding motion. But, under State v. Gowdy, this error is harmless unless it rendered

7 Cyphers’s guilty plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As explained below, on

this record, we conclude that Cyphers’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

{¶ 18} A trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11 is typically sufficient to ensure that

a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Cole, 2015-Ohio-3793, at ¶ 12

(2d Dist.). The trial court’s Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Cyphers was complete, without any

misstatements of law, and without incident. Nothing occurred during the plea hearing that

indicated that Cyphers had any misapprehension about the rights—including the right to a

jury trial—being forfeited or that the plea was not voluntary.

{¶ 19} As to the knowing and intelligent prongs of the plea analysis, Cyphers attempts

to overcome the Crim.R. 11 compliance by suggesting that his age prevented a knowing

and intelligent plea. The record indicates otherwise.

{¶ 20} Dr. Daniel Hrinko conducted a forensic evaluation of Cyphers as a required

part of the juvenile bindover procedure. Dr. Hrinko opined that Cyphers was “able to

comprehend and appreciate the charges against him . . . [and that he was] able to [also]

comprehend and appreciate the consequences that may be imposed or result from the

proceedings.” After bindover to adult court and two months before Cyphers pleaded guilty,

Dr. Scott Kidd conducted a forensic evaluation to determine Cyphers’s competence to waive

Miranda rights. Dr. Kidd concluded that Cyphers was “capable of understanding and

appreciating the Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiving the rights at the time

of the [police] interrogation, and thus capable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of

his Miranda rights.”

{¶ 21} The forensic evaluations and Cyphers’s answers during the plea hearing are

at odds with any argument that, because of Cyphers’s age or otherwise, he did not knowingly

and intelligently enter the guilty plea.

8 {¶ 22} With respect to whether the plea was voluntary, Cyphers argues that the

funding decision left him without a viable defense and no real choice but to accept the plea

offer. Cyphers suggests that this circumstance rendered the plea coerced and thus

involuntary.

{¶ 23} Cyphers had a difficult choice—accept the plea offer or proceed to trial and, if

convicted (which was quite probable), appeal the trial court’s funding decision. This

“predicament” did not render the plea coerced. Gowdy, 2025-Ohio-5575, at ¶ 41. Moreover,

there is nothing to suggest that Cyphers “was unable to rationally weigh the advantages of

going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.” Id. at ¶ 42. Unlike State v. Gowdy,

the trial court did not engage in any “overbearing” conduct that would have “clouded [his]

choice.” Id. Under the totality of circumstances, Cyphers’s plea was voluntary.

{¶ 24} Cyphers’s first assignment of error is overruled because any error in the trial

court’s funding decision did not render the plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

And the second assignment of error is overruled because Cyphers, despite the funding

decision, retained the due process rights of a trial and an appeal.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective

{¶ 25} Cyphers’s third assignment of error argues that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel and that this affected the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of

the plea. We disagree.

{¶ 26} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel under the

two-part analysis found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which the Ohio

Supreme Court adopted in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). To prevail on an

ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must show that trial counsel rendered deficient

performance and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland at 687;

9 Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus. In order to demonstrate prejudice after entering a

guilty plea, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” State v. Romero,

2019-Ohio-1839, ¶ 16, quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

{¶ 27} Cyphers first argues that trial counsel’s representation was deficient because

he did not file a motion to reconsider the expert funding decision. Cyphers does not explain

what should have been included in a motion for reconsideration or how such a motion was

likely to change the trial court’s decision. There is simply no basis to conclude either that

trial counsel should have filed a motion seeking reconsideration or that the failure to do so

prejudiced Cyphers.

{¶ 28} Cyphers next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not

make an evidentiary proffer regarding the parental abuse Cyphers endured. But, contrary to

Cyphers’s suggestion, this failure did not prevent the funding issue from being raised on

appeal.

{¶ 29} Finally, Cyphers argues that counsel’s failure to timely file a notice of self-

defense constituted ineffective assistance. It is true that trial counsel did not, as required by

Crim.R. 12.2, file a notice of self-defense 30 days before the June 2, 2025 trial date.

Instead, counsel, on May 14, 2025, filed the funding motion requesting that Cyphers be

evaluated by Dr. Robert Stinson. The trial court’s decision denying the motion stated that a

“final reason” Cyphers did not have a “viable self-defense claim [was] because . . . he [had]

not filed a timely notice of self-defense . . . .” But any fair reading of the trial court’s decision

compels the conclusion that a timely self-defense notice would not have altered the trial

court’s decision. Prejudice simply cannot be demonstrated.

10 {¶ 30} Having found no ineffective assistance of counsel, Cyphers’s third assignment

of error is overruled.

{¶ 31} In the fourth assignment of error, Cyphers argues that the trial court’s errors

and trial counsel’s ineffective assistance made his plea not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary. Having already found Cyphers’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 32} All of Cyphers’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

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HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.