State v. Curtis, No. Cr97 13 40 66 (Aug 3, 1999)

1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 10641
Connecticut Superior Court·Decided August 3, 1999·No. No. CR97 13 40 66·Unpublished

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

DECISION RE: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL CT Page 10642
The court concludes that defendant Kenneth Curtis is competent to stand trial on the charge of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), which charge arises from the death of Donna Kalson on October 30, 1987. It is quite clear to this court that Kenneth Curtis has purposely exaggerated his symptoms in an effort to influence the outcome of this criminal prosecution.

I. History
The basic facts of this case and early procedural history are set forth in State v. Curtis, 22 Conn. App. 199, 476 A.2d 1299 (1990). "On October 30, 1987, the defendant allegedly shot two victims. One died later that day from a gunshot wound to the head, and the other received a nonfatal wound to the leg. Immediately after these shootings, the defendant shot himself in the head, causing extensive organic brain injury. In June, 1988, the defendant was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a (a), attempted murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-49 and 53a-54a (a), and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-59 (a)(1).

"Several competency hearings were held pursuant to General Statutes 54-56d. At the first hearing, in August, 1988, the trial court, Barnett, J., found that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. See General Statutes 54-56d (a). The court was unable, however, to make a further finding as to whether there was a substantial probability that the defendant's competency would be restored; see General Statutes 54-56d (f); and it ordered a reexamination of the defendant. Additional hearings were held on the issue of the defendant's potential for restoration.

"At [a] . . . competency hearing [held on June 5, 1989], the trial court, Damiani, J., found that the defendant was incompetent, and that there was no substantial probability that the defendant, if provided with a course of treatment, would regain competency within the eighteen month placement period. See General Statutes 54-56d (f) and (i). The court then properly determined that its actions were governed by General Statutes54-56d (m)." Id. at 201. The trial court then ordered the defendant released from custody and imposed as a condition of CT Page 10643 release a requirement that the defendant submit to an annual examination for the purpose of determining whether his competency has been regained. Upon the defendant's appeal from this ruling, the Appellate Court held that the trial court did not have the authority to require the defendant to submit to an annual examination and remanded the case with direction that an unconditional order of release be entered. The court, Ronan, J., ordered the defendant unconditionally released on June 27, 1990.

On November 4, 1997, the defendant was rearrested on a warrant charging him with the 1987 murder of Donna Kalson. On November 14, 1997, the state requested the court to order the defendant to submit to an examination pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d to determine his competency to stand trial. On February 13, 1998, the court, Ronan, J., ordered the Office of Court Evaluations to conduct a competency evaluation. The defendant appealed from this order to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on April 22, 1998. The defendant thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition on June 10, 1998.

II. Competency Standard
"The standard we use to determine whether a defendant is competent under state law to stand trial is that set forth inDusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (test for competence to stand trial is `"whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him"'). The Dusky standard has been codified at § 54-56d(a), which provides that `[a] defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while he is not competent. For the purposes of this section, a defendant is not competent if he is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense."' State v. Wolff, 237 Conn. 633, 663,678 A.2d 1369 (1996).

III. Discussion
Pursuant to the court's order, the Office of Court Evaluations examined Curtis, reviewed voluminous documents concerning his medical and educational history and interviewed persons who have treated him, taught him, and socialized with CT Page 10644 him. The evaluation team consisted of Dr. Paul Amble, Dr. Eileen McEvoy, and Dr. Guay Chatfield. Dr. Amble is a medical doctor specializing in forensic psychiatry and is presently employed as a clinical professor at Yale University in the Department of Psychiatry. Dr. McEvoy is a clinical psychologist. Dr. Chatfield is a psychiatric social worker.

In considering Curtis' competency, the evaluation team considered Curtis' ability, to assimilate information, his capacity for abstract reasoning, and his ability to communicate with others. While Curtis is slow in processing information, the team concluded that this impairment is not of an extent that would render him unable to understand the charges and proceedings or to be unable to participate in his own defense. The team found that Curtis was able to discuss his charge and the appeal process rationally with various persons, including his psychiatrists, neurologist, and a college instructor. The team concluded that there is a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Curtis is able to understand the charge against him and to participate in his defense. This conclusion is supported by credible and persuasive evidence, which is discussed in the following paragraphs.

Dr. Amble testified as to the team's findings. On January 6, 1999, the team examined Curtis for four and one-half hours. During this interview, Curtis gave slow and impoverished responses. Significantly, the nature of his responses varied depending on the topics being discussed. When Curtis discussed the charge, he responded slowly. When he discussed other issues, his responses were significantly better. After the interview, the members of the team considered whether Curtis had deliberately been slow.

Given the inconsistences of the examination, the team thought it was important to look at a variety of sources. The team spoke to Curtis' parents, a home health aide, the supervisor of the facility where he lives, professors at the colleges he attended, his neurologist, and two psychiatrists.

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State v. Curtis, No. Cr97 13 40 66 (Aug 3, 1999), 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 10641 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

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Related

Dusky v. United States
362 U.S. 402 (Supreme Court, 1960)
State v. Wolff
678 A.2d 1369 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1996)
State v. Curtis
576 A.2d 1299 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1990)