State v. Curtis

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-204
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-204

Filed 19 February 2025

Wake County, Nos. 22CR200476-910, 22CR200478-910, 22CR200480-910, 22CR000804-910

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

GRIFFIN ALEXANDER CURTIS

Appeal by defendant by writ of certiorari from judgments entered 25 August

2023 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court

of Appeals 15 January 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Christopher W. Brooks and Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.

Ellis & Winters LLP, by Kelly Margolis Dagger, Michelle A. Liguori, and Chelsea A. Pieroni, for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Defendant Griffin Alexander Curtis appeals from judgments entered upon his

guilty plea to two counts of felony death by vehicle, three counts of felony serious

injury by vehicle, and one count of driving while impaired. Defendant does not

challenge his convictions; he only challenges the trial court’s sentencing upon those

convictions. After careful review, we vacate and remand for resentencing.

I. Background STATE V. CURTIS

Opinion of the Court

This case arises from a fatal automobile collision on 9 January 2022, in which

Defendant drove his vehicle head-on into an oncoming vehicle. The collision resulted

in the deaths of two passengers in the oncoming vehicle, as well as serious injuries to

three additional passengers between both vehicles. Inside the wreckage of

Defendant’s vehicle, law enforcement officers discovered dozens of used containers of

nitrous oxide, along with hundreds of unused containers. Defendant also admitted

that he had consumed alcohol and marijuana that evening.

Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of felony death by

vehicle, and one count each of felony serious injury by vehicle, driving while impaired,

driving left of center, possession of marijuana up to one-half ounce, and driving with

an open container after consuming alcohol. On 24 January 2022, a Wake County

grand jury returned indictments formally charging Defendant with the same

offenses; three months later, the grand jury returned another indictment charging

Defendant with two additional counts of felony serious injury by vehicle.

On 25 August 2023, Defendant entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea

agreement. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of felony death by vehicle,

three counts of felony serious injury by vehicle, and one count of driving while

impaired, with the judgment to be arrested on the latter conviction. Defendant also

agreed to waive his right of appeal and stipulated to the aggravating factor for

sentencing that he “knowingly created great risk of death to more than one person by

means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more

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than one person.” In exchange, the State agreed not to seek further indictments for

second-degree murder or felony assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious

injury, and to dismiss the three remaining misdemeanor charges. The State also

stipulated to the mitigating factor for sentencing that Defendant “has accepted

responsibility for [his] criminal conduct.”

The trial court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and entered a series of

judgments upon the plea. For the two felony death by vehicle convictions, the trial

court sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range for a prior record level I offender

to consecutive terms of 80 to 108 months’ imprisonment in the custody of the North

Carolina Department of Adult Correction. For one of the felony serious injury by

vehicle convictions, the court sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range to a term

of 20 to 33 months’ imprisonment, which the court again set to run consecutively. The

court consolidated Defendant’s remaining two convictions for felony serious injury by

vehicle and sentenced Defendant to another consecutive prison term of 20 to 33

months. Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court arrested judgment on

Defendant’s conviction for driving while impaired and dismissed the remaining

misdemeanor convictions.

On 1 September 2023, Defendant timely filed notice of appeal.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction

With limited statutory exceptions, a “defendant is not entitled to appellate

review as a matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a

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criminal charge in the superior court, but he may petition the appellate division for

review by writ of certiorari.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e) (2023). Because Defendant

received sentences in the aggravated range, Defendant is entitled by statute to a

limited right of appeal:

A defendant who has . . . entered a plea of guilty . . . to a felony, is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether his or her sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing hearing only if the minimum sentence of imprisonment does not fall within the presumptive range for the defendant’s prior record or conviction level and class of offense.

Id. § 15A-1444(a1).

Additionally, this case presents the threshold issue of an appeal waiver.

Defendant filed notice of appeal from the judgments entered in this case despite his

waiver of “all right to appeal” pursuant to his plea agreement. Defendant now

contends that “this appeal waiver is unenforceable.”

We need not address that issue, however, because Defendant filed a petition

for writ of certiorari contemporaneous with his appellate brief in the event that this

Court should determine that the waiver “may be enforceable in whole or in part to

take away his right to appeal.”

“Certiorari is a discretionary writ, to be issued only for good and sufficient

cause shown.” State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 189, 111 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1959) (italics

omitted), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 917, 4 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1960). Allowing a petition for

writ of certiorari “is an extraordinary measure. Accordingly, a petitioner must satisfy

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a two-part test before we will issue the writ.” State v. Barton, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___,

905 S.E.2d 230, 234 (2024) (citation omitted). “First, a writ of certiorari should issue

only if the petitioner can show merit or that error was probably committed below.

Second, a writ of certiorari should issue only if there are extraordinary circumstances

to justify it.” Id. (cleaned up). “An extraordinary circumstance generally requires a

showing of substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial resources, or wide-

reaching issues of justice.” Id. (cleaned up).

The State concedes that error was committed below and does not oppose

Defendant’s petition. As for showing extraordinary circumstances, Defendant

observes that he “is serving four consecutive aggravated sentences that are not

supported by the evidence presented at sentencing (including a stipulated mitigating

factor).” In our discretion, we allow Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari and

proceed to the merits of his appeal.

III. Discussion

On appeal, Defendant raises a series of arguments concerning his sentencing;

however, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court failed to find the mitigating

factor to which he and the State stipulated in the plea agreement. The State concedes

that this constitutes reversible error, and we agree. Therefore, we vacate and remand

for resentencing.

A. Standard of Review

“This Court reviews alleged sentencing errors for whether the sentence is

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supported by evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing hearing.” State v. Bacon,

228 N.C. App. 432, 434, 745 S.E.2d 905, 907 (2013) (cleaned up). “A trial court’s

weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed on appeal absent

a showing that there was an abuse of discretion.” State v. Morston, 221 N.C. App. 464,

473, 728 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2012) (citation omitted). “The balance struck by the

sentencing judge in weighing the aggravating against the mitigating factors, being a

matter within his discretion, will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unsupported

by reason, or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned

decision.” Id. at 473–74, 728 S.E.2d at 408 (citation omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendant argues that “[t]he trial court’s failure to find mitigating factor 15 in

the face of the parties’ stipulation and supporting evidence was reversible error.” The

State concedes error, and we agree.

Under the Structured Sentencing Act, the trial “court shall consider evidence

of aggravating or mitigating factors present in the offense that make an aggravated

or mitigated sentence appropriate, but the decision to depart from the presumptive

range is in the discretion of the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(a). “The State

bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor

exists, and the offender bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that a mitigating factor exists.” Id. Additionally, it is “clearly established

that the sentencing judge has a duty to find a statutory mitigating factor when the

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evidence in support of a factor is uncontradicted, substantial and manifestly

credible.” State v. Spears, 314 N.C. 319, 321, 333 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1985) (original

emphasis omitted).1

“[E]vidence is credible as a matter of law when the non-movant establishes

[the] proponent’s case by admitting the truth of the basic facts upon which the claim

of the proponent rests.” State v. Albert, 312 N.C. 567, 579, 324 S.E.2d 233, 241 (1985)

(cleaned up). Thus, when the State stipulates to the facts supporting the finding of a

mitigating factor, “the trial court err[s] in failing to find this fact in mitigation.” Id.

at 580, 324 S.E.2d at 241.

In the present case, it is undisputed that Albert is the controlling precedent.

As part of the plea agreement, the State stipulated to the statutory mitigating factor

that Defendant “has accepted responsibility for [his] criminal conduct.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 15A-1340.16(e)(15). By stipulating to this mitigating factor, the State

“admitt[ed] the truth of the basic facts upon which the [factor] rest[ed].” Albert, 312

N.C. at 579, 324 S.E.2d at 241. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to fail to

find this mitigating factor. See id. at 580, 324 S.E.2d at 241; see also Spears, 314 N.C.

at 321, 333 S.E.2d at 244.

“[W]henever there is error in a sentencing judge’s failure to find a statutory

1 Although Spears and other cases cited in this opinion were decided prior to the enactment of

the Structured Sentencing Act, “this Court has repeatedly applied the logic of cases decided under the Fair Sentencing Act to cases arising under the Structured Sentencing Act.” State v. Vaughters, 219 N.C. App. 356, 360, 725 S.E.2d 17, 21, cert. denied, 366 N.C. 402, 735 S.E.2d 321 (2012).

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mitigating circumstance and a sentence in excess of the presumptive term is imposed,

the matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.” State v. Daniel, 319

N.C. 308, 315, 354 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1987). This principle holds “true in proceedings

involving guilty pleas and plea agreements.” State v. Braswell, 269 N.C. App. 309,

317, 837 S.E.2d 580, 586 (2020). Consequently, we must remand for a resentencing

hearing.

Although the parties agree that this matter must be remanded for

resentencing, they disagree regarding one aspect of the disposition: whether

Defendant is entitled to a resentencing hearing before a different trial judge.

Defendant principally relies upon State v. Rodriguez, in which this Court

remanded for resentencing because the State “breached the provision of the plea

agreement promising that the prosecution would ‘take no position on sentencing on

the assault charge.’ ” 111 N.C. App. 141, 143–44, 431 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1993). The

State’s breach of the plea agreement resulted in the trial court receiving information

about several nonstatutory aggravating factors regarding one of the offenses to which

the defendant pleaded guilty. Id. at 143, 431 S.E.2d at 789. The court then referenced

one of these nonstatutory aggravating factors when entering the statutory maximum

sentence for the affected conviction. Id. We remanded for resentencing due to this

error, and instructed that a different judge was to conduct the hearing upon remand.

Id. at 148, 431 S.E.2d at 792 (“While we have every confidence in the distinguished

trial judge’s ability to afford [the] defendant a fair and impartial hearing on remand,

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. . . we also direct that [the] defendant’s new sentencing hearing be conducted before

a different trial judge.” (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427

(1971))).

In the instant case, Defendant asserts that, pursuant to Rodriguez, we must

also direct that a different trial judge conduct his resentencing hearing on remand.

We disagree.

Defendant’s reliance on Rodriguez is misplaced. The trial court in Rodriguez

improperly received information regarding nonstatutory aggravating factors that it

otherwise would not have received pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement

between the defendant and the State. Id. at 143, 431 S.E.2d at 789. That bell could

not be unrung. Moreover, due to the egregious nature of the State’s breach of the

agreement, the Rodriguez Court determined that it was immaterial whether the

defendant’s sentence was impacted to his detriment. Id. at 147, 431 S.E.2d at 791. As

this Court emphasized, the defendant could not be guaranteed the opportunity to

receive the benefit of his plea agreement unless a different trial judge—one

unaffected by the State’s breach—conducted the resentencing hearing on remand. Id.

at 148, 431 S.E.2d at 792.

Unlike Rodriguez, no additional prejudicial information—beyond that already

provided in the plea agreement—was disclosed to the trial court here. Accordingly,

Defendant is unable to demonstrate any similar risk to his opportunity to receive the

benefit of his bargained-for plea agreement on remand. Rodriguez is thus

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inapplicable, and Defendant’s request for a different trial judge on remand is denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate and remand to the trial court for

resentencing pursuant to the plea agreement. In light of our disposition, we need not

address Defendant’s remaining arguments.

VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

Judges TYSON and FLOOD concur.

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