State v. Crowley

2025 Ohio 3002

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-66 & 2024-CA-76
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Crowley, 2025-Ohio-3002.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. Nos. 2024-CA-66; 2024-CA-76 Appellee : : Trial Court Case Nos. 24-CR-434; 24- v. : CR-107 : DOUGLAS L. CROWLEY : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION ...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 22, 2025, the judgments of

the trial court are affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, PRESIDING JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and LEWIS, J., concur. -2- OPINION CLARK C.A. Nos. 2024-CA-66; 2024-CA-76

CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant CHRISTOPHER P. LANESE, Attorney for Appellee

EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, Douglas L. Crowley appeals from his convictions

on numerous charges stemming from the shooting death of Richard Howard II on February

5, 2024, and the drugs that were found when Crowley was apprehended the following day.

Crowley’s arguments are limited to two issues. He challenges his conviction for tampering

with evidence in Clark C.P. No. 24 CR 107 (the murder case) and the imposition of the

mandatory fine in Clark C.P. No. 24 CR 434 (the drug case). For the following reasons, the

trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Crowley and Howard were acquaintances, and Howard, a cocaine addict, had

purchased crack cocaine from Crowley. In early January 2022, Crowley brought his white

Chevy Tahoe to Howard so Howard could perform some repairs on it, and by early February

2022, Crowley was eager for its return. When Howard failed to return the vehicle to him,

Crowley repeatedly attempted to contact Howard without success. Ultimately, around 9:30

p.m. on February 5, 2022, Crowley texted Howard a series of messages starting with “Since

you want to ride around in my truck, the police is looking for you. And my family is also.”

This was followed by “I told my cousin if they see you shoot to kill.” Crowley next wrote,

“Dude what’s wrong with you. I told not to f*ck me over. And straight did. Lied to me.

You really don’t care about your life anymore.” Minutes later, he wrote, “I’m ready to go to

prison on you. On everything.” At 11:13 p.m., Crowley received a text from someone -3- showing the Tahoe parked behind an address on Stanton Avenue, where Howard was living.

{¶ 3} At 11:21 p.m. that night, Howard was parked in the Tahoe along Mason Street

beside the Littleton & Rue Funeral Home parking lot, speaking with his long-time girlfriend

using the Messenger app on his phone. Crowley, driving a white Chrysler 200, found him

there, approximately two blocks from the Stanton address. Crowley stopped his car,

approached the driver’s side window of the Tahoe, and raised a gun toward Howard.

Crowley and Howard had a brief altercation during which Howard was shot and sustained a

wound to the head. The entire encounter lasted approximately one minute.

{¶ 4} Howard’s girlfriend heard the shooting. She testified that she heard Crowley

tell Howard to get off the phone and Howard respond that he was on the phone with his

girlfriend and to give him a minute. She then heard Howard “crying and screaming” and tell

Crowley, “Put the gun away; here’s your truck.” After she heard a gunshot and then nothing

further from Howard, her nephew called 911 and reported the shooting. He relayed that his

aunt had been on a video-call with Howard (although Howard’s camera was off) and believed

Howard had been shot by Crowley. He told the dispatcher the address on Stanton Avenue

at which Howard was staying and that Howard had Crowley’s Chevy Tahoe. Officers were

dispatched to that address, but they did not find him. A resident there texted Crowley about

the police investigation.

{¶ 5} At approximately 1:30 p.m. the following day, an employee of Littleton & Rue

Funeral Home walked past the white Chevy Tahoe and noticed Howard slumped over the

console. She called 911 and reported that the occupant had been shot in the head, which

she assumed due to the blood on the top of Howard’s head. An autopsy later revealed that

Howard had been shot in the back of his left shoulder; the bullet was recovered from his

right chest area. Springfield police officers recovered a spent cartridge casing from inside -4- the Tahoe. Crowley’s Ohio identification card and Social Security card were also located

within the vehicle.

{¶ 6} Crowley and the Chrysler 200 sedan were found at the Fairfax Inn, and he was

arrested as he entered the vehicle in the parking lot. Upon searching his room, Springfield

police officers discovered a digital scale and suspected powdered drugs, as well as medical

paperwork with Crowley’s name. The Chrysler 200 was towed to a secured facility.

Officers later removed a Sentry safe from the vehicle’s trunk; the safe contained a Champion

bag with several baggies of suspected narcotics. A loaded Taurus G3 9mm Luger

semiautomatic pistol with an extended magazine was found in the trunk behind the safe. A

box of sandwich baggies and a digital scale with white powder residue were also found

inside the vehicle. In an interview with a detective that night (February 6), Crowley

confessed to the shooting, stating that he thought he had shot Howard in the shoulder. He

expressed that he never meant to shoot Howard; he only wanted the keys to his truck.

{¶ 7} Multiple items were sent to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) for

testing. Crowley’s DNA was located on the Taurus 9mm firearm found in the Chrysler 200,

and the spent cartridge casing from the Tahoe was matched to that weapon. Additionally,

two latent fingerprints lifted from the window of the Tahoe’s driver’s door were identified as

Crowley’s fingerprints. Tests on the baggies of suspected narcotics revealed 52 grams (+/-

0.05 grams) of methamphetamine, 10.18 grams of a mixture of cocaine and

methamphetamine, and 6.16. grams (+/- 0.05 grams) of a mixture of cocaine, heroin,

methamphetamine, fentanyl, tramadol, and xylazine.

{¶ 8} A search of Crowley’s phone revealed several text messages from the fall of

2023 related to his trafficking of narcotics, including crack cocaine, fentanyl,

methamphetamine, marijuana, and prescription drugs. Crowley had prior felony -5- convictions for offenses of violence that precluded him from lawfully carrying a firearm.

{¶ 9} On February 13, 2024, Crowley was indicted on eight counts related to the

shooting death of Howard: (1) purposeful murder, (2) felonious assault, (3) felony murder,

(4) improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle, (5) discharge of a firearm on or near

prohibited premises, (6) tampering with evidence, and (7) two counts of having weapons

while under disability. Several counts included firearm specifications, and the murder and

felonious assault counts included specifications that the offenses occurred in a school safety

zone. Case No. 24 CR 107.

{¶ 10} On June 4, 2024, the State charged Crowley in a separate case with eight

offenses related to the drugs located on February 6, 2024: (1) aggravated trafficking in

drugs, (2) aggravated possession of drugs, (3) trafficking in cocaine, (4) possession of

cocaine, (5) trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, (6) possession of a fentanyl-related

compound, (7) trafficking in heroin, and (8) possession of heroin. Each charge included a

firearm specification, and each of the trafficking charges included an additional specification

that it occurred within the vicinity of a school. Case No. 24 CR 434.

{¶ 11} The cases were consolidated for trial, which was held in October 2024.

Before opening statements, the State dismissed the school-related specifications. After

deliberating, the jury could not reach a verdict on purposeful murder, and the State later

dismissed that charge. The jury found Crowley guilty of the remaining charges and

specifications. Except for the two fentanyl-related charges, the jury found Crowley guilty of

a lower quantity of drugs than alleged in the indictment.

{¶ 12} After merging several counts and specifications in each case, the trial court

imposed an aggregate term of 24 years to life in prison in Case No. 24 CR 107 and an

aggregate term of 5½ years in prison plus a mandatory fine of $5,000 for trafficking in a -6- fentanyl-related compound (Count Five) in Case No. 24 CR 434. The court ordered the

sentence in Case No. 24 CR 434 to run consecutively to the sentence in Case No. 24 CR

107.

{¶ 13} Crowley appeals from the trial court’s judgments, raising two assignments of

error.

II. Tampering with Evidence

{¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Crowley claims that his conviction for tampering

with evidence was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

{¶ 15} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has

presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the

jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether any

rational finder of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could have

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.

Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997). A guilty verdict will not be disturbed on appeal

unless “reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” Id.

{¶ 16} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability

of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is

more believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 12; see Eastley v. Volkman,

2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. When reviewing an argument challenging the weight of the

evidence, an appellate court may not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact. Rather,

we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the

credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the -7- finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins at 387, quoting State v.

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A judgment of conviction should be

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional

circumstances. Martin at 175.

{¶ 17} Crowley was convicted of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C.

2921.12(A)(1), based on his hiding the murder weapon in the trunk of his car. “[A]

conviction for tampering with evidence pursuant to R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) requires proof that

the defendant intended to impair the value or availability of evidence that related to an

existing or likely official investigation or proceeding. Likelihood is measured at the time of

the act of alleged tampering.” State v. Straley, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 19; State v. Revere,

2022-Ohio-551, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 18} Crowley acknowledges that he could reasonably have expected that an

investigation would ensue after the murder. However, he asserts that the State failed to

present evidence that he concealed the gun with the purpose of impairing its value or

availability as evidence. He analogizes his case to State v. Like, 2008-Ohio-1873 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 19} In Like, the victim had been shot three times in a vacant apartment. Three

empty cartridges were found at the scene, but the murder weapon was never recovered.

During an interview with the police, Like told a detective that he had shot the victim after the

victim had attacked him and that he had disposed of the gun in a dumpster. At trial, an

acquaintance of Like testified that he heard Like say that he had gotten rid of the gun that

was used to shoot the victim. At trial, Like denied any involvement in the shooting. Like

ultimately was convicted of numerous offenses, including tampering with evidence based on

the disposal of the gun. -8- {¶ 20} On appeal, Like challenged the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on that

tampering with evidence offense. He argued that the State had failed to prove the corpus

delicti of the crime as there was no evidence, beyond his statements, that he had tampered

with the gun. The State responded that the discovery of a dead body with bullet wounds at

the apartment and the absence of the gun that inflicted those wounds were sufficient

evidence of tampering with evidence to permit the use of Like’s statements about the gun’s

disposal. We disagreed, stating, “Although it is beyond dispute that the gun was removed

from the scene of the crime, no evidence was presented to support an inference that the

gun was taken to impair its value or availability as evidence. Thus, the state failed to offer

evidence, other than Like's own statement about throwing the gun into a dumpster, tending

to prove the fact that the crime of tampering with evidence (the gun) was committed.” Id.

at ¶ 24.

{¶ 21} We have repeatedly cited Like for the proposition that a gun’s absence from

the crime scene where it was used does not, without more, support the conclusion that the

defendant removed the gun to impair its availability as evidence. E.g., State v. Smith, 2025-

Ohio-679, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.); State v. Mabra, 2015-Ohio-5493, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.); State v. Sims,

2009-Ohio- 5875, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.). A significant fact in Like was that law enforcement officers

never found the gun used in the murder.

{¶ 22} We distinguished Like in State v. Bonaparte, 2019-Ohio-2030, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.),

in which witnesses saw the defendant return to retrieve the gun he dropped while running

away following a shooting. We held that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the

shooter retrieved the gun to prevent it from being found and used as evidence against him.

{¶ 23} In this case, Crowley drove away from Mason Street with the murder weapon.

The Springfield police located the gun in the trunk of Crowley’s sedan, where he must have -9- placed it later, and it was not discovered until after officers removed the Sentry safe, which

was blocking any view of it. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded

that Crowley did not simply leave with the gun but, rather, hid the gun behind the safe in the

trunk to prevent its availability as evidence. Crowley’s conviction for tampering with

evidence was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

{¶ 24} Crowley’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Mandatory Fine

{¶ 25} In his second assignment of error, Crowley claims that the trial court abused

its discretion when it imposed a mandatory $5,000 fine for trafficking in a fentanyl.

{¶ 26} Crowley was found guilty of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in an

amount equal to or more than five grams but less than ten grams, in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(9)(d), a felony of the third degree (Count Five). When a defendant

is found guilty of a third-degree felony violation of R.C. Chapter 2925, the sentencing court

is required to impose “a mandatory fine of at least one-half, but not more than, the maximum

statutory fine amount authorized for the level of the offense.” R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). Crowley

was thus subject to a mandatory fine between $5,000 (the mandatory minimum) and

$10,000 (the statutory maximum for a third-degree felony). R.C. 2929.18(B)(1); R.C.

2929.18(A)(3)(c).

{¶ 27} Before imposing a mandatory fine, the trial court must consider the offender’s

present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction. R.C. 2929.19(C)(5). The

court is not required to hold a hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay, nor is it required to

make findings or to expressly state that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay. E,g.,

State v. Brammer, 2018-Ohio-3067, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.); State v. Lewis, 2012-Ohio-4858 (2d -10- Dist.). “A trial court need only consider the issue, which it frequently can do by reviewing a

pre-sentence investigation report that contains enough pertinent information.” Brammer at

¶ 26, citing State v. Barker, 2014-Ohio-3946, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 28} For purposes of imposing a mandatory fine, being “indigent” and being “unable

to pay” are not the same. Id. at ¶ 25, citing State v. Gipson, 80 Ohio St.3d 626, 636 (1998).

We have explained that “[i]ndigency concerns a defendant’s current financial situation,

whereas an inability to pay encompasses his future financial situation as well.” Id. “[T]he

payment of a mandatory fine over a period of time is not equivalent to the immediate need

for legal representation at the initiation of criminal proceedings.” State v. Stevens, 2023-

Ohio-3510, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Powell, 78 Ohio App.3d 784, 790 (3d Dist. 1992).

{¶ 29} No mandatory fine may be imposed if, prior to sentencing, the offender files an

affidavit with the court stating that the offender is indigent and is unable to pay the mandatory

fine and the court makes those determinations. R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). The phrase “prior to

sentencing” has been interpreted “to mean that the affidavit must be formally filed with the

court prior to the filing of a journal entry reflecting the trial court’s sentencing decision.”

Gipson at 632; State v. Prichard, 2023-Ohio-160, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). “[T]he burden is upon the

offender to affirmatively demonstrate that he or she is indigent and is unable to pay the

mandatory fine.” (Emphasis in original.) Gipson at 635.

{¶ 30} We review a trial court’s determination regarding an offender’s ability to pay a

mandatory fine for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ojezua, 2020-Ohio-303, ¶ 55 (2d Dist.).

“A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable,

unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34.

{¶ 31} In this case, the trial court did not order a presentence investigation following

the pronouncement of the jury’s verdicts (it ordered criminal records check only), and neither -11- party objected. No sentencing memoranda were filed.

{¶ 32} At sentencing, both the prosecutor and defense counsel made statements

related to the length of Crowley’s prison sentence. The prosecutor argued that the drug

charges should run consecutively to the murder and tampering with evidence sentences,

whereas defense counsel sought concurrent sentences. Defense counsel reminded the

trial court that Crowley, who was 46 years old, had Stage 4 renal failure and required dialysis

multiples times per week. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel addressed the

mandatory fine for trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound. Defense counsel did not

inform the trial court that Crowley had filed, intended to file, or would be filing an affidavit

related to his inability to pay the mandatory fine. The court indicated that it had considered

Crowley’s present and future ability to pay before imposing a mandatory fine of $5,000.

{¶ 33} On appeal, Crowley states that he filed a motion to waive the mandatory fine

with the appropriate affidavit just before sentencing on October 18, 2024. The record

contains a motion “to suspend mandatory fine due to indigency,” filed on October 18, 2024.

Crowley attached a financial disclosure form, which indicated that he lacked any assets or

income. Although filed on the same date, the motion appears in the record after the trial

court’s judgment of conviction. Accordingly, it is not apparent that the motion was timely

filed, and its request to “suspend” the mandatory fine further suggests that it was not.

{¶ 34} On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

Crowley had the ability to pay the mandatory fine and imposing it. The record suggests that

Crowley failed to timely move for waiver of the mandatory fine. Even assuming, for the

sake of argument, that Crowley’s motion were timely, the filing of the financial disclosure

form was not the equivalent of filing of affidavit of indigency, which avers an inability to pay

the mandatory fine. E.g., Ojezua, 2020-Ohio-303, at ¶ 61 (2d Dist.); State v. Plemons, -12- 2015-Ohio-2879, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). Crowley did not, in fact, file an affidavit indicating that he

was indigent and was unable to pay the mandatory fine. The failure to file a timely affidavit

alleging that the defendant is indigent and unable to pay the mandatory fine is, alone, a

sufficient reason to affirm the trial court’s decision. State v. Davenport, 2017-Ohio-688,

¶ 35; Plemons at ¶ 9.

{¶ 35} Crowley’s second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 36} The trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

.............

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.