[Cite as State v. Crowder, 2026-Ohio-1474.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30560 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 03407/2 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas ROBERT CROWDER JR. : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 24, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE
TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30560
CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee
LEWIS, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Robert Crowder, Jr., appeals from his convictions following
a jury trial in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. For the following reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} This appeal involves Crowder’s conviction for trespassing in a habitation owned
by J.C. on Indianola Avenue in Dayton, Ohio (“the Indianola Property”). On January 31,
2024, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Crowder on one count of trespass in a
habitation, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B); one count of breaking and
entering, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A); and one count of forgery
(elderly person), a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(2). The indictment
stated that the trespass in a habitation and breaking and entering counts involved Crowder’s
actions on or about July 8, 2022. Crowder pleaded not guilty to all counts. 1
{¶ 3} On April 2, 2025, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Crowder on one
count of tampering with records, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2913.42(A)(1); one
count of false representation as an attorney, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of
R.C. 4705.07(A)(1); and one count of false representation as an attorney/unauthorized
practice of law, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4705.07(A)(2).
1. The January 31, 2024 indictment also included charges against Dorrick Conner and The Village DBA Irrevocable Trust, but those charges are not at issue in this appeal and are not further discussed in this opinion.
2 {¶ 4} On July 6, 2025, the State filed its bill of particulars. Among other things, the
bill of particulars provided that (1) from June 15, 2022, to June 17, 2022, Crowder forged a
warranty deed relating to property owned by J.C.; (2) on or about June 17, 2022, Crowder
submitted a forged warranty deed for recording; and (3) on or about June 17, 2022, Crowder
submitted a real property conveyance form listing J.C. as a grantor.
{¶ 5} A jury trial on the six counts in the two indictments was held in July 2025.
Dorrick Conner testified first for the State. Conner was a self-employed auto mechanic who
had known Crowder since they were children. Crowder told Conner that he was an attorney
and that they could acquire abandoned houses in Dayton through adverse possession.
Crowder explained to Conner that they did not need to acquire the properties through a
foreclosure proceeding because “we’re neighbors of the city.” Tr. 215-216.
{¶ 6} As part of their plan to acquire abandoned houses, Conner paid the delinquent
property taxes owed on the Indianola Property. Conner and Crowder moved into the
Indianola Property and began making repairs to the house. Conner testified that J.C. came
to the Indianola Property while Conner and Crowder were living there. J.C. called the
police, but the police asked J.C. to leave. Conner and Crowder subsequently were evicted
from the Indianola Property. Crowder told Conner that the eviction was illegal and they
were being “human trafficked.” Tr. 226.
{¶ 7} Conner spent about $45,000 on back taxes and $6,000 on utilities for properties
that Crowder told them they could acquire through adverse possession. Conner
considered Crowder his legal advisor throughout the process. Crowder prepared all the
paperwork and Conner signed it. Relating to the paperwork for the Indianola Property,
Crowder listed himself as the trustee of J.C., which was based on J.C.’s “implied consent.”
Tr. 214.
3 {¶ 8} Kimberly DeLong also testified for the State. She was a Detective Sergeant
with the Trotwood Police Department. DeLong interviewed Crowder and Conner on
July 14, 2022, and a video recording of the interview was played for the jury. She did not
believe Crowder was an attorney, and once it was determined that Crowder was not the
owner of the Indianola Property, she referred the case to the county to consider bringing
criminal charges against him.
{¶ 9} Jennifer Connelly, the supervisor of tax delinquency at the Montgomery County
Treasurer’s Office, testified that anyone can make a real estate property tax payment on the
County Treasurer’s website. However, she explained that the payment of property taxes
by someone who does not own a property does not change ownership of the property.
While an owner of a property makes payments toward a delinquent balance under a
payment plan, the owner is protected against a tax foreclosure proceeding or the sale of a
tax lien. On June 15, 2022, Conner paid off the remaining $7,113.91 that was owed in
delinquent property taxes on the Indianola Property. At the time Conner paid the taxes, the
owner of the Indianola Property (J.C.) was current on a payment plan that had started in
March 2020.
{¶ 10} J.C. testified that he was 74 years old at the time of the hearing and was a
retired real estate appraiser who currently owned and maintained 27 rental properties. He
had owned the Indianola Property since 2010, when he bought it for approximately $18,000.
He had previously rented out the house on the Indianola Property, but it had been vacant
since his last tenants moved out sometime in 2020. Once his last tenants moved out, J.C.
could not afford the necessary repairs on the property, and he fell behind in paying his
property taxes. He set up a payment plan to make payments toward the outstanding
property taxes.
4 {¶ 11} In 2022, J.C. planned to make repairs on the Indianola Property and sent an
electrician to the property to verify that the electricity was in working condition. J.C. needed
to do this as the first step toward applying for the necessary permits to make repairs on the
house. The electrician went to the Indianola Property on July 8, 2022, and discovered that
somebody was living there. When asked whether he went to the Indianola Property on
July 8 after receiving the call from his electrician, J.C. testified, “If not that day, in the next
couple days.” Tr. 317.
{¶ 12} When J.C. arrived at the property, he found Crowder and Conner living there,
and they told him that it was their house. J.C. testified that he never gave Crowder
permission to enter the Indianola Property or to act as his trustee, and he never gave
Crowder a power of attorney. While speaking with Crowder at the house, J.C. offered to
sell the house to Crowder. J.C. then called the police but was told that it was a civil matter.
J.C. subsequently regained possession of the Indianola Property through the civil eviction
process. Crowder sued J.C. to recover money for repairs that had been done to the
property, but the court awarded J.C. $35,000, which Crowder had not paid.
{¶ 13} Tyson Dillon, a criminal investigator for the Montgomery County Prosecutor’s
Office, testified for the State as well. Part of his job duties included investigating financial
crimes and fraud. He began his investigation into the Indianola Property when Connelly
notified him in 2022 of some unusual payments on delinquent taxes received by the
Montgomery County Treasurer. Dillon discovered that Conner had paid off back taxes on
three properties. Dillon researched the Indianola Property and located a deed transferring
the Indianola Property from J.C. to Crowder. Dillon met with Conner in December 2024, at
which time Conner provided Dillon with some documents, including a power of attorney and
5 a declaration of tax representative. As part of his investigation, Dillon also searched for any
record of Crowder being a licensed attorney but was unable to find any such record.
{¶ 14} Crowder waived his right against self-incrimination and testified at his trial.
He stated that he was a “federal attorney” and had successfully represented many
individuals at the Noble Correctional Institution. Crowder testified that he had attorney bar
numbers in Florida, Washington, and West Virginia. He stated that he did not have to go
to law school to become an attorney. Crowder represented that he had made over three
million dollars in North Carolina and Florida using the nuisance abatement process and was
not a con man.
{¶ 15} Crowder explained what he fixed at the Indianola Property and why it was
obvious that the property was not occupied when he moved in:
We noticed a property had -- it was a good prospect. It was a lot of code
violations. It was a hole in the roof. The doors were -- and windows were
either broken out or not secured. There were dead animals throughout inside
and outside the property. Trash. Black mold from the basement almost all
the way to the third floor. We had to completely renovate and -- and take out
all of that just to make it habitable. There was no way possible anyone could
have occupied that structure before we got there. The black mold would have
killed them. That alone. So for anyone to lead you to believe that we thought
we were taking someone else’s property, that’s not true. We knew it was
previously owned by someone, but it was in a abandoned state in accordance
with 2308.02 of the Ohio Revised Code.
...
6 There’s no possible way I could have been sitting there foreseeing that
someone would interfere in a lawful abatement of a nuisance in the
neighborhood. It was obvious that these properties were not occupied.
Obvious. And at the time that we received notice that anybody had a interest
that they were trying to protect, before we got into the property, we backed off.
No one let us know anything until after. When Tyson Dillon contacted me, we
had already got rid of all of the mold. We had already fixed the roof. We had
already fixed all the windows and doors. We had already secured our
investment.
Tr. 389-390.
{¶ 16} Crowder conceded that he had never received explicit consent from J.C. to
sign anything on his behalf, but Crowder believed that he had implied consent to do so.
Crowder did not pay J.C. any money after Crowder lost his civil suit against J.C.
{¶ 17} The jury found Crowder guilty as charged on all six counts contained in the
two indictments. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged for purposes of
sentencing the trespass in a habitation and the breaking and entering convictions, and the
State elected sentencing on the trespass in a habitation conviction. The trial court did not
merge any other convictions. Crowder neither asked that any other convictions be merged
nor objected to the trial court’s decision to not merge any other convictions.
{¶ 18} The trial court sentenced Crowder to 18 months in prison for trespass in a
habitation, 12 months in prison for forgery (elderly/disabled), 36 months in prison for
tampering with records (government), 180 days in jail for false representation as an attorney,
and 180 days in jail for false representation as an attorney/unauthorized practice of law.
The court ordered the prison sentences to be served consecutively to each other and the
7 jail sentences to be served concurrent with both each other and the felony sentences.
Crowder’s total prison sentence was 66 months. Crowder filed a timely notice of appeal
from the trial court’s judgment.
II. Crowder’s Trespass in a Habitation Conviction Is Supported by Sufficient
Evidence and Is Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 19} Crowder’s first assignment of error states:
CROWDER’S CONVICTION FOR TRESPASS IN A HABITATION IS
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND BASED UPON LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
{¶ 20} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a
conviction is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Groce,
2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7, citing In re J.V., 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 3. “To resolve a sufficiency
challenge, we must determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 325,
quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. An
appellate court does not engage in a determination of witnesses’ credibility when reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 139 (1998), citing State
v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Nor does an appellate
court assess whether the evidence admitted at trial should be believed but, rather, if
believed, whether the evidence “would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. “We will not disturb
the verdict unless we find that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by
the trier of fact.” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484 (2001), citing Jenks at 273.
8 {¶ 21} Crowder was convicted of trespass in a habitation in violation of
R.C. 2911.12(B), which provides, “No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass
in a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person other than an
accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present.” Criminal trespass is defined
in R.C. 2911.21(A)(1) as to “[k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another”
without privilege to do so. On appeal, Crowder challenges only whether the State proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that any person was present or likely to be present at the
Indianola Property when he trespassed there. Crowder argues that “[t]he evidence was
overwhelming that the Indianola property was abandoned and that there was no objective
reason to believe anyone was likely to be present.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 4. Crowder further
argues that the property was unoccupied when Crowder and Conner found it and that the
State failed to prove that anyone was present at the time Crowder and Conner moved into
the property.
{¶ 22} The State responds that it does not matter whether anyone was present when
Crowder first began living at the Indianola Property because the trespass in a habitation
charge was not based on his initial trespass. “The likely to be present element was not the
theory under which Crowder was convicted, it was the present element.” Appellee’s Brief,
p. 11. According to the State, “Crowder was trespassing in this habitation while people
were present. On or about July 8, 2022, an electrician sent by J.C. was present at the
property while Crowder was trespassing and a few days later Crowder was still trespassing
while J.C. was present.” Id. at 12.
{¶ 23} Several appellate districts have considered and rejected Crowder’s argument
that a defendant can only be convicted under the burglary statute if a person was present or
likely to be present when the defendant first entered the property of another. As the Eighth
9 District has held, “the ‘trespass’ element of burglary can constitute more than the initial entry
and the trespass continues throughout the duration of the offense.” State v. Davis, 2004-
Ohio-1908, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Fontes, 87 Ohio St.3d 527, 530 (2000), and State
v. Powell, 59 Ohio St.3d 62, 63 (1991). Therefore, when a person arrives at a property
while a defendant is trespassing there, the trespassing offense may be converted into a
burglary offense. State v. Scurry, 2011-Ohio-2243, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.); State v. Fairrow, 2004-
Ohio-3145, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.) (“[A] burglary conviction may stand if, during anytime that the
defendant is trespassing, a person enters the premises.”); State v. Rosas, 2024-Ohio-2522,
¶ 27-28 (3d Dist.); Davis at ¶ 16.
{¶ 24} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the State provided
sufficient evidence to prove that a person other than Crowder and Conner was present at
the Indianola Property on or about July 8, 2022, while Crowder was trespassing. J.C.
testified that he planned to make repairs on the house at the Indianola Property and sent an
electrician there to verify that the electricity was in working condition. J.C. needed to do
this as the first step toward applying for the necessary permit to make repairs on the house.
The electrician went to the Indianola Property on July 8, 2022, and discovered that Crowder
was living there. When asked whether he went to the Indianola Property on July 8 after
receiving the call from his electrician, J.C. testified, “If not that day, in the next couple days.”
Tr. 317. Conner confirmed that J.C. came to the Indianola Property while Crowder was
living there. Based on the testimony of Conner and J.C., any rational trier of fact could have
found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a person other than
Crowder and Conner was present at the Indianola Property on or about July 8, 2022, when
Crowder was trespassing. While no person other than Crowder and his accomplice were
present when Crowder first entered the Indianola Property, Crowder remained on the
10 Indianola Property after the electrician and J.C. arrived at the property. The evidence was
sufficient to support the conviction of trespass in a habitation in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B).
{¶ 25} We also conclude that Crowder’s conviction for trespass in a habitation is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, the
weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence
offered to support one side of the issue rather than the other. State v. Thompkins, 1997-
Ohio-52, ¶ 24, citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “A reviewing court considering
a manifest-weight claim ‘review[s] the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, [and] considers the credibility of witnesses.’” State v. Group, 2002-Ohio-7247,
¶ 77, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A case should be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “‘only in the exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting
Martin at 175.
{¶ 26} The jury heard testimony relating to Crowder’s scheme to obtain ownership of
properties in Dayton by first having Conner pay delinquent taxes owed on the properties.
Crowder then recorded deeds with the Montgomery County Recorder’s Office that purported
to show a transfer of those properties from the owners to Crowder. As part of the scheme,
Crowder and Conner moved into the Indianola Property. Neither of them had received
permission from J.C. to move into his property or to transfer the property to them. J.C.
testified that he had rented the Indianola Property to tenants as recently as 2020 and
planned to do it again in 2022 after he made the required repairs to the property. On July 8,
2022, as part of his plan to rent the property again, J.C. sent an electrician to the Indianola
Property. When the electrician arrived at the property, he discovered that Crowder was
trespassing. Despite the presence of the electrician, Crowder remained at the property.
11 After speaking with the electrician, J.C. went to the Indianola Property on either July 8 or a
couple of days later. Once again, after J.C. arrived at the Indianola Property, Crowder
remained there. This evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Crowder
criminally trespassed in the Indianola Property when someone other than Crowder and his
accomplice were present at the property. We cannot conclude that this is the exceptional
case where the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction.
{¶ 27} The first assignment of error is overruled.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error by Failing to Merge the Forgery
and Tampering with Records Convictions at Sentencing
{¶ 28} Crowder’s second assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MERGE CROWDER’S
CONVICTIONS FOR FORGERY AND TAMPERING WITH RECORDS.
{¶ 29} Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits multiple punishments for
the same offense. This prohibition is codified at R.C. 2941.25, which states:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may
be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the
same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to
each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses,
and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
12 {¶ 30} “‘[W]hen determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three questions when defendant’s
conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or
significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with
separate animus or motivation?’” State v. Earley, 2015-Ohio-4615, ¶ 12, quoting State v.
Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 31. “‘An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate
convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.’” Id., quoting
Ruff at ¶ 31. As to the question of import and significance, “two or more offenses of
dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct
constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense
is separate and identifiable.” Ruff at ¶ 23.
{¶ 31} Crowder contends that the merger issue raised in this assignment of error was
preserved when the trial court sua sponte merged Crowder’s convictions for breaking and
entering and trespass in a habitation but failed to consider merging any of the other counts.
As the State points out, however, “there is nothing in the record showing that Crowder
objected to the trial court’s pronouncement that it was only going to merge his convictions
for breaking and entering and trespass in a habitation.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 12, citing
Tr. 511-519.
{¶ 32} “An accused’s failure to raise the issue of allied offenses of similar import in
the trial court forfeits all but plain error, and a forfeited error is not reversible error unless it
affected the outcome of the proceeding and reversal is necessary to correct a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 3. “Accordingly, an accused
has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied
offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus;
13 absent that showing, the accused cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to inquire
whether the convictions merge for purposes of sentencing was plain error.” Id.
{¶ 33} The record-tampering statute provides, “No person, knowing the person has
no privilege to do so, and with purpose to defraud or knowing that the person is facilitating
a fraud, shall do any of the following: (1) Falsify, destroy, remove, conceal, alter, deface,
or mutilate any writing, computer software, data, or record.” R.C. 2913.42(A)(1). The
forgery statute provides, “No person, with purpose to defraud, or knowing that the person is
facilitating a fraud, shall do any of the following: (2) Forge any writing so that it purports to
be genuine when it actually is spurious, or to be the act of another who did not authorize that
act, or to have been executed at a time or place or with terms different from what in fact was
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.” R.C. 2913.31(A)(2).
{¶ 34} Crowder contends that the forgery and tampering with government records
convictions should have been merged because “[o]ne offense cannot be committed without
the other.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. According to Crowder, (1) both convictions were based
on the deed to the property that Crowder drafted; (2) drafting the deed and filing it were of
similar import and committed simultaneously because the indictment alleges that Crowder
both forged the deed and filed it with the recorder on June 17, 2022; (3) Crowder’s ultimate
motivation was to attempt to have the property placed in his name, which can only be done
by forging a deed and filing it; and (4) “the forging of the deed and filing it with the recorder
must be done with the same animus: obtaining possession of the Indianola property.” Id.
at 7-8.
{¶ 35} The State responds that the trial court did not err in failing to merge the forgery
and tampering with records convictions because the victims were different. J.C. was the
victim of the forgery count, and the government was the victim of the tampering with records
14 count. The State further argues that the two convictions should not have been merged
because the forgery offense was completed before the tampering with records offense
occurred. According to the State, “the forgery was completed when the documents were
drafted. Crowder was not charged with uttering the forgery but instead forging the
document itself. After the forgery was complete, the document was taken to the Auditor’s
Office and filed, thereby committing tampering with records.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 17-18.
{¶ 36} We cannot conclude that the trial court committed plain error in failing to merge
the tampering with records and forgery convictions at sentencing because the offenses
involved separate victims. The victim in the forgery offense was J.C., an elderly person.
However, when Crowder recorded the deed and the property transfer form, he committed
fraud as to the government office that oversaw recording property transfer documents.
Therefore, the county government was a victim of the tampering with records offense. See
State v. Delaney, 2025-Ohio-16, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.) (holding that forgery (identity fraud) and
attempted tampering with government records offenses should not merge because there
were two victims in the case, the person who lost her benefits and the Department of Family
and Job Services); State v. Jarrell, 2019-Ohio-1356, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (holding that the trial
court did not commit plain error by failing to merge the attempted tampering with records
and identity fraud counts where appellant had caused harm to the police department and
his brother). The forgery and tampering with records offenses are not allied offenses of
similar import, and the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to merge the two
convictions for purposes of sentencing.
{¶ 37} The second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 38} Having overruled the assignments of error, the judgment of the trial court is
15 affirmed.
.............
TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.