IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCSC-14
No. 180A20
Filed 11 February 2022
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. JUSTIN BLAKE CROMPTON
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals, State v. Crompton, 270 N.C. App. 439 (2020), affirming six
judgments revoking defendant’s probation entered on 25 October 2018 by Judge
Marvin P. Pope Jr. in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 17 May 2021.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Brenda Eaddy, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Sterling Rozear, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
MORGAN, Justice.
¶1 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations against him, contained
in six probation violation reports, that he committed the revocable probation violation
of absconding. Defendant also disputes the sufficiency of the State’s factual basis for
its absconding allegation, contending that even if the charge is taken as true, it
cannot serve as the basis for a finding that defendant had in fact absconded. In this STATE V. CROMPTON
Opinion of the Court
case, we determine that the probation violation reports at issue effectively pleaded
that defendant absconded probation and that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking defendant’s probation upon concluding that defendant had, in
fact, absconded his probation. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.
I. Background
¶2 Defendant pleaded guilty to one count each of felony breaking and entering,
felony larceny after breaking and entering, felony breaking and entering a motor
vehicle, felony altering the serial number of a firearm, and misdemeanor carrying a
concealed gun, along with three counts of felony obtaining property by false
pretenses, on 24 April 2017. The Superior Court, Buncombe County entered six
consecutive judgments sentencing defendant to a minimum of 36 months and a
maximum of 102 months of imprisonment, but suspended the activation of this
sentence in favor of 36 months of supervised probation. Among the terms of
defendant’s probation were his requirements to (1) report regularly as instructed by
the probation officer; (2) answer the reasonable inquiries of the officer; (3) report and
obtain approval for any change in address; (4) report and obtain approval before
leaving the jurisdiction of the trial court; (5) abstain from using drugs; and (6) “not
abscond, by willfully avoiding supervision or by willfully making the defendant’s
whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation officer.”
¶3 Defendant soon began to violate the terms of his probation, resulting in his STATE V. CROMPTON
supervising probation officer issuing violation reports on each of defendant’s cases
two months later on 28 June 2017. The probation violation reports alleged that
defendant missed curfew on several dates, left the jurisdiction of the trial court
without permission on multiple dates, and admitted to the usage of marijuana while
on probation. The violation reports were called for consideration by the trial court on
7 September 2017; defendant admitted that he violated the conditions of his
probation as alleged. The trial court found defendant to be in willful violation of his
probation and ordered him to serve a 90-day term of confinement with the North
Carolina Division of Adult Correction and to complete 90 days of house arrest upon
release from his prison confinement.
¶4 Defendant tested positive for marijuana again in April of 2018, after
completing his period of confinement and subsequent house arrest as the
consequences for the probation violations which he admitted on 7 September 2017.
On 14 May 2018, which was the day that defendant was scheduled to report to the
probation office for an appointment, defendant called his supervising probation
officer Jamie Harris by telephone and left a voicemail message that defendant would
be unable to keep the day’s appointment due to an altercation which occurred on the
previous night between defendant and defendant’s brother with whom the
probationer lived. Officer Harris returned defendant’s telephone call and left a
voicemail message instructing defendant to provide updated information concerning STATE V. CROMPTON
defendant’s residential situation and to report to the probation office on 16 May 2018.
Contrary to Officer Harris’ directive, defendant did not contact the probation officer
again. Defendant’s whereabouts were unknown to the State until defendant’s arrest
almost three months later on 8 August 2018.
¶5 Officer Harris conducted an absconding investigation in which the probation
officer visited defendant’s last known address on two occasions, called all of the
references and telephone contact numbers that defendant had provided during
defendant’s term of probation, called the local hospital by telephone to determine if
defendant had been admitted, reviewed law enforcement databases to ensure that
defendant was not in custody, and called a vocational rehabilitation program in which
defendant was enrolled in order to determine if the program providers had any
knowledge of defendant’s whereabouts. Having exhausted all available avenues of
contacting defendant, and being cognizant of defendant’s earlier probation violation
which Officer Harris considered to have put defendant on notice of “the ramifications
of absconding,” on 23 May 2018 defendant’s probation officer issued another
probation violation report and accompanying order for arrest in each of defendant’s
cases. The probation violation report in each case alleged that defendant had willfully
violated the following conditions of probation:
1. Regular Condition of Probation: General Statute 15A- 1343(b)(3a) “Not to abscond, by willfully avoiding supervision or willfully making the supervisee’s whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation officer” STATE V. CROMPTON
in that, THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO REPORT[] AS DIRECTED BY THE OFFICER, HAS FAILED TO RETURN THE OFFICER[’]S PHONE CALLS, AND HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE THE OFFICER WITH A CER[T]IFIABLE ADDRESS. THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR SUPERVISION AS DIRECTED BY HIS OFFICER, THEREBY ABSCONDING SUPERVISION. THE OFFICER[’]S LAST FACE TO FACE CONTACT WITH THE OFFENDER WAS DURING A HOME CONTACT ON 4/16/18.
2. Condition of Probation “Not use, possess or control any illegal drug or controlled substance unless it has been prescribed for the defendant by a licensed physician and is in the original container with the prescription number affixed on it . . .” in that THE DEFENDANT TESTED POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA ON 4/16/18.
3. “Report as directed by the Court, Commission or the supervising officer to the officer at reasonable times and places . . .” in that THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO REPORT AS DIRECTED ON 5/14/18, 5/16/18, AND 5/23/18.
4. Condition of Probation “The defendant shall pay to the Clerk of Superior Court the “Total Amount Due” as directed by the Court or probation officer” in that THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MAKE ANY PAYMENTS TOWARD HIS COURT INDEBTEDNESS AND RESTITUTION. 1
¶6 Defendant was arrested on 8 August 2018 and his alleged probation violations
came on for hearing on 25 October 2018. At the hearing, Officer Harris provided the
1 While five of defendant’s cases of probation had associated court-ordered fees and
restitution, defendant’s sixth case, which concerned his conviction for felony larceny after breaking and entering, did not have associated fees or restitution; therefore, the corresponding violation report omitted allegation #4. STATE V. CROMPTON
trial court with a synopsis of the investigation which he conducted, along with a
factual basis for the non-absconding alleged probation violations listed on the
violation reports. Defendant admitted his commission of all of the alleged probation
violations as detailed—including the allegation of absconding supervision—and
represented that he had turned himself in for the purposes of arrest and for “the sake
of . . . his family.” Defendant offered these explanations to the trial court in an effort
to persuade the trial court to allow defendant to serve his underlying sentences
concurrently, rather than consecutively as the initial sentencing trial court had
ordered. In accepting defendant’s admission to a revocable probation violation, the
trial court revoked defendant’s probation, denied defendant’s request that his
sentences be served concurrently, and activated defendant’s sentences as originally
determined. Defendant verbally noticed his appeal.
¶7 The Court of Appeals issued a divided opinion in which the majority held that
the State had met its burden of proof to show that defendant willfully violated a
revocable condition of probation and that the trial court’s revocation of defendant’s
probation was not an abuse of discretion. State v. Crompton, 270 N.C. App. 439, 448–
49 (2020). The dissenting opinion considered the absconding allegation in the
probation violation reports to allege only violations of regular conditions of probation
found in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3), and therefore the absconding allegation itself was
insufficient here to allege a revocable condition of probation under N.C.G.S. § 15A- STATE V. CROMPTON
1343(b)(3a), pursuant to the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Williams, 243 N.C.
App. 198, 199–200 (2015). Crompton, 270 N.C. App. at 454–55 (McGee, C.J.
dissenting). Even assuming that the alleged facts contained within the claimed
absconding violation were not limited to violations of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3), the
dissent deemed that the allegations “taken together[ ] still do not establish a violation
of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3a)[ ] because they do not adequately allege willfulness by
[d]efendant” as required by the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Melton, 258 N.C.
App. 134, 139 (2018). Id. at 455. The dissent reasoned that, although defendant
admitted to the absconding violation as alleged and Officer Harris testified to
exhausting all methods of contact with defendant, nonetheless the allegations in the
probation violation report failed to charge that defendant actually knew that his
supervising officer was trying to contact him. Id. Consequently, the dissenting view
would have decided that “the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
absconding.” Id. at 457. Defendant appealed to this Court as a matter of right based
upon the issues raised in the dissent.
II. Analysis
¶8 The trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s term of probation pursuant to
a valid probation violation report is reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal. State
v. Murchison, 367 N.C. 461, 464 (2014).
¶9 Defendant argues that the absconding allegation contained within each of the STATE V. CROMPTON
probation violation reports was “merely an assertion that [defendant] failed to report,
failed to return phone calls, and failed to provide a certifiable address,” which merely
amount to violations of the regular conditions of probation codified in N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b)(3) (2019). According to defendant’s construction of Williams, Melton, and
State v. Krider, 258 N.C. App. 111, aff’d per curiam in part, disavowed per curiam in
part, 371 N.C. 466 (2018)2, these allegations fail as a matter of law to allege a
revocable probation violation. Defendant also argues that “[c]onsidering N.C.G.S. §
15A-1343 as a whole and construing its various subsections in pari materia, it is clear
the legislature intended ‘absconding’ to have a unique, limited, and heightened
meaning – separate and apart from violations of other conditions of probation.”
¶ 10 First, this Court must determine whether the probation violation reports
sufficiently alleged that defendant absconded supervision. Our analysis is guided by
2 Our per curiam affirmance of Krider is inapplicable to the case at bar. In Krider, the
defendant denied absconding probation and testified at the probation violation hearing about his attempts to contact his supervising officer “plenty of times” during the time period in which the probation officer accused the defendant of absconding. The supervising officer testified that the defendant maintained regular contact with the officer following the defendant’s arrest for absconding, during which time the defendant made progress on several conditions of his probation. Krider, 258 N.C. App. at 112, 116–17. In vacating the trial court’s orders in Krider revoking the defendant’s probation, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning—which we endorsed—was predicated on the conclusion that “the State’s evidence was insufficient to support [the] allegation” of absconding. Id. at 118. However, at issue in the present case is the sufficiency of the probation violation report’s allegation of the revocable offense of absconding. In addition to this essential distinction between the current case and Krider, defendant here admitted the absconding allegation, and the State therefore was under no burden of production of evidence where defendant waived formal reading of the violation report and a formal hearing. STATE V. CROMPTON
our discussion in State v. Moore, 370 N.C. 338 (2017), in which this Court addressed
whether a probation violation report sufficiently alleged that the defendant had
committed the revocable violation of committing a new criminal offense while on
probation as prohibited by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1). The defendant in Moore had
been placed on probation for the commission of two different sets of identical criminal
offenses which he perpetrated in two consecutive months. Moore, 370 N.C. at 338–39.
The judgments in that defendant’s cases contained many of the “regular conditions of
probation” found in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b) and included the condition that defendant
must “commit no criminal offense in any jurisdiction.” Id. at 339. Subsequently, the
State filed two probation violation reports—one for each of the crimes which caused
the defendant to be placed on probation—with each of the probation violation reports
alleging violations of the monetary conditions of probation and the following “Other
Violation”:
The defendant has the following pending charges in Orange County. 15CR 051315 No Operators License 6/8/15, 15CR 51309 Flee/Elude Arrest w/MV 6/8/15. 13CR 709525 No Operators License 6/15/15, 14CR 052225 Possess Drug Paraphernalia 6/16/15, 14CR 052224 Resisting Public Officer 6/16/15, 14CR 706236 No Motorcycle Endorsement 6/29/15, 14CR 706235 Cover Reg Sticker/Plate 6/29/15, and 14CR 706234 Reg Card Address Change Violation.
Id.
¶ 11 At the probation violation hearing, the defendant Moore’s probation officer
testified about the probationer’s alleged criminal offenses that were identified in each STATE V. CROMPTON
of the probation violation reports. Id. at 339–40. Additionally, two law enforcement
officers offered testimony about the defendant’s alleged commission of one of the
identified offenses among those listed in the probation violation reports; namely,
fleeing to elude arrest. Id. at 340. The trial court found that the defendant had
violated the condition of his probation to “commit no criminal offense.” Based upon
the defendant’s commission of this revocable violation, the trial court revoked his
probation and activated both original suspended sentences. Id.
¶ 12 Just like defendant in the instant case, the defendant in Moore contended on
appeal that “the probation violation reports did not give him adequate notice because
they did not specifically state the condition of probation that he allegedly violated.”
Here, defendant claims that there was not sufficient notice of an absconding
allegation which was “separate and apart from violations of other conditions of
probation”; in Moore, the defendant contended that “because the probation violation
reports did not specifically list the ‘commit no criminal offense’ condition as the
condition violated, the reports did not provide the notice . . . require[d].” Id. In
upholding the trial court’s revocation of the defendant’s probation in Moore, we
explained that
“a statement of the violations alleged” refers to a statement of what a probationer did to violate his conditions of probation. It does not require a statement of the underlying conditions that were violated . . . [N.C.G.S. § 15A-1345(e)] requires only a statement of the actions that violated the conditions, not of the conditions that those actions violated. STATE V. CROMPTON
Id. at 341.
¶ 13 The absconding allegation in the case at bar satisfies the notice requirement
for probation violation reports established in Moore. Each report alleged that
defendant willfully (1) failed to report to the office as directed by his supervising
officer, (2) failed to return his supervising officer’s telephone calls, (3) failed to provide
a certifiable address, and (4) generally failed to make himself available for
supervision as directed by his officer. The absconding allegation in each violation
report provided further notice to defendant of the details of the charge by specifying
the time period of defendant’s alleged conduct by alerting him and the trial court that
defendant was last seen in person on 16 April 2018, and therefore he could not be
held accountable for absconding prior to that date. Defendant’s admission to all of the
probation violations as alleged connotes the effectiveness of the sufficiency of the
notice to defendant. More specifically, defendant’s admission that he willfully failed
to make himself available for supervision demonstrates that defendant absconded “by
willfully avoiding supervision or by willfully making the defendant’s whereabouts
unknown to the supervising officer.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3a).
¶ 14 Defendant’s argument that his failures to report to his probation officer as
directed, to return his probation officer’s telephone calls, and to provide a legitimate
address could not independently serve as the bases for both violating the regular
conditions of probation as codified in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3) and the revocable STATE V. CROMPTON
violation of absconding supervision is meritless. As the Court of Appeals majority
reasoned in its opinion, such an interpretation as submitted by defendant
would also operate to eliminate absconding as a ground for probation revocation. As a practical matter, those conditions laid out in Section 15A-1343(b)(3) make up the necessary elements of “avoiding supervision” or “making [one's] whereabouts unknown.” A defendant cannot avoid supervision without failing to report as directed to his probation officer at reasonable times and places. Neither can a defendant make his whereabouts unknown without failing to answer reasonable inquiries or notify his probation officer of a change of address.
Crompton, 270 N.C. App. at 446. This Court is constrained from interpreting N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1343(b)(3a) to reach such an absurd result. State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614–
15 (2005) (rejecting a criminal defendant’s interpretation of a statute that “could lead
to absurd results.”).
¶ 15 In applying the principles espoused and established in Moore to the present
case, there was no abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in its decision to
revoke defendant’s probation and to activate his suspended sentences upon
defendant’s admission of his commission of the revocable violation of absconding
probation. Sufficient notice of the absconding allegations was provided to defendant
in the probation violation reports; the fact that defendant’s alleged violations of
“regular conditions of probation” likewise served to constitute grounds for his
commission of the expressly alleged probation violation of absconding did not prevent
these violations from operating in such a dual capacity. Similarly, the State’s factual STATE V. CROMPTON
basis for its absconding allegation constituted sufficient notice to defendant of the
basis for the State’s claim of a revocable violation of probation. Defendant’s admission
of the probation violations as alleged, including the absconding allegation, confirms
the effectiveness of the notice which informed defendant of the individual absconding
allegation. Defendant’s knowledge of the individual allegation of absconding through
the notice provided to him in the probation violation reports is buttressed by his
awareness of the trial court’s ability to activate his suspended sentences upon
defendant’s admission to absconding, as defendant capably addressed the trial court
in an unsuccessful effort to convert his multiple terms of incarceration to concurrent
sentences rather than consecutive sentences. In compliance with this Court’s
determinations in Moore, defendant here was sufficiently and properly informed by
the probation violation reports of his alleged violations and his alleged conduct which
constituted the alleged violations, including the alleged absconding behavior which
defendant admitted.
III. Conclusion
¶ 16 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant’s probation.
The Court of Appeals opinion upholding the trial court’s judgments is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Justice BERGER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case. Justice EARLS dissenting.
¶ 17 In 2011, the General Assembly passed the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA) as
“part of a national criminal justice reform effort” the purpose of which was to reduce
corrections spending and reinvest the savings in strategies that reduce recidivism
and improve public safety. State v. Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 139, 143 (2016) (quoting
Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1935, 1947 (2014)).
Among other changes, the JRA “made it more difficult to revoke offenders’ probation
and send them to prison.” Id. The General Assembly was seeking to address a
significant problem: “Before the JRA was enacted, over half of the individuals
entering North Carolina prisons were doing so because of violations of conditions of
probation.” State v. Moore, 370 N.C. 338, 344 (2017) (citing James M. Markham, The
North Carolina Justice Reinvestment Act 1 (2012)).
¶ 18 With today’s decision, the Court potentially takes an unwarranted step toward
rolling back a critical part of those reforms. By failing to sharply distinguish between
“absconding,” which permits a trial court to immediately revoke a defendant’s
probation, and other probation violations, which do not, the majority’s opinion in this
case could be seen to be changing the law to permit the revocation of probation for
failing to report, failing to answer a probation officer’s phone calls, and failing to
notify a probation officer of a change in address. I am sure that is not the course this
Court intends to take. I dissent from the application of the JRA in this case and write STATE V. CROMPTON
Earls, J., dissenting
separately to observe that prior precedents enforcing the distinction embodied in the
JRA between failing to report and willfully absconding remain good law.
¶ 19 The defendant, Justin Blake Crompton, pleaded guilty to breaking and/or
entering, larceny after breaking and/or entering, three counts of obtaining property
by false pretenses, breaking or entering a motor vehicle, possessing a firearm with
an altered or removed serial number, and carrying a concealed gun on 24 April 2017.
The trial court imposed six consecutive sentences of 6 to 17 months’ imprisonment,
each of which was suspended and subject to a 36-month period of supervised
probation. Following probation violations in May and June of 2017, Mr. Crompton
was ordered to complete a 90-day period of confinement in response to violation (CRV)
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(d2), followed by a 90-day period of house arrest.
¶ 20 Approximately a year into his probation, on 14 May 2018, Mr. Crompton called
his probation officer. Mr. Crompton told his probation officer that he had gotten into
a fight with his brother and would not be able to attend his appointment that day.
The officer called back and left a message, saying “let me know what you work out for
housing and report two days later.” The probation officer did not hear back from Mr.
Crompton and initiated an absconding investigation.1
1 The majority details the extent of the investigation as support for its conclusion that
the trial court did not err in determining that Mr. Crompton had, in fact, absconded within the meaning of the statute. However, in the instant case the relevant question is not the extent of the investigation conducted by the probation officer—it is what the defendant did. By focusing on the extent of the investigation, the majority suggests that we can infer that a STATE V. CROMPTON
¶ 21 On 23 May 2018, the probation officer filed violation reports against Mr.
Crompton. The reports alleged that Mr. Crompton had absconded supervision, used
a controlled substance, failed to report to his probation officer, and failed to make
mandatory payments. The factual allegations in the reports that supported the
allegation of absconding were that Mr. Crompton had “failed to report[ ] as directed
by the officer,” “failed to provide the officer with a cer[t]ifiable address,” “failed to
make himself available for supervision as directed by his officer,” and that “the
officer[’]s last face to face contact with [Mr. Crompton] was during a home contact on
4/16/18.” At a hearing on 22 October 2018, Mr. Crompton admitted the violations.
The trial court found that Mr. Crompton “willfully and intentionally violated the
terms and conditions of the probationary sentencing by absconding” and activated his
sentences.
¶ 22 The majority holds that the trial court did not err in finding that Mr. Crompton
had absconded and activating Mr. Crompton’s sentences. However, doing so based on
the factual allegations in the probation violation report is, at best, inferring evidence
of willfulness that is not in the report itself.
¶ 23 There are two categories of probation violations relevant to the instant case.
In the first category, consisting of most probation violations, “[t]he court may not
defendant absconded in violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3a) because a probation officer conducted a thorough investigation. However, neither the existence nor the quality of an investigation is evidence of guilt. STATE V. CROMPTON
revoke probation unless the defendant has previously received a total of two periods
of confinement under this subsection. [CRVs].” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(d2) (2019).
However, if a defendant commits a criminal offense or absconds from supervision
while on probation, the two probation violations which are in the second category,
then the court may revoke probation regardless of whether the defendant has
received two CRVs. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a); see also State v. Moore, 370 N.C. 338, 344
(2017) (“The changes to the law that the JRA effected were consistent with these
concerns because subsection 15A-1344(a), as amended by the JRA, now makes only
committing a new criminal offense or absconding revocation-eligible unless a
defendant has already served two periods of confinement for violating other
conditions of probation.”).
¶ 24 The violation reports filed by Mr. Crompton’s probation officer only allege, and
Mr. Crompton therefore only admitted to, conduct which amounts to violations of
Section 15A-1343(b)(3)—a violation in the first category, for which a court “may not
revoke probation unless the defendant has previously received” two CRVs. N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1344(d2); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a) (“The Court may only revoke
probation for a violation of a condition of probation under [N.C.]G.S. 15A-1343(b)(1)
or [N.C.]G.S. 15A-1343(b)(3a), except as provided in [N.C.]G.S. 15A-1344(d2).”). The
violation reports alleged that Mr. Crompton “failed to report[ ] as directed by the
officer.” However, this is a violation of Section 15A-1343(b)(3), which requires that a STATE V. CROMPTON
defendant “[r]eport as directed by the court or his probation officer.” The violation
reports also allege that Mr. Crompton “failed to return the officer[’s] phone calls,”
which is a violation of the requirement in Section 15A-1343(b)(3) that a defendant
“answer all reasonable inquiries by the officer.” The violation reports further allege
that Mr. Crompton “failed to provide the officer with a [certifiable] address.” 2 This is
a violation only of Section 15A-1343(b)(3)’s directive that a defendant must “obtain
prior approval from the officer for, and notify the officer of, any change in address.”
¶ 25 While the facts alleged are violations of Subsection 15A-1343(b)(3), they are
alleged as violations of Subsection 15A-1343(b)(3a), absconding. This
misapprehension of the statutory provisions does not, however, somehow transform
Mr. Crompton’s conduct into absconding. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 243 N.C. App.
198, 205 (2015) (“Although the report alleged that Defendant's actions constituted
‘abscond[ing] supervision,’ this wording cannot convert violations of [N.C.G.S.] §§
15A-1343(b)(2) and (3) into a violation of [N.C.G.S.] § 15A-1343(b)(3a).”). The majority
notes that Mr. Crompton relies on Williams, but the majority does not distinguish
that case or explain why its holding is wrong. In fact, Williams has been followed at
least seven other times on this same point. See State v. McAbee, No. COA18-25, 2018
2 The violation reports also state that “[t]he defendant has failed to make himself
available for supervision as directed by his officer, thereby absconding supervision. The officer’s last face to face contact with the offender was during a home contact on 4/16/18.” A review of the hearing transcript reveals no facts other than those listed above on which these statements might be based, suggesting that they are merely a summary of the facts above. STATE V. CROMPTON
WL 6613936 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018) (unpublished) (holding the evidence did
not support a conclusion defendant absconded where violations of regular conditions
of probation did not authorize revocation based upon violations of those conditions);
State v. Melton, 258 N.C. App. 134 (2018) (emphasizing that there was insufficient
evidence that defendant willfully refused to make herself available for supervision
merely because she failed to attend scheduled meetings and the probation officer was
unable to reach defendant after two days of attempts); State v. Krider, 258 N.C. App.
111 (2018) (reasoning that the State’s allegations and supporting evidence were very
similar to those rejected in Williams because defendant’s actions only amounted to a
violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3) and did not rise to the distinct violation of
absconding supervision); State v. Booker, No. COA 16-1142, 2017 WL 3863881 (N.C.
Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017) (holding that defendant’s actions, without more, did not violate
N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(b)(3a) when those actions violated the explicit language of “a
wholly separate” regular condition of probation which did not allow probation
revocation and activation of a suspended sentence); State v. Batiste, No. COA16-1186,
2017 WL 3863538 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017) (concluding that because defendant’s
alleged violations of probation could not be meaningfully distinguished from those at
issue in Williams, the evidence failed to support the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant willfully absconded from supervision); State v. Brown, No. COA 15-847,
2016 WL 4608187 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2016) (holding that the trial court was not STATE V. CROMPTON
authorized to revoke defendant’s probation based on allegations in the violation
report which were virtually identical to those in the Williams report; allegations
tracked the language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(2) and (b)(3) but not statutory
absconding); State v. Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 139 (2016) (relying on its interpretation
of Williams and Tindall, the court held that defendant’s actions without more could
not serve as a basis to revoke defendant’s probation).
¶ 26 The only possible conclusion from the majority’s silence on this point is that
these cases remain good law. A defendant absconds by “willfully avoiding supervision
or by willfully making the defendant’s whereabouts unknown to the supervising
probation officer, if the defendant is placed on supervised probation.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b)(3a). Because a violation of this provision permits the revocation of probation
while a violation of Subsection 1343(b)(3) does not, see N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a),
logically, it must be true that absconding is something different than a violation of
Subsection 1343(b)(3)—it cannot be true that the same conduct both prohibits a trial
court from revoking probation and permits the trial court to revoke probation.
¶ 27 The majority errs by concluding in this case that the alleged conduct will
support a finding that Mr. Crompton has absconded. Allowing actions which explicitly
violate a regular condition of probation other than those found in N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1343(b)(3a) to also serve, without the State showing more, as a violation of that very
same provision, renders portions of the statutory language in § 15A-1343 superfluous. STATE V. CROMPTON
The General Assembly did not intend for a violation of a condition of probation other
than absconding to result in revocation. The probation violation report’s use of the
term “absconding” to describe Mr. Crompton’s noncompliance with the regular
condition of probation under § 15A-1343(b)(3) has the effect of overstepping the trial
court’s limited revocation authority under the JRA, which does not include this
condition.
¶ 28 The majority’s logic is that if the allegations in this case do not suffice to
establish absconding, then no allegations could achieve that end because such
conduct is the only possible way to prove a defendant absconded within the meaning
of the statute. However, the distinction between failing to report and willfully
avoiding supervision gives legal significance to the differences between negligence
and intent; accident and willfulness. These are common distinctions throughout civil
and criminal law. And in this context, other cases provide clear examples of
allegations that are sufficient to show willful avoidance of supervision. See, e.g., State
v. West, No. COA18-242, 2019 WL 190239 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan 15, 2019) (unpublished).
In West, the probation violation report alleged that, among other things, defendant
was aware his probation officer was looking for him, demonstrably lied about whether
he had transportation, and was instructed by his probation officer to remain at his
house until she could arrive. Instead, defendant disregarded that instruction and the
urging of his family by leaving before his probation officer got to his home. The trial STATE V. CROMPTON
court correctly concluded that “the violation reports filed by [the probation officer]
expressly alleged willful conduct distinct from Defendant's mere failure to report.” Id
at *4.
¶ 29 In contrast, there are no allegations in this case that Mr. Crompton willfully
avoided supervision, only that he failed to call, he failed to provide an address, he
failed to report, and he failed to make mandatory payments. Following established
and well-reasoned precedent from the Court of Appeals on this point, and
understanding the logic of the statutory structure, I would conclude that these
allegations are not sufficient to establish willful absconding.
¶ 30 “The JRA’s purpose was ‘to reduce prison populations and spending on
corrections and then to reinvest the savings in community-based programs.’ ”Moore,
370 N.C. at 343 (quoting James M. Markham, The North Carolina Justice
Reinvestment Act 1 (2012)). It accomplished this objective by restricting the situations
for which a defendant’s probation could be revoked to those wherein a defendant has
committed a new criminal offense, absconded supervision, or already served two
CRVs for other probation violations. Id. at 344; see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a). The
General Assembly has defined absconding to mean “willfully avoiding supervision” or
“willfully making the defendant’s whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation
officer,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3a), and it separated that violation from other
probation violations. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(a). The allegations in this case did not STATE V. CROMPTON
sufficiently allege willfulness and therefore, I dissent.