State v. Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc.

342 A.2d 640, 115 N.H. 455, 1975 N.H. LEXIS 334
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire
DecidedJuly 31, 1975
DocketNo. 7258
StatusPublished

This text of 342 A.2d 640 (State v. Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc., 342 A.2d 640, 115 N.H. 455, 1975 N.H. LEXIS 334 (N.H. 1975).

Opinion

Kenison, C.J.

The question for decision by this appeal is whether a private credit bureau may transfer ownership or possession of credit files which it has compiled on consumers to “any person other than the subject of those files” without violating the provisions of RSA ch. 359-B (Supp. 1973) (Consumer Credit Reporting). See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Credit Reporting Agencies). Loughlin, J., reserved and transferred the State’s exception to his determination that RSA ch. 359-B (Supp. 1973) does not prevent the transfer of the files.

The defendant Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc., engages in the business of providing credit reports on consumers. Information collected by the bureau from various financial organizations, official records and credit investigations is maintained in its files. Condensations of the information in the form of consumer credit reports are sold by the defendant credit bureau to prospective grantors of credit as well as to other interested persons, subject to the restrictions of RSA ch. 359-B (Supp. 1973) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. See Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Banking and Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 52-53 (May 1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Credit Bureau Hearings of 1969]; Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 Texas L. Rev. 837, 839-41 (1971); Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 Yale L.J. 1035, 1036-37 (1971).

In May 1975, the Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc., mailed a letter to the subjects of its credit files proposing to sell the individual his own file prior to the bureau’s contemplated transfer of the files to a “large computerized data bank, which may allow unlimited access by thousands of people.” By a petition dated June 9, 1975, the State sought to enjoin the sale of the bureau’s files to individual [457]*457consumers and the transfer of ownership or possession of the files to any other party. RSA 358-A:2 (Supp. 1973) (Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer Protection: Acts Unlawful); RSA 358-A:4 III (Supp. 1973) (Administration; Enforcement); RSA 359-B:4 (Supp. 1973) (Consumer Credit Reporting: Permissible Purposes of Reports); RSA 359-B:7 (Supp. 1973) (Compliance Procedures); RSA 359-B:21 (Supp. 1973) (Administrative Enforcement).

On June 10, the Superior Court (Loughlin, J.) issued a temporary restraining order directing that the defendants “are enjoined from either selling any consumer credit files to consumers or transferring ownership or possession of any consumer credit files to any other party”, pending a hearing on the State’s petition for a permanent injunction. As a result of a hearing on the State’s petition held June 13, the superior court vacated the temporary restraining order insofar as it prevented the transfer of the bureau’s files to any person other than the consumer, on the ground that RSA ch. 359-B (Supp. 1973) does not prohibit the transfer.

During the past twenty-three years the total consumer credit outstanding in the United States has increased more than 22-1'old, giving rise to a burgeoning consumer credit reporting industry which has created a vast resource of personal information on this country’s citizens. Consumer Credit in the United States, Report of the National Commission on Consumer Finance, at 5 (1972); id. at 9; Fed. Reserve Bull. A-54 (Jan. 1971); Senate Credit Bureau Hearings of 1969, supra at 1; see Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 Geo. L.J. 509 (1969). Computerized information storage and retrieval have increased the danger of harm to the consumer resulting from inaccurate and unwarranted disclosures of personal information. Spafford, Consumer Credit: Giving Creditors Their Due, 11 Trial 35 (1975); McNamara, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: A Legislative Overview, 22 J. Pub. L. 67, 87-88 (1973); Senate Credit Bureau Flearings of 1969, supra at 28-31.

Recognizing the need for regulation of the consumer reporting industry, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.), effective April 24, 1971. See Proxmire, Consumer Credit: Privacy the Collateral, 11 Trial 34, 36 (1975); Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 819, 822 (1972); Denny, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 88 Banking L.J. 579, 586-87 (1971). Several months later on August 29, 1971, New Hampshire adopted RSA ch. 359-B (Supp. 1973) (Consumer Credit Reporting) which was intended to be an almost verbatim enactment of the Federal [458]*458Fair Credit Reporting Act. N.H.S. Jour. 1242 (1971); Laws 1971, 430:1 (An Act Enacting the Fair Credit Reporting Act).

While acknowledging the economic need for credit reporting, both the Federal and the New Hampshire Acts purport to “require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information RSA 359-B:2 II (Supp. 1973) (Findings and Purpose); 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (Congressional findings and statement of purpose); see RSA 359-B:2 I (a) (Supp. 1973); 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1). To accomplish these goals, the Acts restrict the dissemination of personal information (RSA 359-B:4 [Supp. 1973]; 15 U.S.C. § 1681b); require information to be accurate as well as current (RSA 359-B:5 [Supp. 1973], :7 II [Supp. 1973]; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c, 1681e(b)); and allow the consumer access to the information in his credit file (RSA 359-B:9 [Supp. 1973], :11 [Supp. 1973]; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 168li); see Koon, Translating the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 48 Den. L.J. 51, 53 (1971); Note, 23 Me. L. Rev. 253, 257 (1971). See also Comment, Commercial Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State Action, 24 Am. U.L. Rev. 421, 439-41 (1975).

The effective scope of RSA ch. 359-B (Supp. 1973) and of the Federal Act is limited, however, to “consumer reports” furnished by a “consumer reporting agency”. RSA 359-B:3 VI (Supp. 1973) defines a “consumer reporting agency” as “any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties ....” (15 U.S.C. § 1681a (f)).

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342 A.2d 640, 115 N.H. 455, 1975 N.H. LEXIS 334, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-credit-bureau-of-nashua-inc-nh-1975.