State v. Crawford

2025 Ohio 731

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Crawford, 2025-Ohio-731.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. : Hon. Andrew J. King, J. -vs- : : EQUAWN CRAWFORD : Case No. CT2024-0078 : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2023-0806

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: March 5, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant

EQUAWN CRAWFORD, PRO SE INMATE no. 828-662 15708 McConnelsville Road Caldwell, OH 43724 King, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Equawn Crawford appeals the May 6, 2024 judgment

of conviction and sentence of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-

Appellee is the State of Ohio.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On December 7, 2023, a Muskingum County Sheriff's deputy conducted a

traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Crawford after Crawford failed to stop at a traffic light.

During the course of the stop the deputy removed Crawford from the vehicle. Upon doing

so, the deputy noticed a gun in Crawford's hoodie pocket. Crawford was searched as a

result. A black bag strapped to Crawford's person contained several bags containing

either a white powder or a crystalline substance. The bag also contained several pieces

of aluminum foil containing white powder. Later testing confirmed the substances were

narcotics. Relevant to this matter, one bag contained 60 grams of methamphetamine. A

subsequent search of the vehicle produced scales, sandwich baggies, and another gun

in the glovebox. Crawford had $2,220 on his person.

{¶ 3} On December 14, 2023, the Muskingum County Grand Jury returned an 11-

count indictment charging Crawford with various weapons, trafficking, and drug offenses.

Relevant to this appeal, count four of the indictment charged Crawford with aggravated

trafficking in methamphetamine pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), 2925.03(C)(1)(d), a

felony of the second degree. The charge also contained a firearm specification and a

property forfeiture specification for the cash found on Crawford.

{¶ 4} Crawford pled not guilty to the charges and filed a motion to suppress the

stop and the search of his vehicle. A suppression hearing was scheduled for May 1, 2024. On that that day, however Crawford appeared with counsel and withdrew his motion to

suppress. Pursuant to plea negotiations with the State, Crawford instead agreed to enter

a plea of guilty to count four of the indictment and the attendant firearm and forfeiture

specifications and to receive a sentence agreed upon by the parties. In exchange, the

State agreed to dismiss the balance of the indictment. Crawford signed a plea agreement

which outlined the possible penalties, the State's agreement, and the rights Crawford

relinquished by entering his plea. The trial court then engaged Crawford in a Crim.R. 11

plea colloquy.

{¶ 5} After the trial court accepted Crawford's guilty plea, Crawford indicated he

wished to forgo a presentence investigation and proceed immediately to sentencing. The

trial court granted that request and imposed the jointly agreed upon indefinite sentence

of eight to eleven and a half years.

{¶ 6} Crawford filed an appeal and was appointed counsel. Thereafter,

Crawford's attorney filed an Anders brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967).

{¶ 7} In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that if, after a

conscientious examination of the record, the defendant's counsel concludes that the case

is wholly frivolous, then counsel should so advise the court and request permission to

withdraw. Id. at 744. Counsel must accompany the request with a brief identifying

anything in the record that could arguably support the defendant's appeal. Id. Counsel

also must: (1) furnish the defendant with a copy of the brief and request to withdraw; and

(2) allow the defendant sufficient time to raise any matters that the defendant chooses.

Id. Once the defendant's counsel satisfies these requirements, the appellate court must

fully examine the proceedings below to determine if any arguably meritorious issues exist. If the appellate court also determines that the appeal is frivolous, it may grant counsel's

request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal without violating constitutional requirements,

or may proceed to a decision on the merits if state law so requires. Id.

{¶ 8} On September 16, 2024, Crawford's counsel filed a motion to withdraw. By

judgment entry filed October 1, 2024, this court noted counsel had filed an Anders brief

and notified Crawford via certified U.S. Mail that he "may file a pro se brief in support of

the appeal within 60 days from the date of this entry." Crawford filed his pro se brief on

January 23, 2025. This court accepted Crawford's pro se brief instanter.

{¶ 9} The matter is now before this court for consideration of counsel's Anders

brief and Crawford's pro se brief. Counsel urges this court to review the following:

I

{¶ 10} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING CRAWFORD'S GUILTY

PLEAS UNDER CRIM.R. 11 AND ERRED IN SENTNECING HIM.

{¶ 11} Crawford's brief raises three potential assignments of error as follow:

{¶ 12} "APPELLANT EQUAWN CRAWFORD'S GUILTY PLEA WAS

INVOLUNTARY AND COERCED BY APPELLANT'S COUNSEL BY THREAT THAT A

FAILURE TO WAIVE THE SUPPRESSION HEARING WOULD RESULT IN APPELLANT

FACING THE STATE AND COURT ALONE WITH NO COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF HIS

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."

II

{¶ 13} A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE HAS TAKEN PLACE DUE TO THE FACT

THAT THE CONVICTION WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE, RESUTING IN VIOLATON OF APPELLANT, EQUAWN CRAWFORD'S

FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

III

{¶ 14} THE MUSKINGUM COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT IMPROPERLY

STATE APPELLANT WAS SERVING AN INDEFINATE MANDATORY SENTENCE

UNDER R.C. 2967.271 VIOLATING APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO KNOW HIS ACTUAL

SENTENCE IN COURT.

{¶ 15} We first address counsel's proposed assignment of error. Counsel proposes

the trial court erred in accepting Crawford's guilty plea under Crim.R. 11 and erred in

sentencing him. We disagree.

{¶ 16} When reviewing a plea's compliance with Crim.R. 11(C), we apply a de novo

standard of review. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108-109 (1990); State v. Groves,

2019-Ohio-5025, ¶ 7 (5th Dist.).

{¶ 17} Crim.R. 11 requires guilty pleas to be made knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily. The Supreme Court of Ohio noted the "different tiers of compliance with the

rule" i.e., partially, substantially, strictly, literally, "have served only to unduly complicate

what should be a fairly straightforward inquiry." State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17.

The Court stated: "Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has

the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not

complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant

from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required,

has the defendant met that burden?" Id. But the Court reaffirmed the substantial

compliance rule when it stated: "the traditional rule continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure

of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)." Id. at ¶ 16, citing State

v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). In Nero, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated:

"[l]iteral compliance with Crim.R. 11 is certainly the preferred practice, but the fact that

the trial judge did not do so does not require vacation of the defendant's guilty plea if the

reviewing court determines that there was substantial compliance." Nero at 108.

"Substantial compliance" means "under the totality of the circumstances the defendant

subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving." Id.

{¶ 18} As to the constitutional notifications, before accepting a plea, a trial court

must inform a defendant that by entering a plea, the defendant waives important

constitutional rights, specifically: (1) the right to a jury trial; (2) the right to confront one's

accusers; (3) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (4) the right to

compulsory process to obtain witnesses; and (5) the right to require the state to prove the

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

{¶ 19} As to the non-constitutional rights, a trial court must notify a defendant of:

(1) the nature of the charges; (2) the maximum penalty involved, which includes, if

applicable, an advisement on post-release control; (3) if applicable, that the defendant is

not eligible for probation or the imposition of community control sanctions; and (4) that

after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed directly to judgment

and sentencing. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).

{¶ 20} We have reviewed the transcript of Crawford's plea and find the trial court

was thorough in its explanations and met Dangler's requirement of compliance with his

constitutional and non-constitutional rights; Crawford indicated he understood the

implications of his pleas and the rights he was waiving. Transcript of plea and sentence May 1, 2024 T. at 3-13. Additionally, Crawford signed a Plea of Guilty form which also

outlined the possible penalties, the rights Crawford relinquished by entering his plea, and

the agreement between the parties. Plea of Guilty filed May 1, 2024, docket item 43.

SENTENCES

{¶ 21} As for Crawford's sentence, this court reviews felony sentences using the

standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 22;

State v. Howell, 2015-Ohio-4049, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.). Subsection (G)(2) sets forth this court's

standard of review as follows:

(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this

section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the

sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a

sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for

resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is not

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate

court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and

convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings

under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or

(C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the

Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. {¶ 22} "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is

more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty

as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 23} "A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial

court 'considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed

in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant

within the permissible statutory range.' " State v. Morris, 2021-Ohio-2646, ¶ 90 (5th Dist.),

reversed on other grounds; State v. Morris, 2022-Ohio-4609, quoting State v. Dinka,

2019-Ohio-4209, ¶ 36 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 24} Following a properly conducted Crim.R. 11 colloquy, Crawford pled guilty to

one felony of the second degree. T. at 13. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a), "[f]or a

felony of the second degree committed on or after March 22, 2019, the prison term shall

be an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two,

three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is determined

pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code[.]"

{¶ 25} Crawford received a sentence that was jointly recommended by the parties;

a mandatory seven years for trafficking in methamphetamine and an additional mandatory

year for the gun specification, which must be served consecutively. Pursuant the Reagan

Tokes Act, codified as R.C. 2929.144, Crawford received an aggregate indefinite prison

term of eight to eleven and a half years. Judgment Entry filed May 6, 2024. The trial court

notified Crawford of postrelease control and his right to appeal. T. at 13, 19. While we

note he trial court did not mention the appropriate sentencing factors on the record, it did state its consideration in the sentencing judgment entry, and further, this was an agreed

upon sentence. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), a sentence imposed upon a defendant

is not subject to review "if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended

jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing

judge." "The General Assembly intended a jointly agreed-upon sentence to be protected

from review precisely because the parties agreed that the sentence is appropriate. Once

a defendant stipulates that a particular sentence is justified, the sentencing judge no

longer needs to independently justify the sentence." State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095,

¶ 25.

{¶ 26} Upon review of the record, we find the trial court properly informed Crawford

of the consequences of his pleas, imposed sentences within the permissible statutory

range and as agreed upon by the parties, explained the stated and indefinite sentences,

and properly imposed postrelease control. Crawford's sentences are therefore not clearly

and convincingly contrary to law.

{¶ 27} We next address Crawford's assignments of error. Crawford first argues trial

counsel was ineffective. Specifically, Crawford alleges his counsel coerced him into

pleading guilty.

{¶ 28} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel's performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel's errors

prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the

result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-

688, 694 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. "Reasonable probability" is "probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome." Strickland at 694.

{¶ 29} Because there are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any

given case, judicial scrutiny of a lawyer's performance must be highly deferential.

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 at 694. "Decisions on strategy and trial tactics are granted wide

latitude of professional judgment, and it is not the duty of a reviewing court to analyze trial

counsel's legal tactics and maneuvers." State v. Quinones, 2014-Ohio-5544, ¶ 18 (8th

Dist.)

{¶ 30} Crawford alleges his trial counsel threatened him by telling him to plead or

else counsel would withdraw representation leaving Crawford to represent himself. The

record however, is devoid of any evidence to support Crawford's self-serving allegations.

Indeed, the record reflects Crawford indicated he was satisfied with the advice and

assistance of counsel, and had not been threatened in any way in order to procure his

guilty plea. T. 10-11.

{¶ 31} Crawford's first assignment of error is without merit.

{¶ 32} In his second assignment of error, Crawford argues his conviction was

obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure. However, as noted in our recitation

of the procedural history of this matter, Crawford withdrew his motion to suppress. Since

this argument was not raised to the trial court, it will not be addressed by this Court; new

arguments will not be considered for the first time on appeal. See Murphy v.

Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 360 (1992) (issues not raised and tried in the trial court

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

{¶ 33} Crawford's second assignment of error is overruled. III

{¶ 34} In his final assignment of error, Crawford alleges the trial court imposed an

illegal mandatory sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.144, the Reagan Tokes Act. We

disagree.

{¶ 35} Crawford pled guilty to one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs. The

indictment alleged Crawford "did knowingly prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver,

prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substance

analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled

substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender

or another person and the drug involved in the violation is any compound, mixture,

preparation, or substance included in Schedule I or Schedule II, to wit:

Methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug and the amount of the drug equals or exceeds five

times the bulk amount but is less than fifty times the bulk amount."

{¶ 36} R.C. 2925.03(C)(1) addresses sentencing for trafficking offenses. R.C.

2925.03(C)(1)(d) provides "if the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds five times

the bulk amount but is less than fifty times the bulk amount, aggravated trafficking in drugs

is a felony of the second degree, and the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term

a second degree felony mandatory prison term." Crawford was therefore subject to a

mandatory sentence.

{¶ 37} The trial court explained the indefinite sentence involved twice during the

plea and sentencing hearing, once during the plea colloquy and again when Crawford

questioned the court about "good time credit." The court explained that he would serve

the mandatory seven years imposed for trafficking, plus the mandatory consecutive

sentence for the gun specification. The court then explained the rebuttable presumption that Crawford would be released at that point, but that under R.C. 2929.144, he could

potentially be held up to ten and a half years depending on the Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction's evaluation of his conduct while in prison. T. 7-8, 17-19.

{¶ 38} The record reflects the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence for

Crawford's trafficking conviction, not R.C. 2929.144. Further the court never stated it was

imposing a mandatory sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.144 . Accordingly, Crawford's final

assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶ 39} "Anders equated a frivolous appeal with one that presents issues lacking in

arguable merit .... An issue lacks arguable merit if, on the facts and law involved, no

responsible contention can be made that it offers a basis for reversal." State v. Pullen,

2002-Ohio-6788, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 40} After independently reviewing the record, we agree with appellate counsel's

conclusion that no arguably meritorious claims exist upon which to base an appeal. We

therefore find the appeal to be wholly frivolous under Anders, grant counsel's request to

withdraw, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

{¶ 41} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is hereby

affirmed.

By King, J.,

Baldwin, P.J. and

Hoffman, J. concur.