[Cite as State v. Craig, 2026-Ohio-200.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COLUMBIANA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALICIA CRAIG,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 25 CO 0021
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio Case No. 2024-CR-552
BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
Atty. Vito J. Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor and Atty. Christopher R. W. Weeda, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Atty. Rhonda G. Santha, for Defendant-Appellant
Dated: January 22, 2026 –2–
WAITE, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Alicia Craig was accused of igniting a fire in the bedroom of an
apartment building in Salem, Ohio where she and her boyfriend were staying. She was
convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated arson and was sentenced to twelve to
fifteen years in prison. She argues on appeal that video and audio surveillance files
should not have been admitted as evidence because they violated the best evidence rule.
The record reflects that the digital clips were exact copies of the original files taken from
a DVR at the apartment building where the fire occurred. The clips were properly
authenticated, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the digital media
files to be admitted. She also argues that the trial judge committed plain error by not sua
sponte striking the testimony of the fire marshal who appeared as an expert witness
because his testimony was not credible. Credibility is determined by the jury, and the
expert witness testimony is fully supported by the record. Appellant’s assignments of
error are without merit, and her convictions and sentence are affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On October 9, 2024, Appellant was indicted in the Columbiana County
Court of Common Pleas on two counts of aggravated arson pursuant to R.C.
2909.02(A)(1), first degree felonies. The charges arose from an altercation Appellant had
with her boyfriend, Nicholas Edwards (“Edwards”) on May 2, 2025 at 647 E. Sixth Street,
Apartment 8, in Salem, Ohio. The address contains a two-story, eight-unit apartment
building. Appellant and Edwards were temporarily staying in the apartment, which was
leased to another person. They became involved in a domestic dispute on May 2, 2025.
At approximately 5:34 p.m. on that date, the police received multiple calls reporting that
Case No. 25 CO 0021 –3–
there was a fire in the building. The firefighters arrived within a few minutes of receipt of
the distress calls. Appellant had already left the scene by the time firefighters arrived.
The building was evacuated, all the tenants were accounted for, and the fire was
extinguished. Two firefighters were injured responding to the fire. The circumstances of
the fire were deemed suspicious, and it was later determined that Appellant had caused
the fire, leading to her indictment. Count one involved the firefighters who were injured
responding to the fire. Count two referenced the tenants in the apartment building.
{¶3} Jury trial began on June 2, 2025. The state presented three witnesses:
Scott Mason, Fire Chief of the City of Salem; Richard Todd Stitt, Assistant Fire Marshal
for the State Fire Marshal’s Office; and Detective Brad Davis of the Salem Police
Department. The state submitted numerous photos of the fire, as well as surveillance
video and audio from the apartment building from the period both before and during the
fire. Fire Marshal Stitt testified as an expert witness. Appellant Alicia Craig testified in her
own defense. The defense did not offer a rebuttal expert witness.
{¶4} Witnesses at trial established that Appellant was in the apartment prior to
and at the time the fire started on May 2, 2025. Appellant and Edwards had been loudly
arguing the night before and during the day of the fire. A neighbor heard Appellant and
Edwards arguing, and heard Appellant say, “[w]ell, it’s up in flames now.” (Trial Tr., pp.
358-359.) After the fire started, Appellant packed a bag and fled, telling Edwards:
“Burning it all down, all of it. Fuck you. It’s all up in flames.” (Trial Tr., pp. 300-301; Exh.
37.) Appellant got into a borrowed pickup truck and left the area at 5:34 p.m.
{¶5} Eleven calls were made to 911 regarding the fire. None were from
Appellant. As Appellant had thrown Edwards’s cell phone out of the apartment window,
Case No. 25 CO 0021 –4–
he was not able to report the fire. The fire’s flames were visible to people passing by.
The fire caused considerable smoke, soot, and water damage to the building and caused
the roof to collapse. Multiple people, including tenants who were in the building at the
time, were placed at risk of harm. One firefighter’s arm was injured. Another firefighter
twisted his knee after stepping in a hole, and was transported to a hospital for treatment.
The fire completely consumed apartment eight and damaged other portions of the
building.
{¶6} Chief Mason considered the circumstances of the fire suspicious and
ordered an investigation. Fire Marshal Stitt concluded that the fire was an incendiary fire
that began in apartment eight. The surveillance video recorded Appellant saying: “Fuck
you. The bedroom is on fire. It’s going to burn. It’s all going to burn. Why are you doing
this to me?” (Trial Tr., pp. 273-274; Exh. 37.)
{¶7} Surveillance video showed that Edwards left the apartment at 5:32 p.m.,
and returned a few seconds later. Appellant can be heard saying “Fuck you. Your
bedroom’s on fire.” Edwards immediately left again. At 5:33 p.m. Appellant exited the
apartment, carrying three bags. Smoke can be seen pouring from the apartment and a
smoke alarm can be heard ringing. Appellant took one of the bags and proceeded down
the stairs. She can be seen leaving the building at 5:33 p.m. A camera recorded her
driving away in a pickup truck at 5:34 p.m. Also at 5:34 p.m. a neighbor can be seen
running into apartment 8 and then running back out and into the apartment next door, and
shutting the door. After this there is so much smoke that nothing can be seen in the video
of the second floor. The first floor video camera recorded a neighbor at 5:35 p.m. yelling
Case No. 25 CO 0021 –5–
“[e]verybody get out.” Four tenants can be seen leaving at 5:36 p.m., and can be heard
coughing.
{¶8} Police searched for Appellant after the fire to question her. On May 10,
2025, she was observed by police sitting at a bench in Memorial Park in Salem. Detective
Davis, along with another officer (Detective Beeson), approached Appellant and asked to
speak with her in an informal conversation. She agreed, and the conversation was
recorded. A transcript of this recording is in the record. Appellant stated that she was
very angry on the day of the fire, that Edwards was terrified of her, and admitted she was
the person on the surveillance video screaming at Edwards. Detective Davis asked why
she did not call the fire department. She said she had no phone and that she told Edwards
to call. However, later in the conversation she admitted that she threw Edwards’s phone
out of the window prior to the fire. When asked whether she said “I’m going to burn your
stuff up,” she did not respond. Detective Davis testified that he asked Appellant on May
10, 2025 whether she, in a fit of rage, started the fire on purpose, but Appellant did not
respond. (Trial Tr., p. 330.)
{¶9} Fire Marshal Stitt testified as an expert witness, without objection from
Appellant’s counsel. Stitt, after an extensive investigation, concluded that the fire was an
incendiary fire intentionally started in the bedroom of the apartment using an open flame,
and that an open flame could include something such as a cigarette lighter or a lit
cigarette. (Trial Tr., pp. 233, 242.)
{¶10} Appellant testified that she and Edwards were homeless at the time of fire
and were staying in the apartment as a favor from a friend. She testified that she had a
“horrific fight” with Edwards on the day of the fire. (Trial Tr., p. 414.) She stated:
Case No. 25 CO 0021 –6–
A. I’ve known of a house fire because a lady fell asleep smoking, and her
house burnt down, and she was not held responsible for it.
Q. Okay. But this wasn’t you sleeping and falling asleep with a cigarette;
right? This was you and your boyfriend having an all-out argument and
fight, throwing one another’s things out the windows, and you threatening
to throw his stuff on a fire that was in the bedroom?
A. Yes.
(Trial Tr., p. 413.)
{¶11} The jury found Appellant guilty of both counts on June 5, 2025. Sentencing
was held on June 6, 2025. The court sentenced Appellant to an indefinite six-year
minimum prison term for both counts, to be served consecutively, with a maximum term
of fifteen years. Appellant was also required to register as a lifetime arson offender, and
post-release control was imposed. The judgment entry was filed on June 13, 2025, and
a nunc pro tunc judgment entry was filed on June 18, 2025. This timely appeal was filed
on June 27, 2025. Appellant has raised two assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL BY FAILING TO
SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF A SURVEILLANCE
CAMERA DVD VIDEO COPY OF THE INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR OF
THE APARTMENT BUILDING WHERE THE FIRE IN THIS CASE
Case No. 25 CO 0021 –7–
OCCURRED AS WELL AS THE ADMISSION OF THE EXTRACTED,
SEPARATE AUDIO PORTION OF THE VIDEO CLIPS IN DVD FORM.
{¶12} Appellant argues that the copy of the surveillance video from 647 E. Sixth
Street, Salem, should not have been admitted at trial because it was not the original video.
She also objects to a digital audio clip taken from the surveillance video that was
introduced as evidence at trial. Both the video (which contains audio) and the separate
audio clip are contained on DVD discs that were accepted into evidence as State’s
Exhibits 37 and 38. Appellant argues that Evid.R. 1002, usually referred to as the “best
evidence rule,” requires original recordings to be used as evidence, except as otherwise
permitted by the Rules of Evidence. She contends that duplicates are only permitted
under Evid.R. 1003 when there is a question as to authenticity or when it would be unfair
to admit a copy. Appellant claims that Exhibits 37 and 38 are not the original surveillance
videos and are not accurate copies.
{¶13} Appellant’s arguments are linked to objections made at trial by her trial
counsel. As the video clips from the apartment on the day of the fire were about to be
published to the jury, counsel objected that the DVD clips were not the best evidence,
and that the video clips that he viewed were on a different machine. (Trial Tr., p. 280.)
Counsel believed that when he observed the video it was from the actual machine that
recorded the video. However, the prosecutor explained that what counsel had seen was
a copy of the video that was placed on Detective Davis’s external hard drive. (Trial Tr.,
p. 281.) “So in order to admit them into evidence . . . we need to make actual copies of
them for purposes of admitting them into the record.” (Trial Tr., p. 281.) The prosecutor
stated that Detective Davis had already testified that the video and audio clips were true
Case No. 25 CO 0021 –8–
and accurate recordings as they were retrieved from the DVR system at 647 E. Sixth
Street, that they were shown to counsel, and that the DVD copies accurately reflected the
original content. The court stated: “So it’s just a different format?” The prosecutor
answered: “It’s just a different format, Your Honor.” (Trial Tr., p. 281.) The court
overruled the objection.
Evid.R. 1003 provides that a duplicate is admissible to the same
extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu
of the original. This does not place any limitations on how a party may
authenticate a document, instead allowing all duplicates into evidence to
the same extent as the original. Thus, this allows a party to authenticate a
duplicate in any manner authorized under the law.
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Lake, 2003-Ohio-332, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.).
{¶14} Evid.R. 901 requires evidence to be properly authenticated.
The provisions of Evid.R. 901(A) require only that a proponent of a
document produce “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question” is what the proponent claims it to be. (Emphasis added.) This
low threshold standard does not require conclusive proof of authenticity, but
only sufficient foundational evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that the
document is what its proponent claims it to be.
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Easter, 75 Ohio App.3d 22, 25 (4th Dist.1991).
Case No. 25 CO 0021 –9–
{¶15} Video evidence is authenticated in the same manner as photographic
evidence. State v. Haywood, 2023-Ohio-1121, ¶ 52 (7th Dist.). “[P]hotographic evidence
may be admitted upon a sufficient showing of the reliability of the process or system that
produced the evidence.” State v. Green, 2014-Ohio-648, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). Authenticity is
an evidentiary matter that lies within the discretion of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 11. A trial
court’s ruling on authenticity can only be reversed based on an abuse of discretion. Id.
State v. Shakoor, 2010-Ohio-6386, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.). “Abuse of discretion means an error
in judgment involving a decision that is unreasonable based upon the record; that the
appellate court merely may have reached a different result is not enough.” State v. Dixon,
2013-Ohio-2951, ¶ 21 (7th Dist.).
{¶16} Detective Davis authenticated the DVD recordings. He explained that the
DVD recordings were exact duplicates of the material on his computer hard drive, and
those recordings were taken from the DVR in the apartment building. He described how
the DVR system worked, how he obtained the DVR machine, how he extracted the files,
and how the files ended up on the DVDs. He also explained that there was software on
the DVDs to allow for viewing the recordings. We have viewed and listened to the digital
files that were admitted into evidence and there is no indication that these are different
from the evidence used and discussed at trial.
{¶17} This case is similar to the Haywood case earlier cited. In Haywood, the
defendant challenged the admission of a surveillance video at trial because the original
DVR recording machine was not admitted. Instead, a copy of the video on a flash drive
was submitted as evidence. We stated that it was “not clear why Appellant believe[d] this
was a legal error.” Id. at ¶ 63. This is because in Haywood, a law enforcement officer
Case No. 25 CO 0021 – 10 –
testified that the DVR machine was sent to the state BCI lab, a copy of the video was
retrieved, and the copy was placed on a flash drive. Similarly, in the instant case
Detective Davis testified about the original DVR machine, the process of extracting the
video, and the chain of custody. He testified that the digital video on the DVDs submitted
as evidence was an exact copy of the original. The very low bar for establishing
authenticity has been met in this case, and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial
court allowing the admission of this evidence. Appellant’s first assignment of error has
no merit and is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS FAILURE
TO SUA SPONTE STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF FIRE MARSHAL TODD
STITT FOR HIS FIRE CAUSE DETERMINATION OF “INCENDIARY,”
WHICH REQUIRES AN INTENTIONAL ACT.
{¶18} Appellant argues that the expert testimony of Fire Marshal Stitt should have
been stricken sua sponte by the trial judge because Stitt was not credible. Stitt testified
that there are four causes of fires: natural, incendiary, accidental, and undetermined.
(Trial Tr., pp. 232-233.) Stitt testified that an incendiary fire is deliberately or intentionally
set. (Trial Tr., p. 233.) Stitt filed a report and testified that the fire started in the northeast
area of the bedroom and was intentionally started with an open flame using combustible
material in the room. (Trial Tr., p. 233.) As such, Stitt concluded that the fire was
incendiary and constituted arson. (Trial Tr., p. 233.)
Case No. 25 CO 0021 – 11 –
{¶19} There was no objection to any of this testimony. Without objection, the error
being raised by Appellant can only be reviewed for plain error. State v. Givens, 2024-
Ohio-2563, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.). Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Crim.R. 52(B).
Plain error is a discretionary doctrine that is only used in exceptional circumstances, when
required to avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Noling, 2002-Ohio-7044,
¶ 62. To establish plain error, the defendant must demonstrate that the court committed
an obvious error and must show that the error affected the outcome of trial. State v.
Graham, 2020-Ohio-6700, ¶ 93. In other words, the appellant must show that the
outcome would have been different absent the plain error. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d
21, 27 (2002).
{¶20} Appellant does not challenge Stitt’s expert credentials. Appellant’s trial
counsel stated in court that he did not object to Stitt as an expert. (Trial Tr., p. 201.)
Appellant merely contends that Stitt was not credible. The “trial court is in the best
position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” State
v. White, 2018-Ohio-1339, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366
(1992).
{¶21} Appellant, without any authority, claims an incendiary fire can only be
initiated by open flames applied to a combustible material, and then claims there was no
open flame in this case. However, Appellant actually cites a definition of incendiary that
does not include the “open flame” requirement and merely states that an incendiary fire
is deliberately set with the intent to cause a fire in an area where a fire should not naturally
occur. Further, Stitt concluded there was use of an open flame and that the fire in
Case No. 25 CO 0021 – 12 –
question was started with an open flame. Appellant admits that there were numerous
combustible materials in the room such as clothing, carpet, wood, or polyurethane foam.
Although Appellant believes that her testimony may have contradicted Stitt’s testimony,
she does not specifically cite to any of her testimony to support this argument. Since
Appellant does challenge Stitt’s credentials as an expert, and presented no evidence to
contradict Stitt’s testimony, it was within the province of the jury to believe or disbelieve
Stitt. The jury apparently believed his testimony.
{¶22} Appellant takes issue with a few other aspects of Stitt’s testimony, alleging
that he failed to interview witnesses, found no evidence of an accelerant, and that he was
not aware of any video showing a person starting the fire using an accelerant. None of
these three have any impact as to whether the fire was incendiary or whether Stitt’s expert
opinion was correct or credible. Stitt found ample evidence that there were combustible
materials in the bedroom, and Appellant agreed with that testimony. Stitt testified that an
open flame can consist of a cigarette lighter or even a lit cigarette itself (Trial Tr., p. 242),
and Appellant admitted she was a smoker and was smoking when the fire occurred.
{¶23} As far as examining witnesses, Stitt did speak to various people about the
fire, including firefighters, police, and others who were investigating the crime. For
example, his report states that he interviewed the owner of the apartment, Thomas
Eastek. Thus, Appellant’s allegation that Stitt did not interview witnesses is incorrect.
Stitt also examined the fire scene, investigated the entire apartment building, took
numerous photos of the fire scene (29 of which were entered into evidence), collected
debris from the fire, and used a K-9 officer to help determine whether combustible liquids
were used to start the fire (none were found by the laboratory examination of the items
Case No. 25 CO 0021 – 13 –
collected). Stitt concluded that the fire started in the northeast area of the bedroom by a
person using an open flame that ignited combustible materials in the bedroom, and was
an incendiary fire (meaning a deliberately and intentionally set fire). (Trial Tr., p. 233.)
{¶24} We note that at oral argument Appellant additionally contended that federal
guidelines have abolished the category of “incendiary,” and so it was improper for Stitt to
have so classified this fire. Appellant appears to believe that Ohio rules in this regard
must comport with federal. Regardless, this issue was not briefed, and so was not
properly raised for the first time at oral argument in this matter.
{¶25} Even without Stitt’s testimony, there is considerable evidence that Appellant
caused the fire and that this act was intentional. The video evidence establishes that
Edwards was not in the apartment when the fire started. Appellant can be heard shouting
at or very near the time the fire started: “Burning it all down, all of it. Fuck you. It’s all up
in flames.” (Trial Tr., pp. 300-301; Exh. 37.) She admitted to smoking a lit “blunt” when
the fire started, and that a cigarette or “blunt” could cause a fire. When asked if she and
Edwards had an argument and if she threatened to throw his belongings on a fire in the
bedroom, she answered “Yes.” (Trial Tr., p. 413.) She testified that she threw Edwards’s
phone out the window. It is logical to infer from this testimony that Appellant prevented
Edwards from calling 911 to report the fire. Within one minute after telling Edwards that
the bedroom was on fire and his belongings were burning, she fled the scene in a pickup
truck. She did not call 911 to report the fire at any time. All of this evidence tends to
show that she was in the apartment alone, had the ability to start a fire, had materials to
create an incendiary fire, had a motive to start the fire, made statements showing her
intent to cause a fire, and attempted to prevent the fire from being reported. Based on all
Case No. 25 CO 0021 – 14 –
of this evidence, and based on the power of the jury to determine the credibility of
testimony, there is no plain error in this case in the jury’s reliance on the testimony and
expert conclusions of Fire Marshal Stitt. Appellant's second assignment of error is without
merit and is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶26} Appellant challenges her conviction on two counts of aggravated arson.
She argues video and audio evidence should not have been admitted at trial because
they violated the best evidence rule found in Evid.R. 1003. The state made copies of
surveillance videos (including audio) that were recorded at the time of fire. The state also
extracted the audio from the video files and separately copied the audio files to a disk.
The digital clips were exact copies of the original files taken from a DVR at the apartment
building where the fire occurred. The DVD recordings of those clips were introduced as
evidence and were properly authenticated and were presented to the jury. Appellant has
not shown how these recordings may have violated the best evidence rule, and her first
assignment of error has no merit. She also contends that the trial judge committed plain
error by failing to strike the expert witness testimony of the fire marshal, particularly as to
his conclusion that the fire was an incendiary fire that was intentionally started. Appellant
believes the fire marshal was not credible, but credibility is determined by the jury. The
witness fully supported his opinion that the fire was incendiary, and Appellant has cited
to nothing in the record to undermine that opinion. Further, there is ample support in the
record as a whole, including Appellant’s own testimony, to support the conclusion that
she set the fire intentionally. Appellant’s second assignment of error is also without merit,
and her convictions and sentence are affirmed.
Case No. 25 CO 0021 – 15 –
Robb, J. concurs.
Dickey, J. concurs.
Case No. 25 CO 0021 [Cite as State v. Craig, 2026-Ohio-200.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignments of
error are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment
of the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs waived.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.