State v. Crabtree

2025 Ohio 5674

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: 2025 CA 0018
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Crabtree, 2025-Ohio-5674.]

COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025 CA 0018

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024 CR 0185 CHRISTOPHER CRABTREE Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry:December 19, 2025

BEFORE: CRAIG R. BALDWIN, P.J., WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J.; Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: R. KYLE WITT, By LORI D. PRITCHARD for Plaintiff-Appellee; TODD W. BARSTOW for Defendant-Appellant

OPINION

Popham, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Christopher Crabtree (“Crabtree”) appeals his

conviction for Aggravated Possession of Drugs (methamphetamine) after a jury trial in the

Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. Crabtree contends that the evidence presented

at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that his conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the

trial court.

Facts and Procedural History {¶2} On April 17, 2024, a Fairfield County grand jury indicted Crabtree on one

count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs (methamphetamine), a fifth-degree felony in

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a). The matter proceeded to a jury trial

commencing on April 29, 2025. The following evidence was presented at trial.

{¶3} Officer Austin Michael Eugene Pierce testified that on January 17, 2024,

while on patrol, he observed Cressy Robbins, a known drug trafficker, seated in the

passenger seat of a pickup truck driven by Crabtree. Trial Transcript (“T.”) at 129, 180.

Officer Pierce testified that Robbins quickly exited the truck and ran into an apartment. T.

at 129, 160-161, 180. Officer Pierce then followed Crabtree’s vehicle and initiated a traffic

stop. Id. at 128-130.

{¶4} Officer Esferiner Delgado arrived shortly thereafter and assisted the other

passenger, Angel Thacker, in exiting the vehicle.1 T. at 154. A records check revealed that

Thacker had an active warrant. Id. at 132, 155-156. The interaction was recorded on

Officer Delgado’s body camera. Id. at 161; State’s Exhibit B.

{¶5} Crabtree consented to a search of his truck. T. at 130, 156. During the

search, Officer Pierce located a glass pipe on the passenger-side floorboard. T. at 132,

135; State’s Exhibit A-3. Officer Pierce testified that such pipes are commonly used to

smoke methamphetamine. Id. at 135. He further testified that Officer Delgado discovered

a small bag containing methamphetamine “on [sic] Ms. Thacker’s pocket.” Id. at 133.

{¶6} Officer Delgado testified that after Crabtree got out of his truck, he asked

Crabtree if he had any weapons on his person. T. at 156; State’s Exhibit B at 00:10:39.

Crabtree told the officer that he had a knife, which Officer Delgado removed from

1 Thacker indicated that she was on her way to the hospital for dialysis and needed assistance to

exit the vehicle because her crutches were in the back of the truck. T. at 131, 154-156. Crabtree’s pocket. Id. Officer Delgado testified that he asked Crabtree to empty his

pockets. Id. at 157; State’s Exhibit B at 00:11:20. Officer Delgado testified,

So, with his left hand he went inside his left pocket - - pants pocket

and he - - when he pulled it out, there was an item that fell out of his left

hand of his possession onto the ground, and I observed it fall from his

person.

T. at 158; State’s Exhibit B at 00:11:31-00:11:36.

{¶7} Officer Delgado told Crabtree, “You just dropped a bag of meth right there.”

State’s Exhibit B at 00:11:36. He then informed Crabtree that he was under arrest for

possession. State’s Exhibit B at 00:11:54. Officer Delgado read Crabtree his Miranda

rights. T. at 159; State’s Exhibit B at 00:14:34. When asked where he obtained the drugs,

Crabtree replied that he got them from “Cressy” and asked, “What’s that do for me?” Id.;

State’s Exhibit B at 00:18:30. Crabtree admitted purchasing the drugs from Cressy. State’s

Exhibit B at 00:19:10.

{¶8} Subsequent laboratory testing confirmed that the substance recovered by

Officer Delgado was approximately 1.08 grams of methamphetamine. T. at 205-206;

State’s Exhibit D.

{¶9} The defense presented no witnesses or exhibits. The jury found Crabtree

guilty of Aggravated Possession of Drugs (methamphetamine), a fifth-degree felony in

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a). T. at 258.

{¶10} The trial court sentenced Crabtree to seven months in prison, to be served

consecutively to his sentences in Ross County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. 23 CR

462 and 23 CR 463. Id. at 267-268. The court also imposed two years of discretionary post-release control, a $700 fine, court costs, and a three-year driver’s license suspension.

Id.

Assignment of Error

{¶11} Crabtree raises one assignment of error for our consideration,

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE

PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO

CONSTITUTION BY FINDING HIM GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF

DRUGS AS THAT VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND

WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

{¶13} In his sole assignment of error, Crabtree argues his conviction is against

the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

Standard of Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶14} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law,

which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30; State v. Jordan,

2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 13. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by an impartial

jury, and the Due Process Clause requires the State to prove each element of a charged

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-510

(1995); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016).

{¶15} When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, the appellate court examines the

statutory elements of the offense in light of the evidence presented at trial. State v.

Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13. The reviewing court does not assess witness

credibility or weigh conflicting testimony. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds

as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 n.4 (1997). The question is whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543 (2001), citing Jenks; Walker, at ¶ 31; State v.

Poutney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19.

{¶16} A conviction will not be reversed for insufficient evidence unless reasonable

minds could reach only one conclusion - acquittal. State v. Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶

94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997), accord State v. Montgomery,

2016-Ohio-5487, ¶ 74.

Governing Law

{¶17} Crabtree was convicted of Aggravated Possession of Drugs

(methamphetamine) under R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a), which provide in relevant part:

(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled

substance or a controlled substance analog.

(C)(1)(a) If the drug involved is a compound, mixture, preparation,

or substance included in Schedule I or II, the offender is guilty of aggravated

possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree.

“Knowingly”

{¶18} Under R.C. 2901.22(B), a person acts knowingly when he is aware that his

conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.

Knowledge may be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the act itself. State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 38 (1978), citing State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio

St. 27 (1936); see also State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 (1992).

“Possession”

{¶19} “Possession” is defined as having control over a thing or substance, though

it cannot be inferred solely from access to the premises where the item is found. R.C.

2925.01(K). Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Butler, 42 Ohio St.3d 174,

176 (1989); State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87 (1982), syllabus. Constructive

possession exists where the defendant has the ability to exercise dominion or control over

the contraband, even if it is not in his immediate physical possession. State v. Wolery, 46

Ohio St.2d 316, 332 (1976). Dominion and control may be established through

circumstantial evidence, including proximity to the contraband. State v. Trembly, 137 Ohio

App.3d 134 (8th Dist. 2000); State v. Morales, 2005-Ohio-4714, ¶ 50 (5th Dist.).

Circumstantial Evidence

{¶20} Circumstantial and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative

value. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 272. It is not necessary that circumstantial evidence be

irreconcilable with every reasonable theory of innocence to support a conviction. Id. All

that is required is that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, convince the trier of

fact of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Analysis – Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶21} Applying these principles, Crabtree’s sufficiency challenge fails.

{¶22} The record demonstrates that Officer Delgado observed that, while

Crabtree was removing items from his pants pocket, an item fell to the ground, which was identified as a bag of methamphetamine. State’s Exhibit B at 00:11:31-00:11:36. Delgado

can be heard on the body-camera recording stating, “You just dropped a bag of meth right

there.” Id. at 00:11:36. The video further depicts Delgado retrieving the bag and showing

it to Crabtree. After receiving his Miranda warnings, Crabtree admitted that he had

purchased the drugs from Cressy Robbins. Id. at 00:18:30-00:19:10.

{¶23} This direct evidence, corroborated by forensic testing confirming that the

bag contained 1.08 grams of methamphetamine, was sufficient for the jury to find that

Crabtree knowingly possessed a controlled substance in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A).

{¶24} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational trier of fact could find all elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. Accordingly, the State met its burden of production, and Crabtree’s conviction is

supported by legally sufficient evidence.

Standard of Review – Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶25} A manifest-weight challenge concerns the persuasive value of the evidence

rather than its legal sufficiency. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. The inquiry

focuses on “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence to support one side

of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997),

superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in Smith, 80 Ohio

St.3d at 102 n.4.

{¶26} In conducting this review, the appellate court examines the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers witness credibility, and

determines whether the jury clearly lost its way, creating a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Thompkins, at 387; State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. {¶27} This review is necessarily deferential to the jury, which is in the best position

to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, tone, and manner of testifying. Eastley, ¶ 21;

Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). A conviction will be

reversed on manifest-weight grounds only in the exceptional case where the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction. Thompkins, at 387. Moreover, Article IV, Section

3(B)(3) of the Ohio Constitution requires that all three judges on the appellate panel concur

in such a reversal.

Analysis – Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶28} Crabtree contends that inconsistencies existed regarding where the

methamphetamine was found, i.e., Officer Pierce testifying that Officer Delgado told him

that he found the drugs “on [sic] Ms. Thacher’s pocket” and Officer Delgado testifying that

he saw them drop from Crabtree’s hand as Crabtree emptied his pockets.

{¶29} The jury, however, was entitled to resolve those discrepancies and evidently

found the body camera video resolved the apparent inconsistency in the testimony. The

law is well settled that the trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony.

State v. Petty, 2017-Ohio-1062, ¶ 63 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Mullins, 2016-Ohio-8347,

¶ 39 (10th Dist.); see also State v. Davis, 2024-Ohio-1504, ¶ 60 (5th Dist.).

{¶30} Minor inconsistencies in testimony do not render a conviction against the

manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Craig, 2000 Ohio App.LEXIS 1138, *10 (10th Dist.

Mar. 23, 2000). When there exist two reasonable interpretations of the evidence, neither

of which is implausible, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the

factfinder. State v. Dyke, 2002-Ohio-1152, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.); State v. Snider, 2012-Ohio-

2183, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). {¶31} Having independently reviewed the record, weighed the evidence, and

considered the credibility of the witnesses as a “thirteenth juror,” we find no indication that

the jury lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Conclusion

{¶32} The evidence presented at trial was both legally sufficient and persuasively

credible to support Crabtree’s conviction for Aggravated Possession of Drugs

(methamphetamine) under R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a). Accordingly, the sole

assignment of error is overruled.

For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Fairfield County Court

of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Costs to Appellant, Christopher Crabtree.

By: Popham, J.

Baldwin, P.J. and

Hoffman J., concur