NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 28-DEC-2020 08:03 AM Dkt. 37 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT T. COVINGTON, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (#EWA DIVISION) (CASE NO. 1DTC-19-018947)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Hiraoka, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Robert T. Covington, Jr.
(Covington) appeals from an (amended) August 13, 2019 Notice of
Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment (Judgment)
entered against him by the District Court of the First Circuit,
#Ewa Division, (District Court).1 After a bench trial, Covington
was convicted of Driving Without a License (DWOL), in violation
of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-102 (Supp. 2019),2 and
1 The Honorable William M. Domingo presided. 2 HRS § 286-102 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 286-102 Licensing. (a) No person, except one: (1) Exempted under section 286-105;
(continued...) NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Driving Without Motor Vehicle Insurance (DWOI), in violation of
HRS § 431:10C-104(a) (2019).3
Covington raises two points of error on appeal
contending that the District Court erred in: (1) concluding that
sufficient evidence was adduced at trial proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Covington committed the offense of DWOL in
violation of HRS § 286-102, and (2) concluding that sufficient
evidence was adduced at trial proving, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Covington committed the offense of DWOI in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104(a).
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
2 (...continued) (2) Who holds an instruction permit under section 286-110;
(3) Who holds a limited purpose driver's license, limited purpose provisional driver's license, or limited purpose instruction permit under section 286-104.5;
(4) Who holds a provisional license under section 286-102.6; (5) Who holds a commercial driver's license issued under section 286-239; or (6) Who holds a commercial driver's license instruction permit issued under section 286-236,
shall operate any category of motor vehicles listed in this section without first being appropriately examined and duly licensed as a qualified driver of that category of motor vehicles. 3 HRS § 431:10C-104 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 431:10C-104. Conditions of operation and registration of motor vehicles. (a) Except as provided in section 431:10C-105, no person shall operate or use a motor vehicle upon any public street, road, or highway of this State at any time unless such motor vehicle is insured at all times under a motor vehicle insurance policy.
2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Covington's points of error as follows:
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has held that an officer's
testimony that a defendant failed to produce proof of no-fault
insurance, along with the defendant's admission to the officer
that he did not have no-fault insurance, was sufficient evidence
to sustain a conviction for DWOI. State v. Lee, 90 Hawai#i 130,
135, 976 P.2d 444, 449 (1999). The supreme court noted that "it
appears that it was the legislature's intent that the trier of fact might infer from the inability to produce an insurance
identification card that there was no no-fault insurance coverage
of the vehicle or the driver." Id.
Here, Honolulu Police Department Sergeant Melvin
Conjugacion (Sgt. Conjugacion) testified that, after stopping a
vehicle that had no license plate, he asked the driver, who he
identified as Covington, for his license, insurance, and
registration. Covington responded, inter alia, that he did not
have a license or insurance because he did not recognize the
government. Instead, Covington produced a Hawai#i State ID card
to Sgt. Conjugacion.
Here, like the supreme court in Lee, we conclude that
Sgt. Conjugacion's testimony to the effect that Covington failed
to produce proof of no-fault insurance upon request, along with
Covington's admission that he did not have no-fault insurance,
was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for DWOI.
3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
The Lee court commented on the legislative history of
the no-fault statute as supporting a conviction based simply on
an inference from a defendant's inability to produce an insurance
identification card – even without a confession. But here, as in
Lee, the defendant (Covington) confessed to not having insurance
or a driver's license, as well as failed to produce an insurance
card or driver's license. Covington cites State v. Yoshida, 44
Haw. 352, 354 P.2d 986 (1960), for the proposition that
Covington's confession is not sufficient to establish the crime of DWOL, because it is unsupported by any other evidence.4 In
Yoshida, the supreme court described the following as a
"satisfactory general statement of the principle applicable on
this appeal": The general rule now is that while the corpus delicti cannot be established by the extrajudicial confession of the defendant unsupported by any other evidence, it may be established by such a confession corroborated by other facts and circumstances. It is not necessary to prove the corpus delicti by evidence entirely independent and exclusive of the confession, but sufficient proof to convict exists when the corpus delicti is established by other evidence and the confession taken together.
Id. at 360, 354 P.2d at 991 (citation omitted).
The supreme court clarified that the "other evidence"
itself need not be sufficient to sustain a conviction, favorably
quoting the following proposition stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court: [W]e think the better rule to be that the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. It is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to
4 Covington makes the same argument for DWOI, but we conclude that Lee controls and we need not address it further.
4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
establish the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, the independent evidence serves a dual function. It tends to make the admission reliable, thus corroborating it while also establishing independently the other necessary elements of the offense.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 28-DEC-2020 08:03 AM Dkt. 37 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT T. COVINGTON, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (#EWA DIVISION) (CASE NO. 1DTC-19-018947)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Hiraoka, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Robert T. Covington, Jr.
(Covington) appeals from an (amended) August 13, 2019 Notice of
Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment (Judgment)
entered against him by the District Court of the First Circuit,
#Ewa Division, (District Court).1 After a bench trial, Covington
was convicted of Driving Without a License (DWOL), in violation
of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-102 (Supp. 2019),2 and
1 The Honorable William M. Domingo presided. 2 HRS § 286-102 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 286-102 Licensing. (a) No person, except one: (1) Exempted under section 286-105;
(continued...) NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Driving Without Motor Vehicle Insurance (DWOI), in violation of
HRS § 431:10C-104(a) (2019).3
Covington raises two points of error on appeal
contending that the District Court erred in: (1) concluding that
sufficient evidence was adduced at trial proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Covington committed the offense of DWOL in
violation of HRS § 286-102, and (2) concluding that sufficient
evidence was adduced at trial proving, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Covington committed the offense of DWOI in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104(a).
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
2 (...continued) (2) Who holds an instruction permit under section 286-110;
(3) Who holds a limited purpose driver's license, limited purpose provisional driver's license, or limited purpose instruction permit under section 286-104.5;
(4) Who holds a provisional license under section 286-102.6; (5) Who holds a commercial driver's license issued under section 286-239; or (6) Who holds a commercial driver's license instruction permit issued under section 286-236,
shall operate any category of motor vehicles listed in this section without first being appropriately examined and duly licensed as a qualified driver of that category of motor vehicles. 3 HRS § 431:10C-104 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 431:10C-104. Conditions of operation and registration of motor vehicles. (a) Except as provided in section 431:10C-105, no person shall operate or use a motor vehicle upon any public street, road, or highway of this State at any time unless such motor vehicle is insured at all times under a motor vehicle insurance policy.
2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Covington's points of error as follows:
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has held that an officer's
testimony that a defendant failed to produce proof of no-fault
insurance, along with the defendant's admission to the officer
that he did not have no-fault insurance, was sufficient evidence
to sustain a conviction for DWOI. State v. Lee, 90 Hawai#i 130,
135, 976 P.2d 444, 449 (1999). The supreme court noted that "it
appears that it was the legislature's intent that the trier of fact might infer from the inability to produce an insurance
identification card that there was no no-fault insurance coverage
of the vehicle or the driver." Id.
Here, Honolulu Police Department Sergeant Melvin
Conjugacion (Sgt. Conjugacion) testified that, after stopping a
vehicle that had no license plate, he asked the driver, who he
identified as Covington, for his license, insurance, and
registration. Covington responded, inter alia, that he did not
have a license or insurance because he did not recognize the
government. Instead, Covington produced a Hawai#i State ID card
to Sgt. Conjugacion.
Here, like the supreme court in Lee, we conclude that
Sgt. Conjugacion's testimony to the effect that Covington failed
to produce proof of no-fault insurance upon request, along with
Covington's admission that he did not have no-fault insurance,
was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for DWOI.
3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
The Lee court commented on the legislative history of
the no-fault statute as supporting a conviction based simply on
an inference from a defendant's inability to produce an insurance
identification card – even without a confession. But here, as in
Lee, the defendant (Covington) confessed to not having insurance
or a driver's license, as well as failed to produce an insurance
card or driver's license. Covington cites State v. Yoshida, 44
Haw. 352, 354 P.2d 986 (1960), for the proposition that
Covington's confession is not sufficient to establish the crime of DWOL, because it is unsupported by any other evidence.4 In
Yoshida, the supreme court described the following as a
"satisfactory general statement of the principle applicable on
this appeal": The general rule now is that while the corpus delicti cannot be established by the extrajudicial confession of the defendant unsupported by any other evidence, it may be established by such a confession corroborated by other facts and circumstances. It is not necessary to prove the corpus delicti by evidence entirely independent and exclusive of the confession, but sufficient proof to convict exists when the corpus delicti is established by other evidence and the confession taken together.
Id. at 360, 354 P.2d at 991 (citation omitted).
The supreme court clarified that the "other evidence"
itself need not be sufficient to sustain a conviction, favorably
quoting the following proposition stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court: [W]e think the better rule to be that the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. It is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to
4 Covington makes the same argument for DWOI, but we conclude that Lee controls and we need not address it further.
4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
establish the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, the independent evidence serves a dual function. It tends to make the admission reliable, thus corroborating it while also establishing independently the other necessary elements of the offense. It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth. Those facts plus the other evidence besides the admission must, of course, be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 359, 354 P.2d at 991 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
In Yoshida, there was nothing in the "independent
evidence" that proved the defendant's intent as positively and
directly as his confession, but the circumstances tended to
support his intent to solicit prostitution. Id. at 360-61, 354
P.2d at 992. Here, Covington's failure to produce a driver's
license, when requested by Sgt. Conjugacion, did not positively
and directly prove that he did not have a driver's license.
However, it did provide circumstantial evidence tending to show
that he did not in fact hold a valid driver's license. In
addition to simply confessing that he did not have a license,
Covington further offered a reason or explanation as to his
motivation for why he did not have a driver's license – that he
did not recognize the government. Viewing all of the evidence
and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that Covington's confession that he did
not have a license, along with the circumstantial evidence in
this case, was sufficient to support his conviction for DWOL.
5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
For these reasons, the District Court's August 13, 2019
Judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, December 28, 2020.
On the briefs: /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza Walter J. Rodby, Chief Judge for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Loren J. Thomas, Associate Judge Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka for Plaintiff-Appellee. Associate Judge