State v. Cotton

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 8, 2026
• Docket: 30664
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Cotton, 2026-Ohio-1677.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30664 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 25CRB2558 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) JAMAR COTTON : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellant : OPINION :

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 8, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed and this matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of

issuing a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that accurately reflects that appellant was convicted

following a bench trial.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30664

DAVID R. MILES, Attorney for Appellant MARIE POINSATTE, Attorney for Appellee

EPLEY, J.

{¶ 1} Jamar Cotton appeals from his conviction for aggravated menacing, a first-

degree misdemeanor, following a bench trial in the Dayton Municipal Court. Cotton asserts

that his conviction is based on insufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. He further claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial and that

the trial court’s judgment entry erroneously indicates that he entered a guilty plea. For the

following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed, and this matter is remanded to the

trial court for the sole purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc judgment entry to reflect the manner

of Cotton’s conviction.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} The facts introduced at trial indicate that on July 15, 2025, Janie and Jessica

Williams, along with Janie’s son and stepson, brought balloons to the Xenia Bridge in Dayton

where there was a memorial for a child who had been murdered. Cotton was also present

at the bridge with his seven-year-old son. Janie and Jessica are sisters, and they know

Cotton through their prior friendship with his child’s mother, Chelsea Ray. During the bench

trial, Janie testified that she had previous issues with Chelsea, and a few months before this

incident, Chelsea accused Janie of coming to her home with a firearm and pointing it at

Chelsea and Cotton’s son. Janie denied this.

{¶ 3} Janie testified that while at the memorial, Cotton approached them very

aggressively and began threatening to “kill [them] and everyone around [them]”. She further

2 recalled that Cotton said, “Stay away from my son,” and “don’t talk about my son” while he

was confronting her and Jessica. Janie recounted that she was able to grab her son and

stepson before running across the street. According to Janie, Cotton was blocking Jessica

from crossing the street, but Jessica was eventually able to step around him and follow

Janie. Once they were all safely across the street, Janie called 911 and Cotton left the scene

with his son. Janie testified that as they were leaving the scene, Chelsea drove past them

with her window down and said, “Gotcha, bitch.” Janie, Jessica, and Janie’s son and stepson

then went to Jessica’s house, where the police responded. Janie testified that she had

previously witnessed Cotton physically abuse Chelsea, and believed Cotton would follow

through on his threats to harm or kill them.

{¶ 4} Janie’s sister, Jessica, also testified during the bench trial. Jessica recalled that

while visiting the memorial on the bridge, Cotton approached her and began screaming in

her face. She said that Cotton was so close to her face that he was touching her, and he

yelled, “Bitch, do you not know I don’t play about my son? Keep my son’s name out your

mouth. Do you not know I will kill you and everybody around me? I’m not scared of you. I’m

not scared of you.” Jessica testified that Cotton is significantly taller than she is and that as

he was yelling at her, he was hovering over her with his hand in her face. Jessica recalled

that Janie’s sons, as well as Cotton’s son, were visibly shaken and scared. Jessica stated

that when they were able to start walking away, Cotton followed them and continued

repeating his threats. Jessica indicated that Cotton left the scene after they all reached the

other side of the street and Janie called 911. Jessica said that she had also witnessed Cotton

abuse Chelsea, so she believed that he would act on his threats to harm them.

{¶ 5} Cotton testified on his own behalf and denied threatening Janie or Jessica in

any way. He testified that instead, he only told Jessica to “leave the kids out of it,” and he

3 recalled repeating that five or six times. Cotton denied threatening anyone’s life, threatening

to harm anyone, or using any profanity. Contrary to Janie’s and Jessica’s testimony, Cotton

stated that the encounter ended when “Janie gave [him] some nice feedback” regarding his

son, to which he responded by reiterating his wish that she “leave the kids out of it” before

he walked away. Cotton testified that as he was walking away, “Janie was on the phone and

she said something in regard to something that got [his] attention.” He recalled that he

decided to call Chelsea at that point to tell her to come pick up their son because her friends

were there and they were “acting weird and tripping.” Cotton acknowledged that when he

walked away, he walked in the opposite direction from where his car was parked because it

was close to where Janie and Jessica were walking. He said that he did not know what they

were doing or who Janie was calling, but it made him nervous. Cotton denied knowing that

Janie and Jessica would be at the bridge that day and testified that he was not looking for

them.

{¶ 6} Cotton was charged with one count of aggravated menacing, and on September

23, 2025, a bench trial was held in the Dayton Municipal Court. On September 25, 2025, the

trial court found Cotton guilty as charged. On October 8, 2025, Cotton was sentenced to

180 days in the Montgomery County Jail, which was suspended, and he was placed on basic

supervised probation for a period of six months. Cotton was further ordered to complete an

anger management program through the Montgomery County Probation Department and

pay a fine of $100.00 plus court costs. The trial court granted Jessica Williams’s request for

a post-conviction no contact order against Cotton.

{¶ 7} Cotton now appeals the trial court’s judgment. He raises four assignments of

error.

4 II. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 8} In his first and second assignments of error, Cotton asserts that his conviction

for aggravated menacing is based upon insufficient evidence and is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Because these assignments of error are interrelated, we address

them together.

{¶ 9} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant inquiry is whether

the evidence presented, if believed, was sufficient to support the conviction.” State v.

Anderson, 2024-Ohio-2003, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-3311, ¶ 16. The

question is whether any rational finder of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable

to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997). A guilty verdict will not

be disturbed on appeal unless “reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached

by the trier-of-fact.” Id.

{¶ 10} Conversely, “a weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of

the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more

believable or persuasive.” Anderson at ¶ 14, citing State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12

(2d Dist.). “When evaluating whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id.,

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). “The fact that the evidence is

subject to different interpretations does not render a conviction against the manifest weight

of the evidence.” Id., citing Wilson at ¶ 14. “A judgment of conviction should be reversed as

5 being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

172, 175 (1st Dist.).

{¶ 11} Cotton was convicted of one count of aggravated menacing in violation of

R.C. 2903.21(A), which states: “No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the

offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person, the

other person’s unborn, or a member of the other person’s immediate family.”

{¶ 12} R.C. 2901.22(B) provides the following definition of “knowingly”: “A person acts

knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will

probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has

knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably

exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such

knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of

its existence and fails to make an inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning

the fact.”

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

{¶ 13} With respect to Cotton’s assertion that his conviction is based on insufficient

evidence, he contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

acted knowingly. He states that he denied threatening Janie or Jessica and notes that there

was no testimony regarding his criminal intent or culpable mental state.

{¶ 14} However, “[c]ulpable mental states are frequently demonstrated through

circumstantial evidence,” and “[a] defendant’s state of mind may be inferred from the totality

of the circumstances.” State v. Leigh, 2023-Ohio-91, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.). In this case, both Janie

and Jessica testified that Cotton accosted them aggressively while they were at the

6 memorial on the bridge. Further, they both testified that they believed that Cotton would

follow through on his threats to harm them based on his demeanor on the bridge, as well as

the fact that they had both previously witnessed him abuse Chelsea. During Jessica’s

testimony, she described Cotton’s intimidating physical presence, and recalled that he was

so close to her during the encounter that she could feel his spittle hitting her face as he

screamed at her. Both Janie and Jessica described Cotton’s son and Janie’s son and

stepson as visibly frightened and upset during this encounter. Accordingly, based on the

evidence and testimony presented, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to

reasonably conclude that Cotton acted knowingly when he approached Janie and Jessica

and confronted them on the bridge, and that his conduct made them believe that he would

cause serious physical harm to them.

B. Manifest Weight

{¶ 15} Similarly, Cotton’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Cotton asserts that Janie’s and Jessica’s testimony lacked credibility because

they had previous issues with Chelsea and did not present the 911 call or other evidence to

corroborate their testimony. Cotton states that this, along with the fact that he testified that

he did not threaten Janie or Jessica, establishes that the trial court lost its way when it

convicted him of aggravated menacing. He further asserts that this matter should be

remanded for a jury trial.

{¶ 16} First, because aggravated menacing is considered a “petty offense” under

Crim.R. 2(D), “where there is a right of jury trial, the defendant shall be tried by the court

unless he demands a jury trial.” Cotton did not demand a jury trial, and therefore it was

appropriate for the trial court to hear this case and make determinations as to the issues of

fact and law.

7 {¶ 17} Next, Cotton appears to argue that his testimony denying the allegations

against him and the absence of police officer testimony and of evidence of the 911 call are

enough to establish that the trial court lost its way when it found him guilty. However, Janie

and Jessica testified in detail about Cotton’s behavior towards them during the incident.

They both described how angry Cotton appeared and how fearful they were that he would

follow through with his threats to harm them and people close to them.

{¶ 18} Additionally, Cotton’s testimony included various inconsistencies. Specifically,

although Cotton stated that his interaction with Janie and Jessica on the bridge was peaceful

and did not include any threats or profanity, he acknowledged that he heard Janie call 911

and tell the operator that she was scared. Cotton also admitted that when he left the scene

with his son, he walked in the opposite direction from where his car was parked. According

to Cotton, this was because Janie and Jessica were near his car and he was “nervous” about

potential conflict. Cotton’s own testimony, however, establishes that Janie was the one who

had expressed fear and called the police. Cotton failed to provide any explanation as to why

he would have been worried about his safety or potential conflict with Janie and Jessica if

the encounter had taken place as calmly and peacefully as he described. Instead, it appears

from the evidence and testimony submitted to the trial court that Cotton had confronted Janie

and Jessica in a manner that made them fearful enough to call 911, and upon hearing that

the police had been called, he left the scene. Markedly, Cotton also admitted to calling

Chelsea to come pick their son up from the scene after his encounter with Janie and Jessica.

This not only corroborates Janie’s and Jessica’s testimony that Chelsea drove past them

immediately after the confrontation, but it also demonstrates that the incident created a

situation that was unsafe for Cotton’s child and undermines Cotton’s testimony that the

interaction on the bridge was calm and civil.

8 {¶ 19} Therefore, the trial court did not lose its way when it weighed the evidence and

testimony and determined that Janie and Jessica were more credible than Cotton. Cotton’s

conviction for aggravated menacing is based on sufficient evidence and not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Cotton’s first and second assignments of error

are overruled.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 20} In his third assignment of error, Cotton claims that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his attorney did not present certain evidence at trial. Cotton

argues that his son witnessed the entire interaction, but he was not called to testify. Cotton

also faults the lack of testimony from any of the police officers who responded to Janie’s 911

call. Cotton maintains that the trial court “did not get the picture of the entire incident.”

{¶ 21} “We review the alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

under the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and

adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989).” State

v. Clinard, 2011-Ohio-876, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.). “Pursuant to those cases, trial counsel is entitled

to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

assistance.” Id., citing Strickland at 688. In addition, “[t]he failure to call a witness to testify

ordinarily is a matter of trial strategy that will not be second-guessed by a reviewing court.”

Id. at ¶ 51, citing State v. Mills, 2004-Ohio-267, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). Rather, “defense counsel's

decision not to call a witness is afforded a presumption of reasonableness.” Id., citing

Beavercreek v. LeValley, 2007-Ohio-2105, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 22} “As a further matter, it is well established that ‘in direct appeals appellate courts

do not consider claims that rest on matters outside the record.’” State v. Hopkins, 2025-

Ohio-4681, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Carver, 2022-Ohio-2653, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.).

9 “Therefore, if demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel requires proof outside the

record, then such claim is not properly raised in a direct appeal.” Id., citing State v. White,

2018-Ohio-3076, ¶ 71 (2d Dist.) (“[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be

asserted on direct appeal if it relies on matters outside the record”), citing State v. Harris,

2017-Ohio-9052, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 23} Here, although Cotton contends that the failure to call his son or the police

officers who responded to Janie’s 911 call constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel,

there is no evidence in the record to support this claim. Cotton cannot offer anything beyond

mere speculation as to what his son or the police officers might have said. Further, the record

is devoid of any evidence as to the contents of their testimony or any indication that this

testimony would have changed the trial court’s ultimate determination of his guilt.

{¶ 24} Therefore, Cotton’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel relies on

matters outside the record and cannot be considered on direct appeal. Cotton’s third

assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Manner of Conviction

{¶ 25} In his fourth and final assignment of error, Cotton asserts that the trial court

erroneously checked the box on the judgment entry of conviction indicating that he had

entered a guilty plea, rather than that he had been found guilty following a bench trial. He

requests that the trial court issue a nunc pro tunc entry to correct this clerical error, and the

State agrees.

{¶ 26} Therefore, we sustain Cotton’s fourth assignment of error. We remand the

matter to the trial court to file a nunc pro tunc judgment entry to reflect that Cotton was

convicted following a bench trial, not upon entering a plea of guilty.

10 V. Conclusion

{¶ 27} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed, and this matter is remanded to the trial

court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that accurately

reflects that Cotton was convicted following a bench trial.

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TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.