State v. Cotten

241 So. 3d 457
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 14, 2018
Docket17–684
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 241 So. 3d 457 (State v. Cotten) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Cotten, 241 So. 3d 457 (La. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

COOKS, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 6, 2014, nine-month-old Aiden Dyson was left by his mother in the care of his step-father, Defendant, Billy Dean Cotten, while she went to work. Several hours later, the victim was taken to the hospital suffering from life threatening injuries requiring him to be placed on life support. The following day, after it was determined that Aiden had no brain activity, he was removed from life support.

After an investigation by the authorities, Defendant was jointly charged with his wife, Darlene Michelle Cotten, by bill of indictment with the March 6, 2014, second degree murder of Defendant's step-son, Aiden Dyson. A jury unanimously convicted Defendant of the charged offense, and the court subsequently imposed a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. From this conviction and sentence, Defendant appeals.

ANALYSIS

Assignment of Error One

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction of second degree murder in that it failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the death was caused accidentally and unintentionally.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 states in pertinent part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
....
*459(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, ... even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

Cruelty to juveniles is defined in pertinent part as:

(1) The intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone seventeen years of age or older of any child under the age of seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child. Lack of knowledge of the child's age shall not be a defense[.]

La.R.S. 14:93.

Second degree cruelty to juveniles is defined in pertinent part as follows:

A. (1) Second degree cruelty to juveniles is the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone over the age of seventeen to any child under the age of seventeen which causes serious bodily injury or neurological impairment to that child.
(2) For purposes of this Section, "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury involving protracted and obvious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or substantial risk of death.

La.R.S. 14:93.2.3.

In State v. Jackson , 15-393 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/15), 179 So.3d 753, 767-69, writ denied, 15-2191 (La. 5/2/16), 206 So.3d 877, this court reviewed the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented in a second degree murder case which was based on cruelty to a juvenile. In doing so, this court stated:

In State v. Taylor , 14-432, pp. 7-8 (La. 3/17/15), 166 So.3d 988, 993-94 (emphasis added), the court explained in pertinent part:
The rational trier of fact standard established by Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), preserves " 'the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence,' " by requiring an appellate court to review " 'all of the evidence ... in the light most favorable to the prosecution.' " McDaniel v. Brown , 558 U.S. 120, 134, 130 S.Ct. 665, 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 [ (2010) ] (quoting Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ). Preserving the role of the factfinder means that in cases involving circumstantial evidence, when "the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant [ ], that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt." State v. Captville , 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984). The alternative hypothesis is not one that merely "could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion," but one that, after viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, admissible as well as inadmissible, "is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not 'have found proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.' " Captville , 448 So.2d at 680 (quoting Jackson ); see State v. Hearold , 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992) ("[W]hen the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the assignments of trial error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial.")....
....
... This court has stated the following regarding circumstantial evidence:
*460[W]hen the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that such evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Camp , 446 So.2d 1207 (La.1984) ; State v. Wright ,

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Bluebook (online)
241 So. 3d 457, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-cotten-lactapp-2018.