[Cite as State v. Corwin, 2016-Ohio-4718.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 26690 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2014-CR-1458/2 : JEREMY CORWIN : (Criminal Appeal from : Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :
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OPINION
Rendered on the 30th day of June, 2016.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by CHRISTINA E. MAHY, Atty. Reg. No. 0092671, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
GARY SCHAENGOLD, Atty. Reg. No. 0007144, 4 East Schantz Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45409 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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WELBAUM, J. -2-
{¶ 1} In this case, Defendant-Appellant, Jeremy Corwin, appeals from his
convictions and sentences. After pleading no contest to all twelve counts in the
indictment, which involved drug possession, drug trafficking, and engaging in a pattern of
corrupt activity, Corwin was sentenced to concurrent terms totaling nine years in prison.
{¶ 2} In support of his appeal, Corwin contends that the trial court erred in
overruling his request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98
S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Corwin also contends that the procedure the trial
court used in deciding the Franks issue violated due process. Finally, Corwin contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result
of an illegal search warrant.
{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a
Franks hearing, as there was no evidence that the affiant knew of the falsity of any
statements in the affidavit for the search warrant, nor was there evidence that the affiant
acted with reckless disregard for the truth. The trial court also did not deprive Corwin of
due process, as the right to a hearing under Franks is limited, and Corwin was able to
present evidence to the trial court. Finally, the trial court did not err in denying the
motion to suppress evidence gathered from a search of Appellant’s premises. The
affidavit provided the issuing judge with a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed. Even if the affidavit did not satisfy requirements for probable cause, the
motion to suppress was properly denied because the police officer's reliance on the
judge’s probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant was
objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. -3-
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 4} The charges against Corwin arose from an investigation of a large-scale drug
trafficking operation being conducted in several counties, including Montgomery County,
Ohio. During the course of the investigation, Detective Dan Schweitzer, who was
assigned to the Warren County Drug Task Force, learned that a major marijuana drug
organization was based in Vandalia, Ohio, and had ties to Oregon, California, Indiana,
Florida, Colorado, and cities in Ohio, including Dayton, Columbus, and Springfield. The
organization’s hierarchical structure included Bradley O’Neal as head, Corwin as second-
in-command, and William Murphy as third-in-command. Other individuals were also
involved.
{¶ 5} The surveillance that led to the search warrant that was issued in this case
began in March 2013 and lasted through November 2013, and included activities of the
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and the Task Force, as well as individuals who dealt
with the organization, including confidential informants CI 585 and CI 586.
{¶ 6} In March 2013, the DEA seized about 8.5 pounds of marijuana and more
than $24,000 in Indianapolis, at the residence of Matthew Lee. Lee told the DEA that
Corwin was his supply source for hydroponic marijuana, and that he and Corwin had
made several trips to California and Oregon to pick up marijuana. O’Neal was also
involved in these trips. Lee described Corwin as driving a maroon Ford Explorer that
had a hidden compartment under the third row seat.
{¶ 7} In late August 2013, Detective Schweitzer interviewed CI 586, who stated
that “Brad” and “Jeremy” (later identified as O’Neal and Corwin) got 200 to 300 pounds -4-
of hydroponic marijuana at a time from Oregon and California.
{¶ 8} Another informant, CI 585, also told Detective Schweitzer that O’Neal
traveled to Oregon and obtained 200 to 300 pounds of marijuana at a time, and that
Corwin would accompany O’Neal. In early October 2013, CI 585 showed law
enforcement a drug route, and described operations CI 585 had witnessed. CI 585 also
showed law enforcement houses associated with the operation, including residences on
South Patterson Boulevard in Dayton, Ohio, and Gabriel Street in Vandalia, Ohio.
{¶ 9} Essentially, once the marijuana was obtained in large quantities, it would be
taken to a place called “the Farm” in Bellefontaine, Ohio, where it would be broken down
into one-pound bags and would then be transported elsewhere. O’Neal would take the
first 200 pounds from the load to an individual in Columbus, Ohio. The residence on
South Patterson was used as a “stash house,” and O’Neal, as well as others, lived at the
Gabriel Street location. CI 585 also informed the police about vehicles that were used
by O’Neal and Corwin, but were titled to others. These vehicles included a 2013 white
Ford Explorer owned by O’Neal, and a black Audi and a black Cadillac Escalade owned
by Corwin.
{¶ 10} CI 585 told the police that on September 22, 2013, O’Neal, while driving the
2013 white Ford Explorer, arrived at a location in Urbana, Ohio, with 100 pounds of
marijuana. Murphy also had 100 pounds of marijuana in his vehicle. Subsequently,
four vehicles, including one containing Corwin, traveled to Columbus, Ohio, and the men,
including O’Neal, Murphy, and Corwin, delivered the 200 pounds of marijuana to a garage
at an address on Dennison Avenue. CI 585 saw a large duffle bag of cash in the garage,
which at the price per pound of marijuana, would have contained about $500,000. -5-
{¶ 11} CI 585 also described a trip he and Corwin took to Indiana to sell 20 pounds
of marijuana. In late October and early November, Detective Schweitzer also made
undercover drug purchases of substantial amounts of marijuana and hashish from an
individual (Casey Oakes) who identified O’Neal’s organization as his supplier. Oakes
verified details Schweitzer already knew about the organization. Schweitzer then
purchased Hashish from Oakes on November 22, 2013, and showed him $100,000 in
cash. An arrangement was made for Schweitzer to purchase 100 pounds of marijuana
on November 25, 2013.
{¶ 12} A vehicle titled to Corwin listed Corwin’s residence as 2124 Pittsfield Street.
The other vehicles owned by Corwin but titled to others, were seen, during spot
surveillance, at both the “stash house” and at the Pittsfield Street address. CI 585 also
told Detective Schweitzer that he/she had seen about 200 pounds of marijuana inside the
Pittsfield Street residence.
{¶ 13} On November 25, 2013, Detective Schweitzer prepared four affidavits and
search warrants, including warrants to search the residences on Gabriel Street, South
Patterson Boulevard, and Pittsfield Street. The warrants were signed by a judge and
were executed the same day.
{¶ 14} On August 8, 2014, Corwin was indicted on twelve counts, including one
count of Participating in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, two counts of Possession of
Marijuana, two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, three counts of Possession of Hashish,
three counts of Trafficking in Hashish, and one count of Having a Weapon under Disability
(one first-degree felony; two second-degree felonies, seven third-degree felonies, one
fourth-degree felony, and one fifth-degree felony). Corwin pled not guilty, and filed -6-
motions to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the Pittsfield Street and South
Patterson residences. At a hearing held in October 2014, the trial court set a briefing
schedule so that the parties could address whether a hearing should be held under
Franks, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667. Although Corwin never made
a written request for such a hearing, the parties have stipulated that the issue arose at a
conference in chambers, off the record, and that the trial court determined the issue as if
a written request had been made.
{¶ 15} In December 2014, the trial court denied the request for the Franks hearing.
The court also overruled Corwin’s motions to suppress on January 20, 2014. Corwin
then pled no contest to all the charges in March 2015. After merging some of the
charges, the court sentenced Corwin to concurrent sentences on all charges, and to a
total of nine years in prison. Corwin now appeals from his convictions and sentences.
II. The Request for a Franks Hearing
{¶ 16} Corwin has combined his discussion of the First and Second Assignments
of Error, and we will do the same. Corwin’s First Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Erred in Overruling Appellant’s Request for a Franks
Hearing.
{¶ 17} Corwin’s Second Assignment of Error states that:
In the Context of the Procedure Utilized by the Trial Court in
Considering Appellant’s Request for a Franks Hearing, the Trial Court’s
Determination of Whether Appellant’s Proffer of Evidence Established a
Substantial Preliminary Showing of Falsity Failed to Comport with Due -7-
Process.
{¶ 18} Under these assignments of error, Corwin contends that the trial court erred
by holding an abbreviated hearing, and by refusing to let him cross-examine Detective
Schweitzer or to present witnesses. Corwin also maintains that the evidence warranted
a hearing.
{¶ 19} Crim.R. 41(C)(1) provides, with respect to warrants, that:
A warrant shall issue on either an affidavit or affidavits sworn to
before a judge of a court of record or an affidavit or affidavits communicated
to the judge by reliable electronic means establishing the grounds for
issuing the warrant. In the case of a search warrant, the affidavit shall
name or describe the person to be searched or particularly describe the
place to be searched, name or describe the property to be searched for and
seized, state substantially the offense in relation thereto, and state the
factual basis for the affiant's belief that such property is there located.
{¶ 20} “In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in
support of a search warrant, [an issuing magistrate’s task] * * * ‘is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544
N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). “The affidavit underlying a search
warrant is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause if, based on the totality of the -8-
circumstances, it provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that there
was probable cause to issue the warrant.” United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 414
(6th Cir.2008), citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527
(1983).
{¶ 21} However, “where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing
be held at the defendant's request.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57
L.Ed.2d 667. Furthermore, if the defendant establishes the perjury allegation or reckless
disregard by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing, and if, with the false material
set aside, “the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the
search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent
as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” Id. at 156.
{¶ 22} In Franks, the United States Supreme Court stressed that for an evidentiary
hearing to be mandated:
[T]he challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and must be
supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and
those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should
point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be
false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting
reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses -9-
should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations
of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. The deliberate falsity or
reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the
affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant. Finally, if these
requirements are met, and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged
falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient
content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no
hearing is required. On the other hand, if the remaining content is
insufficient, the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, to his hearing.
Franks at 171-172.
{¶ 23} “ ‘Reckless disregard’ means that the affiant had serious doubts of an
allegation's truth.” State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 441, 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992),
citing United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir.1984).
{¶ 24} The standard of review of denials of a Franks hearing is unsettled, with
some federal circuit courts applying a “clear error” standard, and others applying a “de
novo” standard. State v. Kilbarger, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25584, 2013-Ohio-2577,
¶ 23, fn. 4, citing Fowler, 535 F.3d at 415, fn.2 (6th Cir.2008). However, regardless of
the standard used, we find no error on the trial court’s part.
{¶ 25} As was noted, Corwin argues that the trial court’s refusal to let him cross-
examine Detective Schweitzer unfairly inhibited his ability to make the threshold showing
required under Franks. However, Franks stressed that the challenge must be premised
on more than a desire to cross-examine. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 -10-
L.Ed.2d 667. Accord State v. Jones, 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 412, 739 N.E.2d 300 (2000).
Moreover, Corwin did file his own affidavit, and nothing prevented him from presenting
affidavits of other witnesses.
{¶ 26} In addition, courts have rejected the assertion that “any interference with
the defendant's ability to mount [a Franks] challenge is impermissible,” and that
defendants have “an unlimited right to access all information possibly needed to meet the
preliminary showing requirement” in Franks. United States v. Napier, 436 F.3d 1133,
1136 (9th Cir.2006). In Napier, which involved access to records that could identify a
confidential informant, the court stressed the need to balance the right outlined in Franks
with the harm that could result from disclosure. Id. More importantly, the court stressed
that the argument for an absolute right was “further weakened” by the fact that “due
process requirements at suppression hearings are less elaborate and demanding than
those at trial.” Id. at 1136-37, citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679, 100
S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).
{¶ 27} Specifically, in criminal trials, the need for a confidential privilege is
outweighed by the need for truthful verdicts, while in suppression hearings, defendants
are seeking to enforce the 4th Amendment. Id. at 1137, citing McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). “ ‘The very purpose of a motion to
suppress is to escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand, not because its probative
force is diluted in the least by the mode of seizure, but rather as a sanction to compel
enforcement officers to respect the constitutional security of all of us under the Fourth
Amendment. If the motion to suppress is denied, defendant will still be judged upon the
untarnished truth.’ ” Id., quoting McCray at 307. -11-
{¶ 28} The case before us does not involve attempts to learn the identity of a
confidential informant; in fact, Corwin’s affidavit indicates that he knew the informant’s
identity. Nonetheless, the above remarks about suppression hearings apply with equal
force here.
{¶ 29} At the brief hearing that was held, the trial court allowed defense counsel to
cross-examine Detective Schweitzer, but limited the questioning to Schweitzer’s
execution of the affidavit and the judge’s execution of the warrant. Transcript of
Proceedings, pp. 19 and 23.
{¶ 30} The cross-examination by Corwin’s counsel at the hearing disclosed that
Schweitzer learned during his investigation that Corwin had signed a lease on the
Pittsfield Street address. This was beyond the scope of the trial court’s limitation, but
was nonetheless brought to the trial court’s attention by Corwin. In addition, the trial
court verified that the information presented to the issuing judge was limited to the content
of the affidavit.
{¶ 31} Subsequently, Corwin presented the following information to the trial court
through defense counsel’s unverified statement: Detective Schweitzer called defense
counsel on November 12, 2014, and indicated that the informant (CI 585) had seen 200
pounds of marijuana inside the Pittsfield residence. During this call, Schweitzer also said
that he made no contemporaneous record of the conversation; that no records of the
informant’s statement existed outside the affidavit; that the informant’s statement about
the marijuana probably occurred in November 2013, but he was not sure; and that the
informant did not tell him when he had seen the marijuana inside the premises.
Defendant Jeremy Corwin’s Third Motion to Suppress, Doc. #36, p. 3. -12-
{¶ 32} In addition, Corwin stated in an affidavit that the identity of CI 585 clearly
was Brandon Oakes; that Oakes was never inside the premises at Pittsfield Street, and
that to his knowledge, 200 pounds of marijuana was never inside the premises.
{¶ 33} In rejecting the request for a Franks hearing, the trial court concluded that
even if the informant had misrepresented the information about the marijuana, there was
no indication in either Corwin’s motion or affidavit that Detective Schweitzer knew the
information was false or had recklessly disregarded the statement’s truthfulness. This
conclusion was appropriate. See Searing v. Hayes, 684 F.2d 694, 697 (10th Cir.1982)
(rejecting a Franks challenge where, even though the defendant had furnished affidavits
indicating that an informant could not have seen contraband, the defendant did not offer
evidence that the affiant knew of this or recklessly disregarded the informant’s inability to
see the contraband). See also Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d at 441, 588 N.E.2d 819 (reaching
a similar conclusion).
{¶ 34} Assuming for purposes of argument that the statement in the affidavit was
false and that Detective Schweitzer would have testified as averred by defense counsel,
there is no indication that the detective knew of the statement’s falsity or that he was
reckless in that regard. The affidavit details a lengthy investigation conducted between
March and November 2013, involving both state and federal law enforcement agencies.
Corwin’s involvement as an integral participant and a high-ranking member of the drug
ring was confirmed by multiple sources, including CI 585, who had direct contact with
Corwin. Schweitzer indicated in the affidavit that CI 585 was believed to be truthful and
had provided information that had been corroborated by law enforcement and other
means. The affidavit contains descriptions of the corroboration, including verification of -13-
Corwin’s identity as a participant by other sources; registration verification of information
about vehicles and property identified by CI 585 that were placed in other parties’ names;
Schweitzer’s own verification, though “spot check surveillance” and direct observation, of
information given to him by CI 585; and Schweitzer’s own drug purchases made from an
individual in the drug ring who had previously been identified by CI 585. Defendant
Jeremy Corwin’s Third Motion to Suppress, Doc. #36, Affidavit for Search Warrant, ¶s 7,
8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 27, 29-30, 31, 34, 37-38, 43-44, 46-48, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 70,
and 71. 1 The content of the affidavit also indicates that CI 585 demonstrated very
detailed knowledge about the workings of the drug ring and Corwin’s involvement.
{¶ 35} Accordingly, there is no indication that Detective Schweitzer knew of the
alleged falsity of CI 585’s statement about having seen drugs at Corwin’s residence on
Pittsfield Street, or that Schweitzer was reckless in that regard.
{¶ 36} Corwin has also complained about Detective Schweitzer’s omission in the
affidavit of the date on which CI 585 had seen the 200 pounds of marijuana at the Pittsfield
residence. In this regard, we have previously adopted a test from the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which held that omissions will trigger a Franks hearing only in “ ‘rare
instances.’ ” State v. Blaylock, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24475, 2011-Ohio-4865, ¶ 15-
16, quoting Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir.1998). This test indicates
that “ ‘except in the very rare case where the defendant makes a strong preliminary
showing that the affiant with an intention to mislead excluded critical information from the
1 Corwin attached a copy of the affidavit to his motion to suppress and numbered the paragraphs for ease of reference. A certified copy of the affidavit was also admitted by the trial court as Ex. 4 during the hearing. See Transcript of Proceedings, pp. 22 and 24. For purposes of convenience, we have referred to the paragraphs as they were numbered in the affidavit attached to Corwin’s motion. -14-
affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding of probable cause, Franks is
inapplicable to the omission of disputed facts.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15, quoting
Mays at 816.
{¶ 37} As was noted, there was no evidence that the detective had an intention to
mislead, and Corwin’s argument, therefore, fails to satisfy the first prong of the test. We
also note that Mays contains an extended discussion of the reasons why the due process
rationale of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), does
not extend to the search warrant situation. In this regard, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals observed that in contrast to a Brady situation, “the probable cause determination
in Franks, derived from the Fourth Amendment, involves no definitive adjudication of
innocence or guilt and has no due process implications. Because the consequences of
arrest or search are less severe and easier to remedy than the consequences of an
adverse criminal verdict, a duty to disclose potentially exculpatory information appropriate
in the setting of a trial to protect the due process rights of the accused is less compelling
in the context of an application for a warrant.” Mays at 816.
{¶ 38} In this regard, Mays also commented that “the non-lawyers who normally
secure warrants in the heat of a criminal investigation should not be burdened with the
same duty to assess and disclose information as a prosecutor who possesses a mature
knowledge of the entire case and is not subject to the time pressures inherent in the
warrant process. A statement of these differences does not condone deliberate
misrepresentations in the warrant application process. Rather it points out that the
obligations shouldered during the adjudication process should not be imposed by
inference onto the warrant application process.” Id. -15-
{¶ 39} Based on the preceding discussion, the trial court did not err in denying
Corwin a Franks hearing, and did not violate Corwin’s rights to due process.
{¶ 40} Accordingly, the First and Second Assignments of Error are overruled.
III. Alleged Error in Denying the Motion to Suppress
{¶ 41} Corwin’s Third Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence.
{¶ 42} Under this assignment of error, Corwin contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence gathered at Pittsfield Street, because the
affidavit failed to demonstrate a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
would be found. In this regard, Corwin focuses on the following facts: (1) the source of
the information that he resided at the address was not disclosed; (2) Corwin’s prior drug
trafficking convictions (which were listed in the affidavit) occurred several years earlier;
(3) the source of information about the registration of his vehicle was not in the affidavit;
and (4) the date on which the observation of the 200 pounds of marijuana was observed
was not included in the affidavit.
{¶ 43} As was noted, an issuing magistrate’s task in determining sufficiency of
probable cause “ ‘is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and
“basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” George, 45
Ohio St.3d at 325, 544 N.E.2d 640, paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Gates, 462 -16-
U.S. at 238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.
{¶ 44} In George, the court further stated that: “[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of
probable cause in an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant issued by a
magistrate, neither a trial court nor an appellate court should substitute its judgment for
that of the magistrate by conducting a de novo determination as to whether the affidavit
contains sufficient probable cause upon which that court would issue the search warrant.”
(Citation omitted.) Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. “Rather, the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed. In conducting any after-the-fact scrutiny of an affidavit
submitted in support of a search warrant, trial and appellate courts should accord great
deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal
cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.” Id.
{¶ 45} In upholding the warrant for Pittsfield, the trial court observed that it was a
“close call,” but concluded that the observation of the 200 pounds of marijuana, even
without a time frame, provided a sufficient basis for the probable cause determination.
{¶ 46} After reviewing the record and applicable law, we agree with the trial court.
This observation, coupled with the other detailed information about Corwin’s significant
participation in a large-scale drug trafficking operation, justified a conclusion that a search
of his residence would, in fair probability, reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.
{¶ 47} Notably, the trial court went on to find that even if probable cause was not
established, the motion should be overruled under the good faith exception to
suppression. “Where * * * it has been determined that the magistrate did not have a
substantial basis for finding probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the -17-
applicability of the good faith exception turns on whether the police officer's reliance on
the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the
warrant was objectively reasonable.” State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332,
683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct.
3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). See also State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 490 N.E.2d
1236 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-
Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 92.
{¶ 48} In light of our prior discussion, we must conclude that Detective
Schweitzer’s reliance on the judge’s probable cause determination and the technical
sufficiency of the warrant was objectively reasonable. As was noted, the detective was
not aware of the alleged falsity (if, indeed, the statement was false), and did not act in
reckless disregard of a falsity. Instead, he reasonably relied on the facts before him, and
on the issuing judge’s decision to issue the warrant. Accordingly, the Third Assignment
of Error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 49} All of Corwin’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
............. -18-
DONOVAN, P.J. and FAIN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr. Christina E. Mahy Gary Schaengold Hon. Mary Katherine Huffman