State v. Cornwell

2026 Ohio 272

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 29, 2026
• Docket: 25CA002
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Cornwell, 2026-Ohio-272.]

COURT OF APPEALS HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25CA002

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Holmes County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 24CR030 JOSLYN CORNWELL Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: January 29, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King, William B. Hoffman, Robert G. Montgomery, Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: Robert K. Hendrix, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff- Appellee; Jeffery Kellogg, for Defendant-Appellant OPINION

Hoffman, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Joslyn Cornwell appeals the judgment entered by the

Holmes County Common Pleas Court convicting her following jury trial of one count of

attempted rape of a child under the age of thirteen (R.C. 2923.02/2907.02(A)(1)(b),

2907.02(B)) and sentencing her to a term of five years of incarceration. Plaintiff-appellee

is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On December 7, 2023, the Holmes County Sheriff’s Office received a report

of a possible incident of sexual abuse. The eleven-year-old victim was a relative of

Appellant. Appellant and her boyfriend, Larry Fisher, were the suspected perpetrators.

The victim stated she was staying at Appellant’s house, and Appellant was sleeping in a

camper near the home on the property. While the victim was sleeping, an arm came

under the pillow and across her chest. She realized the arm belonged to Fisher, and

began to panic. Fisher touched her stomach and her side, and began to pull down the

victim’s pants. The victim jumped up and ran to the bathroom. After thinking about the

incident, the victim ran to the camper where Appellant was staying.

{¶3} Police interviewed Fisher. Fisher stated he was having a problem with the

fact he only had three sexual partners in his life. He left his relationship with Appellant to

pursue other partners, but returned to his relationship with Appellant before any sexual

encounters with other partners occurred. Fisher asked Appellant to oversee his

experiences with other sexual partners. Fisher told police he and Appellant decided to

have the victim watch their toddler, who was very active at the time. While the victim was staying at the house, the opportunity presented itself for Fisher to have sex with the victim.

Fisher told police he believed the victim’s account of what occurred between them, but

he did not remember the encounter.

{¶4} Appellant initially denied any involvement with the incident. However,

Appellant eventually changed her story. Appellant told police Fisher was attracted to

young girls, specifically the victim. Fisher told Appellant he would kill himself if he didn’t

get the chance to sleep with a virgin. Fisher asked Appellant for help, stating the victim

could be asleep at the time. Fisher had a bottle of chloroform he wanted to use on the

victim, but Appellant did not want to use chloroform on the victim.

{¶5} Appellant told police one day when the victim came to the house to babysit,

she mentioned Fisher’s proposal, and the victim cried. Appellant told the victim she would

not bring it up again. She invited the victim back to the house to babysit on another

occasion. While the victim was in the house, Fisher began begging to do something with

the victim. He wanted to give the victim melatonin so he could have sex with her while

she slept, but Appellant declined. Fisher continued to beg, and Appellant woke up the

victim. Appellant told the victim Fisher thought the victim was pretty and he wanted to

“adult cuddle” with the victim. State’s Exhibit 6. Appellant then went to a camper on the

property. The victim later came to the trailer crying, telling Appellant she thought

Appellant meant Fisher just wanted to talk to her when Appellant said he wanted to adult

cuddle. The victim told Appellant Fisher tried to pull her shorts down.

{¶6} Appellant was indicted by the Holmes County Grand Jury with one count of

attempted rape. The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Holmes County Common Pleas

Court. {¶7} As voir dire began, it became apparent the trial judge’s mother was a

potential juror in the case. The trial court addressed the potential jurors:

So that’s the general outline, and I’ll have a few questions for you,

and then counsel will have a few questions for you after we administer the

oath, but before we get to that, I also like to take a moment and

acknowledge kind of the uniqueness of our community and the fact that I

know a great number of you to various degrees, from a little bit to somebody

who gave me life and gave me my name. This is so surreal that my mother’s

in the jury pool today, so it’s very strange to make her stand when you come

into the room, because that does not happen anywhere else, so – a very

weird moment.

{¶8} Tr. 5-6.

{¶9} Although the trial court did not identify which juror was his mother, the jury

chart filed as a part of the record in this case demonstrates Juror No. 3 has the same last

name as the trial court. During voir dire, the only question and response recorded

concerning Juror No. 3 came after she apparently raised her hand when defense counsel

asked if anyone had heard of the presumption of innocence:

MR. CROSS: What does the presumption of innocence mean to

you?

JUROR NO. 3: (Unintelligible). MR. CROSS: Ok. So based on thoughts and what you have heard.

Now, what about as she currently sits here right now?

JUROR NO. 3: By – by looking at her and (unintelligible).

{¶10} Tr. 23.

{¶11} The trial judge’s mother was selected as a juror. Toward the end of the

first day of trial while discussing whether to recess for the day, the trial judge noted he

knew his mother had to get home to care for his father.

{¶12} The jury found Appellant guilty. The trial court convicted Appellant upon the

jury’s verdict and sentenced her to five years of incarceration.

{¶13} It is from the January 17, 2025 judgment of the trial court Appellant

prosecutes her appeal, assigning as error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND VIOLATED APPELLANT’S

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT

FAILED TO EXCUSE THE JUDGE’S MOTHER FROM THE JURY SUA

SPONTE FOR CAUSE, DESPITE HER IMPLIED BIAS AND THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY, ALTERNATIVELY, TRIAL COUNSEL

RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO CHALLENGE

THE JUROR FOR CAUSE OR USE A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. {¶14} Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte excuse his

mother from the jury, and further argues the seating of the judge’s mother on the jury was

structural error. In the alternative, she argues counsel was ineffective for failing to further

pursue the possibility of bias on the part of Juror No.3, and by failing to challenge her for

cause or exercise a peremptory challenge to remove her from the jury. We disagree.

{¶15} Crim. R. 24(C) provides in pertinent part:

(C) Challenge for cause. A person called as a juror may be

challenged for the following causes:

(10) That the juror is related by consanguinity or affinity within the

fifth degree to the person alleged to be injured or attempted to be injured by

the offense charged, or to the person on whose complaint the prosecution

was instituted; or to the defendant.

(11) That the juror is the person alleged to be injured or attempted to

be injured by the offense charged, or the person on whose complaint the

prosecution was instituted, or the defendant.

(12) That the juror is the employer or employee, or the spouse,

parent, son, or daughter of the employer or employee, or the counselor,

agent, or attorney, of any person included in division (B)(11) of this rule.

(14) That the juror is otherwise unsuitable for any other cause to

serve as a juror. {¶16} A trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, sua sponte dismiss a juror

when it determines a juror possesses either enmity or bias toward a party or determines

for some other reason a juror is not impartial or is otherwise unsuitable for service. State

v. Midwest Pride IV, Inc., 131 Ohio App.3d 1, 20 (12th Dist. 1998). A trial court's ruling

“’will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary.'" Id.

{¶17} In State v. Brumley, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1390 (11th Dist. March 29,

1996), the trial judge’s brother-in-law was unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the

defendant, and ultimately served as a juror in the case. On appeal, the defendant argued

the trial court erred in failing to excuse his brother-in-law for cause. In rejecting the

defendant’s argument, the appellate court noted Crim. R. 24(C) does not include a

provision requiring a close relative of the trial judge to be excused from the jury, nor is

there a general rule all relatives of an attorney must be excused from the jury. Id. at 50.

The court held:

If a relative of the prosecuting attorney or defense counsel can only

be challenged for cause under certain circumstances, it logically follows that

a relative of the trial judge can only be excused when his answers during

voir dire specifically indicate that he is somehow biased toward either party.

This conclusion follows from the fact that, unlike the attorneys in the case,

the trial judge is an impartial figure who has no interest in the ultimate

outcome of the case. Given this, there is no reason to assume that a relative

of the judge is automatically biased toward either party. {¶18} Id. at 51.

{¶19} In the instant case, nothing in Juror No. 3’s answers during voir dire

indicated she was biased toward either party. She was not automatically disqualified by

virtue of her relationship to the trial judge, as the trial judge is a neutral party with no

interest in the outcome of the case. We find the trial court did not err in failing to sua

sponte excuse his mother from the jury.

{¶20} Appellant next argues the inclusion of the trial judge’s mother in the jury was

structural error. We disagree.

{¶21} A constitutional error is structural when it affects the framework in which the

trial is conducted, rather than simply being an error in the trial process itself. State v.

Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 20. The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed when structural

error analysis should be used in State v. Perry, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 23:

We emphasize that both this court and the United States Supreme

Court have cautioned against applying a structural-error analysis where, as

here, the case would be otherwise governed by Crim.R. 52(B) because the

defendant did not raise the error in the trial court. See Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d at

199, 749 N.E.2d 274; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137

L.Ed.2d 718. This caution is born of sound policy. For to hold that an error

is structural even when the defendant does not bring the error to the

attention of the trial court would be to encourage defendants to remain silent

at trial only later to raise the error on appeal where the conviction would be

automatically reversed. We believe that our holdings should foster rather than thwart judicial economy by providing incentives (and not disincentives)

for the defendant to raise all errors in the trial court-where, in many cases,

such errors can be easily corrected.

{¶22} State v. Jones, 2018-Ohio-4089, ¶ 12.

{¶23} In the instant case, Appellant could have raised the asserted error in the

trial court by challenging the juror for cause, and Appellant could have removed the juror

by use of peremptory challenge. We find structural error does not apply in the instant

case.

{¶24} Finally, Appellant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately

question Juror No. 3 concerning potential bias, for failing to challenge her for cause,

and/or for failing to use a peremptory challenge to excuse her.

{¶25} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37

Ohio St.3d 153 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings

would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v.

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, (1989). In other words, Appellant must show counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.

{¶26} Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability the result of her

trial would have been different had counsel taken steps to remove the judge’s mother

from the jury. Nothing in the record reflects the judge’s mother was biased against Appellant. Fisher admitted to police he attempted to engage in sexual activity with the

victim, and Appellant admitted to police she attempted to aid Fisher in his endeavor to

engage in sexual activity with the victim. We find Appellant has not demonstrated counsel

was ineffective.

{¶27} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Holmes County

Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to Appellant.

By: Hoffman, J.

King, P.J. and

Montgomery, J. concur