Opinion
LAVERY, J.
The defendant, Sherail Cooper, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after her [96]*96guilty plea, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3)1 and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53-21.2 On appeal, the defendant claims, with respect to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, that the trial court improperly failed to appoint substitute counsel to assist her with her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on that claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are necessary for our review. On March 9,1997, paramedics were called to 90 Nelton Court in Hartford, where they found two year old Andre Shirley, Jr., the defendant’s son, in an extremely flaccid condition with shallow respira-tions and a very low heart rate. The defendant reported .that her son had suffered a seizure while eating. Shirley was transported to Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center and then to Connecticut Children’s Medical Center. The child’s treating physicians found that he had sustained three distinct blows to his head, one of which was powerful enough to tear his sagittal sinus vein. Shirley died at the Connecticut Children’s Medical Center on March 18, 1997.
The defendant was the child’s sole caregiver at the time of his injuries. She was arrested on April 3, 1997, and charged with capital felony in violation of General [97]*97Statutes § 53a-54b (9) and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21.
A probable cause hearing was held, but not completed, on various days in July, 1997. The defendant reported to an investigating police officer that Shirley was injured when he fell backward while trying to get onto a city bus. The defendant’s explanations were not consistent with the severity of the child’s injuries. Betty Spivack, a physician specializing in pediatric critical care and child abuse, had treated Shirley and testified that his head injuries were consistent with those incurred in a fall from a ten to fifteen story building.
On September 15, 1997, the defendant waived her right to a probable cause hearing3 and pleaded guilty [98]*98to manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child as alleged in a substitute information the state filed that day.4 In November, 1997, two days prior to [99]*99her sentencing, the defendant moved for a continuance to afford her an opportunity to reevaluate her plea, her attorneys’ advice and the fairness of her plea agreement [100]*100in view of contemporaneous events in Massachusetts.5 On December 4, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to [101]*101withdraw her guilty plea, claiming that she was denied effective assistance of counsel and that her plea was not knowing and voluntary.6 The trial court heard argu[102]*102ment on the motion on December 12, 1997, at which time the defendant’s public defenders requested that the court appoint a special public defender to represent her with respect to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea,7 particularly with respect to a hearing on the effective assistance of counsel issue.8 The trial court refused [103]*103to appoint substitute counsel and denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The court then sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of twenty years incarceration on the manslaughter charge and ten years on the risk of injury charge. This appeal followed.
The defendant’s claim before us is that the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and its failure to appoint new counsel violated her rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, and our rules of practice. See Practice Book § 39-19 et seq. 9
[104]*104“A guilty plea, once accepted, may be withdrawn only with the permission of the court. State v. Risk, 17 Conn. App. 447, 451, 553 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 802, 559 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S. Ct. 72, 107 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1989). The court is required to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea upon proof of any ground set forth in Practice Book § [39-27], State v. Collins, 207 Conn. 590, 597, 542 A.2d 1131 (1988); State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 265, 460 A.2d 970 (1983). Whether such proof is made is a question for the court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been abused. State v. Crenshaw, [210 Conn. 304, 308-309, 554 A.2d 1074 (1989)]; Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 23, 355 A.2d 49 (1974).” State v. Morant, 20 Conn. App. 630, 633, 569 A.2d 1140, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 818, 576 A.2d 547 (1990).
“It is axiomatic that unless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable. State v. Childree, 189 Conn. 114, 119, 454 A.2d 1274 (1983). By entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront his accusers as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 288, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 542 A.2d 299 (1988). It is well settled that the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant’s choice was made intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Childree, supra, 120.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, 23 Conn. App. 1, 3-4, 579 A.2d 560 (1990).
“After a guilty plea is accepted but before the imposition of sentence the court is obligated to permit withdrawal upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book § 39-27]. An evidentiary hearing is not required if the record of the plea proceeding and other information in the court file conclusively establishes that the motion [105]*105is without merit. See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215, 93 S. Ct. 1461, 36 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1973).” State v. Torres, 182 Conn.
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Opinion
LAVERY, J.
The defendant, Sherail Cooper, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after her [96]*96guilty plea, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3)1 and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53-21.2 On appeal, the defendant claims, with respect to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, that the trial court improperly failed to appoint substitute counsel to assist her with her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on that claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are necessary for our review. On March 9,1997, paramedics were called to 90 Nelton Court in Hartford, where they found two year old Andre Shirley, Jr., the defendant’s son, in an extremely flaccid condition with shallow respira-tions and a very low heart rate. The defendant reported .that her son had suffered a seizure while eating. Shirley was transported to Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center and then to Connecticut Children’s Medical Center. The child’s treating physicians found that he had sustained three distinct blows to his head, one of which was powerful enough to tear his sagittal sinus vein. Shirley died at the Connecticut Children’s Medical Center on March 18, 1997.
The defendant was the child’s sole caregiver at the time of his injuries. She was arrested on April 3, 1997, and charged with capital felony in violation of General [97]*97Statutes § 53a-54b (9) and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21.
A probable cause hearing was held, but not completed, on various days in July, 1997. The defendant reported to an investigating police officer that Shirley was injured when he fell backward while trying to get onto a city bus. The defendant’s explanations were not consistent with the severity of the child’s injuries. Betty Spivack, a physician specializing in pediatric critical care and child abuse, had treated Shirley and testified that his head injuries were consistent with those incurred in a fall from a ten to fifteen story building.
On September 15, 1997, the defendant waived her right to a probable cause hearing3 and pleaded guilty [98]*98to manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child as alleged in a substitute information the state filed that day.4 In November, 1997, two days prior to [99]*99her sentencing, the defendant moved for a continuance to afford her an opportunity to reevaluate her plea, her attorneys’ advice and the fairness of her plea agreement [100]*100in view of contemporaneous events in Massachusetts.5 On December 4, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to [101]*101withdraw her guilty plea, claiming that she was denied effective assistance of counsel and that her plea was not knowing and voluntary.6 The trial court heard argu[102]*102ment on the motion on December 12, 1997, at which time the defendant’s public defenders requested that the court appoint a special public defender to represent her with respect to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea,7 particularly with respect to a hearing on the effective assistance of counsel issue.8 The trial court refused [103]*103to appoint substitute counsel and denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The court then sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of twenty years incarceration on the manslaughter charge and ten years on the risk of injury charge. This appeal followed.
The defendant’s claim before us is that the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and its failure to appoint new counsel violated her rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, and our rules of practice. See Practice Book § 39-19 et seq. 9
[104]*104“A guilty plea, once accepted, may be withdrawn only with the permission of the court. State v. Risk, 17 Conn. App. 447, 451, 553 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 802, 559 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S. Ct. 72, 107 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1989). The court is required to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea upon proof of any ground set forth in Practice Book § [39-27], State v. Collins, 207 Conn. 590, 597, 542 A.2d 1131 (1988); State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 265, 460 A.2d 970 (1983). Whether such proof is made is a question for the court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been abused. State v. Crenshaw, [210 Conn. 304, 308-309, 554 A.2d 1074 (1989)]; Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 23, 355 A.2d 49 (1974).” State v. Morant, 20 Conn. App. 630, 633, 569 A.2d 1140, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 818, 576 A.2d 547 (1990).
“It is axiomatic that unless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable. State v. Childree, 189 Conn. 114, 119, 454 A.2d 1274 (1983). By entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront his accusers as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 288, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 542 A.2d 299 (1988). It is well settled that the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant’s choice was made intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Childree, supra, 120.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, 23 Conn. App. 1, 3-4, 579 A.2d 560 (1990).
“After a guilty plea is accepted but before the imposition of sentence the court is obligated to permit withdrawal upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book § 39-27]. An evidentiary hearing is not required if the record of the plea proceeding and other information in the court file conclusively establishes that the motion [105]*105is without merit. See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215, 93 S. Ct. 1461, 36 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1973).” State v. Torres, 182 Conn. 176, 185, 438 A.2d 46 (1980). Before the trial court, the defendant relied on two subsections of § 39-27 to withdraw her plea. Only the second reason is applicable in this appeal, namely that “[t]he plea resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel.” Practice Book § 39-27 (4).
“In considering whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea the court may disregard any allegations of fact, whether contained in the motion or made in an offer of proof, which are either conclusory, vague or oblique. For the purpose of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the court should ordinarily assume any specific allegations of fact to be true.” State v. Torres, supra, 182 Conn. 185. The defendant’s motion to withdraw contains no facts upon which she bases her claim that her plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Crenshaw, supra, 210 Conn. 311-12.
The defendant had the benefit of two public defenders representing her throughout the unconcluded probable cause hearing and the subsequent hearing in which she waived the probable cause hearing and pleaded guilty, and in the filing of motions for continuance and to withdraw her guilty plea. The defendant cited no facts in her motion or at oral argument before the trial court as to how or why counsels’ representation was ineffective. The defendant now claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant her a continuance to develop facts to support her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Her counsel asked for a reasonable period of time in which to develop those facts, and our reading of the record discloses that the court gave the defendant a reasonable period of time to do so. The defendant’s sentencing was originally scheduled to take place on November 26, 1997. The [106]*106court continued the sentencing until December 12,1997, but the defendant failed to take advantage of that time to develop a factual basis to support her motion to withdraw her plea.
The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly abused its discretion by failing to appoint substitute counsel to press her ineffective assistance of counsel claim. At argument before the trial court, the defendant’s counsel requested that substitute counsel be appointed because an inherent conflict had developed between the defendant and her counsel. Our reading of the transcript demonstrates that while the defendant was waiting to be sentenced, she learned of a case in Massachusetts concerning yet another tragic death of a very young child. Apparently, the defendant hoped that she could resolve her case in a similar manner. The trial court made a specific point of telling the defendant that the Massachusetts matter was of no consequence in Connecticut. It is readily apparent from the transcript that the defendant’s counsel informed her of that as well. Defense counsel ascribed the conflict between them and the defendant to the defendant’s lack of education and her unfamiliarity with the legal system. The trial court properly noted that defense counsel acceded to the defendant’s wish for another lawyer without considering the foreseeable consequence, i.e., that the defendant would repeatedly look for a lawyer who could resolve her case in a manner similar to what occurred in the Massachusetts case. “Whether the circumstances warrant the appointment of new counsel is within the discretion of the trial court. . . . [A]bsent a factual record revealing an abuse of [the court’s] discretion, the court’s failure to allow new counsel is not reversible error.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 314. For this reason, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for substitute counsel and
[107]*107a hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.