State v. Cooke

2016 Ohio 3445
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 13, 2016
Docket15-CA-50
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2016 Ohio 3445 (State v. Cooke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Cooke, 2016 Ohio 3445 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Cooke, 2016-Ohio-3445.]

COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. -vs- : : JENNIFER COOKE : Case No. 15-CA-50 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Municipal Court, Case No. 15CRB00778

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part, Vacated in part Final judgment entered

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 13, 2016

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

TRICIA M. MOORE MICHAEL R. DALSANTO Assistant Law Director 3 South Park Place, Suite 220 40 W. Main Street Newark, Ohio 43055 Newark, Ohio 43055 Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-50 2

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Appellant Jennifer Cooke appeals a judgment of the Licking County

Municipal Court convicting her of criminal mischief (R.C. 2909.07(A)(1)) and disorderly

conduct while intoxicated (R.C. 2917.11(B)(1)). Appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On May 7, 2015, appellant ran up and down Mound Street and Mound Court

in Newark, Ohio, rapping and dancing. She jumped from one porch to another. Her

behavior frightened several children.

{¶3} Joseph Green was working on the brakes of a vehicle. When he said

something about the measurements of the sockets, she would incorporate the numbers

into her rap lyrics, and would use parts of what she heard other people saying in her

songs. At about 10:30 p.m., appellant beat on Green’s door. His 13-year-old daughter

was frightened by appellant’s behavior.

{¶4} Police arrived and Officer William Evans located appellant at her mom’s

residence. She had removed a curtain from a common area of her mom’s apartment

building and was wearing it as a cape, while rapping to the police about the state stealing

her innocence and about her husband, who had passed away. Officer Evans could smell

alcohol on appellant, and she did not appear to be “all there” when he tried to

communicate with her. Tr. 25. Police handcuffed her and transported her to the police

station. She continued her rapping while in the cruiser.

{¶5} Appellant was charged with criminal mischief, falsification, and disorderly

conduct while intoxicated. The case proceeded to bench trial. In closing argument, the Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-50 3

State conceded that the evidence did not support the charge of criminal mischief. The

court found appellant not guilty of falsification and guilty of criminal mischief and disorderly

conduct. The court specifically found as to criminal mischief that appellant tampered with

property by being on it, and being a distraction and a nuisance. She was sentenced to

sixty days incarceration for criminal mischief and thirty days incarceration for disorderly

conduct, to be served consecutively, and fined $50.00 on each conviction.

{¶6} Appellant assigns two errors:

{¶7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE APPELLANT COMMITTED

CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2909.07(A)(1) OF THE REVISED

CODE IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶8} “II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO

SUA SPONTE MERGE THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND CRIMINAL MISCHIEF

CONVICTIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE ALLIED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT.”

I.

{¶9} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the judgment

convicting her of criminal mischief is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the

evidence.

{¶10} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492,

paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). In determining whether a verdict is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-50 4

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the trier of fact “clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed

and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997–Ohio–52,

678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717

(1983).

{¶11} Appellant was convicted of criminal mischief as defined by R.C.

2909.07(A)(1):

{¶12} “(A) No person shall:

{¶13} “(1) Without privilege to do so, knowingly move, deface, damage, destroy,

or otherwise improperly tamper with the property of another[.]”

{¶14} In State v. Maxwell, 9th Dist. Medina No. 1646, 1988 WL 38075 (April 13,

1988), a juvenile was found delinquent by reason of criminal mischief when he was

observed in the parking lot of the courthouse placing his hands on car windows and

looking inside. He was also observed attempting unsuccessfully to open several vehicles.

In reversing the finding of delinquency, the court held:

In R.C. 2909.07(A)(1), the general words “otherwise improperly

tamper” are proceeded by the much more specific terms “move, deface,

damage, destroy.” Consequently, the rule of statutory construction known

as ejusdem generis applies. In explaining this rule, the Supreme Court of

Ohio has stated:

“Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where in a statute terms are first

used which are confined to a particular class of objects having well-known Licking County, Case No. 15-CA-50 5

and definite features and characteristics, and then afterwards a term having

perhaps a broader signification is conjoined, such latter term is, as indicative

of legislative intent, to be considered as embracing only things of a similar

character as those comprehended by the preceding limited and confined

terms.”

State v. Aspell (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 1, paragraph two of the

syllabus. See, also, Light v. Ohio University (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 66, 68.

Applying ejusdem generis to R.C. 2909.07(A)(1), we conclude that a

showing of some change in either the physical location or physical condition

of the property is necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute. This

interpretation is in accord with the facts present in other decisions

addressing R.C. 2909.07(A)(1). See, e.g., State v. Isaac (1975), 44 Ohio

Misc. 87 (door of unattended vehicle forced open with metal instrument);

State v. Kidwell (Mar. 18, 1981) Clermont App. Nos. 925/927, unreported

(deep tire marks created in the yard of another); State v. Evans (May 26,

1982), Hamilton App. No. C-810495, unreported (hose smelling of gasoline

found near vehicle with gas tank cap about to fall off).

In the case sub judice, the testimony of the state's witnesses indicates that

Maxwell merely peered into the vehicles in controversy and tried the door

handles. There is no indication that Maxwell attempted to force open the

locked doors and the evidence clearly indicates that Maxwell did nothing to

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Ridgeway
2021 Ohio 3450 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2021)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2016 Ohio 3445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-cooke-ohioctapp-2016.