[Cite as State v. Conrad, 2025-Ohio-5499.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2024 CA 0099
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024 CR 0103 JEREMIAH CONRAD, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: December 9, 2025
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: JODIE M. SCHUMACHER and MICHELLE FINK, for Plaintiff- Appellee; ALISON ROTH and SAMANTHA KOVACEVIC, for Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Montgomery, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jeremiah Conrad, appeals from the jury verdict from
the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, finding him guilty of murder. For the
reasons below, we AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
{¶2} On Sunday, January 9, 2022, Deanna Hoam was found dead in the bathtub
of her apartment, located at 128 Rowaland Avenue, in Richland County. On February 7,
2024, Defendant-Appellant, Jeremiah Conrad (“Appellant”), was indicted on three counts
of murder, two counts of felonious assault, and two counts of gross abuse of a corpse in connection with Deanna’s murder. Appellant pled not guilty to all charges and proceeded
to a jury trial. On October 28, 2024, the trial began and continued through November 8,
2024, with the State calling over 25 witnesses in addition to admitting numerous exhibits.
After deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Appellant on all seven counts.
Counts one through five merged and count seven merged with count six.
{¶3} On November 19, 2024, Appellant was sentenced to 15 years to life in
prison on count one, purposeful murder, and one year in prison for count 6, gross abuse
of a corpse. For count six he was also sentenced to two years of discretionary post-
release control and ordered to pay $3,000.00 in restitution. Appellant timely filed his
notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
{¶4} Deanna Hoam, the victim (“Deanna” or “victim”) lived in an apartment on
Rowland Avenue in Mansfield, Ohio, located in Richland County. Her father, Donald
Hoam (“Mr. Hoam”) paid for her rent and utilities as well as her vehicle, a 2007 red Ford
Fusion. Mr. Hoam testified that Deanna associated with some “dark” people and had
drug use and addiction issues. Nonetheless, he was always there for Deanna, and
testified they were in contact three to five times per week, sometimes daily, and that she
almost always returned any texts from him. It was uncharacteristic for her not to respond
to Mr. Hoam.
{¶5} Deanna had a son, Hanif Donaldson, and they also had a close relationship.
Hanif testified he texted with his mom almost daily and called nearly every other day.
Hanif testified that he met Appellant in November 2021, when they all went shopping one
day. At some point, Appellant was detained for suspected shop lifting. Deanna and Hanif left the shopping mall and went home. Later, Hanif was at Deanna’s apartment when
Appellant called Deanna, stating he was very angry she left him when he was detained
for shop lifting. Deanna placed Appellant on speaker phone and Hanif heard Appellant
state he was going to kill Deanna. The last time he saw his mom was during Christmas
2021.
{¶6} On January 4, 2022, Appellant had a text conversation with a woman
named Jennifer Smith and claimed he had been awake for 3 days. Late in the evening
of January 5, 2022, Smith asked Appellant if he had a vehicle and he responded, “I will.”
Earlier that afternoon, on Wednesday the 5th, Deanna texted her dad that she needed a
heater because her apartment was getting cold. Mr. Hoam stated he would get her a
heater.
{¶7} In the very early morning hours of January 6, 2022, at approximately 1:30
a.m., Deanna’s two neighbors, Shawnda Sexton and Jon Godfrey, returned from their
night shifts. A little later, they heard banging noises, like faint thuds, coming from the
victim’s apartment directly below. Robert Mettler, another neighbor, also woke up to loud
yelling and banging on January 6, between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. Toward the end of the
commotion, Mettler testified he heard a voice say, “Please stop” two separate times.
Mettler testified that when he left for work a few hours later around 6:00 a.m., he did not
see the victim’s red car and has not seen it since that night. The neighbors had also seen
Appellant with Deanna at the apartment complex on various occasions before the murder.
{¶8} That same morning around 6:30 a.m., Appellant texted a woman named
Chandelle Cummings, stating “I got wheels. Going slow.” At around 1:00 p.m. on the
6th, Mr. Hoam took the new heater to Deanna’s apartment, went inside to the living area, and plugged it in so the apartment would be warm when she returned. He did not notice
anything unusual at that time; he did not leave the living area. However, hours passed,
and Deanna did not text Mr. Hoam to thank him for the heater, which was very out of
character for her. Thereafter, Mr. Hoam called and texted Deanna several times with no
response.
{¶9} Later in the day on January 6, 2022, around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., Rachel
Brown noticed via her Ring camera that Appellant - a childhood friend - was sitting in a
red car in front of her Davidson Road apartment trying to use her wi-fi. Appellant was
wearing a black hoodie sweatshirt. Appellant asked Brown if he could come inside, and
she said yes. A bit later, Appellant’s friend, Michelle Chapman, arrived at Brown’s
apartment. Appellant and Chapman eventually came inside. Brown overheard Appellant
and Chapman discussing going to Motel 6 and that Appellant wanted to hook up a phone
to his account. Appellant and Chapman eventually left Brown’s house together around
6:59 p.m. At approximately 10:47 p.m., a new Google account was created on Deanna’s
phone with the name “tedbundythehokilla@gmail.com.” Tr., p. 996-998.
{¶10} Chapman testified at Appellant’s trial. She first met Appellant on a
psychiatric unit, then participated in a drug deal, and has known him for several years. In
early January 2022, they reconnected through Appellant’s Facebook account, known as
“Professor Finesser,” because Chapman wanted to exchange gift cards for drugs.
Chapman testified that on January 6, 2022, she met Appellant outside of Brown’s
apartment, and when she and Appellant went inside, Appellant handed her a phone and
asked her to reset it, because Appellant knew she briefly worked for Boost Mobile, but she was unsuccessful. That’s when the two of them left Brown’s apartment and drove to
Motel 6 to meet Appellant’s friends.
{¶11} Chapman testified that she and Appellant did drugs at the Motel 6 and then
drove to Speedway, McDonald’s, and back to Motel 6. When Champman was ready to
leave at around 3:00 a.m. on January 7, 2022, Appellant began to drive Chapman back
to her car. While driving, Appellant failed to stop at a stop sign and ran a red light.
Lieutenant Ryan Grimshaw, with the Mansfield Police Department, initiated a traffic stop.
Grimshaw observed brass knuckles hanging out of Appellant’s pocket and noticed a meth
pipe in plain sight in addition to bags of syringes on the floorboard near Chapman’s feet.
Grimshaw next discovered that Appellant had an active warrant for his arrest, so he
placed Appellant under arrest. Another officer drove Chapman back to her own car, still
parked at Brown’s apartment on Davidson Road. Chapman later returned to the 2007
red Ford Fusion, broke the window, and stole the items inside to attempt to resell. Tr., p.
712.
{¶12} Later that morning on January 7, 2022, Mr. Hoam reported Deanna missing.
At around 10:00 a.m., Mr. Hoam met Sergeant Gess (“Sgt. Gess”) at Deanna’s apartment,
and they walked through it together. Mr. Hoam noticed a basket of clothes at the foot of
Deanna’s bed had been knocked over but nothing else seemed out of the ordinary,
although he noted the apartment was extremely messy and cluttered. Sgt. Gess went
into the bedroom and saw drug paraphernalia on the dresser and collected only “a couple
of things that were suspected to be illegal.” Tr., p. 378. Sgt. Gess did not enter the
bathroom that day. He testified the bathroom was dark and he could see that no one was in there. Because it was a missing person report at the time, he did not think it was
necessary to check (although hindsight he says he would have).
{¶13} After about 20 minutes, Sgt. Gess went outside to his cruiser and entered
Hoam’s missing vehicle information into LEADS to research potential friends and
acquaintances. Sgt. Gess discovered that Deanna’s vehicle had been involved in a traffic
stop earlier that day, the traffic stop involving Appellant and Chapman. The information
led Sgt. Gess to Rachel Brown’s apartment. Brown told Sgt. Gess that “they were with
[the victim] the night before; that she was in the car and they dropped her off. And that
was about the gist of it.” Tr., p. 381. Sgt. Gess testified that Brown “reiterated two or three
times that she knows she’s fine, and she even stated she’s not dead.” Id.
{¶14} On January 9, 2022, Mr. Hoam and his wife went looking for Deanna
because she still had not responded to him. He returned to Deanna’s apartment to use
the restroom and decided to pull back the shower curtain and discovered Deanna’s
deceased body in the bathtub. She was in a fetal position on her left side with her head
down by the drain and a lot of blood, the flesh was torn off from her face. Tr., pp. 292-
294. Mr. Hoam called 9-1-1. Lead Detective Larry Schacherer and other officers soon
arrived at Deanna’s apartment. When Schacherer initially entered the apartment, nothing
seemed out of place or atypical. However, upon entering the bedroom, he observed that
items appeared to be knocked off the shelves and dresser, and he saw what appeared to
be blood on the walls and carpet. The State admitted several photographs as exhibits to
demonstrate the areas of blood Schacherer noticed, including on the bedroom’s light
switch, on the refrigerator and floor in the kitchen (what he described as possible transfers
of blood), as well as streaks of blood going from “like, the bedroom to the bathroom.” Tr., pp. 952-953. Another photograph revealed blood marks on the wall after detectives
moved Deanna’s bed away from the wall. One such mark was “substantial,” about eight
inches in width. Tr., p. 960.
{¶15} Later that day, Mr. Hoam discovered that charges were made to a credit
card he gave to Deanna for emergencies, and he informed Detective Schacherer. The
charges, including Speedway and McDonald’s, were made on Thursday, January 6,
2022. The State provided several lay witnesses that produced and testified regarding
video footage from certain business establishments on January 6, 2022. One such video
was obtained from the nearby Valero gas station, showing Appellant entering the Valero
with Chapman in a red Ford Fusion that was definitively established to be Deanna’s car.
Additional video evidence showed Appellant and Chapman at McDonald’s and
Speedway, as referenced above and testified to by Chapman. In each video, Appellant
was driving Deanna’s car with Chapman as the passenger, and Deanna was nowhere to
be seen.
{¶16} At trial, Detective Schacherer identified Appellant as the individual wearing
a black sweatshirt who entered the Valero gas station on Ashland Road on January 6,
2022, at 3:08 a.m., in a red 2007 Ford Fusion. Through Detective Schacherer, and over
the defense’s objection, the State introduced several Facebook threads of conversations
between Appellant and different women, demonstrating that Appellant was struggling in
the days leading up to Deanna’s murder. The State similarly introduced certain messages
and chat history between Deanna and Appellant.
{¶17} On January 10, 2022, Michelle Chapman learned from her mother that
Detective Ronee Swisher was trying to reach her. Chapman eventually called the detective and later pulled her car into a garage where the Mansfield Police Department
recovered several items determined to be Deanna’s, including the apartment security
camera, a backpack, a laptop, and Deanna’s driver’s license. The security company
monitoring Deanna’s camera reported it was inactive since December 26, 2021.
Detectives also took Chapman’s cell phone.
{¶18} On January 11, Chapman brought police a second cell phone and Deanna’s
father’s credit card, and on January 17, Chapman brought detectives a third cell phone.
Detective Schacherer confirmed that the phones collected belonged to Chapman,
Appellant, and Deanna. Jerry Botdorf, a forensic investigator, performed data extractions
on the involved cell phones using Cellebrite. Botdorf testified that when a device is older
but contains little data, it has likely been “reset.” Tr., p. 635. In his opinion, Deanna’s
phone was reset on January 6, 2022, the day a new email account was established
named “tedbundythehokilla.”1
{¶19} Bryan Mazzolini, a special agent with the United States Secret Service,
analyzed the raw data he received from Mansfield Police Department’s “geofence”
warrants. In essence, Agent Mazzolini took Google’s GPS data, consisting of time, date,
and location - and put it into a Google Earth map. Tr., p. 444. He created a power point
as “a visual representation” of the locations of the device during the time between
January 5 and January 6, 2022. Tr., p. 446. The data revealed that Deanna’s phone was
indeed at the Valero location, the Speedway, and the McDonalds on January 6, as
1Several items were collected from Appellant at the Richland County jail including multiple
pieces of jewelry, all of which belonged to Deanna as identified by her son and her sister. Officers also took the clothing Appellant was wearing upon arrival, including Appellant’s tan leather work boots. referenced above. Again, Appellant and Chapman are clearly seen in the video footage
from these businesses, but not Deanna.
{¶20} Thomas Stortz, an investigator with Richland County Coroner’s Office,
determined that Deanna’s cause of death was homicide, with multiple sharp force thrust
injuries. The date and time of death was listed as January 6, 2022, at 1900 hours. Bryan
Casto, a forensic pathologist with the Montgomery County Coroner, conducted the post-
mortem examination and death investigation regarding Deanna. Casto found at least 25
injuries, including stab wounds, incise wounds, and blunt force lacerations to her head
and neck area. Casto further reported four stab wounds to Deanna’s chest, three to four
inches deep that cut through the cartilage and damaged three major organs, along with
two smaller stab wounds to her heart and stab wounds to both lungs. Deanna also had
defensive wounds with fractures to her right hand, typical of someone fighting off an
attack. Casto opined that the cause of death was multiple sharp force trauma. Deanna
also had three separate areas on her body that appeared to be bloody shoe prints. Tr.,
p. 746. Casto collected various swabs and fingernail scrapings for further testing.
{¶21} Dawn Fryback, a DNA analyst, conducted comprehensive scientific DNA
testing on the fingernail scrapings from Deanna as well as certain clothing worn by
Appellant and collected by law enforcement. The right fingernail scrapings from Deanna
indicated the presence of two males, with one “major” male DNA profile matching
Appellant. Tr., p. 810. The left fingernail scrapings indicated three potential males, with
one “major” DNA match to Appellant. Id. A second male’s DNA that was submitted for
comparison, William “Johnny” Marvicsin, was excluded as to both nail scrapings. Tr., pp.
812-813. Appellant’s tan leather boots indicated the presence of blood; the blood on the boots was a match to Deanna’s blood to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Tr.,
p. 828. Fryback also examined Appellant’s black hoodie sweatshirt with indications of
blood on the zipper. It indicated the DNA of two people - Appellant was the source of the
major DNA profile and Deanna was the source of the minor DNA profile.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶22} “I. CONRAD’S MURDER CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DENYING HIM HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
{¶23} “II. THE USE OF INFLAMMATORY AND UNADMITTED EVIDENCE DURING OPENING STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND VIOLATED CONRAD’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.”
{¶24} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING AN ORDER OF RESTITUTION WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING RESTITUTION IN ITS SENTENCING ORDER FOR ECONOMIC LOSS PROPERLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO A CRIME OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED.”
{¶25} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEANNA HOAM’S STATEMENTS REGARDING THREE WOMEN WERE HEARSAY AND EXCLUDING MR. HOAM’S TESTIMONY ABOUT THESE STATEMENTS FROM EVIDENCE.”
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶26} In the first assignment of error, Appellant claims his convictions are against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. Weight of the evidence addresses
the evidence's effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387
(1997); State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4396, ¶ 83. When a court of appeals reverses a
judgment of a trial court as against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as
a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact finder's resolution of conflicting testimony.
State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800; Thompkins at 387; Williams, ¶ 60. The reviewing court
must determine whether the jury clearly “lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice” that the conviction cannot stand, and a new trial must be ordered.
Id., quoting State v. Group, 2002-Ohio-7247, ¶ 77 (citations omitted). Reversing a
conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering a new trial
should be reserved for only the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
against the conviction. State v. Dotson, 2017-Ohio-5565, ¶ 1 (5th Dist.).
{¶27} In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of
the presumption in favor of the finder of fact. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21;
In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the [trier of fact] is best able to view
the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these
observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co.,
Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). In determining whether a witness is
credible, the trier of fact is in the best position to consider inconsistencies in testimony,
as well as the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying. Dotson, ¶ 50. Moreover,
a defendant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds simply because there
was inconsistent evidence presented at trial. Id.; State v. Raver, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21
(10th Dist.). If the evidence is susceptible to one or more interpretations, a reviewing
court must interpret it in a manner consistent with the verdict. Dotson, ¶ 49.
{¶28} Further, circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct
evidence, and a conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone.
State v. Mahone, 2014-Ohio-1251, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.). It is within the province of the jury
to consider the probative value of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, and to
draw reasonable inferences from the facts and testimony in evidence. Id., at ¶ 49. Here, upon review, we find that the jury did not “clearly” lose its way or create a manifest
injustice in finding appellant guilty of murdering Deanna. Accordingly, Appellant’s
convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶29} The evidence presented at trial suggesting Appellant’s guilt is significant.
Deanna and Appellant reconnected in November 2021, and they had some type of
relationship in the weeks leading up to her murder. The last day that Mr. Hoam had any
contact with Deanna was the afternoon of January 5, 2022, when she texted him asking
for a heater because her apartment was getting cold. Mr. Hoam delivered the heater to
her apartment and plugged it in on January 6, 2022, around 1:00 p.m.
{¶30} Between 3:08 a.m. on January 6, 2022, and the later evening hours that
same day Appellant was seen on video with Chapman at multiple locations – Valero,
Speedway, and McDonald’s. The video footage clearly identifies Appellant and Chapman
together using Deanna’s 2007 red Ford Fusion, but there is no sign of Deanna. The
“geofence” cell phone data traced Deanna’s cell phone to the very same locations.
Appellant even used the credit card Mr. Hoam gave to Deanna for emergencies to make
multiple purchases, including purchases at Speedway and McDonalds. Appellant and
Chapman were clearly together after the murder, and Chapman was later found with
multiple items belonging to Deanna, including her cell phone. When detectives recovered
the phone, they determined that it had recently been reset, on or about January 6, 2022,
the same day that a new account was made named “tedbundythehokilla.” Appellant was
also in possession of Deanna’s jewelry, some of which she wore daily. Lead detective
Schacherer discovered multiple areas of blood in Deanna’s apartment. Deanna’s neighbors heard loud noises coming from her apartment in the early hours of January 6,
2022, and one heard someone say, “Please stop.”
{¶31} In addition to the above circumstantial evidence, perhaps most significant
is the direct physical DNA evidence in this case. As set forth in the statement of facts,
Dawn Fryback performed a comprehensive DNA analysis, including Deanna’s fingernail
scrapings and certain clothing worn by Appellant. The right fingernail scrapings from
Deanna indicated the presence of two males, with one “major” male DNA profile matching
Appellant. Tr., p. 810. The left fingernail scrapings indicated three potential males, with
one “major” DNA match to Appellant. Deanna had three bloody boot marks on her
deceased body. Appellant’s boots indicated the presence of blood; the blood on the
boots matched Deanna’s blood to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Tr., p. 828.
Fryback also examined Appellant’s black hoodie sweatshirt with indications of blood on
the zipper. It indicated the DNA of two people - Appellant was the source of the major
DNA profile and Deanna was the source of the minor DNA profile, again to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty.
{¶32} Thus, after examining the entire record, we cannot conclude that the jury
clearly lost its way or created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
cannot stand. To the contrary, significant evidence exists in this case to support the jury’s
determination that Appellant murdered Deanna in the early morning hours of January 6,
2022. As such, Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Unadmitted photographs of the victim as a child
{¶33} In the second assignment of error, Appellant claims the use of “inflammatory
and unadmitted evidence” during opening statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct and violated Appellant’s rights to Due Process and a fair trial. More
specifically, Appellant argues the State’s use of two photographs of the victim as a child,
that were later excluded as irrelevant, were so prejudicial that Appellant was denied his
right to a fair trial.
{¶34} As an initial matter, Appellant objected to the entirety of the prosecution’s
opening statement before it even began, and provided arguments regarding certain
portions of the power point but did not challenge the two photos. The trial court overruled
the objection and allowed the prosecution to proceed with opening statements. Only after
the State’s case in chief did Appellant specifically object to the two photographs of the
victim as a child and the trial court agreed, finding them irrelevant to Appellant’s guilt.
Regardless of the timing of the objection, we find Appellant’s argument is without merit.
{¶35} The prosecution enjoys wide latitude during opening and closing
statements. State v. Gilbert, 2005-Ohio-5536, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). The test for prosecutorial
misconduct is, first, whether the conduct is improper, and second, whether the conduct
prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the accused. State v. McConnell, 2023-
Ohio-654, ¶ 34 (5th Dist.), citing Vill. of Sunbury v. Sullivan, 2012-Ohio-3699, ¶ 30 (5th
Dist.), citing State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160 (1990). In reviewing allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, an appellate court must consider the conduct complained of in
the context of the entire trial. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
{¶36} A trial is not unfair, if, in the context of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond
a reasonable doubt the jury would have found the defendant guilty even without the
improper conduct. State v. Treesh, 2001-Ohio-4; State v. White, 1998-Ohio-363; State v.
Saleh, 2009-Ohio-1542, ¶ 66 (10th Dist.). In other words, "a defendant’s substantial rights cannot be prejudiced when the remaining evidence, standing alone, is so overwhelming
that it constitutes defendant's guilt, and the outcome of the case would have been the
same regardless of evidence admitted erroneously." State v. Hicks, 2011-Ohio-3578, ¶30
(8th Dist. 2011), citing State v. Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, 349-350 (1988).
{¶37} Even assuming, without deciding, that the inclusion of two photos of the
victim as a child during opening statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct, it simply
was not prejudicial to Appellant’s right to a fair trial. First, the court instructed the jury that
opening statements are simply not evidence and the State must prove each element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Fannon, 2018-Ohio-5242, ¶ 58 (4th Dist.),
citing Gilbert, supra. Second, the two photographs of the victim as a child had little effect
upon the jury’s determination of Appellant’s actual guilt. Indeed, the evidence against
Appellant was significant and it is clear that the outcome of the case would have been the
same regardless of the use of the photos. See State v. McConnell, 2023-Ohio-654 (5th
Dist.). As a result, Appellant’s right to a fair trial was not violated. Appellant’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
Restitution
{¶38} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
rendering an order of restitution for economic loss attributable to a crime for which the
defendant was not convicted. Again, we disagree with Appellant.
{¶39} R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) permits a trial court to impose restitution as part of a
sentence to compensate a victim for economic loss. The court may base its order of
restitution on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence
investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other information. However, the amount shall not exceed the
amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the
commission of the offense. R.C. 2929.01(L) defines "[e]conomic loss," as relevant here,
as "any economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result of the
commission of an offense and includes any * * * medical cost * * * incurred as a result of
the commission of the offense." State v. Jones, 2015-Ohio-3983, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); State
v. Dunham, 2014-Ohio-1042, ¶ 81 (5th Dist.), citing, State v. Lalain, 2013-Ohio-3093,
syllabus.
{¶40} "An award of restitution is limited to the actual loss caused by the
defendant's criminal conduct for which he [or she] was convicted, and there must be
competent and credible evidence in the record from which the court may ascertain the
amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.” Jones, ¶ 13. The evidence
supporting a restitution order can be either documentary or testimonial evidence. State
v. DeJoy, 2011-Ohio-2745, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Holt, 2011-Ohio-1582 (8th
Dist.). Generally, an appellate court reviews restitution orders under an abuse of
discretion standard. To find an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must determine the
trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an
error of law or judgment. State v. Cook, 2017-Ohio-1503 (5th Dist.).
{¶41} A defendant who does not dispute an amount of restitution, request a
hearing, or otherwise object at the sentencing hearing waives all but plain error regarding
the order of restitution. State v. Ratliff, 2011-Ohio-2313, ¶14 (2d Dist.); State v. Sheets,
2018-Ohio-996 (5th Dist.); State v. Patterson, 2025-Ohio-4933 (5th Dist.). Thus, a trial
court is required to conduct a hearing on restitution only if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount of restitution ordered. Id., at paragraph two of the syllabus; R.C.
2929.18(A)(1).
{¶42} Here, Appellant utterly failed to object at the sentencing hearing regarding
restitution and likewise, does not raise a plain error argument on appeal. For that reason
alone, Appellant’s assignment of error is wholly without merit. However, even if Appellant
raised the plain error argument on appeal, such error simply does not exist. To establish
plain error, Appellant must show an error occurred, the error was obvious, and there is a
reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice, meaning the error affected the
actual outcome of the trial. State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 66, citing State v.
Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. Under this standard, the defendant bears the burden of
“showing that but for a plain or obvious error, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been otherwise, and reversal must be necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 16.
{¶43} An appellate court has discretion to notice plain error and therefore "is not
required to correct it." State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 22, citing State v. Rogers, 2015-
Ohio-2459, ¶ 24. Here, Appellant was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt on all seven
charges against him, including the murder of Deanna by blunt force trauma. After the
murder, Appellant took the victim’s car and he and Chapman drove around for many hours
together using Mr. Hoam’s credit card, taking Deanna’s personal items, including her cell
phone. Appellant was ultimately arrested, after a traffic stop, due to an active warrant.
The police took Deanna’s car back to a location and locked it, but Chapman later came
back and smashed the car to retrieve items that she hoped to later sell. Every one of
these events occurred at the hands of Appellant, after brutally murdering the victim. Thus, we will not recognize plain error in this matter and reversal is not necessary to
correct any “manifest miscarriage of justice.”
Hearsay Exception – Excited Utterance
{¶44} In the fourth and final assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the trial
court improperly excluded statements Deanna made to Mr. Hoam shortly before her death
that demonstrate Deanna was being threatened and targeted by multiple people. Prior
to her murder, Deanna called her father to tell him that three unnamed women had come
to her apartment complex, broke the windshield of her car, and dented the sides when
trying to taunt her. At some point, Deanna also told Mr. Hoam that she “feared for her
life.” Tr., p. 338. Defense counsel claimed that Deanna feared for her life because of the
three unnamed women’s behavior and proffered Mr. Hoam’s testimony regarding these
statements.
{¶45} Appellate courts review challenges to the admissibility of hearsay
statements for an abuse of discretion, provided an objection is made at trial. State v.
Smith, 2019-Ohio-3257, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.); State v. Ocanas, 2023-Ohio-951, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.);
In re S.H.W., 2016-Ohio-841, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). “A trial court is vested with broad discretion
in determining the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such
discretion is exercised in line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake
Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (1991). An abuse of discretion implies more than an error
in judgment; it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. State v. Coriell, 2023-Ohio-4113,
¶¶ 30-31 (5th Dist.).
{¶46} Generally, hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at trial, offered in evidence “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is not admissible, unless an exception exists as provided by the
U.S. or Ohio Constitutions, by statute, or by rule. In turn, Evid.R. 803(2) sets forth a
hearsay exception for statements that are considered “excited utterances,” defined as
statements "relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." See State v. Carter, 2017-
Ohio-7443, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.); State v. Railey, 2024-Ohio-5502, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.).
{¶47} To be admissible as an excited utterance, four requirements must be met:
(1) a startling event produced a nervous excitement in the declarant, (2) the statement
was made while still under the stress of excitement caused by the event, (3) the statement
relates to the startling event, and (4) the declarant personally observed the startling event.
State v. Brown, 112 Ohio App.3d 583, 601 (12th Dist. 1996). "The excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule exists because excited utterances are the product of
reactive rather than reflective thinking and, thus, are believed inherently reliable." State
v. Ducey, 2004-Ohio-3833, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.); State v. Hopkins, 2018-Ohio-1864, ¶ 36 (2d
Dist.); State v. Akers, 2021-Ohio-2562, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.) (noting that the rule protects
statements or declarations that are spontaneous and unreflective); State v. Duncan, 53
Ohio St.2d 215 (1978). In Duncan, the Ohio Supreme Court expansively reflected on this
exception to the hearsay rule:
Testimony as to a statement or declaration may be admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous exclamations where the trial
judge reasonably finds (a) that there was some occurrence startling enough
to produce a nervous excitement in the declarant, which was sufficient to
still his reflective faculties and thereby make his statements and declarations the unreflective and sincere expression of his actual
impressions and beliefs, and thus render his statement or declarations
spontaneous and unreflective, (b) that the statement or declaration, even if
not strictly contemporaneous with its exciting cause, was made before there
had been time for such nervous excitement to lose a domination over his
reflective faculties, so that such domination continued to remain sufficient
to make his statements and declarations the unreflective and sincere
expression of his actual impressions and beliefs, (c) that the statement or
declaration related to such startling occurrence or the circumstances of
such startling occurrence, and (d) that the declarant had an opportunity to
observe personally the matters asserted in his statement or declaration.
Id., at syllabus.
{¶48} Here, as set forth, defense counsel claimed Deanna’s statements to Mr.
Hoam that she feared for her life was connected to the behavior of the three unnamed
women who were taunting and threatening her. The defense proffered the following
relevant testimony from Mr. Hoam, outside the presence of the jury. See Tr., pp. 330-
352.
Q. Do you remember speaking to the police * * * on January 10th?
A. January 10th? What day of the week is that?
Q. I believe Sunday was the day that you entered the apartment and
found your daughter deceased, and that was on the 9th. So I believe the
10th would have been the very next morning, Monday. * * * Q. Did you talk to them about your daughter fearing somebody trying to
kill her?
A. Did I talk to them about someone wanting to kill her?
Q. That she felt someone was trying to kill her?
A. She told me she feared for her life and she would like to move to
another place.
Q. What had happened that caused her to fear for her life?
A. I’m not sure.
Q: Did you tell police about three women beating up her car and taunting
her and demanding she come out and she indicated to you that caused her
to fear for her life?
A. Would that be considered hearsay?
Q. You’re allowed to answer. That’s why they’re [the jury] not in here
right now.
The Court: If you remember, I mean, if you remember this conversation. If
you do, you do. If you don’t, you don’t.
A. Yeah, that’s entirely possible.
Q. Did you - - you told the police in the statement that that - - I think your
exact words were she told me I think it was Monday that they broke the
windshield in her car and put some dents in the side of her car when they
came out trying to taunt her again. Did you mean that prior Monday? A. I don’t remember that conversation at all. I don’t remember. I don’t
remember that conversation, I really don’t. * * * [the witness reads his prior
statement to police on the witness stand]
Q. And you testified just a few seconds or minutes ago that she was
concerned enough she wanted to move?
A. Yes.
Q. * * * Do you remember did you mean the Monday right prior to the
event, the way it’s worded?
A. She had been - - I don’t remember when she told me she wanted to
move, but it was in that time period.
The Court: What time period?
The witness: Probably a week or two weeks prior [to her murder].
***
Q. Two and a half years ago, you used the word “Monday.”
Q. Is that what it says?
Q. By context, does it seem like you might have meant possibly the
Monday before that but within that close time frame of you finding her on
the Sunday?
A. She told me at one time she feared for her life. Q. What was her demeanor like when she was telling you that?
A. She seemed to be scared.
Tr. pp. 332-338.
By the prosecution.
Q. You said there were, like, three girls that’s been coming around
taunting her, yelling at her when she is at her apartment, telling her to come
out, they wanted to fight her.
A. Um-hum.
Q. Is that what she told you?
Q. When did she tell you that? And I don’t want you to guess. If you
don’t know when she told you that, then you don’t know.
A. I don’t know exactly when she told me that.
Id. at 343.
{¶49} The prosecution asked Mr. Hoam whether Deanna was scared or crying
whenever she told him about the three girls. Id., at 344. He responded that she was not
crying but seemed “extremely concerned” and felt “unsafe.” Id. When she made the
statement, she was not yelling or talking fast but her tone of voice indicated to him that
she was very concerned. Id., at 345. The prosecution asked again, “And did she tell you
when this event with the three girls occurred? I don’t want you guessing.” Id. (emphasis
added). Mr. Hoam replied, “No.” Id.
Q. You don’t know?
A. I don’t remember. I don’t remember. Q. Okay. So your answer is you don’t know when this situation with the
three girls - - what time period she was referring to when she was telling you
that. Is that correct?
A. I’m not sure. I’m not sure of the time, what day it was or exactly when
it was.
Q. The conversation where she said that she feared for her life, do you
recall when you had that phone conversation?
A. It was shortly before she was murdered.
Q. Okay.
A. I don’t remember what day it was.
Q: Okay.
A. It was shortly before she was murdered. * * *
Q. Did she tell you why she feared for her life?
A. No, she didn’t.
Q. You have no idea why she feared for her life?
A. She didn’t tell me and I didn’t know.
Q. Not only do you not know why she feared for her life, you don’t have
any time frame on whatever it was that could have caused that fear?
A. Right.
Q. It could have been two years ago? You don’t know?
A. I don’t know.
By the Court: Q. My question briefly: I guess when she told you she feared for her life,
was that a separate conversation that you had with her? Was that separate
from this talk of the three girls?
Q. All right. And the talk of - - and she never told you why she said that?
She just said I fear for my life, but you don’t know why she - - she didn’t
explain to you what had happened to explain why she said that?
A. Correct.
Tr., at pp. 346-348.
{¶50} After the proffer, the trial court held that the testimony was not admissible
under Evid.R.803(2), the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The court
stated “he can’t tell us what that time period is. He can’t say if it was five minutes, ten
minutes, three days, two weeks. It doesn’t fit. You have to be able to say it was in a time
frame that she was still under the stress, so she has to be like, oh, my God. It doesn’t fit.”
Tr., p. 352.
{¶51} Upon review of the proffered testimony, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding Deanna’s statements to Mr. Hoam. When the court itself
asked Mr. Hoam whether her statement that she feared for her life was a separate
conversation from her statements about the three women, he replied yes, meaning it was
separate and distinct. Mr. Hoam was clear he did not know why she feared for her life,
she just made that statement at some point. Indeed, when Mr. Hoam was pressed about
the exact time frame Deanna told him she feared for her life, he could not definitively answer. As set forth, an excited utterance must be spontaneous and unreflective and
clearly relate to a startling event.
{¶52} Moreover, Mr. Hoam’s testimony does not clearly demonstrate that Deanna
observed the women damaging her car. Mr. Hoam recalled she told him about the
incident during a phone conversation, but there is no indication Deanna was “under the
stress” of the startling event. Simply stated, Appellant did not establish a sufficient
connection or timeline between the three women’s alleged conduct and the victim’s
utterance that she feared for her life. The trial court thoughtfully listened to the proffered
testimony, asked its own clarifying questions, and carefully analyzed the issue. As a
result, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
statements. Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION
{¶53} For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, Appellant’s first, second, third, and
fourth assignments of error are overruled in their entirety. The jury verdict and judgment
from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶54} Costs to Appellant.
By: Montgomery, J.
King, P.J. and
Popham, J. concur.