State v. Conner

2024 Ohio 3110

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 15, 2024
• Docket: 113405
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Conner, 2024-Ohio-3110.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113405 v. :

KENDLE CONNER, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 15, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-661269-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Kendle Conner, pro se.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:

Defendant-appellant, Kendle Conner, appeals from the trial court’s

judgment denying his “motion to vacate the sentence as being contrary to law.” We

affirm. I. Background

Conner pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter, felonious

assault, and having weapons while under disability in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-

661269 (“661269”) and to having weapons while under disability in Cuyahoga C.P.

No. CR-21-661251 (“661251”). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate 25-year

prison sentence. Over the State’s objection at the sentencing hearing, the trial court

declined to impose the “Reagan Tokes tail” when sentencing Conner, finding the

indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law to be unconstitutional.

Conner raised no objection to his sentence at the sentencing hearing.

On direct appeal, Conner raised two assignments of error: (1) that his

guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made and (2) that the

trial court erred in sentencing him on both the involuntary manslaughter and

felonious assault counts in 661269 because they were allied offenses. Neither

Conner nor the state raised any argument on direct appeal regarding the trial court’s

failure to sentence Conner in compliance with the Reagan Tokes Law.

This court found no merit to Conner’s arguments on direct appeal and

affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Conner, 2023-Ohio-1220 (8th Dist.).

In its written opinion, this court noted the trial court’s decision not to sentence

under the Reagan Tokes Law but did not address the issue further because neither

party raised it on direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 12, fn. 1. This court subsequently denied

Conner’s motion for reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B). State v. Conner, 2023-

Ohio-3485 (8th Dist.). Conner then filed in the trial court a “motion to vacate the sentence

as being contrary to law,” arguing that his sentence was contrary to law and the trial

court was required to resentence him because the court had not sentenced him in

compliance with the Reagan Tokes Law. The trial court denied the motion. It found

that Conner’s argument was not applicable to 661251 because the offense to which

Conner pleaded guilty in that case was a third-degree felony to which the Reagan

Tokes Law did not apply. It further found that Conner’s argument regarding 661269

was precluded because neither party had challenged the sentence on direct appeal,

as required by the Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-

2913, and State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784.

Conner now appeals from that judgment.

II. Law and Analysis

In his first assignment of error, Conner contends that the trial court

erred by not sentencing him under the Reagan Tokes Law. In his second assignment

of error, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate his

sentence as being contrary to law. We address these assignments of error together

because they are related.

As an initial matter, we observe that the trial court correctly found

that Conner’s arguments regarding the trial court’s failure to sentence under the

Reagan Tokes Law are not applicable to his sentence in 661251. Under the Reagan

Tokes Law, qualifying first- and second-degree felonies committed after March 22,

2019, are subject to the imposition of indefinite sentences. State v. Allmon, 2023- Ohio-3880, ¶ 2, citing R.C. 2929.14(A) and 2929.144. In 661251, Conner pleaded

guilty to having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony offense.

Accordingly, the indefinite provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not apply to the

sentence in that case.

With respect to Conner’s arguments regarding 661269, we observe

that in Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, and Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, the Ohio

Supreme Court realigned its precedent with the traditional understanding of what

constitutes a void judgment. Harper at ¶ 4; Henderson at ¶ 34. “Based on Harper

and Henderson, the current void-sentence jurisprudence of the Ohio Supreme Court

is clear: if the sentencing court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and

personal jurisdiction over the defendant, any sentencing error renders the sentence

voidable, not void.” State v. Stansell, 2021-Ohio-2036, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (en banc).

And if a sentencing error renders the defendant’s sentence voidable, the error must

be challenged on direct appeal or the sentence will be subject to the doctrine of res

judicata, which bars the assertion of claims that could have or should have been

raised in a prior proceeding. Harper at ¶ 43; State v. Woody, 2014-Ohio-302, ¶ 12

(8th Dist.).

There is no dispute in this case that the trial court had both subject-

matter jurisdiction over Conner’s case and personal jurisdiction over him. R.C.

2931.03; State v. Castner, 2021-Ohio-1048, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). Accordingly, the trial

court’s failure to comply with the Reagan Tokes Law when sentencing Conner in

661269 rendered the sentence voidable, not void, and thus, to avoid the application of the doctrine of res judicata, Conner was required to raise the issue on direct

appeal. He did not do so and, accordingly, res judicata prohibits him from raising

the claim now.

The assignments of error are overruled, and the trial court’s judgment

is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR