[Cite as State v. Colquitt, 2024-Ohio-2647.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-37 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 21-CR-070 : PIERRE O. COLQUITT : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on July 12, 2024
CARLO C. MCGINNIS, Attorney for Appellant
ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee
.............
EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Pierre O. Colquitt appeals from his conviction in the
Clark County Court of Common Pleas after he pleaded guilty to one count of failure to
comply with an order or signal of a police officer and was sentenced to an agreed term of
nine months in prison. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be -2-
affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On January 19, 2021, and then again on January 25, 2021, Colquitt fled from
Clark County law enforcement officers. As a result, he was indicted on four counts of
failure to comply, but he was not served until February 2023 because he was incarcerated
in other jurisdictions. Once back in Clark County, Colquitt entered into a negotiated plea
agreement in which he pleaded guilty to Count One of the indictment in return for the
dismissal of the other three counts. Additionally, the parties agreed to recommend a nine-
month prison term. A misdemeanor driving under suspension case was also dismissed
pursuant to the plea agreement.
{¶ 3} Colquitt was released on his own recognizance after the April 13, 2023 plea
hearing to resolve other charges out of Warren County; the disposition was set for May
12. After months of delay due to continuances relating to calculation of jail-time credit,
Colquitt was sentenced on August 10 to the agreed-upon nine-month term. He was also
given 59 days of jail-time credit, a number far less than he had calculated. The jail-time
credit calculation caused an angry outburst from Colquitt, who demanded that he be
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and accused the court of being racist.
{¶ 4} Colquitt filed a timely appeal.
II. Guilty Plea
Consecutive Sentence
{¶ 5} Colquitt’s assignment of error features two parts. In the first part he argues -3-
that his plea was invalidly made because “the Criminal Rule 11 colloquy, written Plea of
Guilty, Entry of Judgment, Conviction, and Sentence were deficient in failing to fully
explain the maximum penalties he would be facing.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. He
specifically alleges that because the trial court failed to inform him that a sentence for
failure to comply is required to be served consecutively to any other prison sentence, his
plea was not made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner. We disagree.
{¶ 6} To satisfy the requirements of due process, a guilty plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate as
much. State v. Harris, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-29, 2021-Ohio-1431, ¶ 15. For a plea
to be made knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must follow the mandates of Crim.R.
11(C). State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520, 24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13.
“[T]he rule ‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally
inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the
plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’ ” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-
Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331
N.E.2d 411 (1975).
{¶ 7} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) mandates that the trial court inform the defendant of the
constitutional rights he is waiving, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to compulsory process, the right against self-incrimination, and the
right to require the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perdue,
2022-Ohio-722, 185 N.E.3d 683, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). Strict compliance with the rule is required
and a failure to do so invalidates the plea. Id. -4-
{¶ 8} “A trial court must substantially comply with the notification of non-
constitutional rights contained in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b),” and a defendant generally
must show prejudice before a plea will be vacated for failure to substantially comply with
these notifications. State v. Easter, 2016-Ohio-7798, 74 N.E.3d 760, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.).
“Substantial compliance” means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant
understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is giving up. State v. Thomas,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26907, 2017-Ohio-5501, ¶ 37; State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106,
108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).
{¶ 9} In this case, Colquitt does not assert that the trial court failed to advise him
of any of his constitutional rights, but rather, that there was not substantial compliance
with Crim.R. 11 because the court failed to inform him that a conviction and sentence for
failure to comply statutorily required imposition of consecutive sentences. This argument,
however, is without merit.
{¶ 10} We have previously rejected the proposition that a guilty plea to failure to
comply (R.C. 2921.331(D)) is involuntary if the defendant is not told that the statute
requires a consecutive sentence. State v. Bailey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19736, 2004-
Ohio-273, ¶ 16. Our reasoning was simple: Crim.R. 11(C) does not require that a
defendant be told that his sentences may be imposed consecutively. Id.; State v.
Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988), syllabus; State v. Nawman, 2d
Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-6, 2015-Ohio-447, ¶ 31; State v. Shade, 2d Dist. Montgomery
Nos. 29373 and 29374, 2022-Ohio-3845.
{¶ 11} Colquitt’s argument – that a court must inform a defendant that a sentence -5-
imposed pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(D) shall run consecutively to any other prison term –
is not a new one and has actually been adopted by other Ohio appellate districts. State
v. Norman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91302, 2009-Ohio-4044. The Norman court stated
that when a statute mandates that sentences be served consecutively, the consecutive
nature “directly affects the length of the sentence, thus becoming a crucial component of
what constitutes a ‘maximum’ sentence.” Id. at ¶ 7. More succinctly, when consecutive
sentences are mandatory (as opposed to discretionary), a trial court must advise of that
fact to achieve “substantial compliance” with Crim.R. 11(C). See also State v. Milhoan,
6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-10-1328, L-10-1329, 2011-Ohio-4741.
{¶ 12} The holdings of cases like Norman and Milhoan, though, are only applicable
“when the imposition of consecutive sentences is a foregone conclusion at the time the
plea is entered and accepted, that is, only in cases where ‘a mandatory, consecutive
prison term was a guaranteed consequence of appellant’s guilty plea.’ ” Milhoan at ¶ 35,
quoting Norman at ¶ 9. There is nothing that requires the court to advise as to “the
potential for consecutive mandatory sentencing.” Id.
{¶ 13} When Colquitt pleaded guilty here, it was not a foregone conclusion that he
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[Cite as State v. Colquitt, 2024-Ohio-2647.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-37 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 21-CR-070 : PIERRE O. COLQUITT : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on July 12, 2024
CARLO C. MCGINNIS, Attorney for Appellant
ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee
.............
EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Pierre O. Colquitt appeals from his conviction in the
Clark County Court of Common Pleas after he pleaded guilty to one count of failure to
comply with an order or signal of a police officer and was sentenced to an agreed term of
nine months in prison. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be -2-
affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On January 19, 2021, and then again on January 25, 2021, Colquitt fled from
Clark County law enforcement officers. As a result, he was indicted on four counts of
failure to comply, but he was not served until February 2023 because he was incarcerated
in other jurisdictions. Once back in Clark County, Colquitt entered into a negotiated plea
agreement in which he pleaded guilty to Count One of the indictment in return for the
dismissal of the other three counts. Additionally, the parties agreed to recommend a nine-
month prison term. A misdemeanor driving under suspension case was also dismissed
pursuant to the plea agreement.
{¶ 3} Colquitt was released on his own recognizance after the April 13, 2023 plea
hearing to resolve other charges out of Warren County; the disposition was set for May
12. After months of delay due to continuances relating to calculation of jail-time credit,
Colquitt was sentenced on August 10 to the agreed-upon nine-month term. He was also
given 59 days of jail-time credit, a number far less than he had calculated. The jail-time
credit calculation caused an angry outburst from Colquitt, who demanded that he be
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and accused the court of being racist.
{¶ 4} Colquitt filed a timely appeal.
II. Guilty Plea
Consecutive Sentence
{¶ 5} Colquitt’s assignment of error features two parts. In the first part he argues -3-
that his plea was invalidly made because “the Criminal Rule 11 colloquy, written Plea of
Guilty, Entry of Judgment, Conviction, and Sentence were deficient in failing to fully
explain the maximum penalties he would be facing.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. He
specifically alleges that because the trial court failed to inform him that a sentence for
failure to comply is required to be served consecutively to any other prison sentence, his
plea was not made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner. We disagree.
{¶ 6} To satisfy the requirements of due process, a guilty plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate as
much. State v. Harris, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-29, 2021-Ohio-1431, ¶ 15. For a plea
to be made knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must follow the mandates of Crim.R.
11(C). State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520, 24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13.
“[T]he rule ‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally
inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the
plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’ ” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-
Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331
N.E.2d 411 (1975).
{¶ 7} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) mandates that the trial court inform the defendant of the
constitutional rights he is waiving, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to compulsory process, the right against self-incrimination, and the
right to require the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perdue,
2022-Ohio-722, 185 N.E.3d 683, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). Strict compliance with the rule is required
and a failure to do so invalidates the plea. Id. -4-
{¶ 8} “A trial court must substantially comply with the notification of non-
constitutional rights contained in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b),” and a defendant generally
must show prejudice before a plea will be vacated for failure to substantially comply with
these notifications. State v. Easter, 2016-Ohio-7798, 74 N.E.3d 760, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.).
“Substantial compliance” means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant
understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is giving up. State v. Thomas,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26907, 2017-Ohio-5501, ¶ 37; State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106,
108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).
{¶ 9} In this case, Colquitt does not assert that the trial court failed to advise him
of any of his constitutional rights, but rather, that there was not substantial compliance
with Crim.R. 11 because the court failed to inform him that a conviction and sentence for
failure to comply statutorily required imposition of consecutive sentences. This argument,
however, is without merit.
{¶ 10} We have previously rejected the proposition that a guilty plea to failure to
comply (R.C. 2921.331(D)) is involuntary if the defendant is not told that the statute
requires a consecutive sentence. State v. Bailey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19736, 2004-
Ohio-273, ¶ 16. Our reasoning was simple: Crim.R. 11(C) does not require that a
defendant be told that his sentences may be imposed consecutively. Id.; State v.
Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988), syllabus; State v. Nawman, 2d
Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-6, 2015-Ohio-447, ¶ 31; State v. Shade, 2d Dist. Montgomery
Nos. 29373 and 29374, 2022-Ohio-3845.
{¶ 11} Colquitt’s argument – that a court must inform a defendant that a sentence -5-
imposed pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(D) shall run consecutively to any other prison term –
is not a new one and has actually been adopted by other Ohio appellate districts. State
v. Norman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91302, 2009-Ohio-4044. The Norman court stated
that when a statute mandates that sentences be served consecutively, the consecutive
nature “directly affects the length of the sentence, thus becoming a crucial component of
what constitutes a ‘maximum’ sentence.” Id. at ¶ 7. More succinctly, when consecutive
sentences are mandatory (as opposed to discretionary), a trial court must advise of that
fact to achieve “substantial compliance” with Crim.R. 11(C). See also State v. Milhoan,
6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-10-1328, L-10-1329, 2011-Ohio-4741.
{¶ 12} The holdings of cases like Norman and Milhoan, though, are only applicable
“when the imposition of consecutive sentences is a foregone conclusion at the time the
plea is entered and accepted, that is, only in cases where ‘a mandatory, consecutive
prison term was a guaranteed consequence of appellant’s guilty plea.’ ” Milhoan at ¶ 35,
quoting Norman at ¶ 9. There is nothing that requires the court to advise as to “the
potential for consecutive mandatory sentencing.” Id.
{¶ 13} When Colquitt pleaded guilty here, it was not a foregone conclusion that he
would face consecutive sentences; it was the only charge he was facing in Clark County.
He would not have had the possibility of facing consecutive sentences in Clark County,
and while there were purportedly other charges pending in different jurisdictions, there
was no way for the trial court to know the outcomes of those cases at the time of the
colloquy.
{¶ 14} We conclude that the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) as -6-
it pertained to Colquitt’s constitutional rights and, at the very least, substantially complied
with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b) as to his non-constitutional rights. The record demonstrates
that Colquitt understood the nature of the charges against him, the maximum penalties
involved, and his eligibility for community control sanctions. The court also informed
Colquitt of the effects of his plea and that it could move directly to judgment and sentence
(although in this case it did not immediately do so).
{¶ 15} Because the trial court complied with both the constitutional and non-
constitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11, and because the Rule does not require that a
defendant be told his sentences may be imposed consecutively, we conclude that
Colquitt’s plea was made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary way.
Jail-Time Credit
{¶ 16} In the second part of his assignment of error, Colquitt contends that the trial-
court erred in calculating his earned jail-time credit; he believes he should have been
granted much more than the 59 days credited to him.
{¶ 17} R.C. 2967.191 states that “the department of rehabilitation and correction
shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the
prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was
convicted and sentenced.” State v. Ragland, 2018-Ohio-3292, 118 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 20 (2d
Dist.). However, any argument about jail-time credit is moot once a defendant has
completed his or her sentence. State v. Eleyet, 2018-Ohio-4879, 125 N.E.3d 380, ¶ 6;
State v. Lucas, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 18 CA 10, 2018-Ohio-3227, ¶ 9-11.
{¶ 18} Colquitt was sentenced to nine months in prison on August 10, 2023. That -7-
means that, at the very latest, his prison term expired in May 2024. (He was given jail-
time credit for nearly 2 months, so he was likely released in March 2024.) Our search of
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction website confirms that Colquitt is no
longer incarcerated. See State v. Bennett, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2014-CA-60, 2015-Ohio-
2779 (court took judicial notice of ODRC website confirming that defendant was no longer
incarcerated). Accordingly, there is no meaningful remedy available to him because he
has completed his sentence. Colquitt’s challenge to the trial court’s calculation of jail-time
credit is moot. See State v. Pack, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28459, 2020-Ohio-5210, ¶ 15;
Eleyet, at ¶ 6. The assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.