An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-19 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Edgecombe County Nos. 12 CRS 53619-20 JERRY HAROLD COFFIELD, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 3 July 2013 by
Judge Walter H. Godwin, Jr. in Edgecombe County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 July 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Mary Cook, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Defendant Jerry Harold Coffield, Jr. appeals from judgments
sentencing him to consecutive terms of 77 to 105 and 17 to 30
months imprisonment, entered upon jury verdicts finding him
guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of
immediate precursor chemicals used in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court. -2- At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that on 4
December 2012, officers of the Edgecombe County Sheriff’s
Department conducted a controlled buy of methamphetamine from
defendant’s son, Heath Coffield, by a person working as a
confidential informant (“CI”). Officers provided the CI with
$40 to purchase the methamphetamine and installed a surveillance
video camera on his person. The CI went to the pre-arranged
location to meet Heath, and found Heath in a truck driven by
defendant. Also in the truck were Heath’s girlfriend and her
two-year-old child.
The CI approached the truck, gave Heath $40, and in return
Heath gave the CI a quantity of methamphetamine concealed in a
lip-gloss container. During the transaction, the CI spoke with
defendant, who stated that he and Heath were planning to make
more methamphetamine later on and that he was planning to
purchase additional equipment so that they could manufacture
more methamphetamine at once. Defendant also asked the CI if
the CI would purchase Sudafed for him. Sudafed is a brand name
medication typically containing the active ingredient
pseudoephedrine. Defendant’s statements were recorded by the
surveillance video camera, and the recording was played for the
jury. -3- After defendant and Heath completed the sale of
methamphetamine to the CI, they drove off in the truck.
Officers followed, and decided to stop the truck. During the
stop, officers discovered more methamphetamine and individually
questioned defendant and Heath. Defendant denied being present
for the controlled buy and stated he was just taking Heath to
the drug store. Heath, however, admitted to “cooking”
methamphetamine with defendant that morning at defendant’s home,
where he too was living.
Based on Heath’s statements, the discovery of
methamphetamine in the truck, and the sale of methamphetamine to
the CI, officers obtained a search warrant for defendant’s
property at 3093 U.S. 64 Alternate East in Tarboro, North
Carolina. In defendant’s house, officers discovered Sudafed in
the master bedroom used by defendant and his wife, and a
casserole plate containing methamphetamine residue in the
bedroom shared by Heath and his girlfriend. In a horse barn in
defendant’s back yard, officers found a pot used to cook
methamphetamine, muriatic acid, lithium batteries, lighter
fluid, sodium hydroxide, ammonium nitrate, tubing, jars, coffee
filters, pill crusher, and a bottle containing methamphetamine
sludge material. Muriatic acid is also known as hydrochloric -4- acid. Outside the barn, officers found a burn pile that
included empty boxes of pseudoephedrine and a 30 November 2012
receipt from Walmart for the purchase of pseudoephedrine.
Testimony from a Walmart pharmacy manager also established that
Jerry Coffield of 3093 Alternate U.S. 64 East, Tarboro, North
Carolina had purchased a box of pseudoephedrine on 1 December
2012.
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession
of precursor chemicals. Defendant contends the State failed to
present substantial evidence that he had actual or constructive
possession of the muriatic/hydrochloric acid, lithium batteries
or pseudoephedrine found in his horse barn. We disagree.
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal,
the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged,
or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s
being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is
properly denied.’” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526
S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 -5- S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890 (2000). “In
making its determination, the trial court must consider all
evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the
light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit
of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions
in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d
211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135 (1995).
“To prove that a defendant possessed contraband materials,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had either actual or constructive possession of the
materials.” State v. Loftis, 185 N.C. App. 190, 197, 649 S.E.2d
1, 6 (2007), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 241, 660 S.E.2d 494
(2008).
A person has actual possession of a substance if it is on his person, he is aware of its presence, and either by himself or together with others he has the power and intent to control its disposition or use. Constructive possession, on the other hand, exists when the defendant, while not having actual possession, . . . has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the [contraband]. When the defendant does not have exclusive possession of the location where the [contraband was] found, the State must make a showing of other incriminating circumstances in order to establish constructive possession. -6- State v. Boyd, 177 N.C. App. 165, 175, 628 S.E.2d 796, 805
(2006) (citations and quotations omitted). “Where sufficient
incriminating circumstances exist, constructive possession of
the contraband materials may be inferred even where possession
of the premises is nonexclusive.” State v. Kraus, 147 N.C. App.
766, 770, 557 S.E.2d 144, 147 (2001).
We agree with defendant that he was not in actual
possession of the chemical precursors when officers discovered
them. The State thus had to prove defendant constructively
possessed the chemicals, and because there was evidence that
defendant did not have exclusive possession of the areas where
the chemicals were found, the State also had to show other
incriminating circumstances to establish defendant’s
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-19 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Edgecombe County Nos. 12 CRS 53619-20 JERRY HAROLD COFFIELD, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 3 July 2013 by
Judge Walter H. Godwin, Jr. in Edgecombe County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 July 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas H. Moore, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Mary Cook, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Defendant Jerry Harold Coffield, Jr. appeals from judgments
sentencing him to consecutive terms of 77 to 105 and 17 to 30
months imprisonment, entered upon jury verdicts finding him
guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of
immediate precursor chemicals used in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court. -2- At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that on 4
December 2012, officers of the Edgecombe County Sheriff’s
Department conducted a controlled buy of methamphetamine from
defendant’s son, Heath Coffield, by a person working as a
confidential informant (“CI”). Officers provided the CI with
$40 to purchase the methamphetamine and installed a surveillance
video camera on his person. The CI went to the pre-arranged
location to meet Heath, and found Heath in a truck driven by
defendant. Also in the truck were Heath’s girlfriend and her
two-year-old child.
The CI approached the truck, gave Heath $40, and in return
Heath gave the CI a quantity of methamphetamine concealed in a
lip-gloss container. During the transaction, the CI spoke with
defendant, who stated that he and Heath were planning to make
more methamphetamine later on and that he was planning to
purchase additional equipment so that they could manufacture
more methamphetamine at once. Defendant also asked the CI if
the CI would purchase Sudafed for him. Sudafed is a brand name
medication typically containing the active ingredient
pseudoephedrine. Defendant’s statements were recorded by the
surveillance video camera, and the recording was played for the
jury. -3- After defendant and Heath completed the sale of
methamphetamine to the CI, they drove off in the truck.
Officers followed, and decided to stop the truck. During the
stop, officers discovered more methamphetamine and individually
questioned defendant and Heath. Defendant denied being present
for the controlled buy and stated he was just taking Heath to
the drug store. Heath, however, admitted to “cooking”
methamphetamine with defendant that morning at defendant’s home,
where he too was living.
Based on Heath’s statements, the discovery of
methamphetamine in the truck, and the sale of methamphetamine to
the CI, officers obtained a search warrant for defendant’s
property at 3093 U.S. 64 Alternate East in Tarboro, North
Carolina. In defendant’s house, officers discovered Sudafed in
the master bedroom used by defendant and his wife, and a
casserole plate containing methamphetamine residue in the
bedroom shared by Heath and his girlfriend. In a horse barn in
defendant’s back yard, officers found a pot used to cook
methamphetamine, muriatic acid, lithium batteries, lighter
fluid, sodium hydroxide, ammonium nitrate, tubing, jars, coffee
filters, pill crusher, and a bottle containing methamphetamine
sludge material. Muriatic acid is also known as hydrochloric -4- acid. Outside the barn, officers found a burn pile that
included empty boxes of pseudoephedrine and a 30 November 2012
receipt from Walmart for the purchase of pseudoephedrine.
Testimony from a Walmart pharmacy manager also established that
Jerry Coffield of 3093 Alternate U.S. 64 East, Tarboro, North
Carolina had purchased a box of pseudoephedrine on 1 December
2012.
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession
of precursor chemicals. Defendant contends the State failed to
present substantial evidence that he had actual or constructive
possession of the muriatic/hydrochloric acid, lithium batteries
or pseudoephedrine found in his horse barn. We disagree.
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal,
the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged,
or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s
being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is
properly denied.’” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526
S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 -5- S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890 (2000). “In
making its determination, the trial court must consider all
evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the
light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit
of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions
in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d
211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135 (1995).
“To prove that a defendant possessed contraband materials,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had either actual or constructive possession of the
materials.” State v. Loftis, 185 N.C. App. 190, 197, 649 S.E.2d
1, 6 (2007), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 241, 660 S.E.2d 494
(2008).
A person has actual possession of a substance if it is on his person, he is aware of its presence, and either by himself or together with others he has the power and intent to control its disposition or use. Constructive possession, on the other hand, exists when the defendant, while not having actual possession, . . . has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the [contraband]. When the defendant does not have exclusive possession of the location where the [contraband was] found, the State must make a showing of other incriminating circumstances in order to establish constructive possession. -6- State v. Boyd, 177 N.C. App. 165, 175, 628 S.E.2d 796, 805
(2006) (citations and quotations omitted). “Where sufficient
incriminating circumstances exist, constructive possession of
the contraband materials may be inferred even where possession
of the premises is nonexclusive.” State v. Kraus, 147 N.C. App.
766, 770, 557 S.E.2d 144, 147 (2001).
We agree with defendant that he was not in actual
possession of the chemical precursors when officers discovered
them. The State thus had to prove defendant constructively
possessed the chemicals, and because there was evidence that
defendant did not have exclusive possession of the areas where
the chemicals were found, the State also had to show other
incriminating circumstances to establish defendant’s
constructive possession of the chemicals. We hold the State met
its burden in both instances.
Here, officers found the precursor chemicals of
pseudoephedrine, muriatic/hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide,
lighter fluid, ammonium nitrate, and lithium in defendant’s
horse barn located in his back yard. Although defendant’s
control over the horse barn was not exclusive, the State
introduced statements from him and his son, Heath, to show other
incriminating circumstances to establish defendant’s -7- constructive possession of the chemicals. During the controlled
buy, defendant stated to the CI that he intended to manufacture
additional methamphetamine later that day and that he planned to
expand his methamphetamine production abilities in the future.
Additionally, Heath stated to investigating officers that he and
defendant had “cooked” methamphetamine the morning of 4 December
2012. Defendant contends the State’s evidence is repudiated by
his testimony that his statements to the CI were lies made at
Heath’s instructions and Heath’s testimony that defendant was
never involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine. However,
in ruling on a motion to dismiss, “[t]he defendant’s evidence,
unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into
consideration.” State v. Denny, 361 N.C. 662, 665, 652 S.E.2d
212, 213 (2007). Accordingly, we hold the State presented
substantial evidence of defendant’s constructive possession of
the precursor chemicals in this case, and the trial court did
not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of
possession of precursor chemicals.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).