IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE : Def. I.D. # 2410000422 : Cr. A. Nos. S24-10-0376, 0377, v. : 0378, 0379 : RONALD COFFEY, : Defendant. :
Submitted: May 8, 2025 Decided: May 22, 2025
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress GRANTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Abram, Esquire, Law Office of Abram, Gulab & Hutchison, 9 Chestnut Street, Georgetown, Delaware 19947 Julie Johnson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13 The Circle, Georgetown, Delaware 19947
KARSNITZ, R.J. This case came before me to evaluate a Motion to Suppress evidence police
obtained following a stop of a motor vehicle in transit. After the stop, the Ocean
View police developed probable cause to arrest Ronald Coffey (“Defendant”) for
driving under the influence of alcohol. I held the suppression hearing a few days
before the scheduled trial date. I orally granted the motion but promised a written
decision articulating my reasoning.
The facts are simple and uncontested. During the afternoon hours of October
1, 2024, Lt. Ballentine of the Ocean View Police Department approached the vehicle
Defendant owned heading south on Central Avenue to its intersection of Route 26.
Lt. Ballentine read the license plate on the vehicle and determined through a
computer records search that Defendant owned it. Lt. Ballentine then used a
different computer search and learned that Defendant had a suspended operator’s
license, and that he was male. He had no further information about Defendant. He
did, however, observe the driver of the vehicle as he looked at the officer in his
sideview mirror and identified him as male.
Lt. Ballentine had no other information to identify the driver of the vehicle,
as, for example, his hair color, age or race. Lt. Ballentine candidly testified he relied
upon a presumption that the owner is the driver to give him reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify the stop. Because I am of the view that the Delaware
2 Constitution, Art. I, §61 provides protection against the presumption the officer used
here, I found the stop unlawful.
The standard to justify the stop of a vehicle is the officer must have reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the individual is committing or has committed a crime.2
Within the ambit of “crime” are traffic offenses. The bar is a low one, recognizing
the fluid nature of motor vehicles.
The issue has been the subject of several Delaware decisions. In State v.
Dempster,3 this Court denied a Motion to Suppress on identical facts. The Court
pointed to several statutory provisions which allowed a presumption that the owner
was the driver4 to justify its decision. I take an opposite view. The Legislature
obviously knows how to write laws which create the presumption and has not done
so here.
The Delaware law is grounded in State v. Prouse.5 Prouse involved random
traffic stops which the Court found impermissible. The Court in Prouse opined that
“…the factor which … makes random stops, absent justifying facts, unreasonable is
1 “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” 2 Miller v. State, 25 A.3d 768 (Del. 2011). 3 2016 WL 749994 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 2016). 4 These provisions include 21 Del. C. §4166 (g) (passing a school bus) and 21 Del. C. §7203(b) (paying voluntary assessments for motor vehicle violations). 5 382 A.2d 1359 (1978), aff’d 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 3 the inherent arbitrariness of the procedure.”6 Thus, the reasonableness of an
intrusion by law enforcement requires a balance between the public interest and the
individual right to freedom from an arbitrary intrusion.
An additional relevant case is Jones v. State.7 In Jones, law enforcement
approached Jones after receiving an anonymous 911 call regarding a “suspicious
black male wearing a blue coat.” Law enforcement knew the area to be high in crime
but had no recognition of Jones. Upon seeing Jones in a blue coat, they ordered him
to stop. When Jones refused police grabbed him. A struggle ensued, and police
subdued and arrested Jones. The Delaware Supreme Court determined Jones’
actions did not furnish reasonable, articulable suspicion to allow his seizure. The
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court decision which denied the
Motion to Suppress. The Jones Court also reviewed both the Federal Constitutional
history, including the Fourth Amendment, as well as Article I, §6 of the Delaware
Constitution to determine if the latter should be interpreted to provide protections
that are greater than the rights accorded citizens by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court found that the search and seizure provisions in the
Delaware Constitution preceded the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and reflect
the State’s commitment to protecting the privacy of its citizens. Thus, the Court
6 Id. at 1364. 7 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999). 4 concluded the Delaware Constitution may provide individuals with greater rights
than those afforded by the United States Constitution. I address this issue further
later in this opinion.
Several other cases dealt with these issues, but with the distinguishing twist
that the officer in each case took steps to determine if the driver was the owner. For
example, in the Dempster case, cited above, this Court denied a Motion to Suppress.
In Dempster the law enforcement officer determined the owner’s sex, date of birth,
height, eye color and weight. He compared all the information with what he could
see of the driver and determined the driver matched the description of the owner as
he saw her. The Court gave credence to the officer’s testimony and found it sufficient
to justify the stop.
In a similar vein is Harrison v. State of Delaware8 in which the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed a denial of a Motion to Suppress based upon an owner with
a suspended license and additional information about the owner. The officer
determined the owner was an approximately 40 years old white woman, and as he
followed the vehicle, he was able to see the driver met that description.
In State v. Johnson,9 the Court addressed the issue the parties raised here. In
my view the Johnson opinion thoughtfully addressed the question and answered it
8 144 A.3d 549 (Del. 2016). 9 2000 WL 33275015 (Del. Com. Pl. 2000). 5 by suppressing the evidence obtained by a stop predicated upon the assumption the
driver was the owner who had a suspended license. The Court in Johnson concluded:
To find that the seizure was based on a reasonable articulable suspicion without any evidence corroborating the officer’s hunch under these circumstances would be contrary to Delaware law.10 Allowing a stop based solely upon the owner’s suspended license status
would, by tautology, mean that the police would be free to stop any vehicle owned
by an operator with a suspended license.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE : Def. I.D. # 2410000422 : Cr. A. Nos. S24-10-0376, 0377, v. : 0378, 0379 : RONALD COFFEY, : Defendant. :
Submitted: May 8, 2025 Decided: May 22, 2025
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress GRANTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Abram, Esquire, Law Office of Abram, Gulab & Hutchison, 9 Chestnut Street, Georgetown, Delaware 19947 Julie Johnson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13 The Circle, Georgetown, Delaware 19947
KARSNITZ, R.J. This case came before me to evaluate a Motion to Suppress evidence police
obtained following a stop of a motor vehicle in transit. After the stop, the Ocean
View police developed probable cause to arrest Ronald Coffey (“Defendant”) for
driving under the influence of alcohol. I held the suppression hearing a few days
before the scheduled trial date. I orally granted the motion but promised a written
decision articulating my reasoning.
The facts are simple and uncontested. During the afternoon hours of October
1, 2024, Lt. Ballentine of the Ocean View Police Department approached the vehicle
Defendant owned heading south on Central Avenue to its intersection of Route 26.
Lt. Ballentine read the license plate on the vehicle and determined through a
computer records search that Defendant owned it. Lt. Ballentine then used a
different computer search and learned that Defendant had a suspended operator’s
license, and that he was male. He had no further information about Defendant. He
did, however, observe the driver of the vehicle as he looked at the officer in his
sideview mirror and identified him as male.
Lt. Ballentine had no other information to identify the driver of the vehicle,
as, for example, his hair color, age or race. Lt. Ballentine candidly testified he relied
upon a presumption that the owner is the driver to give him reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify the stop. Because I am of the view that the Delaware
2 Constitution, Art. I, §61 provides protection against the presumption the officer used
here, I found the stop unlawful.
The standard to justify the stop of a vehicle is the officer must have reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the individual is committing or has committed a crime.2
Within the ambit of “crime” are traffic offenses. The bar is a low one, recognizing
the fluid nature of motor vehicles.
The issue has been the subject of several Delaware decisions. In State v.
Dempster,3 this Court denied a Motion to Suppress on identical facts. The Court
pointed to several statutory provisions which allowed a presumption that the owner
was the driver4 to justify its decision. I take an opposite view. The Legislature
obviously knows how to write laws which create the presumption and has not done
so here.
The Delaware law is grounded in State v. Prouse.5 Prouse involved random
traffic stops which the Court found impermissible. The Court in Prouse opined that
“…the factor which … makes random stops, absent justifying facts, unreasonable is
1 “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” 2 Miller v. State, 25 A.3d 768 (Del. 2011). 3 2016 WL 749994 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 2016). 4 These provisions include 21 Del. C. §4166 (g) (passing a school bus) and 21 Del. C. §7203(b) (paying voluntary assessments for motor vehicle violations). 5 382 A.2d 1359 (1978), aff’d 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 3 the inherent arbitrariness of the procedure.”6 Thus, the reasonableness of an
intrusion by law enforcement requires a balance between the public interest and the
individual right to freedom from an arbitrary intrusion.
An additional relevant case is Jones v. State.7 In Jones, law enforcement
approached Jones after receiving an anonymous 911 call regarding a “suspicious
black male wearing a blue coat.” Law enforcement knew the area to be high in crime
but had no recognition of Jones. Upon seeing Jones in a blue coat, they ordered him
to stop. When Jones refused police grabbed him. A struggle ensued, and police
subdued and arrested Jones. The Delaware Supreme Court determined Jones’
actions did not furnish reasonable, articulable suspicion to allow his seizure. The
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court decision which denied the
Motion to Suppress. The Jones Court also reviewed both the Federal Constitutional
history, including the Fourth Amendment, as well as Article I, §6 of the Delaware
Constitution to determine if the latter should be interpreted to provide protections
that are greater than the rights accorded citizens by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court found that the search and seizure provisions in the
Delaware Constitution preceded the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and reflect
the State’s commitment to protecting the privacy of its citizens. Thus, the Court
6 Id. at 1364. 7 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999). 4 concluded the Delaware Constitution may provide individuals with greater rights
than those afforded by the United States Constitution. I address this issue further
later in this opinion.
Several other cases dealt with these issues, but with the distinguishing twist
that the officer in each case took steps to determine if the driver was the owner. For
example, in the Dempster case, cited above, this Court denied a Motion to Suppress.
In Dempster the law enforcement officer determined the owner’s sex, date of birth,
height, eye color and weight. He compared all the information with what he could
see of the driver and determined the driver matched the description of the owner as
he saw her. The Court gave credence to the officer’s testimony and found it sufficient
to justify the stop.
In a similar vein is Harrison v. State of Delaware8 in which the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed a denial of a Motion to Suppress based upon an owner with
a suspended license and additional information about the owner. The officer
determined the owner was an approximately 40 years old white woman, and as he
followed the vehicle, he was able to see the driver met that description.
In State v. Johnson,9 the Court addressed the issue the parties raised here. In
my view the Johnson opinion thoughtfully addressed the question and answered it
8 144 A.3d 549 (Del. 2016). 9 2000 WL 33275015 (Del. Com. Pl. 2000). 5 by suppressing the evidence obtained by a stop predicated upon the assumption the
driver was the owner who had a suspended license. The Court in Johnson concluded:
To find that the seizure was based on a reasonable articulable suspicion without any evidence corroborating the officer’s hunch under these circumstances would be contrary to Delaware law.10 Allowing a stop based solely upon the owner’s suspended license status
would, by tautology, mean that the police would be free to stop any vehicle owned
by an operator with a suspended license. The hypotheticals are intriguing. If the
vehicle is jointly owned, and one driver has a suspended license, would a stop be
justified? If not, would such a rule discriminate in favor of joint owners? If it would
be allowed, would that not be to the detriment of the properly licensed owner, with
no discernable basis for this distinction?
The United States Supreme Court weighed in on this exact issue in the 2020
case of Kansas v. Glover.11 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the U.S.
Constitution, specifically, the Fourth Amendment, was not offended by a stop of a
vehicle based solely upon the presumption that the owner is the driver, and the driver
had a suspended license. As a matter of federal constitutional law, I am bound by
this ruling. But here the defendant argued the police action also violated Delaware
Constitutional dictates, and specifically violated Article 1, §6 of the Delaware
10 Id. at *5. 11 589 U.S. 376 (2020). 6 Constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court has directed subordinate Courts to
examine both State and Federal law when the parties raise issues addressing both
fundamental documents, and rule on each.12
Our Supreme Court said in Jones v. State the following:
But in this case, our holding rests not on the Fourth Amendment but on the Delaware detention statute, 11 Del. C. §1902, and Article I §6 of the Delaware Constitution. The Delaware Constitution, like the constitutions of certain other states, may provide individuals with greater rights than those afforded by the United States Constitution. For example, we have held that the Delaware Constitution provides greater rights than the United States Constitution in the preservation of evidence used against a defendant, the right of confrontation, the right to counsel, and the right to trial by jury. Hodari D. is not consistent with our view of when a person is “seized” within the meaning of Article I, §6 of the Delaware Constitution in that Hodari D. would allow a police officer lacking reasonable suspicion to create that suspicion through an unjustified attempted detention. A number of states have likewise interpreted Hodari D. as inconsistent with the protections provided by their state constitutions. (internal citations omitted)13 In my view the Delaware case law requires something more than that upon
which Lt. Ballentine relied here.
I have reviewed Delaware precedent. The weight of the authority is that
something more than a presumption that the owner of the vehicle has a suspended
12 Terroros v. State, 312 A.3d 651 (Del. 2024). 13 Jones, supra, at 863-864.
7 license is required to show a reasonable articulable suspicion that an offense has
occurred. In my opinion, the Delaware Constitution in this instance requires more
and gives our citizens protection above what the U.S. Supreme Court determined the
U.S. Constitution requires. As a result, I granted the Motion to Suppress.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary