State v. Cochran, Unpublished Decision (8-4-2004)

2004 Ohio 4061
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 4, 2004
DocketC.A. No. 21806.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2004 Ohio 4061 (State v. Cochran, Unpublished Decision (8-4-2004)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Cochran, Unpublished Decision (8-4-2004), 2004 Ohio 4061 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
{¶ 1} Appellant, Virgil Cochran, appeals a judgment entry of the Barberton Municipal Court finding Appellant guilty of failure to obey an order, a violation of R.C. 3707.48. We affirm.

I.
{¶ 2} On December 13, 2002, the City of Norton charged Appellant with a violation of R.C. 3707.48, which states:

"No person shall violate sections 3707.01 to 3707.53, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or any order or regulation of the board of health of a city or general health district made in pursuance thereof, obstruct or interfere with the execution of such order, or willfully or illegally omit to obey such order."

{¶ 3} Appellant pled not guilty, and the matter was set for a hearing in the Barberton Municipal Court on January 21, 2003 at 2:30 P.M. On January 9, 2003, Appellant filed a demand for a jury trial, specifically stating that he did not waive his speedy trial rights. The court denied the demand because R.C. 3707.99 makes the first violation of R.C. 3707.48 a minor misdemeanor. In order to meet the speedy trial deadline, the trial court accelerated the trial date to January 13, 2003. On January 13, 2003, Appellant filed a document wherein he moved the court for a "Suppressing Hearing" (sic), to suppress evidence, to dismiss, and to issue a protective order. Appellant filed a memorandum in support of his motions. In the memorandum, Appellant asserted that "[t]he search warrant failed to set forth probable cause for its issuance" and "[n]umerous searches were executed illegally and are null and void." Regarding the motion to dismiss, Appellant averred that the case could be heard only in Norton's Mayor's Court and Barberton Municipal Court had no jurisdiction; the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute an offense; the complaint is inadequate to provide notice of the offense charged; double jeopardy applies; the applicable ordinance was not correctly cited thereby misleading Appellant; the complaint contains defects on its face; and the complaint does not say that city officials trespassed upon his property. Also on January 13, 2003, Appellant filed an affidavit wherein he averred that Barberton Municipal Judge McNulty was biased against Appellant.

{¶ 4} In response to Appellant's motions, the trial court agreed to hear the motions and continued the case so the prosecution could have time to prepare for the hearing. The motion hearing was scheduled for and held before Barberton Municipal Judge Weigand on March 3, 2003; Appellant did not appear and the trial court denied the motions. The court also set a new trial date for March 19th, 2003. On March 12, 2003, Appellant filed a new affidavit alleging bias toward him on the part of Judge Weigand This filing resulted in a stay of the case pending authorization to proceed from the Presiding Judge of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Ultimately, a new trial date of May 23, 2004 was scheduled before Judge Weigand On that date, the trial court granted Appellant a further continuance after granting the prosecution's motion to amend the complaint. The trial court rescheduled the trial for September 25, 2003.

{¶ 5} The trial proceeded on that date and a transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. The transcript demonstrates that the first witness called was a city health inspector for the cities of Barberton and Norton. He testified that on August 19, 2002, he performed an inspection on Appellant's property located at 3720 Alberta Drive in Norton, Ohio. The inspector described the property as "severely in disarray * * * the residential structure was fairly dilapidated, roof caving in. * * * There was also a preponderance of trash and debris, solid waste around the entire premises, consisting of numerous materials. It was solid waste." According to the inspector's testimony, the waste consisted of two unlicensed junk vehicles, lumber, trash, old spouting, broken lawn chairs, lawn and tractor mowers, old plastic, dozens of gallon plastic containers strewn around, boxes of debris, a garage filled with refuse and junk, and old roofing shingles. As a result, the witness issued an order to Appellant to clean up his property within fourteen days. The order further indicated that failure to comply would result in the matter being referred for prosecution and "[a]ppeal procedures are attached." The appeal procedures directed Appellant to request a hearing before the health commission in writing within ten calendar days. Appellant did not appeal that order. The witness stated that he returned to the property on numerous occasions and found no change in the condition of the property.

{¶ 6} On cross-examination, Appellant, acting pro se, proceeded to direct questions to the witness which the trial court disallowed as they pertained to Appellant's motion to suppress which was not granted at the March 3, 2003 hearing. Appellant then asked the court to strike all of that witness's testimony and dismiss the case on the grounds that the prosecution did not prove "that I am responsible for the condition of the property." The trial court questioned Appellant about who lived there and for how long, and then denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant then proceeded to ask questions of the witness to which the prosecution entered an objection on the basis of res judicata, claiming that Appellant did not appeal the order to clean up his property and was precluded from his line of questioning. The trial court sustained the objection.

{¶ 7} A second witness, an environmental sanitarian for the City of Barberton, testified that he had visited Appellant's property; at that point, Appellant requested the court's permission to leave the trial alleging that he was not permitted to present evidence. The trial court asked that the record reflect that Appellant was voluntarily leaving the trial. Appellant also told the trial court that he would not file a post-trial brief.

{¶ 8} On October 14, 2003, the trial court journalized a judgment entry wherein Appellant was found guilty of violating R.C. 3707.48. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on November 6, 2003. The journal entry from the sentencing indicates that the hearing was scheduled for 1:00 p.m. The case was called at 1:25 p.m., but the bailiff advised the court that Appellant had left the court at 1:20 p.m. The trial court sentenced Appellant in absentia to a $100.00 fine plus costs.

{¶ 9} This appeal followed. Appellant raises ten assignments of error. We list and reiterate Appellant's arguments for all assignments of error and then address them together at the conclusion of the list.

II.
Assignment of Error No. 1
"The lower court (`the court') erred in its failure to determine its jurisdiction and to follow correct applicable speedy trial, constitutional, and other controlling law."

{¶ 10} In this assignment of error, Appellant claims a violation of the speedy trial statutes, cites to authority stating that speedy trial statutes are to be strictly construed against the state and that an appellate court counts days to determine if the case was tried within time limits.

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2004 Ohio 4061, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-cochran-unpublished-decision-8-4-2004-ohioctapp-2004.