State v. Cline
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-P-0091 CITY OF RAVENNA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court, Ravenna Division - vs -
SHIRLEY A. CLINE, Trial Court No. 2009 TRD 16536 R Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: July 6, 2026
Judgment: Reversed and remanded
Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Timothy P. Bogner, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Sam A. Zingale, 17443 Clifton Boulevard, Lakewood, OH 44107 (For Defendant- Appellant).
MATT LYNCH, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Shirley A. Cline, appeals the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, overruling her motion to expunge her record. After a careful review of Cline’s assignment of error, challenging the municipal court’s failure to apply R.C. 2952.61(B)(1) to her traffic offense conviction when her other charges qualified for expungement, as well as a review of the record and pertinent law, we determine Cline’s argument has merit. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
{¶2} In 2011, a jury found Cline guilty of operating a vehicle left of center, a minor misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.25(A), and not guilty of the remaining charges of vehicular homicide, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(3); vehicular manslaughter, a second-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(4) and (D); four counts of negligent assault, third-degree misdemeanors, in violation of R.C. 2903.14; and operation of a motor vehicle without reasonable control, a minor misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.202.
{¶3} On September 25, 2025, Cline filed an “application to expunge records of nonconviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.32.” On October 15, 2025, Cline filed a memorandum in support of her application, contending she was entitled to expunge her records pursuant to R.C. 2953.33(A), because her traffic offense conviction fell within the exception of R.C. 2953.61(B)(1), and the other charges were eligible for sealing or expungement.
{¶4} On February 4, 2026, the court held a hearing on the motion, pursuant to Marsy’s Law, to allow the victims an opportunity to be heard. The State objected to the motion at the outset, contending Cline’s charges were not eligible for expungement. The court then gave the victims an opportunity to speak. One of the victims stated Cline never expressed remorse, she was reopening “old wounds” from 17 years ago by seeking expungement, she never attempted to contact the victims or apologize, and she acted inappropriately at the scene of the motor vehicle accident and at the hospital after his mother died. The victim felt Cline needed to “live with what she did.” Cline attempted to clarify her actions at the scene of the accident and the hospital. Cline further explained before trial, she was advised not to contact the victims with any act of sympathy because
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her acts could be taken as an admission of guilt, and she heard angry and hurtful comments at the end of the trial, which led her to believe she should stay away from the family.
{¶5} The court reviewed the jury only found Cline guilty of driving left of center, a “non-sealable” minor misdemeanor traffic offense. In a judgment entry filed November 21, 2025, the court denied Cline’s application for an expungement “[d]ue to the fact that this offense is a violation of Chapter 4511.”
{¶6} Cline timely filed her appeal and raises one assignment of error for our review:
{¶7} “The trial court erred in overruling defendantappellant’s motion to expunge her record based on the trial court’s erroneous state [sic] belief that there are no circumstances where traffic related charges pursuant to Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 4511 can be expunged.”
{¶8} In her sole assignment of error, Cline contends the municipal court committed reversible error by failing to apply R.C. 2953.61(B)(1), the exception allowing expungement in cases of multiple charges and one otherwise ineligible traffic offense conviction.
{¶9} “An appellate court generally reviews a trial court’s decision on an application for expungement for an abuse of discretion.” State v. E.K., 2024-Ohio-5496,
¶ 8 (10th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is “the trial court’s ‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). “However, where questions of law
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are in dispute, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination de novo.” E.K. at ¶ 8, citing State v. Pariag, 2013-Ohio-4010, ¶ 9.
{¶10} “Expungement is a statutorily created privilege, not a right.” Id. at ¶ 9.
“Because expungement is an ‘act of grace created by the state,’ a court may grant an expungement only when the applicant meets all statutory requirements for eligibility.” Id., citing State v. Futrall, 2009-Ohio-5590, ¶ 6.
{¶11} At the outset, we note that “expungement” and “sealing” are not the same, although the terms are often used interchangeably (as in this case by the parties and the court) and both are governed by R.C. Chapter 2935. “‘Expungement occurs when a conviction is completely erased from one’s record. Sealing is when the records of a conviction are filed in a “separate, secured location” and “cannot be seen by most people.”’” (Citation omitted.) State v. E.H., 2022-Ohio-4289, ¶ 7, fn. 2 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. D.D.G., 2019-Ohio-4982, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.); see also R.C. 2953.31(B)(2)(b) (“expunge” means “[t]o destroy, delete, and erase a record as appropriate for the record’s physical or electronic form or characteristic so that the record is permanently irretrievable”).
{¶12} The municipal court found Cline’s minor misdemeanor traffic conviction under R.C. 4511.25(A) could not be expunged pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(a), which provides: “Sections 2953.32 and 2953.34 of the Revised Code do not apply to . . . [c]onvictions under Chapter . . . 4511. of the Revised Code . . . .”
{¶13} Cline argues the court should have applied the exception contained in R.C.
2953.61(B)(1), which provides:
When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a result of or in connection with the same act and the final disposition of one, and only one,
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of the charges is a conviction under any section of Chapter . . . 4511., other than section 4511.19 or 4511.194 of the Revised Code, . . . and if the records pertaining to all the other charges would be eligible for sealing or expungement under section 2953.33, 2953.39, or 2953.521 of the Revised Code in the absence of that conviction, the court may order that the records pertaining to all the charges be sealed or expunged. In such a case, the court shall not order that only a portion of the records be sealed or expunged.
{¶14} In State v. Williamson, 2025-Ohio-2402 (7th Dist.), appeal not accepted, 2025-Ohio-4853, the Seventh District succinctly explained, “This statute contains a partial exception to the more general rule that traffic convictions cannot be sealed. Pursuant to this statute, certain traffic convictions may be sealed if the following conditions are met: multiple charges arose as a result of, or in connection with, the same act; one of the charges was a traffic violation that resulted in a conviction; the traffic conviction qualifies for sealing under the statute; and all the other charges also qualify for sealing. If these conditions are met, the court may seal all of the records. It may not seal only a portion of the records.” Id. at ¶ 29.
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