State v. Clendenin

24 Ark. 78
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedDecember 15, 1861
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 24 Ark. 78 (State v. Clendenin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Clendenin, 24 Ark. 78 (Ark. 1861).

Opinion

TVTt. Chief Justice ENGlish

delivered the opinion of the court.

In November 1882, the attorney general presented to the Hon. John J. Clendenin, judge of the 5th judicial circuit, a petition, statiDg that Oliver H. Oates was, .at the general election in August, 1860, elected a senator from the senatorial district com.posed of the counties of Phillips and Monroe, and qualified and acted as such — that at -the session of the general assembly, com. mencing on the first Monday of November, 1862, he was, whilst legally a senator, his term of office not having expired, elected secretary of state, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of that office — which said last election, the relator alleges, was void, the said Oates being by the constitution ineligible to any office within the gift of the general assembly, during the period for which he was elected a senator. And the relator prayed the judge to grant the writ of quo warramto, requiring said Oates to appear and show by what warrant he exercised the office of secretary of state.

The judge refused to grant the writ, and the attorney general applied to this court for a mandamus to compel him.

On the 30th of January, 1836, the people of Arkansas, preparatory to their admission into the Union, acting by their delegates in convention assembled, created for themselves a state government, by adopting a constitution. This constitution was the frame work of the government; it carved out the offices, and defined and limited the powers and duties of the agents who were to fill them, and to be entrusted with the administration of the government.

In Kamper vs. Hawkins, 1 Va. Ca., 24, Judge NelsoN said : “ A constitution is that by which the powers of government are limited. It is to the governors, or rather to the departments of government, what law is to individuals — nay, it is not only a rule of action to the branches of the government, but it is that from which their existence flows, and by which the powers (or portions of the right to govern) which may have been committed to them, are prescribed. It is their commission — nay, it is their crmiorT''

On tbe 6th of May, 1861, the people of Arkansas, being again assembled in convention, by their delegates, abrogated the ordinance, etc., by which they had agreed that the state should become a member of the United States; and resumed to the state such portion of her sovereignty as had been conceded to the federal government on her admission into the union. (Jour., Con., 121.)

Had the convention then abrogated the state constitution, and done nothing more, all of the powers of government exercised by the persons who then filled the offices under the constitution, would have gone back to the people, the source from whence they were derived; ,the offices would have ceased to exist, and the people of Arkansas would have been left in a state of nature, without a social compact or government. (See opinion of Judge Tucker, in Kamper vs. Hawkins, 1 Va. Ca., p. 72.)

The convention did abrogate the state constitution, but at the same moment of time they adopted a new constitution — for in legal effect it is a new constitution, though most of the provisions of the old constitution were embodied in it.

Had the new constitution made no provision for the officers elected or appointed under the old constitution to continue in office, they would have been stripped of all official power at the very instant of time that the old constitution was repealed by the adoption of the new — the instrument which created their offices, and from which they derived all their right to ex.ercise the powers appertaining to them, being abrogated — in other words, their commission, as it is called by the Yirginia judge, being revoked by the fiat of the people who granted it — they could not have held their offices for another moment, or legally discharged a single duty attached to them.

Such seems to have been the understanding of all the conventions which have made new constitutions for the states; for they have invariably deemed it necessary to make provision for the officers deriving their powers from the abrogated constitutions, to continue in the discharge of their duties until the offices'could be filled under the provisions of the new constitutions. See American Constitutions; Opinion of Scott, J., in State vs. Scott, 4 Eng. 283; Watkins vs. Watkins, 2 Maryland R., 341; Benton vs. County of Kennebec, 44 Maine R., 406; Cigur vs. Crinshaw, La., An. Rep., vol. 8, 422.

It was within the power and discretion of the convention that framed our present constitution, to have continued in office any or all of the officers deriving their authority from the old constitution until their terms expired, or for any shorter period deemed expedient; or to have permitted their tenures to expire, with the existence of the instrument under which they held them; and to have appointed persons themselves to fill the offices provisionally until elections could be held, and appointments made, under the provisions of the new constitution — -just as they appointed delegates to represent the state in the confederate congress, until provision could be made for elections by the people — and just as the convention that framed the first constitution of Virginia appointed a governor and privy council, etc. Tucker’s Blackstone, Appendix, p. 90.

In Danley, et al. vs. Clendenin, ante, we decided that the new constitution made provision for the election of a governor of the state at the general election in October, 1862, and that no provision was made for the person, who held the office of governor at the time the new constitution was adopted, to continue in office for the full term of four years for which he had been elected under the abrogated constitution ; but that provision was made for him to hold and exercise the duties of the office-until his successor was elected at the time prescribed by the new constitution, and qualified. And by way of illustration of the matter decided, it was shown that the convention, had made provision for some of the officers holding under the repealed constitution, to continue in office for the remainder of’ their terms, whilst the terms of others were. abridged. But we did not decide, nor intimate, that the convention had provided for the election of the successors of all of the senators in office at the general election in October, 1862, or failed to make provision for them to continue in office- for the ■■remainder of their terms, but this question was intentionally left open, as one that might probably be brought directly before the court for its opinion, before the general election in October,1862, took place. But the question was not brought before us until after the election, when the present case was presented.

The constitution of 1836, provided that the senate should consist of members to be chosen every four years, by the electors of the several districts. (Art. IV, sec. 5.)

That the state should, from time to time, be divided into convenient districts, in such manner that the senate should be based upon the free white male inhabitants of the state, each senator representing an equal number as nearly as practicable; and until the first enumeration of the inhabitants should be taken, the state was divided into sixteen districts, each of which was to elect one senator, except the first, which was to elect two ; seventeen in all.

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24 Ark. 78, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-clendenin-ark-1861.