[Cite as State v. Claypool, 2011-Ohio-2296.]
COURT OF APPEALS HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs-
BRIAN CLAYPOOL Case No. 11CA006
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case No 2010-TRD-1899
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 6, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
CHRISTINE C. WILLIAMS BRIAN W. BENBOW 164 East Jackson Street 605 Market Street Millersburg, OH 44654 Zanesville, OH 43701 Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On November 8, 2010, appellant, Brian Claypool, was charged with
speeding in a school zone in violation of R.C. 4511.21. Appellant was charged with
driving 40 m.p.h. in a 20 m.p.h. zone.
{¶2} A bench trial commenced on January 12, 2011. Appellant moved for
acquittal under Crim.R. 29 after the state's case-in-chief and again at the conclusion of
all the evidence. The trial court denied the motions. The trial court found appellant
guilty and ordered him to pay a $100.00 fine plus court costs.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT'S JANUARY 12, 2011 JUDGMENT ENTRY
CONVICTING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT OF SPEEDING IN A SCHOOL ZONE IS
AGAINST BOTH THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE."
{¶5} Appellant claims his conviction was against the manifest weight and
sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶6} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court is to examine the evidence at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. State
v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks at
paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307. On Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 3
review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and
determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered." State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. See also, State
v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52. The granting of a new trial "should be
exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction." Martin at 175. We note the weight to be given to the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison (1990), 49
Ohio St.3d 182, certiorari denied (1990), 498 U.S. 881. The trier of fact "has the best
opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something
that does not translate well on the written page." Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415,
418, 1997-Ohio-260.
{¶7} In his brief at 4, appellant argues the state "failed to present any evidence
that the sign marking the school speeding zone complied with the Ohio Manual of
Uniform Traffic Control Devices." In denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motions for
acquittal on this issue, the trial court stated the following:
{¶8} "No the statute does just require that it [posted sign] be within so many
feet of a school zone.
{¶9} "Again the sign is total irrelevant. Statute doesn't require a school zone
sign. It specifically says nothing in this section or in the manual specification for uniform
system of traffic control devices shall be construed to require school zones to be
indicated by signs equipped with flashing or other lights. Or giving other special notice Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 4
in which thee (sic) hours of the school zone are in effect. It's kind of an absolute." T. at
10 and 20, respectively.
{¶10} Lieutenant Gary Chanay of the Holmes County Sheriff's Department
testified he clocked appellant driving 40 m.p.h. in a school zone between 3:20 and 3:30
p.m. on a school day. T. at 4-5. School buses were attempting to pull out into traffic
and parents were picking up their children. T. at 4. The flashing lights on the 20 m.p.h.
school zone sign were activated. T. at 5. Appellant admitted to driving 40 m.p.h. and
seeing the school zone sign, but claimed the flashing lights were not on. T. at 12, 14.
He did not see any busses or parents and children leaving indicating that school was
letting out. T. at 12-14. Appellant's sister, Connie Claypool, was in the vehicle with
appellant at the time and testified she also did not see any flashing lights or children
leaving the school. T. at 17-18.
{¶11} Appellant was convicted of violating R.C. 4511.21(B)(1)(a) which states
the following:
{¶12} "(B) It is prima-facie lawful, in the absence of a lower limit declared or
established pursuant to this section by the director of transportation or local authorities,
for the operator of a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar to operate the same at
a speed not exceeding the following:
{¶13} "(1)(a) Twenty miles per hour in school zones during school recess and
while children are going to or leaving school during the opening or closing hours, and
when twenty miles per hour school speed limit signs are erected;***The end of every
school zone may be marked by a sign indicating the end of the zone. Nothing in this
section or in the manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic control devices Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 5
shall be construed to require school zones to be indicated by signs equipped with
flashing or other lights, or giving other special notice of the hours in which the school
zone speed limit is in effect."
{¶14} As clearly stated in R.C. 4511.21(B)(1), the speed limit within a school
zone when such school zone is in effect is 20 m.p.h. The statute "specifically states that
the school zone need not be designated by flashing lights or signs giving special notice
of effective hours. Rather, it is only required that general signs designating the school
zone be erected." Haithcock v. Hunter (2000), Madison App. No. CA2000-01-001.
{¶15} In the case sub judice, there was testimony that there were flashing yellow
school zone signs erected indicating a school zone. Lieutenant Chanay testified school
was in session, and the flashing lights were activated when school was letting out.
Busses and parents and children were leaving the school.
{¶16} Upon review, we find sufficient evidence was presented to establish the
school zone was in effect when appellant drove through at 40 m.p.h., and no manifest
miscarriage of justice.
{¶17} The sole assignment of error is denied. Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 6
{¶18} The judgment of the Municipal Court of Holmes County, Ohio is hereby
affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
_s/ Sheila G. Farmer_________________
_s/ W.
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[Cite as State v. Claypool, 2011-Ohio-2296.]
COURT OF APPEALS HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs-
BRIAN CLAYPOOL Case No. 11CA006
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case No 2010-TRD-1899
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 6, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
CHRISTINE C. WILLIAMS BRIAN W. BENBOW 164 East Jackson Street 605 Market Street Millersburg, OH 44654 Zanesville, OH 43701 Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On November 8, 2010, appellant, Brian Claypool, was charged with
speeding in a school zone in violation of R.C. 4511.21. Appellant was charged with
driving 40 m.p.h. in a 20 m.p.h. zone.
{¶2} A bench trial commenced on January 12, 2011. Appellant moved for
acquittal under Crim.R. 29 after the state's case-in-chief and again at the conclusion of
all the evidence. The trial court denied the motions. The trial court found appellant
guilty and ordered him to pay a $100.00 fine plus court costs.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT'S JANUARY 12, 2011 JUDGMENT ENTRY
CONVICTING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT OF SPEEDING IN A SCHOOL ZONE IS
AGAINST BOTH THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE."
{¶5} Appellant claims his conviction was against the manifest weight and
sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶6} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court is to examine the evidence at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. State
v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks at
paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307. On Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 3
review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and
determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered." State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. See also, State
v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52. The granting of a new trial "should be
exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction." Martin at 175. We note the weight to be given to the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison (1990), 49
Ohio St.3d 182, certiorari denied (1990), 498 U.S. 881. The trier of fact "has the best
opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something
that does not translate well on the written page." Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415,
418, 1997-Ohio-260.
{¶7} In his brief at 4, appellant argues the state "failed to present any evidence
that the sign marking the school speeding zone complied with the Ohio Manual of
Uniform Traffic Control Devices." In denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motions for
acquittal on this issue, the trial court stated the following:
{¶8} "No the statute does just require that it [posted sign] be within so many
feet of a school zone.
{¶9} "Again the sign is total irrelevant. Statute doesn't require a school zone
sign. It specifically says nothing in this section or in the manual specification for uniform
system of traffic control devices shall be construed to require school zones to be
indicated by signs equipped with flashing or other lights. Or giving other special notice Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 4
in which thee (sic) hours of the school zone are in effect. It's kind of an absolute." T. at
10 and 20, respectively.
{¶10} Lieutenant Gary Chanay of the Holmes County Sheriff's Department
testified he clocked appellant driving 40 m.p.h. in a school zone between 3:20 and 3:30
p.m. on a school day. T. at 4-5. School buses were attempting to pull out into traffic
and parents were picking up their children. T. at 4. The flashing lights on the 20 m.p.h.
school zone sign were activated. T. at 5. Appellant admitted to driving 40 m.p.h. and
seeing the school zone sign, but claimed the flashing lights were not on. T. at 12, 14.
He did not see any busses or parents and children leaving indicating that school was
letting out. T. at 12-14. Appellant's sister, Connie Claypool, was in the vehicle with
appellant at the time and testified she also did not see any flashing lights or children
leaving the school. T. at 17-18.
{¶11} Appellant was convicted of violating R.C. 4511.21(B)(1)(a) which states
the following:
{¶12} "(B) It is prima-facie lawful, in the absence of a lower limit declared or
established pursuant to this section by the director of transportation or local authorities,
for the operator of a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar to operate the same at
a speed not exceeding the following:
{¶13} "(1)(a) Twenty miles per hour in school zones during school recess and
while children are going to or leaving school during the opening or closing hours, and
when twenty miles per hour school speed limit signs are erected;***The end of every
school zone may be marked by a sign indicating the end of the zone. Nothing in this
section or in the manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic control devices Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 5
shall be construed to require school zones to be indicated by signs equipped with
flashing or other lights, or giving other special notice of the hours in which the school
zone speed limit is in effect."
{¶14} As clearly stated in R.C. 4511.21(B)(1), the speed limit within a school
zone when such school zone is in effect is 20 m.p.h. The statute "specifically states that
the school zone need not be designated by flashing lights or signs giving special notice
of effective hours. Rather, it is only required that general signs designating the school
zone be erected." Haithcock v. Hunter (2000), Madison App. No. CA2000-01-001.
{¶15} In the case sub judice, there was testimony that there were flashing yellow
school zone signs erected indicating a school zone. Lieutenant Chanay testified school
was in session, and the flashing lights were activated when school was letting out.
Busses and parents and children were leaving the school.
{¶16} Upon review, we find sufficient evidence was presented to establish the
school zone was in effect when appellant drove through at 40 m.p.h., and no manifest
miscarriage of justice.
{¶17} The sole assignment of error is denied. Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 6
{¶18} The judgment of the Municipal Court of Holmes County, Ohio is hereby
affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
_s/ Sheila G. Farmer_________________
_s/ W. Scott Gwin____________________
_s/ Patricia A. Delaney________________
JUDGES
SGF/sg 404 Holmes County, Case No. 11CA006 7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : BRIAN CLAYPOOL : : Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 11CA006
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Municipal Court of Holmes County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
appellant.