[Cite as State v. C.J.R., 2025-Ohio-2477.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-G-0002
Plaintiff-Appellant, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
C.J.R., Trial Court No. 2014 C 000147 Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: July 14, 2025 Judgment: Reversed and remanded
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Nicholas A. Burling, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Justin Enger, Ibold & O’Brien, 401 South Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Defendant- Appellee).
SCOTT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, granting defendant-appellee, C.J.R.’s,
application to seal his records. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the
lower court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶2} On August 14, 2015, C.J.R. entered a guilty plea to Attempted Corrupting
Another with Drugs, a felony of the third degree. The court ordered him to serve five
years of community control which terminated in 2020.
{¶3} In 2023, C.J.R. filed an application to seal his records, which the trial court denied following a hearing. On November 26, 2024, C.J.R. filed a second application to
seal his records. The court filed a judgment entry on December 13, 2024, granting the
application and sealing the records relating to the case. The entry indicated that, on
December 9, 2024, “an in-person hearing was held” and the motion was taken under
advisement. It stated that the “Court had considered the evidence and the State’s
opposition to Defendant’s Application to Seal the Record.” It found that the record
demonstrated C.J.R. had been rehabilitated.
{¶4} The State filed leave to appeal which this court granted. On appeal, it raises
the following assignment of error:
{¶5} “The trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion to seal without holding
a hearing on the request.”
Trial court order vacating judgment on appeal
{¶6} As an initial matter, we observe that, in an effort to remedy the failure to
hold a hearing, the trial court issued a January 13, 2025 order vacating the December 13,
2024 judgment sealing this matter, i.e., the judgment that is the subject of this appeal. In
the January 13 order, the court also found the State’s motion for leave to appeal, filed in
this court, “moot.” The trial court cannot rule on motions filed in this court and such motion
was subsequently granted by this court. Further, concurrently with the request for leave,
the State filed its notice of appeal. Although apparently consistent with this opinion’s
ultimate rationale on the merits, a trial court nonetheless lacks jurisdiction to vacate a
judgment that is the subject of a pending appeal. Mucci v. McCoy, 74 Ohio App.3d 331,
333 (11th Dist. 1991).1 Thus, we proceed to consideration of the merits.
1. “Once a case has been appealed, the trial court loses jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal.” In re S.J., 2005-Ohio-3215, ¶ 9. This court clarified that vacating a judgment “is not an action in aid of the judgment on appeal.” Mucci at 333. PAGE 2 OF 6
Case No. 2025-G-0002 Hearing requirement for applications to seal
{¶7} The State argues that, contrary to the incorrect statement contained in the
court’s judgment entry, it failed to hold a hearing on C.J.R.’s petition to seal the record,
which is required by R.C. 2953.32.
{¶8} R.C. 2953.32(B)(1) provides that an offender may apply for the sealing or
expungement of a criminal matter. “Upon the filing of an application under this section,
the court shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor for the case of the
hearing on the application not less than sixty days prior to the hearing.” R.C. 2953.32(C).
The prosecutor is to provide the victim notice of the date and time of the hearing. “The
court shall hold the hearing not less than forty-five days and not more than ninety days
from the date of the filing of the application.” Id. Further, “[t]he prosecutor may object to
the granting of the application by filing a written objection with the court not later than
thirty days prior to the date set for the hearing.” Id. The victim “may be present and heard
orally, in writing, or both at any hearing under this section.” Id.
{¶9} Decisions regarding the trial court’s ruling on a motion to seal the record are
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-2651, ¶ 13 (11th
Dist.). “When an appellate court must interpret and apply statutory provisions, its
standard of review is de novo.” Id.
{¶10} Courts have consistently held that the requirements to set a date for the
hearing, notify the prosecutor of the date, and hold the hearing are “mandatory,” noting
the need to hear evidence before rendering a decision on such motion. State v. Potts,
2020-Ohio-989, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.); State v. Talameh, 2012-Ohio-4205, ¶ 41 (11th Dist.)
(“the requirement of a hearing is mandatory and each application for expungement must
be set for hearing”); State v. Withrow, 2004-Ohio-3699, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.) (“[n]umerous
PAGE 3 OF 6
Case No. 2025-G-0002 appellate districts . . . have had the opportunity to address this issue and have found that
an oral hearing is mandatory prior to the issuance of a decision on the application for
sealing of record”); State v. Harris, 2004-Ohio-1788, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). The “summary
granting of a motion to seal under R.C. 2953.32” is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
holding that “a motion to seal cannot be summarily granted without a hearing.” State v.
Torres, 2020-Ohio-5390, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons,
2014-Ohio-2354, ¶ 29.
{¶11} While the judgment entry granting the application states that the trial court
held a hearing, this is contrary to the record and the docket, which makes no note of a
hearing date or notice of a hearing given to the parties. See Harris at ¶ 12 (“[s]ince the
record reflects the trial court neither set a specific date for a hearing on appellee’s motion
nor notified appellant of a date upon which it would proceed to consider appellee's motion,
the trial court erred in granting it”). In relation to the 2023 application to seal, denied by
the trial court, the docket contains a note of the date and time of the hearing scheduled,
a separate notation of the scheduling notice, and a notation for the stenographer’s fees.
In the present matter, no such items are contained in the record or noted on the docket.
The judgment entry granting the application immediately follows the filing and notice of
C.J.R.’s application.
{¶12} The fact that the court did not hold a hearing is also demonstrated by the
timing of its judgment entry. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(C), the trial court is to hold a
hearing “not less than forty-five days and not more than ninety days from the date of the
filing of the application.” The court issued its entry granting the application 17 days after
it was filed, well short of the minimum 45 days that must elapse before a hearing can be
held. Of note, in the proceedings on the 2023 application, the court held a hearing around
PAGE 4 OF 6
Case No.
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[Cite as State v. C.J.R., 2025-Ohio-2477.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-G-0002
Plaintiff-Appellant, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
C.J.R., Trial Court No. 2014 C 000147 Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: July 14, 2025 Judgment: Reversed and remanded
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Nicholas A. Burling, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Justin Enger, Ibold & O’Brien, 401 South Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Defendant- Appellee).
SCOTT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, granting defendant-appellee, C.J.R.’s,
application to seal his records. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the
lower court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶2} On August 14, 2015, C.J.R. entered a guilty plea to Attempted Corrupting
Another with Drugs, a felony of the third degree. The court ordered him to serve five
years of community control which terminated in 2020.
{¶3} In 2023, C.J.R. filed an application to seal his records, which the trial court denied following a hearing. On November 26, 2024, C.J.R. filed a second application to
seal his records. The court filed a judgment entry on December 13, 2024, granting the
application and sealing the records relating to the case. The entry indicated that, on
December 9, 2024, “an in-person hearing was held” and the motion was taken under
advisement. It stated that the “Court had considered the evidence and the State’s
opposition to Defendant’s Application to Seal the Record.” It found that the record
demonstrated C.J.R. had been rehabilitated.
{¶4} The State filed leave to appeal which this court granted. On appeal, it raises
the following assignment of error:
{¶5} “The trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion to seal without holding
a hearing on the request.”
Trial court order vacating judgment on appeal
{¶6} As an initial matter, we observe that, in an effort to remedy the failure to
hold a hearing, the trial court issued a January 13, 2025 order vacating the December 13,
2024 judgment sealing this matter, i.e., the judgment that is the subject of this appeal. In
the January 13 order, the court also found the State’s motion for leave to appeal, filed in
this court, “moot.” The trial court cannot rule on motions filed in this court and such motion
was subsequently granted by this court. Further, concurrently with the request for leave,
the State filed its notice of appeal. Although apparently consistent with this opinion’s
ultimate rationale on the merits, a trial court nonetheless lacks jurisdiction to vacate a
judgment that is the subject of a pending appeal. Mucci v. McCoy, 74 Ohio App.3d 331,
333 (11th Dist. 1991).1 Thus, we proceed to consideration of the merits.
1. “Once a case has been appealed, the trial court loses jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal.” In re S.J., 2005-Ohio-3215, ¶ 9. This court clarified that vacating a judgment “is not an action in aid of the judgment on appeal.” Mucci at 333. PAGE 2 OF 6
Case No. 2025-G-0002 Hearing requirement for applications to seal
{¶7} The State argues that, contrary to the incorrect statement contained in the
court’s judgment entry, it failed to hold a hearing on C.J.R.’s petition to seal the record,
which is required by R.C. 2953.32.
{¶8} R.C. 2953.32(B)(1) provides that an offender may apply for the sealing or
expungement of a criminal matter. “Upon the filing of an application under this section,
the court shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor for the case of the
hearing on the application not less than sixty days prior to the hearing.” R.C. 2953.32(C).
The prosecutor is to provide the victim notice of the date and time of the hearing. “The
court shall hold the hearing not less than forty-five days and not more than ninety days
from the date of the filing of the application.” Id. Further, “[t]he prosecutor may object to
the granting of the application by filing a written objection with the court not later than
thirty days prior to the date set for the hearing.” Id. The victim “may be present and heard
orally, in writing, or both at any hearing under this section.” Id.
{¶9} Decisions regarding the trial court’s ruling on a motion to seal the record are
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-2651, ¶ 13 (11th
Dist.). “When an appellate court must interpret and apply statutory provisions, its
standard of review is de novo.” Id.
{¶10} Courts have consistently held that the requirements to set a date for the
hearing, notify the prosecutor of the date, and hold the hearing are “mandatory,” noting
the need to hear evidence before rendering a decision on such motion. State v. Potts,
2020-Ohio-989, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.); State v. Talameh, 2012-Ohio-4205, ¶ 41 (11th Dist.)
(“the requirement of a hearing is mandatory and each application for expungement must
be set for hearing”); State v. Withrow, 2004-Ohio-3699, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.) (“[n]umerous
PAGE 3 OF 6
Case No. 2025-G-0002 appellate districts . . . have had the opportunity to address this issue and have found that
an oral hearing is mandatory prior to the issuance of a decision on the application for
sealing of record”); State v. Harris, 2004-Ohio-1788, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). The “summary
granting of a motion to seal under R.C. 2953.32” is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
holding that “a motion to seal cannot be summarily granted without a hearing.” State v.
Torres, 2020-Ohio-5390, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons,
2014-Ohio-2354, ¶ 29.
{¶11} While the judgment entry granting the application states that the trial court
held a hearing, this is contrary to the record and the docket, which makes no note of a
hearing date or notice of a hearing given to the parties. See Harris at ¶ 12 (“[s]ince the
record reflects the trial court neither set a specific date for a hearing on appellee’s motion
nor notified appellant of a date upon which it would proceed to consider appellee's motion,
the trial court erred in granting it”). In relation to the 2023 application to seal, denied by
the trial court, the docket contains a note of the date and time of the hearing scheduled,
a separate notation of the scheduling notice, and a notation for the stenographer’s fees.
In the present matter, no such items are contained in the record or noted on the docket.
The judgment entry granting the application immediately follows the filing and notice of
C.J.R.’s application.
{¶12} The fact that the court did not hold a hearing is also demonstrated by the
timing of its judgment entry. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(C), the trial court is to hold a
hearing “not less than forty-five days and not more than ninety days from the date of the
filing of the application.” The court issued its entry granting the application 17 days after
it was filed, well short of the minimum 45 days that must elapse before a hearing can be
held. Of note, in the proceedings on the 2023 application, the court held a hearing around
PAGE 4 OF 6
Case No. 2025-G-0002 two months after the application was filed, within the statutory period. In the absence of
anything in the record to substantiate the court’s statement that it held a hearing, we find
this statement to be in error and the trial court failed to comply with the requirement to
hold a hearing compliant with R.C. 2953.32(C). See State v. Hufford, 2024-Ohio-2667,
¶ 8, 12 (12th Dist.) (while the court scheduled the hearing on a specific date, since “[t]he
record [was] devoid of any evidence to indicate that this hearing ever actually took place,”
reversal was required).
{¶13} As noted by the State, the statute also provides that the victim “may be
present and heard orally, in writing, or both at any hearing under this section.” R.C.
2953.32(C). There is nothing in the record to indicate that either the victim or the State
was provided notice of a hearing date to facilitate appearance at such hearing. Further,
the less than three-week turnaround in granting the application interfered with the ability
of the victim to be heard through a written statement. For these reasons, this matter is
reversed and remanded to the trial court for compliance with the timing and hearing
requirements of R.C. 2953.32(C) prior to issuance of a judgment on the application to
seal the record.
{¶14} The sole assignment of error is with merit.
{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting C.J.R.’s
application to seal his records is reversed and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to be taxed against appellee.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
PAGE 5 OF 6
Case No. 2025-G-0002 JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Opinion of this court, the assignment of error is with
merit. The order of this court is that the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common
Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
Costs to be taxed against appellee.
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH
JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND, concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PAGE 6 OF 6
Case No. 2025-G-0002