[Cite as State v. Charleston, 2026-Ohio-1787.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. Nos. 30605; 30606 Appellee : : Trial Court Case Nos. 2024 CR 02183; v. : 2023 CR 03667 : ZION CHARLESTON : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION ...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 15, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed as modified in Case No. 2023 CR 03667. The judgment of the trial court
is affirmed in Case No. 2024 CR 02183.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. Nos. 30605; 30606
ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Zion Charleston appeals from the trial court’s revocation of community control
in Case Nos. 2024 CR 2183 and 2023 CR 3667 and its imposition of an aggregate 60-month
prison sentence along with concurrent lifetime driver’s license suspensions.
{¶ 2} Charleston contends the statutory purposes of felony sentencing obligated the
trial court to impose the minimum sanction necessary and did not support an aggregate 60-
month prison term. He also claims the trial court erred in imposing a “mandatory lifetime
suspension” of his driver’s license in both cases. He asserts that the trial court had discretion
to impose suspensions as short as three years.
{¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, we find no merit in Charleston’s argument about
the length of his prison term. Regarding the driver’s license suspensions, a mandatory
lifetime suspension was proper in Case No. 2024 CR 2183. As a result, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment in that case.
{¶ 4} In Case No. 2023 CR 3667, the trial court erred in changing a previously
imposed three-year suspension to a mandatory lifetime suspension. We modify the trial
court’s judgment in Case No. 2023 CR 3667 by vacating the lifetime suspension and
reinstating the originally imposed three-year suspension. As modified, we affirm the
judgment in Case No. 2023 CR 3667.
2 I. Background
{¶ 5} In Case No. 2023 CR 3667, Charleston pleaded guilty to one count of failure to
comply with an order of signal of a police officer and two counts of child endangering. The
trial court sentenced him to five years of community control with a three-year driver’s license
suspension. In Case No. 2024 CR 2183, Charleston later pleaded guilty to a new charge of
failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. The trial court nevertheless
continued him on community control in Case No. 2023 CR 3667. It also placed him on five
years of community control in Case No. 2024 CR 2183.
{¶ 6} In August 2025, the trial court revoked community control in both cases based
on a domestic violence conviction and Charleston’s failure to meet with his parole officer
after an arrest warrant was issued. The trial court imposed a 24-month prison term for the
failure-to-comply conviction in Case No. 2023 CR 3667 along with current sentences for
child endangering. In Case No. 2024 CR 2183, the trial court imposed a 36-month prison
term. Under the failure-to-comply statute, the sentences in the two cases were required to
be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate 60-month prison term. Regarding the
driver’s license suspensions, the trial court stated: “Your driver’s license is, if it’s not already,
it is suspended for the remainder of your life. It’s a lifetime—mandatory lifetime suspension.”
{¶ 7} In support of its sentencing decision, the trial court indicated that it had
considered the statutory principles and purposes of felony sentencing as well as the
statutory seriousness and recidivism factors. Regarding the purposes of felony sentencing,
the trial court noted that under R.C. 2929.11 it had been “guided by the overriding purposes
of felony sentencing to protect the public from future crime by the Defendant, to punish the
Defendant, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the Defendant, including using
3 minimum sanctions to accomplish those purposes without unnecessarily burdening
governmental resources.”
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} Charleston’s first assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A 60 MONTH PRISON TERM IN
VIOLATION OF R.C. 2929.11.
{¶ 9} Charleston challenges his aggregate 60-month prison sentence on the basis
that it “far exceeded the minimum required to meet the goals of felony sentencing” under
R.C. 2929.11. In support, he notes that he completed the “STAR program” while on
community control and obtained his high school diploma and an electrician’s license. He
attributes his failure to see his parole officer to the warrant issued for his arrest on the
domestic violence charge. Based on these facts, he insists an aggregate 60-month sentence
was unnecessary to satisfy the statutory purposes of felony sentencing.
{¶ 10} Upon review, we find Charleston’s argument to be unpersuasive. It is well
settled that “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not permit a reviewing court to vacate or modify a
sentence ‘based upon its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.’” State v. Smith, 2025-Ohio-2086, ¶ 59 (2d Dist.), quoting State
v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 39. Here the trial court examined the record and determined
that its sentence was consistent with the purposes of felony sentencing and was appropriate
in view of the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors. We are not authorized to review
the record on those issues or weigh the evidence to reach a different conclusion. Id. at ¶ 60.
Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
4 {¶ 11} The second assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUSPENDED CHARLESTON’S
DRIVER’S LICENSE FOR A MANDATORY LIFETIME SUSPENSION WHEN
HE DID NOT FACE A MANDATORY LIFETIME SUSPENSION.
{¶ 12} Charleston contends the trial court erred in imposing a “mandatory lifetime
suspension” of his driver’s license. He claims the trial court possessed discretion to impose
a suspension as short as three years. Because the trial court characterized a lifetime
suspension as “mandatory,” he argues that it failed to exercise its discretion. He asks us to
vacate the lifetime suspension so the trial court can consider a shorter term.
{¶ 13} Charleston’s original judgment entry imposing community control in Case No.
2023 CR 3667 included a three-year driver’s license suspension. The original judgment entry
imposing community control in Case No. 2024 CR 2183 did not impose a driver’s license
suspension. When later sentencing Charleston upon revocation of community control in both
cases, the trial court explained his aggregate 60-month prison sentence and stated that it
was imposing a “mandatory lifetime suspension” of his driver’s license. The trial court then
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[Cite as State v. Charleston, 2026-Ohio-1787.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. Nos. 30605; 30606 Appellee : : Trial Court Case Nos. 2024 CR 02183; v. : 2023 CR 03667 : ZION CHARLESTON : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION ...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 15, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed as modified in Case No. 2023 CR 03667. The judgment of the trial court
is affirmed in Case No. 2024 CR 02183.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. Nos. 30605; 30606
ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Zion Charleston appeals from the trial court’s revocation of community control
in Case Nos. 2024 CR 2183 and 2023 CR 3667 and its imposition of an aggregate 60-month
prison sentence along with concurrent lifetime driver’s license suspensions.
{¶ 2} Charleston contends the statutory purposes of felony sentencing obligated the
trial court to impose the minimum sanction necessary and did not support an aggregate 60-
month prison term. He also claims the trial court erred in imposing a “mandatory lifetime
suspension” of his driver’s license in both cases. He asserts that the trial court had discretion
to impose suspensions as short as three years.
{¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, we find no merit in Charleston’s argument about
the length of his prison term. Regarding the driver’s license suspensions, a mandatory
lifetime suspension was proper in Case No. 2024 CR 2183. As a result, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment in that case.
{¶ 4} In Case No. 2023 CR 3667, the trial court erred in changing a previously
imposed three-year suspension to a mandatory lifetime suspension. We modify the trial
court’s judgment in Case No. 2023 CR 3667 by vacating the lifetime suspension and
reinstating the originally imposed three-year suspension. As modified, we affirm the
judgment in Case No. 2023 CR 3667.
2 I. Background
{¶ 5} In Case No. 2023 CR 3667, Charleston pleaded guilty to one count of failure to
comply with an order of signal of a police officer and two counts of child endangering. The
trial court sentenced him to five years of community control with a three-year driver’s license
suspension. In Case No. 2024 CR 2183, Charleston later pleaded guilty to a new charge of
failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. The trial court nevertheless
continued him on community control in Case No. 2023 CR 3667. It also placed him on five
years of community control in Case No. 2024 CR 2183.
{¶ 6} In August 2025, the trial court revoked community control in both cases based
on a domestic violence conviction and Charleston’s failure to meet with his parole officer
after an arrest warrant was issued. The trial court imposed a 24-month prison term for the
failure-to-comply conviction in Case No. 2023 CR 3667 along with current sentences for
child endangering. In Case No. 2024 CR 2183, the trial court imposed a 36-month prison
term. Under the failure-to-comply statute, the sentences in the two cases were required to
be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate 60-month prison term. Regarding the
driver’s license suspensions, the trial court stated: “Your driver’s license is, if it’s not already,
it is suspended for the remainder of your life. It’s a lifetime—mandatory lifetime suspension.”
{¶ 7} In support of its sentencing decision, the trial court indicated that it had
considered the statutory principles and purposes of felony sentencing as well as the
statutory seriousness and recidivism factors. Regarding the purposes of felony sentencing,
the trial court noted that under R.C. 2929.11 it had been “guided by the overriding purposes
of felony sentencing to protect the public from future crime by the Defendant, to punish the
Defendant, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the Defendant, including using
3 minimum sanctions to accomplish those purposes without unnecessarily burdening
governmental resources.”
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} Charleston’s first assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A 60 MONTH PRISON TERM IN
VIOLATION OF R.C. 2929.11.
{¶ 9} Charleston challenges his aggregate 60-month prison sentence on the basis
that it “far exceeded the minimum required to meet the goals of felony sentencing” under
R.C. 2929.11. In support, he notes that he completed the “STAR program” while on
community control and obtained his high school diploma and an electrician’s license. He
attributes his failure to see his parole officer to the warrant issued for his arrest on the
domestic violence charge. Based on these facts, he insists an aggregate 60-month sentence
was unnecessary to satisfy the statutory purposes of felony sentencing.
{¶ 10} Upon review, we find Charleston’s argument to be unpersuasive. It is well
settled that “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not permit a reviewing court to vacate or modify a
sentence ‘based upon its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.’” State v. Smith, 2025-Ohio-2086, ¶ 59 (2d Dist.), quoting State
v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 39. Here the trial court examined the record and determined
that its sentence was consistent with the purposes of felony sentencing and was appropriate
in view of the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors. We are not authorized to review
the record on those issues or weigh the evidence to reach a different conclusion. Id. at ¶ 60.
Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
4 {¶ 11} The second assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUSPENDED CHARLESTON’S
DRIVER’S LICENSE FOR A MANDATORY LIFETIME SUSPENSION WHEN
HE DID NOT FACE A MANDATORY LIFETIME SUSPENSION.
{¶ 12} Charleston contends the trial court erred in imposing a “mandatory lifetime
suspension” of his driver’s license. He claims the trial court possessed discretion to impose
a suspension as short as three years. Because the trial court characterized a lifetime
suspension as “mandatory,” he argues that it failed to exercise its discretion. He asks us to
vacate the lifetime suspension so the trial court can consider a shorter term.
{¶ 13} Charleston’s original judgment entry imposing community control in Case No.
2023 CR 3667 included a three-year driver’s license suspension. The original judgment entry
imposing community control in Case No. 2024 CR 2183 did not impose a driver’s license
suspension. When later sentencing Charleston upon revocation of community control in both
cases, the trial court explained his aggregate 60-month prison sentence and stated that it
was imposing a “mandatory lifetime suspension” of his driver’s license. The trial court then
filed new judgment entries in 2023 CR 3667 and 2024 CR 2183. Both entries included the
following license-suspension language: “The Court hereby SUSPENDS Defendant’s driver’s
license, for a term of LIFE.”
{¶ 14} The penalty for Charleston’s failure-to-comply conviction in 2023 CR 3667
included a mandatory driver’s license suspension for a definite period of three years to life.
See R.C. 2921.331(E) and 4510.02(A)(2). The trial court properly imposed a three-year
suspension when placing him on community control. Because of that prior offense, the
penalty for Charleston’s subsequent failure-to-comply conviction in 2024 CR 2183 included
a mandatory lifetime driver’s license suspension. See R.C. 2921.331(E) and 4510.02(A)(1).
5 Although the sentencing entry placing Charleston on community control in 2024 CR 2183
did not include a driver’s license suspension, the trial court imposed concurrent lifetime
suspensions in both cases when revoking community control.
{¶ 15} On appeal, Charleston does not challenge the trial court’s authority to impose
a driver’s license suspension in either of the two cases when revoking community control.
As a result, we need not consider whether the trial court properly added the missing
suspension in 2024 CR 2183. Compare State v. Curry, 2021-Ohio-2746, ¶ 5-6 (1st Dist.)
(“[T]he court’s failure to include in its original sentence and sentencing entry the statutorily
mandated license suspension rendered that part of the sentence voidable. . . . Curry’s
sentence on the failure-to-comply charge became final upon the filing of the original
sentencing entry and the trial court lacked authority to modify the sentence by imposing the
license suspension as part of its sentence for Curry’s community-control violation.”).
Charleston argues only that the trial court possessed discretion to impose a suspension of
between three years and life when revoking community control. He contends the trial court
erred in characterizing a lifetime suspension as “mandatory,” revealing that it did not
exercise its discretion.
{¶ 16} In response, the State correctly notes that plain-error review applies because
Charleston did not object to the license suspensions below. Under Crim.R. 52(B), we have
“discretion to correct ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights’ notwithstanding the
accused’s failure to meet his obligation to bring those errors to the attention of the trial court.”
State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. Plain error requires an obvious defect in the
proceedings that affected a defendant’s substantial rights by impacting the outcome in a
prejudicial way. Id.
6 {¶ 17} Upon review, we find Charleston’s argument to be persuasive, in part, and find
plain error. In Case No. 2023 CR 3667, the trial court exercised its discretion and imposed
a three-year driver’s license suspension when placing him on community control. We are
unaware of any authority for modifying that aspect of his sentence upon revoking community
control. A license suspension imposed under R.C. 2921.331(E) is a component of a felony
sentence, not a community control sanction that may be modified. State v. Bakos, 2023-
Ohio-2827, ¶ 21-26 (11th Dist.) (recognizing a driver’s license suspension as part of a felony
sentence); State v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-149, ¶ 35 (1st Dist.) (“A suspension of the
defendant’s driver’s license is part of ‘the maximum penalty involved’ . . . .”). Moreover, even
if the trial court could modify the length of the suspension when revoking community control,
it would have discretion under R.C. 2921.331(E) and 4510.02(A)(2) to impose a suspension
for a definite period of three years to life. Therefore, the trial court erred in Case No. 2023
CR 3667 when it filed a judgment entry revoking community control and imposing a
“mandatory” lifetime driver’s license suspension. The error was “obvious” given the absence
of any arguable legal authority to impose a mandatory lifetime suspension. Charleston also
was prejudiced in Case No. 2023 CR 2667 by having a three-year suspension increased to
an improper “mandatory” lifetime suspension.
{¶ 18} In Case No. 2024 CR 2183, the penalty for Charleston’s subsequent failure-
to-comply conviction included a mandatory lifetime driver’s license suspension under
R.C. 2921.331(E) and 4510.02(A)(1). Consequently, as to that case, we reject his argument
that the trial court possessed discretion to impose a shorter suspension term.
{¶ 19} Based on the reasoning set forth above, the second assignment of error is
sustained in part and overruled in part. The second assignment of error is sustained insofar
as it challenges the trial court’s imposition of a mandatory lifetime driver’s license suspension
7 in Case No. 2023 CR 3667. The second assignment of error is overruled insofar as it
challenges the trial court’s imposition of a mandatory lifetime driver’s license suspension in
Case No. 2024 CR 2183.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 20} The trial court’s judgment in Case No. 2023 CR 3667 is modified by vacating
the lifetime driver’s license suspension and reinstating the originally imposed three-year
suspension. As modified, the judgment in that case is affirmed.
{¶ 21} Finally, the trial court’s judgment in Case No. 2024 CR 2187 is affirmed.
.............
EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.