State v. Charles

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 129,499

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

JARROD ROCK CHARLES,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Saline District Court; AMY NORTON, judge. Submitted without oral argument.

Opinion filed August 21, 2026. Affirmed.

Patrick H. Dunn, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Ethan C. Zipf-Sigler, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before MALONE, P.J., GARDNER and PICKERING, JJ.

PER CURIAM: After pleading guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation of a child, severity level five person felonies, Jarrod Rock Charles appeals the district court's assessment of three Children's Advocacy Center (CAC) fees. Charles argues that under K.S.A. 20-370, he only should have been ordered to pay a single fee. The Kansas Court of Appeals has consistently held otherwise. Thus, we affirm the district court's judgment.

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Factual and procedural background

In February 2025, the State charged Charles with 15 counts of sexual exploitation of a child for crimes allegedly committed between September 6, 2021, to September 17, 2024. We need not discuss the specifics of the charges considering the limited issue on appeal. In May 2025, under a plea agreement, Charles pled guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation of a child in exchange for the State dismissing the other charges.

On August 8, 2025, the district court sentenced Charles to serve 32 months'

imprisonment for each count, ordering counts I and II to run consecutively, for a controlling term of 64 months' imprisonment. At the request of the State, the district court imposed CAC fees of $1,200, representing a $400 fee for each count. Charles did not object to the fees. Charles timely appealed his sentence.

The district court did not err by ordering three CAC fees.

Charles' only claim on appeal is that the district court erred in imposing $1,200 in CAC fees, arguing that K.S.A. 20-370(a) only allows a sentencing court to impose a single CAC fee in each case, rather than one fee for each count of conviction. The State maintains the district court properly imposed the separate CAC fees.

Charles did not object at sentencing to the fees assessed by the district court.

Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. State v. Green, 315 Kan. 178, 182, 505 P.3d 377 (2022). There are several exceptions, and Charles argues that his appeal presents only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts. See State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). Even if an exception applies, the decision to review an unpreserved claim under an exception is prudential and this court is not obligated to review the claim. State v. Rhoiney, 314 Kan. 497, 500, 501 P.3d 368 (2021). This court has addressed similar arguments about CAC

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fees under K.S.A. 20-370(a) despite a lack of preservation. See, e.g., State v. Mason, 66 Kan. App. 2d 209, 220, 579 P.3d 978 (2025). Considering the State does not oppose Charles' request and his asserted exception applies, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of his claim.

Resolution of Charles' claim depends solely on our interpretation of K.S.A. 20-

370. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024).

The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the intent of the Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. An appellate court must first attempt to determine legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). If an appellate court finds no ambiguity, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. Only if the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous does an appellate court use canons of construction or legislative history to construe the Legislature's intent. See State v. Betts, 316 Kan. 191, 198, 514 P.3d 341 (2022).

K.S.A. 20-370(a) states in part: "On and after July 1, 2013, any defendant convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor is a victim, shall pay an assessment fee in the amount of $400 to the clerk of the district court." Charles was assessed a fee totaling $1,200 for his three convictions. On appeal, he argues the plain language of the statute only permits a district court to impose one CAC fee upon each "'defendant convicted of a crime,'" as opposed to one CAC fee per conviction implicating a minor victim.

Charles acknowledges that a panel of this court reached a contrary interpretation of the statute in State v. McDuffie, No. 113,987, 2017 WL 2617648, at *21 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). The McDuffie panel held that the plain language of the statute allowed for two interpretations—one that required "defendants convicted of

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multiple crimes against minors . . . to pay the number of fees equal to the crimes committed against minors," and another that required "defendants convicted of any crimes against minors, regardless of number, . . . to pay just one assessment fee." 2017 WL 2617648, at *19, *21. Finding the statute ambiguous, the McDuffie panel looked to legislative history of K.S.A. 20-370(a) and concluded the Legislature intended the former interpretation—meaning a "one-to-one crime-to-fee" ratio. 2017 WL 2617648, at *19.

But McDuffie is not the only example of this court declining to interpret K.S.A.

20-370(a) in the manner Charles suggests. In State v. Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d 236, 264, 563 P.3d 234, rev. denied 320 Kan. 867 (2025), this court reached a similar conclusion to McDuffie, but not because of a perceived ambiguity in the statute. Instead, the Sanders panel determined the plain language of the statute refers to "'a crime,' which is a singular event" and "does not use the term per case," meaning that a defendant must "pay an assessment fee for each crime committed against a minor." 65 Kan. App. 2d at 264.

Other panels of this court have ruled contrary to Charles' argument, finding that K.S.A. 20-370(a) requires the application of the CAC fee on a per crime basis. See, e.g., Mason, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 220-21; State v. Seeman, No. 128,864, 2026 WL 1908266, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed August 3, 2026; State v. Peters, No. 127,775, 2026 WL 1361905, at *14-15 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed June 12, 2026. Charles challenges the interpretation in McDuffie but does not address this court's analysis in Sanders or these other cases.

While the Kansas Supreme Court recently granted review of two cases in which panels of this court ruled that a CAC fee should be applied on a per crime basis—State v. Mildfelt, No. 126,968, 2025 WL 2815647 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted 321 Kan. 793 (2026), and State v. Shortt, No. 127,828, 2025 WL 3188309 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted 321 Kan. 794 (2026)—there is currently

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no decision that alters the well-reasoned analysis of many panels of this court. As such, we find no need to deviate from the analysis outlined in Sanders and other cases.

The plain language of K.S.A. 20-370(a) unambiguously requires a defendant convicted of a crime against a minor victim to pay a fee for each crime committed against a minor. See Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d at 261-64. Charles has not shown that the statute means anything other than what this court has consistently found—that a fee is required for each qualifying conviction. Before concluding, we acknowledge Charles' argument that under this per-conviction reading of K.S.A. 20-370(a), a defendant could in some cases face a mandatory assessment of a substantial amount of fees. As an example, he cites State v. Hachmeister, 306 Kan. 630, 631, 395 P.3d 833 (2017), where the defendant was convicted of 105 counts of sexual exploitation of a child for possessing individual images of child pornography. No issue was raised in Hachmeister about the assessment of CAC fees. Although multiple fees could arguably become substantial in some cases, Charles' case is not one of them, so this theoretical argument does not change our interpretation of the statute or the result in Charles' case. See Baker v. Hayden, 313 Kan. 667, 672, 490 P.3d 1164 (2021) (finding courts do not give advisory opinions).

Affirmed.