State v. Chandler

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: May 23, 2012
• Docket: 2012-UP-313
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State,     Respondent,

v.

Terrelle Chandler,  Appellant.

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Appeal From Charleston County
 Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No.  2012-UP-313
Head May 9, 2012 – Filed May 23, 2012

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AFFIRMED

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Appellate Defender Tristan M. Shaffer, of Columbia, for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Terrelle Chandler appeals his convictions for murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.  He argues the trial court erred in finding his statement to police was voluntary, despite evidence he was told he would be charged with murder if he refused to give a statement.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (recognizing in criminal cases, appellate courts review errors of law only and are bound by factual findings of trial court unless clearly erroneous); State v. Gillian, 373 S.C. 601, 613, 646 S.E.2d 872, 878 (2007) (placing admission or exclusion of evidence within trial court's sound discretion and permitting appellate courts to disturb such a ruling only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice); State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."). 

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (requiring State to establish accused's knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda[1] rights when giving statement for it to be admissible at trial); State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 429, 510 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998) (finding implicit waiver sufficient); State v. Hughes, 336 S.C. 585, 594, 521 S.E.2d 500, 505 (1999) ("Absent coercive police conduct causally related to a confession, there is no basis for finding a confession constitutionally involuntary."); State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 513-14, 702 S.E.2d 395, 401 (Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing free, knowing, and voluntary waiver may not be procured through use of threats, violence, promises, or improper influence, and requiring a court examining such a waiver to determine "whether the defendant's will was overborne by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession"); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 387, 652 S.E.2d 444, 453 (Ct. App. 2007) (stating a trial court examining totality of the circumstances surrounding a statement has the opportunity to "listen to the testimony, assess the demeanor and credibility of all witnesses, and weigh the evidence accordingly"); State v. McAlister, 133 S.C. 99, 101, 130 S.E. 511, 512 (1925) (holding trial court "passing on the preliminary question of admissibility . . .  [i]s not bound to accept as true the defendant's testimony as to intimidation, even if such testimony [is] not directly controverted by the testimony of other witnesses"). 

AFFIRMED.  

PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur. 

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[1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).