[Cite as State v. Champion, 2012-Ohio-2537.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 24782 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 1997-CR-1509 v. : : BRUCE R. CHAMPION : (Criminal Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : : ...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 8th day of June, 2012.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by KIRSTEN A. BRANDT, Atty. Reg. #0070162, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
BRUCE R. CHAMPION, #354-713, London Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 69, London, Ohio 43140 Defendant-Appellant, pro se
.............
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Bruce R. Champion appeals pro se from the trial court’s decision, entry, and 2
order overruling his motion for resentencing to merge allied offenses of similar import.
{¶ 2} Champion advances three assignments of error on appeal. First, he contends
the trial court erred in refusing to address the merits of his allied-offense argument and an
argument about plain error. Second, he claims the trial court erred in failing to apply the
plain-error doctrine. Third, he asserts that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that
aggravated robbery and kidnapping are allied offenses of similar import.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that Champion was convicted and sentenced in March
1998 on two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of kidnapping, one count of aggravated
burglary, and firearm specifications. This court affirmed on direct appeal, rejecting, among
other things, an allied-offense argument. See State v. Champion, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
17176, 1999 WL 114973 (March 5, 1999). Champion then unsuccessfully sought
post-conviction relief. This court again affirmed. See State v. Champion, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 18394, 2001 WL 62388 (Jan. 26, 2001).
{¶ 4} On May 27, 2011, Champion filed a motion for resentencing. He argued that
his aggravated robbery and kidnapping offenses were allied offenses of similar import under
State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061. Therefore, he
claimed they were subject to merger at sentencing. The trial court overruled the motion,
holding that Johnson has prospective application and does not apply to convictions like
Champion’s that became final long ago. The trial court also denied reconsideration.
{¶ 5} Although Champion raises three assignments of error on appeal, he
acknowledges that they are related. The essence of his appellate argument is that the failure to
merge his aggravated robbery and kidnapping convictions as allied offenses of similar import 3
under Johnson constituted plain error. We reject this argument for at least two reasons.
{¶ 6} First, the trial court correctly held that Johnson has only prospective
application. In Johnson, the Ohio Supreme Court announced a new test for determining when
offenses are allied offenses of similar import that must be merged pursuant to R.C. 2941.25. In
State v. Parson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24641, 2012-Ohio-730, ¶ 11, this court rejected
retroactive application of Johnson to a conviction that became final long ago. On the authority
of Parson, we hold that the test set forth in Johnson has no applicability to Champion.
{¶ 7} Second, Johnson would provide Champion no relief even if it did apply
retroactively. “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import under
R.C. 2941.25(A), the question is whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the
other with the same conduct, not whether it is possible to commit one without committing the
other.” (Citation omitted.) Johnson at ¶ 48. “If the offenses correspond to such a degree that
the conduct of the defendant constituting commission of one offense constitutes commission
of the other, then the offenses are of similar import.” Id.
{¶ 8} “If the multiple offenses can be committed by the same conduct, then the
court must determine whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct, i.e., ‘a single
act, committed with a single state of mind.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 49. “If the answer
to both questions is yes, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and will be
merged.” Id. at ¶ 50. “Conversely, if the court determines that the commission of one offense
will never result in the commission of the other, or if the offenses are committed separately, or
if the defendant has a separate animus for each offense, then, according to R.C. 2941.25(B),
the offenses will not merge.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 51. 4
{¶ 9} When resolving Champion’s direct appeal in 1999, this court determined that
his aggravated robbery and kidnapping offenses were not allied offenses of similar import
because he exposed his victims “to a significantly greater risk of harm than was necessary for
the accomplishment of the aggravated robbery offense.” Champion at *4. This fact established
the existence of a separate animus. Id. at *3-4; see also State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397
N.E.2d 1345 (1979), syllabus (“Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects the
victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from that involved in the
underlying crime, there exists a separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support
separate convictions.”); State v. Gilbert, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 206,
2012-Ohio-1165, ¶ 47 (“Separate animus also exists if the restraint or movement of the victim
substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim.”). Even under Johnson, the existence of
a separate animus for each offense allows the imposition of separate sentences. Johnson at
¶ 51. Therefore, the new test articulated in Johnson does not help Champion.
{¶ 10} Finally, we reject Champion’s request to hold the present appeal in abeyance
until the Ohio Supreme Court decides whether Johnson has retroactive application. Champion
contends the United States District Court certified that state-law question to the Ohio Supreme
Court in Gaines v. Warden, Mansfield Correctional Inst., No. S.D.Ohio 1:07cv347, 2011 WL
2884913 (July 18, 2011). We decline to hold the present appeal in abeyance for three reasons.
First, it is not clear that the question certified by the federal district court would address
retroactive application of Johnson.1 Second, the Ohio Supreme Court’s on-line docket does
1 In Gaines, the federal district court stated that it would certify the following state-law question to the Ohio Supreme Court:
Whether in this case, which involved a single automobile accident resulting in the death of one victim, Ohio 5
not indicate that the certified question has been accepted for review. Third, even if the Ohio
Supreme Court were to hold that Johnson has retroactive application, that holding would not
help Champion for the reason set forth above.
{¶ 11} Champion’s assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
FAIN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck Kirsten A. Brandt Bruce R. Champion Hon. Michael Tucker
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[Cite as State v. Champion, 2012-Ohio-2537.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 24782 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 1997-CR-1509 v. : : BRUCE R. CHAMPION : (Criminal Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : : ...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 8th day of June, 2012.
...........
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by KIRSTEN A. BRANDT, Atty. Reg. #0070162, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
BRUCE R. CHAMPION, #354-713, London Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 69, London, Ohio 43140 Defendant-Appellant, pro se
.............
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Bruce R. Champion appeals pro se from the trial court’s decision, entry, and 2
order overruling his motion for resentencing to merge allied offenses of similar import.
{¶ 2} Champion advances three assignments of error on appeal. First, he contends
the trial court erred in refusing to address the merits of his allied-offense argument and an
argument about plain error. Second, he claims the trial court erred in failing to apply the
plain-error doctrine. Third, he asserts that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that
aggravated robbery and kidnapping are allied offenses of similar import.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that Champion was convicted and sentenced in March
1998 on two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of kidnapping, one count of aggravated
burglary, and firearm specifications. This court affirmed on direct appeal, rejecting, among
other things, an allied-offense argument. See State v. Champion, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
17176, 1999 WL 114973 (March 5, 1999). Champion then unsuccessfully sought
post-conviction relief. This court again affirmed. See State v. Champion, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 18394, 2001 WL 62388 (Jan. 26, 2001).
{¶ 4} On May 27, 2011, Champion filed a motion for resentencing. He argued that
his aggravated robbery and kidnapping offenses were allied offenses of similar import under
State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061. Therefore, he
claimed they were subject to merger at sentencing. The trial court overruled the motion,
holding that Johnson has prospective application and does not apply to convictions like
Champion’s that became final long ago. The trial court also denied reconsideration.
{¶ 5} Although Champion raises three assignments of error on appeal, he
acknowledges that they are related. The essence of his appellate argument is that the failure to
merge his aggravated robbery and kidnapping convictions as allied offenses of similar import 3
under Johnson constituted plain error. We reject this argument for at least two reasons.
{¶ 6} First, the trial court correctly held that Johnson has only prospective
application. In Johnson, the Ohio Supreme Court announced a new test for determining when
offenses are allied offenses of similar import that must be merged pursuant to R.C. 2941.25. In
State v. Parson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24641, 2012-Ohio-730, ¶ 11, this court rejected
retroactive application of Johnson to a conviction that became final long ago. On the authority
of Parson, we hold that the test set forth in Johnson has no applicability to Champion.
{¶ 7} Second, Johnson would provide Champion no relief even if it did apply
retroactively. “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import under
R.C. 2941.25(A), the question is whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the
other with the same conduct, not whether it is possible to commit one without committing the
other.” (Citation omitted.) Johnson at ¶ 48. “If the offenses correspond to such a degree that
the conduct of the defendant constituting commission of one offense constitutes commission
of the other, then the offenses are of similar import.” Id.
{¶ 8} “If the multiple offenses can be committed by the same conduct, then the
court must determine whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct, i.e., ‘a single
act, committed with a single state of mind.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 49. “If the answer
to both questions is yes, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and will be
merged.” Id. at ¶ 50. “Conversely, if the court determines that the commission of one offense
will never result in the commission of the other, or if the offenses are committed separately, or
if the defendant has a separate animus for each offense, then, according to R.C. 2941.25(B),
the offenses will not merge.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 51. 4
{¶ 9} When resolving Champion’s direct appeal in 1999, this court determined that
his aggravated robbery and kidnapping offenses were not allied offenses of similar import
because he exposed his victims “to a significantly greater risk of harm than was necessary for
the accomplishment of the aggravated robbery offense.” Champion at *4. This fact established
the existence of a separate animus. Id. at *3-4; see also State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397
N.E.2d 1345 (1979), syllabus (“Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects the
victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from that involved in the
underlying crime, there exists a separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support
separate convictions.”); State v. Gilbert, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 206,
2012-Ohio-1165, ¶ 47 (“Separate animus also exists if the restraint or movement of the victim
substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim.”). Even under Johnson, the existence of
a separate animus for each offense allows the imposition of separate sentences. Johnson at
¶ 51. Therefore, the new test articulated in Johnson does not help Champion.
{¶ 10} Finally, we reject Champion’s request to hold the present appeal in abeyance
until the Ohio Supreme Court decides whether Johnson has retroactive application. Champion
contends the United States District Court certified that state-law question to the Ohio Supreme
Court in Gaines v. Warden, Mansfield Correctional Inst., No. S.D.Ohio 1:07cv347, 2011 WL
2884913 (July 18, 2011). We decline to hold the present appeal in abeyance for three reasons.
First, it is not clear that the question certified by the federal district court would address
retroactive application of Johnson.1 Second, the Ohio Supreme Court’s on-line docket does
1 In Gaines, the federal district court stated that it would certify the following state-law question to the Ohio Supreme Court:
Whether in this case, which involved a single automobile accident resulting in the death of one victim, Ohio 5
not indicate that the certified question has been accepted for review. Third, even if the Ohio
Supreme Court were to hold that Johnson has retroactive application, that holding would not
help Champion for the reason set forth above.
{¶ 11} Champion’s assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
FAIN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck Kirsten A. Brandt Bruce R. Champion Hon. Michael Tucker
Rev.Code §2941.25 could be construed at the time of petitioner’s conviction and direct appeal in 2005 as permitting a “strict textual comparison” of the elements and a finding, in accordance with the First District Court of Appeals’ later decision in State v. Hundley, No. C-060374, 2007 WL 2019804, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct.App. 1 Dist. July 13, 2007) (unpublished), appeal dismissed, 116 Ohio St.3d 1441, 877 N.E.2d 991 (Ohio 2007), that the two aggravated vehicular homicide charges brought against petitioner under Ohio Rev.Code §§2903.06(A)(1)(a) and 2903.06(A)(2) are dissimilar when compared in the abstract; or whether, conversely, at the time of petitioner’s conviction and direct appeal in 2005, the proper construction of Ohio Rev.Code §2941.25 required a finding that the two offense[s] are of similar import in accordance with the subsequent clarification in Cabrales of the Rance “abstract elements comparison test,” as well as State v. Palmer, 120 Ohio St.3d 322, 898 N.E.2d 960 (Ohio 2008), and the First District Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Moore, No. C-70421, 2008 WL 3544342 (Ohio Ct.App. 1 Dist. Aug. 15, 2008) (unpublished), appeal dismissed, 120 Ohio St.3d 1490, 900 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio 2009), overruling Hundley.
Gaines at *9.