SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
State v. C.H. (A-56-15) (076535) [NOTE: This is a companion case to State v. William R. Joe (A-62-15) (077034), also filed today.]
Argued October 13, 2016 -- Decided March 7, 2017
FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether a defendant who is simultaneously sentenced to consecutive sentences on two separate indictments is entitled to the application of jail credit against both indictments.
Defendant was charged in Warren County under separate indictments for multiple charges involving misconduct with two minors, D.H. and D.M. Indictment 2010-10-00377 (Indictment 1) charged defendant with certain crimes against D.H.; Indictment 2010-10-00378 (Indictment 2) charged defendant with crimes against D.M. Defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and was confined until sentencing, which took place on August 22, 2012. In total, defendant spent 1007 days in pre-sentence custody.
Defendant was tried on each indictment in separate jury trials. On March 20, 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child on Indictment 2. On May 18, 2012, another jury found defendant guilty of two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact and one count of fourth-degree endangering the welfare of a child on Indictment 1.
Defendant was sentenced on both indictments on August 22, 2012. The court first addressed the sentencing for Indictment 2. For the aggravated sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced defendant to ten years’ imprisonment subject to an 85 percent parole ineligibility period. For the endangering the welfare of a child conviction, the court sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of three years’ imprisonment. The court applied 1007 days of jail credit to the sentences imposed under Indictment 2. The jail credits applied to the terms of imprisonment and to defendant’s parole ineligibility period.
On Indictment 1, the court sentenced defendant to twelve months’ imprisonment on each of the two criminal sexual contact convictions and four years’ imprisonment for the endangering the welfare of a child conviction. The court ordered each of the three sentences to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentences imposed under Indictment 2. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court held that the 1007 days of jail credit would apply only to the Indictment 2 sentences.
Defendant appealed, asserting that he was entitled to 2014 jail credits pursuant to State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011). The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing. Specifically, the appellate panel directed the lower court to apply 1007 days of jail credit to the sentences for both Indictment 1 and Indictment 2. The panel highlighted the statement in Hernandez that “defendants are entitled to precisely what [Rule 3:21-8] provides: credits against all sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each case.” 208 N.J. at 28 (quoting R. 3:21-8). The panel concluded that the proper application of Rule 3:21-8 and Hernandez demanded the imposition of 1007 days of jail credit against the sentences imposed in connection with each indictment.
The Court granted the State’s petition for certification as to the jail-credit issue and denied defendant’s cross-petition, which challenged his convictions. 224 N.J. 281 (2016).
HELD: Defendant’s sentences should be viewed together and jail credit applied to the front end of the aggregate imprisonment term for both indictments. To the extent that State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011), has been read differently with respect to consecutive sentences, Hernandez is modified as follows: double credit should not be awarded where a defendant is sentenced to consecutive sentences under separate indictments and receives the optimal benefits of jail credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody. Instead, the sentencing court should treat the sentences as a unified proceeding and maximize the benefits to the defendant by applying jail credit to the front end of the imprisonment term.
1. Rule 3:21-8 states that “[t]he defendant shall receive credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence.” These credits for pre- sentence custody are referred to as “jail credits.” In Hernandez, this Court held that, under Rule 3:21 8, defendants are entitled to jail credit “against all sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each case.” 208 N.J. at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting R. 3:21-8). “Therefore, as interpreted by Hernandez, Rule 3:21-8 requires that a defendant receive jail credit even though the charges are not directly responsible for his or her incarceration.” State v. Rawls, 219 N.J. 185, 194 (2014). (pp. 8-9)
2. In Hernandez, this Court reviewed two consolidated jail credit cases. In the first case, defendant Andrea Hernandez was sentenced in two separate proceedings for offenses committed in Passaic County and Ocean County. She received concurrent sentences, but the trial court did not provide her with credit against her parole ineligibility period. The Court observed that, if jail credit for her total time in pre-sentence custody applied to the Passaic County sentence (for which Hernandez was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment with an 85 percent parole ineligibility period), Hernandez would spend less time imprisoned because the parole ineligibility term would be reduced. Recognizing the inequity of such a scenario, the Court held that “Hernandez should be entitled to jail credit on the Passaic County sentence for the time she spent in custody between her Passaic County arrest and the date sentence was imposed in Ocean County.” 208 N.J. at 47. In the second case, concerning defendant Derrick Wayne Rose, the Court held that when multiple charges are brought in a single indictment, “the total amount of jail credit reduces the aggregate custodial sentence imposed.” Id. at 47-48. The Court sought to avoid scenarios in which jail credits “might have different consequences if the same consecutive sentences are embodied in a single judgment than if they are embodied in separate indictments and the credits applied only to one” of the judgments. Id. at 48. (pp. 9-12)
3. Here, defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and charged in two separate indictments. He remained in custody until he was sentenced for both indictments on August 22, 2012. Altogether, defendant spent 1007 days in pre-sentence custody. He received 1007 days of jail credit against the front end of his aggregate sentence. (p. 12)
4. Contrary to defendant’s contentions, Hernandez does not warrant the application of double jail credit in this case. Here, unlike the situations presented in Hernandez, defendant did not suffer any adverse consequences due to the trial court’s application of jail credit. Defendant received the optimal benefits of jail credit for the entire time he spent in pre-sentence custody. The 1007 days of jail credit were applied to the Indictment 2 sentences, which carried a parole ineligibility term. The jail credits reduced both defendant’s aggregate prison term and his parole ineligibility period. Therefore, the jail credits were applied to the front end of defendant’s aggregate sentence. This application of jail credit is equitable because it maximizes the benefits to defendant. (p. 13)
5. The Court recognizes that some language in Hernandez may have caused confusion about whether jail credits can reduce sentences on each charge of a consecutive sentence, thereby allowing defendants to receive jail credit for twice the amount of time spent in pre-sentence custody. To the extent that language in Hernandez suggests that a defendant is entitled to jail credits for time simultaneously spent in custody on each charge for which he receives a consecutive sentence, the Court makes clear that such double credit is not allowed. The appropriate course of action is to view the separate sentences together and apply jail credit to the front end of the aggregate sentence. This application maximizes the benefits of jail credit for defendants without awarding double time. The approach also is consistent with the policy purposes of Hernandez. (pp. 13-16).
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the sentence imposed by Superior Court, Law Division is REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-56 September Term 2015 076535
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C.H.,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued October 13, 2016 – Decided March 7, 2017
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant who is
simultaneously sentenced to consecutive sentences on two
separate indictments is entitled to the application of jail
credit against both indictments pursuant to Rule 3:21-8.
On October 27, 2010, a Warren County grand jury charged
defendant in two separate indictments for crimes committed
1 against two minors, D.H. and D.M. Defendant spent 1007 days in
pre-sentence custody.
Defendant was subsequently convicted for charges in both
indictments and sentenced in a consolidated hearing. For one
indictment, defendant received a total of ten years’
imprisonment with an 85 percent parole ineligibility period. He
was credited with 1007 days of jail credit for time spent in
confinement. For the other indictment, defendant was sentenced
to a total of four years’ imprisonment, to be served
consecutively with the sentences on the first sentenced
indictment. Over defense counsel’s objections, the trial court
did not apply jail credit in the second sentencing.
The Appellate Division remanded defendant’s case for
resentencing. The panel held that defendant was entitled to
1007 days of jail credit for the sentences on both indictments,
totaling 2014 days of jail credit.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that a
proper application of State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011),
entitles defendant to only 1007 total days of jail credit.
Neither the disposition of Hernandez nor the overarching policy
considerations in that opinion warrant the application of double
jail credit. Instead, defendant’s sentences should be viewed
together and jail credit applied to the front end of the
aggregate imprisonment term for both indictments. Accordingly,
2 we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate
the sentence of the trial court.
I.
Defendant was charged in Warren County under separate
indictments for multiple charges involving misconduct with two
minors, D.H. and D.M. Defendant was arrested on November 19,
2009, and was confined until sentencing, which took place on
August 22, 2012. In total, defendant spent 1007 days in
On October 27, 2010, a Warren County grand jury indicted
defendant separately for crimes committed against D.H. and D.M.
Indictment 2010-10-00377 (Indictment 1) charged defendant with
the following crimes against D.H.: two counts of second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c); two counts of fourth-degree
criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); and one count of
third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-
4(a).
Indictment 2010-10-00378 (Indictment 2) charged defendant
with the following crimes against D.M.: one count of
first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); two
counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and
one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).
3 Defendant was tried on each indictment in separate jury
trials before the same judge. On March 20, 2012, a jury found
defendant guilty of one count of first-degree aggravated sexual
assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of
a child on Indictment 2. Defendant was found not guilty of all
other counts in Indictment 2. On May 18, 2012, another jury
found defendant guilty of two counts of fourth-degree criminal
sexual contact and one count of fourth-degree endangering the
welfare of a child on Indictment 1. Defendant was found not
guilty of all other counts in Indictment 1.
Defendant was sentenced on both indictments in a
consolidated hearing held on August 22, 2012. The court first
addressed the sentencing for Indictment 2. For the aggravated
sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced defendant to ten
years’ imprisonment subject to an 85 percent parole
ineligibility period, pursuant to the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. For the endangering the welfare of
a child conviction, the court sentenced defendant to three
years’ imprisonment.
The sentencing court ordered both sentences under
Indictment 2 to run concurrently. The court also imposed
applicable fines and penalties. Lastly, the court applied 1007
days of jail credit to the sentences imposed under Indictment 2.
4 The jail credits applied to the terms of imprisonment and to
defendant’s parole ineligibility period.
On Indictment 1, the court sentenced defendant to twelve
months’ imprisonment on each of the two criminal sexual contact
convictions and four years’ imprisonment for the endangering the
welfare of a child conviction. The court ordered each of the
three sentences to run concurrently with each other, but
consecutively to the sentences imposed under Indictment 2.
Again, the court applied applicable fines and penalties.
The court then addressed the issue of jail credit for the
Indictment 1 sentences. Defense counsel requested that
additional credits be applied to the Indictment 1 sentences
pursuant to Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 24. The State argued
that if the sentence was imposed as suggested by defense
counsel, defendant would receive 2014 days of jail credit
despite spending only 1007 days in pre-sentence custody.
After expressing concern that a second application of jail
credit would “take away . . . the consecutive nature of the
sentence,” the court held that the 1007 days of jail credit
would apply only to the Indictment 2 sentences. The court
explained that it was applying credits only to the Indictment 2
sentences because otherwise “the consecutive sentence wouldn’t
mean anything.”
5 Defendant appealed, asserting that he was entitled to 2014
jail credits pursuant to Hernandez. In an unpublished per
curiam decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s
convictions but remanded for resentencing. Specifically, the
appellate panel directed the lower court to apply 1007 days of
jail credit to the sentences for both Indictment 1 and
Indictment 2, totaling 2014 days of jail credit.
The Appellate Division reviewed this Court’s interpretation
of Rule 3:21-8 in Hernandez, supra, and highlighted our
statement that “defendants are entitled to precisely what the
Rule provides: credits against all sentences ‘for any time
served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest
and the imposition of sentence’ on each case.” 208 N.J. at 28
(quoting R. 3:21-8). The panel concluded that the proper
application of Rule 3:21-8 and Hernandez demanded the imposition
of 1007 days of jail credit against the sentences imposed in
connection with each indictment.
We granted the State’s petition for certification as to the
jail-credit issue and denied defendant’s cross-petition, which
challenged his convictions. 224 N.J. 281 (2016).
II.
The State argues that the Appellate Division erroneously
awarded defendant twice the amount of jail credit he had
accrued. The State asks this Court to “make clear that a
6 defendant is not entitled to double jail credit when the judge
orders consecutive sentences and gives full jail credit toward
the sentence with the greater parole disqualifier or later
parole-eligibility date.”
The State further asserts that the purpose of Hernandez --
preventing criminal defendants from suffering real-time
consequences due to the inevitable delay in resolving multiple
charges -- does not justify double jail credit in this case.
The State contends that the Appellate Division’s application of
jail credit results in a windfall for defendant because the
double jail credit “will virtually consume” the second sentence
and defendant will serve less time than if he had posted bail.
The State notes that, unlike the defendants in Hernandez,
defendant’s credits were applied to his parole ineligibility
period.
Defendant argues that the Appellate Division properly
applied the tenets of Hernandez. According to defendant, the
State is asking this Court to reverse Hernandez rather than
clarify existing precedent. He maintains that the State
presents no compelling reasons for reversing well-established
precedent. Additionally, defendant notes that the trial court
was free to consider the impact of jail credit upon the real
time he would spend incarcerated when issuing the sentences.
III.
7 Rule 3:21-8 states that “[t]he defendant shall receive
credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time served
in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the
imposition of sentence.” These credits for pre-sentence custody
are referred to as “jail credits.” State v. Rawls, 219 N.J.
185, 192 (2014). “When the Rule preconditions for the
application of jail credits are satisfied, the award of such
credits is mandatory, not discretionary.” Hernandez, supra, 208
N.J. at 37.
“Jail credits are ‘day-for-day credits.’” Ibid. (quoting
Buncie v. Dep’t of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 214, 217 (App. Div.
2005), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 606 (2006)). Jail credits apply
to the “‘front end’ of a defendant’s sentence, meaning that [the
defendant] is entitled to credit against the sentence for every
day defendant was held in custody for that offense prior to
sentencing.” Ibid. In practice, this application means that
“jail credits will ‘reduce a[] [parole] ineligibility term as
well as the sentence imposed.’” Ibid. (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Mastapeter, 290 N.J. Super. 56, 64 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 569 (1996)).
This Court recognizes that jail credits “serve important
policy goals.” Rawls, supra, 219 N.J. at 193. Specifically,
jail credits further equal protection and fundamental fairness
considerations by preventing the “double punishment” of
8 defendants who spend time in custody prior to sentencing. Ibid.
(quoting Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 36). Jail credits
thereby prevent indigent defendants who cannot afford to post
bail from serving greater time in custody than wealthier
defendants. Ibid. In addition, jail credits discourage
prosecutors from manipulating trial dates and promote uniformity
in sentencing. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 48-49.
In Hernandez, supra, this Court held that, under Rule
3:21-8, defendants are entitled to jail credit “against all
sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a state
hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each
case.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting R. 3:21-8).
“Therefore, as interpreted by Hernandez, Rule 3:21-8 requires
that a defendant receive jail credit even though the charges are
not directly responsible for his or her incarceration.” Rawls,
supra, 219 N.J. at 194.
IV.
In Hernandez, this Court reviewed two consolidated jail
credit cases. In the first case, defendant Andrea Hernandez was
arrested in connection with an armed robbery in Passaic County
on October 25, 2006. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 28-29. She
remained in Passaic County custody until January 22, 2007, when
she was transferred to Ocean County custody. Id. at 29. On
January 23, 2007, Hernandez was charged with an Ocean County
9 burglary unrelated to the Passaic County charges. Ibid.
Thereafter, she pleaded guilty to the Ocean County burglary
charge and was sentenced on August 24, 2007. Ibid. Hernandez
was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment, to be served
concurrently with any sentence she would receive in Passaic
County. Ibid. The trial court credited Hernandez with 213 days
of jail credit, representing the number of days she spent in
Ocean County custody between January 23 and August 23, 2007.
Ibid.
Hernandez then pleaded guilty to the Passaic County charges
on October 4, 2007. Id. at 30. She was sentenced to twenty
years’ imprisonment with an 85 percent parole ineligibility
period pursuant to NERA. Ibid. The trial court credited
Hernandez with ninety days of jail credit, representing the time
she spent in Passaic County custody between October 25, 2006,
and January 22, 2007. Ibid.
Hernandez appealed, arguing that she was entitled to jail
credits for the time period between October 25, 2006, and the
Ocean County sentencing on August 24, 2007. Id. at 31. This
Court agreed with Hernandez. Id. at 46-47. We observed that,
if jail credit for her total time in pre-sentence custody
applied to the Passaic County sentence, Hernandez would spend
less time imprisoned because the parole ineligibility term would
be reduced. Ibid. Recognizing the inequity of such a scenario,
10 we held that “Hernandez should be entitled to jail credit on the
Passaic County sentence for the time she spent in custody
between her Passaic County arrest and the date sentence was
imposed in Ocean County.” Id. at 47.
In the second case, defendant Derrick Wayne Rose committed
multiple offenses in Union County. Id. at 31. He allegedly
sold controlled dangerous substances (CDS) to undercover
officers in Plainfield on May 4, 2006, and August 14, 2006, but
was not arrested either time. Ibid. On January 26, 2007, Rose
was arrested in connection with a theft in Linden. Ibid. While
incarcerated, Rose was indicted for the CDS offenses: he was
indicted for the first CDS offense on April 26, 2007, and for
the second CDS offense on May 1, 2007. Ibid. Rose was then
charged for the Linden theft on May 31, 2007. Id. at 31-32.
Rose pleaded guilty to charges in all three indictments and
was sentenced on January 18, 2008, to two concurrent five-year
sentences with three years of parole ineligibility for both CDS
offenses, to run consecutively with a four-year sentence for the
theft offense. Ibid. He received one day of jail credit toward
the first CDS offense; no jail credit toward the second CDS
offense; and 357 days of jail credit toward the theft offense,
representing the time between his January 26, 2007, arrest and
his sentencing date. Id. at 33.
11 Rose appealed, asserting that all jail credits should have
been applied toward the three-year parole bar on the two CDS
sentences. Id. at 35. Defense counsel pointed out that by the
time Rose served his three-year parole ineligibility period, he
would be parole eligible regardless of the 357 days of jail
credit applied to his four-year theft sentence. Ibid. This
Court agreed with Rose. Id. at 47-48. We held that in
situations where multiple charges are brought in a single
indictment, “the total amount of jail credit reduces the
aggregate custodial sentence imposed.” Ibid. We sought to
avoid scenarios in which jail credits “might have different
consequences if the same consecutive sentences are embodied in a
single judgment than if they are embodied in separate
indictments and the credits applied only to one” of the
judgments. Id. at 48. We concluded that Rose was entitled to
jail credits against all three offenses. Ibid.
Here, defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and
charged in two separate indictments. He did not make bail and
remained in custody until he was sentenced for both indictments
on August 22, 2012. Altogether, defendant spent 1007 days in
pre-sentence custody. He received 1007 days of jail credit
against the front end of his aggregate sentence.
12 Contrary to defendant’s contentions, Hernandez does not
warrant the application of double jail credit in this case.
Here, unlike the situations presented in Hernandez, defendant
did not suffer any adverse consequences due to the trial court’s
application of jail credit. In Hernandez, supra, neither of the
defendants received the full benefits of the time they spent in
pre-sentence custody. Id. at 29-33. Instead, both defendants
received jail credits that did not fully apply time spent in
pre-sentence custody to their parole ineligibility terms. Ibid.
Those inequitable scenarios warranted the application of jail
credits to all sentences received by both defendants.
In this matter, however, defendant received the optimal
benefits of jail credit for the entire time he spent in
pre-sentence custody. Defendant received 1007 days of jail
credit, reflecting the full time between his arrest and
sentencing. The 1007 days of jail credit were applied to the
Indictment 2 sentences, which carried a parole ineligibility
term. The jail credits reduced both defendant’s aggregate
prison term and his parole ineligibility period. Therefore, the
jail credits were applied to the front end of defendant’s
aggregate sentence. This application of jail credit is
equitable because it maximizes the benefits to defendant.
We understand that some language in Hernandez may have
caused confusion about whether jail credits can reduce sentences
13 on each charge of a consecutive sentence, thereby allowing
defendants to receive jail credit for twice the amount of time
spent in pre-sentence custody. Defendant Hernandez received
concurrent sentences, but the trial court did not provide her
with credit against her parole ineligibility period. Id. at 29.
This Court required that Hernandez’s jail credit apply to her
parole ineligibility period. Id. at 46-47. In contrast,
defendant Rose received both consecutive and concurrent
sentences, but the trial court did not provide him with credit
against his parole ineligibility period. Id. at 32-33. This
Court stated that Rose was “in custody on all three matters [at
the same time] and traditionally entitled to ‘jail credits’ on
all charges thereafter.” Id. at 48. To the extent that
language suggests that a defendant is entitled to jail credits
for time simultaneously spent in custody on each charge for
which he receives a consecutive sentence, we now make clear that
such double credit is not allowed. To hold otherwise would lead
to the perverse result that a defendant held in custody would be
better off than one released on bail or supervision.
Both defendants in Hernandez were entitled to have the full
amount of time spent in pre-sentence custody applied to the
front end of their aggregate sentences. The appropriate course
of action is to view the separate sentences together and apply
jail credit to the front end of the aggregate sentence. This
14 application maximizes the benefits of jail credit for defendants
without awarding double time.
Moreover, the application of 1007 days of jail credit is
consistent with the policy purposes of Hernandez. Crediting
defendant with 1007 days of jail credit does not provide
defendant with “double punishment,” nor does it disadvantage him
for not posting bail. Id. at 36; see also Rawls, supra, 219
N.J. at 193. Rather than disadvantage defendant, the
application of 1007 days of jail credit to the front end of his
aggregate sentence fairly credits him with the entire time spent
in pre-sentence custody. In contrast, the award of double jail
credit would result in disparate real-time sentences for
defendants who can and cannot afford to post bail. If
defendants who cannot post bail are awarded double jail credit
in such scenarios, their real-time sentences will be reduced for
time they did not actually spend in pre-sentence custody. Our
holding in Hernandez, supra, sought to ensure uniformity in
sentencing and does not call for such irregular results. 208
N.J. at 48-49.
In Hernandez, supra, we also cautioned against a system in
which defendants endure different consequences for sentences
imposed on one indictment or on multiple indictments. Id. at
47-48. Noting that such a system would be ripe for manipulation
by prosecutors, we concluded that “[t]he issue of credits simply
15 cannot turn on such happenstance.” Id. at 48. Under the
application of jail credit urged by defendant, such happenstance
would dictate the real-time sentences defendants receive. For
example, if defendant was charged and sentenced to consecutive
prison terms under a single indictment, he would be entitled to
only 1007 days of jail credit for his time in pre-sentence
custody. But, because defendant was sentenced under two
separate indictments, he would be entitled to 2014 days of jail
credit despite spending the same amount of time in custody.
Such a system defies uniformity and leaves too great of
variation to happenstance.
In sum, Hernandez is modified as follows: double credit
should not be awarded where a defendant is sentenced to
consecutive sentences under separate indictments and receives
the optimal benefits of jail credit for time spent in pre-
sentence custody. To the extent that Hernandez has been read
differently with respect to consecutive sentences we do not
follow that approach. Instead, the sentencing court should
treat the sentences as a unified proceeding and maximize the
benefits to the defendant by applying jail credit to the front
end of the imprisonment term. We caution that this holding in
no way alters the applicability of gap-time credits should
sentences be imposed on different dates.
VI.
16 The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the
sentence imposed by the trial court is reinstated.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.