State v. Celaya

2025 Ohio 5246

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 2025-CA-4
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Celaya, 2025-Ohio-5246.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-4 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 012 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas PAUL M. CELAYA : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 21, 2025, the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

LEWIS, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2025-CA-4

BRADLEY D. ANDERSON, Attorney for Appellant JANE A. NAPIER and KARA N. RICHTER, Attorneys for Appellee

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Paul M. Celaya appeals from his convictions in the Champaign County Common

Pleas Court of aggravated possession of drugs and failure to appear. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In February 2024, Celaya was indicted on one count of aggravated possession

of drugs. Following arraignment, he was released on his own recognizance. After Celaya

failed to appear for the final pretrial conference in April of 2024, the trial court issued a

capias. In May 2024, Celaya was indicted on one count of failure to appear in violation of

R.C. 2937.29 and R.C. 2937.99(A). Celaya did not appear again in court until he was

arrested in November 2024 following a traffic stop in Englewood.

{¶ 3} This matter proceeded to a jury trial during which the State presented the

testimony of Champaign County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Fischer. Fischer was on routine patrol

on January 18, 2024, when at approximately 11:38 p.m., he observed a vehicle driving

toward him with a non-working headlight. Fischer initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle and

approached the driver, Celaya. While speaking with Celaya, Fischer noticed a “butane torch-

style lighter laying on the passenger seat, and then under the radio was a compartment that

had numerous Q-tips in the compartment.” Fischer testified that butane lighters are “typically

used for drug use because it burns hotter than a normal lighter,” and drug users “will take

2 the cotton off the [Q-tip] and use that as a filter for the drugs that they’re drawing into a

syringe."

{¶ 4} During the encounter, Fischer learned that Celaya was on his way to pick up a

female friend named Rusty Smith. Fischer testified that a BOLO alert had been issued for

Rusty Smith, who was wanted by law enforcement in connection with a stolen car and “active

warrants out of Champaign County.”1

{¶ 5} Fischer asked Celaya to step out of his vehicle so that he could have his K-9

perform a free-air sniff of the car. According to Fischer, the K-9 alerted at the driver’s door.

Fischer then searched the car and saw a “glass owl that was filled with water tucked between

the [driver’s] seat and the console.” The owl was not completely visible, and Fischer did not

remove it from its location. Fischer believed the owl was a “marijuana bong.” Fischer then

spoke with Celaya about helping him locate Smith. Celaya indicated that he did not want to

do so. Fischer released Celaya because he was not in possession of felony-level drugs.

{¶ 6} Approximately 40 minutes later, Fischer encountered Celaya at a local gas

station. Fischer “thought . . . [Celaya] could have gone back to pick [Rusty] up.” Fischer

entered the gas station convenience store to look for Rusty, but she was not in the store.

Fischer exited and approached the passenger door of Celaya’s vehicle. Celaya rolled the

window down. Fischer again saw the owl he had noticed earlier, now in plain view in the

passenger seat. Fischer testified that he “instantly recognized it as a meth pipe” because he

“could see the globe on the pipe . . . and it had a white and red residue consistent with

methamphetamine.” Fischer searched the vehicle again, collected the pipe, and released

Celaya.

1 BOLO is an acronym for “be on the lookout.”

3 {¶ 7} The parties stipulated that the glass pipe contained methamphetamine residue.

The State’s evidence revealed that Celaya completed an “own recognizance bond form”

stating that he was required to appear at all court hearings and that failure to do so would

render the bond void. The State’s evidence indicated that Celaya was in court when the

judge set a date for the final pre-trial hearing and the trial. The State’s evidence further

indicated that Celaya had failed to appear for the final pre-trial hearing.

{¶ 8} Celaya testified that he was driving to pick up a female friend when he was

pulled over by Fischer. Celaya testified Fischer asked him to help locate Rusty Smith, but

he denied the request. Fischer had his K-9 conduct a sniff of the vehicle. Celaya maintained

that the K-9 failed to alert, and at the time, he had pointed out the failure to Fischer. Celaya

claimed that Fischer “did not like” his statement so he forced the dog back to the vehicle and

pretended that the K-9 had alerted. Celaya testified that Fischer searched his vehicle,

located the “weed bong,” and stated that he “did not give a shit” about it. After Fischer

released Celaya, he went to a gas station where he again encountered Fischer. Celaya

testified that Fischer approached the passenger side of his vehicle and asked him if Rusty

Smith was with him. Fischer then looked down at the bong and stated, “I did not realize that

was a meth bong.” Fischer took the bong and allowed Celaya to leave. As for Celaya’s failure

to appear for his final pretrial conference, Celaya said that he had not intended to miss his

court date. Celaya testified that he had worked late the night before and accidentally slept

through the hearing time.

{¶ 9} The jury found Celaya guilty of both charges. The trial court imposed an

aggregate prison term of 28 months. Celaya appeals.

4 II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 10} Celaya’s assignment of error states:

APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE

WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

{¶ 11} Celaya asserts his convictions should be reversed because his attorney

provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

{¶ 12} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel under the

two-part analysis found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which the Ohio

Supreme Court adopted in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). To prevail on an

ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must show trial counsel rendered deficient

performance and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland at

paragraph two of the syllabus; Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 13} Courts determine deficient performance by asking whether counsel's conduct

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland at 688. When making this

determination, counsel’s conduct must be judged based on “the facts of the particular case,

viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 690. Only when counsel’s errors were “so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment” has counsel engaged in deficient performance. Id. at 687.

{¶ 14} To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Id. at 694. This requires the errors to be so significant as to “undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. The failure to make a showing of either prong of the

Strickland inquiry is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance. Id. at 692.

5 {¶ 15} Celaya first claims trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present a

“coherent defense” to the charge of aggravated possession of drugs. In support, he contends

counsel did not present evidence to dispute any of the elements of the offense and that

counsel, instead, argued merely that it was unfair for Fischer to get a “do-over” or second

“go-around” at seizing the pipe.

{¶ 16} Counsel’s defense to the drug possession count was an attack on Fischer’s

credibility regarding the two encounters with Celaya and the seizure of the pipe during the

second encounter. This attack was accomplished through counsel’s cross-examination of

Fischer and Celaya’s direct testimony.

{¶ 17} Regardless of the effectiveness of this defense, we cannot agree, especially

in light of the “hand counsel was dealt,” that the defense was incoherent or that it was

improper trial strategy. We do not conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient.

{¶ 18} Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable assistance. State v. Dunn, 2024-Ohio-600, ¶ 19

(2d Dist.). “Debatable strategic and tactical decisions may not form the basis of a claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel, even if, in hindsight, it looks as if a better strategy had

been available.” State v. Hall, 2021-Ohio-1894, ¶ 55 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio

St.3d 516, 524 (1992). This court will not second-guess decisions of counsel that may be

considered matters of strategy. Id., citing State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98 (1985).

{¶ 19} Celaya also contends counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to

suppress evidence discovered during his two encounters with Fischer.

{¶ 20} “[F]ailure to file a motion to suppress is not per se ineffective assistance of

counsel.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing Kimmelman v. Morrison,

477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). Rather, to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for failure

6 to file a motion to suppress, a defendant must “establish that a basis existed to suppress”

the evidence in question. State v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-5845, ¶ 35. “‘Thus, the failure to file a

motion to suppress constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel only when the record

establishes that the motion would have been successful if made.’” State v. Geralds, 2025-

Ohio-2209, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Rosemond, 2019-Ohio-5356, ¶ 34 (1st Dist.).

“[E]ven when some evidence in the record supports a motion to suppress,” an appellate

court will presume that defense counsel was effective if “counsel could reasonably have

decided that the motion to suppress would have been futile.” State v. Brown, 2002-Ohio-

5455, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). Accord State v. Edwards, 1996 WL 388761, *2 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 21} With respect to the first encounter, the traffic stop, Celaya claims his attorney

should have challenged whether the K-9 unit was properly certified and trained for drug

detection. Celaya further asserts the record established a dispute as to whether the K-9

alerted during the open-air sniff of the vehicle. Specifically, Celaya testified the dog failed to

“hit” on his car but Fischer “grabbed his dog by the collar and forced him on my car . . . acting

like he hit. But the dog didn’t hit.” He argues that “challenging the dog’s alert” in a motion to

suppress “could have resulted in the suppression of the probable cause search of the vehicle

and the deputy’s observations during that search, including the discovery of the ‘bong.’”

{¶ 22} With respect to the second encounter at the gas station, Celaya argues that

Fischer had no probable cause for confiscating the pipe. In support, he claims the encounter

was not consensual but rather was “effectively a stop.”

{¶ 23} We begin with the second encounter and note that the Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and

seizures. State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 747 (2d Dist. 1995). This protection,

however, is not implicated in every interaction an individual has with a police officer. State

7 v. Schott, 1997 WL 254141, *2 (2d Dist.). “The law recognizes three types of police-citizen

interactions: 1) a consensual encounter, 2) a brief investigatory stop or detention, and 3) an

arrest.” State v. Millerton, 2015-Ohio-34, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 24} A consensual encounter occurs when “the police merely approach a person in

a public place, engage the person in conversation, request information, and the person is

free not to answer and walk away.” Taylor at 747. Consensual encounters are not seizures,

and the Fourth Amendment guarantees are not implicated in such an encounter. Id. at 747-

748. “Whether a particular police encounter with a citizen is an investigative stop, as

opposed to a consensual encounter, is fact-sensitive.” State v. Weisgarber, 2017-Ohio-

8764, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). “[T]he focus is on the police officer's conduct, not the subjective state

of mind of the person stopped.” Id. at ¶ 18, citing State v. Ramey, 2016-Ohio-607, ¶ 25

(2d Dist.).

{¶ 25} This court has previously held that approaching and questioning people seated

in a parked vehicle does not constitute a seizure so as to require an officer to have a

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Williams, 2010-Ohio-4277, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.),

quoting Schott at *3.

{¶ 26} Here, Fischer was at the gas station and noticed Celaya’s car sitting at the

pumps. Fischer walked up to Celaya’s passenger window, and Celaya rolled down the

window. Fischer saw the entire owl plainly visible on the passenger seat and realized that it

was a meth bong. According to Fischer, he told Celaya that he initially thought the owl was

a marijuana bong and had not realized it was a meth pipe. He then collected the pipe.

Celaya’s testimony did not rebut or challenge this testimony except to add that Fischer again

asked him about Rusty. Celaya indicated only he had felt “harassed” and “nervous.”

8 {¶ 27} As conceded by Celaya, he was sitting in his vehicle in a public space when

Fischer approached him. Celaya does not dispute that the meth pipe was in plain view and

visible to Fischer without a search. There simply is nothing to support the claim that this

constituted a stop. The mere fact that Celaya felt nervous or “harassed” was not a sufficient

basis to find that a stop had occurred.

{¶ 28} On this record we find no basis upon which Celaya’s counsel could have filed

a motion to suppress. Celaya’s counsel was not ineffective in declining to pursue

suppression of the meth pipe that Fischer saw in plain view during his consensual encounter

with Celaya.

{¶ 29} Based on our conclusion in relation to Fischer’s second encounter with Celaya,

even if counsel had performed deficiently by failing to file a motion to suppress regarding

the first encounter, Celaya cannot demonstrate prejudice. Regardless of the propriety of the

first search, Fischer’s lawful recovery of the pipe during the second encounter provided the

only evidence required to charge and convict Celaya of aggravated possession of drugs.

Celaya has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel related to either of his

interactions with Fischer.

{¶ 30} Finally, Celaya claims counsel was deficient because he failed to present any

defense to the charge of failure to appear.

{¶ 31} The transcript establishes that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove

the offense. During the State’s cross-examination of Celaya, he testified that he had missed

the court appearance because he had overslept due to having been required to work late

the night before. Celaya added that he had not intended to miss the hearing.

{¶ 32} The transcript demonstrates that Celaya’s trial counsel informed the court that

the decision not to question Celaya about the offense and the omission of any mention of

9 the offense from the defense’s opening statement and closing argument were matters of trial

strategy discussed with Celaya. Celaya addressed the court at the time defense counsel

made this statement and did not raise any claim to the contrary.

{¶ 33} We are not privy to the reasoning behind this strategy, but it is quite possible

that counsel simply had concluded that he could not present a good faith defense to the

charge. In any event, this record does not permit a finding that counsel was ineffective.

{¶ 34} Because Celaya has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

deficient or that any deficient performance resulted in prejudice, his assignment of error is

overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 35} Having overruled Celaya’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

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LEWIS, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.