IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) Case Nos.: 2102001459 ) 2301009216 CEDRIC SAYLOR, ) ) Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Joinder:
DENIED
SUBMITTED: September 11, 2023 DECIDED: September 12, 2023
Diana A. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, of THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.
Ashley Callaway, Esquire, and Erika LaCon, Esquire, of THE DELAWARE OFFICE OF DEFENSE SERVICES, Wilmington, Delaware, for Cedric Saylor.
JONES, J. INTRODUCTION This motion for relief from joinder brought by Defendant Cedric Saylor requires the
Court to perform an analysis to determine if separate Sexual Abuse charges involving two
minors should be separately tried together. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that
the “common scheme or plan” requirement for a proper joinder of offenses under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 8(a) has been met in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Saylor’s motion
must be DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW Cedric Saylor (“Defendant”) has been indicted by a Grand Jury in a single
indictment for multiple sex crimes against two different victims, both of which are his
minor daughters. Defendant has moved to sever Counts I through IX from Counts X
through VII. Counts I through IX involve J.S., with a date of birth of February 20, 2010.
The charges for Counts I through IX are First Degree Rape, Second Degree Rape,
Attempted Rape First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact, Sexual Abuse of a Child by a
Person in a Position of Trust, Authority, or Supervision, and Continuous Sexual Abuse of
a Child Over a Period of Time from 2014 to 2022. Counts X through XII involve A.S.,
with a date of birth of November 19, 2006, and involve one incident alleged to have
occurred sometime between July 6, 2019, and July 9, 2019. The charges for Counts X
though XII are Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree and Sexual Abuse of a Child by a
Person in a Position of Trust, Authority, or Supervision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) provides that two or more offenses may be
2 charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged are of the same or similar character.1 The purpose of this rule is to
promote judicial economy and efficiency.2 The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating substantial injustice and unfair prejudice from a denial of a motion to
sever.3 Mere hypothetical prejudice from denial is not sufficient.4 The plain fact that the
crimes were separate and were committed against different individuals, with a lapse of
time between them, does not require severance.5 Ultimately, the Court must balance the
rights of the accused against the legitimate concern for judicial economy.6
In Weist v. State, 542 A.2d 1193 (Del. 1988), the Delaware Supreme Court
identified three forms of prejudice that a criminal defendant may suffer as a result of
improper joinder of offenses: (1) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various
crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find; (2) the
jury may use evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the
defendant in order to find guilt of the other crime or crimes; and (3) the defendant may be
subject to embarrassment or confusion in presenting different and separate defenses to
different charges.7
ANALYSIS Defendant claims that he will suffer the second type of prejudice if the counts are
1 Del.Super.Ct. Crim.R., Rule 8(a). 2 Mayer v. State, 320 A.2nd 713 (Del. 1974); State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629 (Del. Super. 2023). 3 Bates v State, 386 A.2nd 1139, 1141 (Del. 1978); Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785 (Del. 1983); State v. Allen, 2003 WL 2327795 (Del. Super. 2003). 4 Bates v. State, 386 A.2d at 1142; Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546 (Del. 1985). 5 Skinner v State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Del. 1990). 6 Mayer v State, 320 A.2nd 713, 717 (Del. 1974). 7 Wiest v. State, 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988).
3 not severed; namely that the jury may use evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general
criminal disposition of the Defendant in order to find guilt.
In responding to the Defendant’s request to sever, the State maintains that all the
offenses are of the same general character, involved a similar course of conduct, and
occurred at the same location. The State also maintains that the offenses are “inextricably
intertwined.”8
The multiple offenses allege similar sexual acts committed by Defendant against his
minor daughters. The state has proffered that both victims and a third witness would testify
at each trial, even if the cases were severed. The proffer is that the abuse is alleged to have
occurred at the Defendant’s resident where all three girls would visit and spend the night
regularly. Each will testify about the defendant’s actions against them. The investigations
as to each victim involve significant overlap as it is alleged all of the children were present
in the home together when some of the offenses would have occurred. Additionally, the
offenses span a time frame that overlap. The multiple offenses charged in this
indictment “are of the same general character and involve a similar course of conduct such
that is it proper to try them together.9
Additional consideration must be given to the fact that these are cases involving
allegations of late reported child sexual abuse. This Court has considered this factor in
deciding similar motions. In State v. Boughner, the defendant was charged with committing
various sexual acts against four minors.10 During the investigation, one of the victims
8 State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629. 9 State v. Ferinden, 2018 WL 2684069 (Del. Super. 2018); State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629. 10 1995 WL 19200095 (Del. Super. 1995).
4 identified another potential victim.11 The defendant moved to sever, arguing that the jury
would cumulate the evidence and infer a general criminal disposition to find guilt. In
Boughner, the Court talked about the challenges of a late reported sexual abuse case which
lacked physical evidence. This Court denied severance in Boughner where the crimes
against each child were so inextricably intertwined as to make the proof of one crime
impossible without proof of the other.12
In State v. Ferinden, this Court recognized that the credibility of the witnesses
becomes paramount in a late reported minor abuse case, elevating the State’s need to
present as to how the investigations unfolded and how one victim identified another.13
There, the Superior Court denied Defendant’s motion for relief from joinder because both
offenses, although different victims, were of the “same general character, involving a
similar course of conduct and taking place within a relatively brief span of time.”14
This is a late reported child abuse case. The facts presented in both Boughner and
Ferinden are present in instant case. As in Boughner, this is a late reported sexual abuse
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) Case Nos.: 2102001459 ) 2301009216 CEDRIC SAYLOR, ) ) Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Joinder:
DENIED
SUBMITTED: September 11, 2023 DECIDED: September 12, 2023
Diana A. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, of THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.
Ashley Callaway, Esquire, and Erika LaCon, Esquire, of THE DELAWARE OFFICE OF DEFENSE SERVICES, Wilmington, Delaware, for Cedric Saylor.
JONES, J. INTRODUCTION This motion for relief from joinder brought by Defendant Cedric Saylor requires the
Court to perform an analysis to determine if separate Sexual Abuse charges involving two
minors should be separately tried together. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that
the “common scheme or plan” requirement for a proper joinder of offenses under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 8(a) has been met in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Saylor’s motion
must be DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW Cedric Saylor (“Defendant”) has been indicted by a Grand Jury in a single
indictment for multiple sex crimes against two different victims, both of which are his
minor daughters. Defendant has moved to sever Counts I through IX from Counts X
through VII. Counts I through IX involve J.S., with a date of birth of February 20, 2010.
The charges for Counts I through IX are First Degree Rape, Second Degree Rape,
Attempted Rape First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact, Sexual Abuse of a Child by a
Person in a Position of Trust, Authority, or Supervision, and Continuous Sexual Abuse of
a Child Over a Period of Time from 2014 to 2022. Counts X through XII involve A.S.,
with a date of birth of November 19, 2006, and involve one incident alleged to have
occurred sometime between July 6, 2019, and July 9, 2019. The charges for Counts X
though XII are Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree and Sexual Abuse of a Child by a
Person in a Position of Trust, Authority, or Supervision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) provides that two or more offenses may be
2 charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged are of the same or similar character.1 The purpose of this rule is to
promote judicial economy and efficiency.2 The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating substantial injustice and unfair prejudice from a denial of a motion to
sever.3 Mere hypothetical prejudice from denial is not sufficient.4 The plain fact that the
crimes were separate and were committed against different individuals, with a lapse of
time between them, does not require severance.5 Ultimately, the Court must balance the
rights of the accused against the legitimate concern for judicial economy.6
In Weist v. State, 542 A.2d 1193 (Del. 1988), the Delaware Supreme Court
identified three forms of prejudice that a criminal defendant may suffer as a result of
improper joinder of offenses: (1) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various
crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find; (2) the
jury may use evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the
defendant in order to find guilt of the other crime or crimes; and (3) the defendant may be
subject to embarrassment or confusion in presenting different and separate defenses to
different charges.7
ANALYSIS Defendant claims that he will suffer the second type of prejudice if the counts are
1 Del.Super.Ct. Crim.R., Rule 8(a). 2 Mayer v. State, 320 A.2nd 713 (Del. 1974); State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629 (Del. Super. 2023). 3 Bates v State, 386 A.2nd 1139, 1141 (Del. 1978); Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785 (Del. 1983); State v. Allen, 2003 WL 2327795 (Del. Super. 2003). 4 Bates v. State, 386 A.2d at 1142; Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546 (Del. 1985). 5 Skinner v State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Del. 1990). 6 Mayer v State, 320 A.2nd 713, 717 (Del. 1974). 7 Wiest v. State, 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988).
3 not severed; namely that the jury may use evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general
criminal disposition of the Defendant in order to find guilt.
In responding to the Defendant’s request to sever, the State maintains that all the
offenses are of the same general character, involved a similar course of conduct, and
occurred at the same location. The State also maintains that the offenses are “inextricably
intertwined.”8
The multiple offenses allege similar sexual acts committed by Defendant against his
minor daughters. The state has proffered that both victims and a third witness would testify
at each trial, even if the cases were severed. The proffer is that the abuse is alleged to have
occurred at the Defendant’s resident where all three girls would visit and spend the night
regularly. Each will testify about the defendant’s actions against them. The investigations
as to each victim involve significant overlap as it is alleged all of the children were present
in the home together when some of the offenses would have occurred. Additionally, the
offenses span a time frame that overlap. The multiple offenses charged in this
indictment “are of the same general character and involve a similar course of conduct such
that is it proper to try them together.9
Additional consideration must be given to the fact that these are cases involving
allegations of late reported child sexual abuse. This Court has considered this factor in
deciding similar motions. In State v. Boughner, the defendant was charged with committing
various sexual acts against four minors.10 During the investigation, one of the victims
8 State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629. 9 State v. Ferinden, 2018 WL 2684069 (Del. Super. 2018); State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629. 10 1995 WL 19200095 (Del. Super. 1995).
4 identified another potential victim.11 The defendant moved to sever, arguing that the jury
would cumulate the evidence and infer a general criminal disposition to find guilt. In
Boughner, the Court talked about the challenges of a late reported sexual abuse case which
lacked physical evidence. This Court denied severance in Boughner where the crimes
against each child were so inextricably intertwined as to make the proof of one crime
impossible without proof of the other.12
In State v. Ferinden, this Court recognized that the credibility of the witnesses
becomes paramount in a late reported minor abuse case, elevating the State’s need to
present as to how the investigations unfolded and how one victim identified another.13
There, the Superior Court denied Defendant’s motion for relief from joinder because both
offenses, although different victims, were of the “same general character, involving a
similar course of conduct and taking place within a relatively brief span of time.”14
This is a late reported child abuse case. The facts presented in both Boughner and
Ferinden are present in instant case. As in Boughner, this is a late reported sexual abuse
case where there is a lack of physical evidence, and the credibility of the victims is essential
to the determination of guilty. Similarly to Ferinden, in the instant case, the affidavit of
probable cause makes it clear that police learned of the actions against J.S. during the
course of the investigation of the matters involving A.S. These cases are inextricably
intertwined and should be tried by one jury.
11 Id. at 2. 12 Id. at 4. 13 Id. 14 Id. at 5.
5 Defendant maintains that application of the factors in Getz v. State require
severance.15 This court disagrees. The evidence of the various incidents is material in
showing intent, modus operandi, opportunity, and identity. The evidence is material to the
issues in the case; the evidence is introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b)
(Intent, modus operandi, opportunity, and intent); the evidence will be proved by plain,
clear and conclusive proof; the acts are not too remote in time; and the probative value of
the evidence outweighs the prejudice. With respect to this last factor, the evidence is
disputed; the proof of the prior conduct is adequate; the probative force of the evidence is
obvious; the state needs the evidence to explain the late reporting and the course of the
investigation; there is no other available proof; there is similarity of the prior wrong to the
charged offense; and an appropriate limiting instruction will be given.
CONCLUSION
The Court is satisfied that the common scheme or plan requirement for a proper
joinder of offenses under Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) has been met in this case.
Further, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced by such
joinder.16 The counts have independent logical relevance on the issue of intent, modus
operandi, opportunity, and identity. The probative value of trying these counts together is
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court will instruct the
jury that it may not infer a general criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from
the multiple charges and that the jury is not to accumulate evidence present on these
15 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 16 Super.Ct. Crim.R., Rule 14.
6 offenses in order to justify a finding of guilt as to the particular offenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr. Francis J. Jones Jr., Judge
Original to Prothonotary