State v. Ceasar

149 So. 3d 301, 14 La.App. 3 Cir. 141, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2341, 2014 WL 4851746
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 1, 2014
DocketNo. 14-141
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 149 So. 3d 301 (State v. Ceasar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Ceasar, 149 So. 3d 301, 14 La.App. 3 Cir. 141, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2341, 2014 WL 4851746 (La. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

PICKETT, Judge.

| .FACTS

On July 28,- 2010, the defendant, Coby Quinton Ceasar shot and killed his stepfather, Patrick Myles, at his mother’s home at 628 Dixy Drive in Lake Charles.

The defendant was indicted for second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, on September 16, 2010. On June 27, 2013, a jury unanimously found the defendant guilty as charged. The trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on July 15, 2013.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On appeal, the defendant asserts one assignment of error:

The State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the verdict of second degree murder.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court [303]*303for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent.

The defendant contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support the verdict of second degree murder. He argues the state failed to show he was not acting in self-defense when he shot the victim.

State ex reí D.P.B., 02-1742, pp. 4-6 (La.5/20/03), 846 So.2d 753, 756-57 (footnote omitted), sets forth the standard of review by an appellate court when the defendant in a homicide case asserts a claim of self-defense:

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard |2enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).... [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984).... Furthermore, in a case in which defendant asserts that he acted in self-defense, the state has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 726, 728 (La.1982). When defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in such a case, the question becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. State v. Matthews, 464 So.2d 298 (La.1985).

Second degree murder is defined as the killing of a human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La.R.S. 14:30.1. The defendant claims the murder was committed in self-defense. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:20(A)(1) defines justifiable homicide:

A homicide is justifiable:

(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.

In State v. Patterson, 10-415, p. 13 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 63 So.3d 140, 149, writ denied, 11-338 (La.6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1037, the fifth circuit noted:

The determination of a defendant’s culpability rests on a two-fold test: 1) whether, given the facts presented, the defendant could reasonably have believed his life to be in imminent danger; and 2) whether deadly force was necessary to prevent the danger. [State v.] Theriot, 07-71 at 12, [La.App 5 Cir. 6/26/07),] 963 So.2d [1012] at 1020. The jury is the ultimate fact-finder in determining whether a defendant proved his condition and whether the State negated the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Theriot, 07-71 at 13, 963 So.2d at 1020.

Further, discussing self-defense in a second degree murder conviction, this court held:

[¡¡The standard in La.R.S. 14:20 is whether the Defendant’s subjective belief that he was in danger was reasonable. State v. Brown, 93-1471 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94), 640 So.2d 488.
Factors to consider in determining whether a defendant had a reasonable belief that the killing was necessary are the excitement and confusion of [304]*304the situation, the possibility of using force or violence short of killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of the assailant’s bad character. State v. Hardeman, 467 So.2d 1163 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985).- Although there is no unqualified duty to retreat, the possibility of escape is a factor to consider in determining whether a defendant had a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to avoid the danger. State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 726 (La.1982).
State v. Spivey, 38,243, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/12/04), 874 So.2d 352, 357.
In cases where the defendant claims self-defense as a justification, the absence of a weapon from the victim’s person or immediate reach is often a critical element of the state’s proof. See State v. Davis, 28,662 (La.App.2d Cir.9/25/96), 680 So.2d 1296.... The absence of [a] weapon on the victim, however, is not dispositive of the issue.
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State in Interest of D.S., 29,554, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir.' 5/7/97), 694 So.2d 565, 567.

State v. Griffin, 06-543, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So.2d 845, 851, writ denied, 07-2 (La.9/14/07), 963 So.2d 995.

In the matter before us, the police answered a dispatch call to 628 Dixy Drive at 12:04 a.m. on July 28, 2010, in response to a shooting. They found Patrick Myles, the defendant’s stepfather, inside a bedroom, lying on the lower level of a trundle bed on the ground with blood underneath him and no pulse.

|4Talisha Myles and her son, Patrick Myles, Jr. (“P.J.”), identified the defendant, also her son, as the shooter. Talisha described the clothing the defendant was wearing and advised he was armed with a handgun.

Around 6:15 a.m. on July 28, after a call from Talisha advising police the defendant was at her house, a SWAT team went into the residence and found wet clothing matching the earlier description of what the defendant was wearing when he left the crime scene. The defendant, however, was gone. Around 11:15 that morning, Nina Jones, the victim’s sister, advised police the defendant was at her residence at 620 Dixy Drive. The detective division and the SWAT team returned to the area. They apprehended the defendant, whom Detective Franklin Fondel of the Lake Charles Police Department identified at trial, inside the residence, under a box spring mattress in a back bedroom.

Detective Fondel’s offense report indicated that on the scene P.J. told the detective he saw his father and the defendant “fighting in the bedroom,” and he went to his mother’s bedroom to tell her. He then ran to Ms. Jones’s residence. On his way back to 628 Dixy Drive, Detective Fondel saw the defendant leave the residence. Detective Fondel agreed that if P.J. saw the defendant exit his house as he was coming from his aunt’s house, he could not have witnessed the shooting.

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Related

State v. Ceasar
224 So. 3d 1226 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
149 So. 3d 301, 14 La.App. 3 Cir. 141, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2341, 2014 WL 4851746, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ceasar-lactapp-2014.