[Cite as State v. Catlin, 2026-Ohio-2380.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0127
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0378 BRYAN L. CATLIN, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 23, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee; KRISTOPHER K. HILL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Bryan L. Catlin, appeals his sentence following his plea in the
Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. The appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On October 24, 2025, the appellant entered pleas of guilty to one count of
Kidnapping, as amended, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), one count of Domestic
Violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) with an accompanying firearm specification
under R.C. 2941.145(A), one count of Obstructing Official Business in violation of R.C.
2921.31(A) with an accompanying firearm specification, one count of Improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1), and one count of
Using Weapons while Intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15(A). Pursuant to plea negotiations, the State moved to dismiss the Rape charges. The trial court granted the
State’s motion to dismiss.
{¶3} On November 5, 2025, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The trial court
allowed the victim to read a victim-impact statement on the record. The court also advised
the appellant of his violent-offender registration duties based on the kidnapping
conviction.
{¶4} The trial court stated on the record that it had received and thoroughly
reviewed the presentence-investigation report. The court further stated it reviewed the
plea form and the appellant’s possible minimum and maximum sentences; the official
version of the offense as reflected in the PSI; the appellant’s letter; the appellant’s family,
work, relationship, substance-use, and mental-health history; the appellant’s criminal
history, the victim’s written letter and oral statement; letters submitted on the appellant’s
behalf; and the appellant’s assistance to correction officers while he was incarcerated in
the Licking County Jail.
{¶5} During sentencing, the trial court stated: “And I agree with Mr. Hill, you
have not been convicted, you’re not being sentenced for any of the rape charges or any
sexual assault, but you are being convicted of domestic violence and kidnapping.” The
trial court then stated that the kidnapping was “for the purpose of engaging in sexual
activity.” The prosecutor immediately corrected the court, explaining that the kidnapping
charge had been amended to involve terrorizing the victim. The trial court thanked the
prosecutor and continued with its sentencing comments.
{¶6} The trial court ordered Counts Four, Six, and Seven to be served
consecutively, and ordered the firearm specification to be served consecutively to the
remaining counts. Counts Five and Eight were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and concurrently with the remaining counts. The aggregate sentence was a
minimum prison term of sixteen years, four years of which were mandatory, with an
indefinite maximum term of twenty-one and one-half years.
{¶7} In its sentencing entry, the trial court stated it considered the record, all
statements, any victim-impact statement, the plea recommendation, the principles and
purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors
under R.C. 2929.12. The trial court also made consecutive-sentence findings under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4), finding that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public
from future crime or to punish the appellant, were not disproportionate to the seriousness
of the appellant’s conduct and the danger the appellant posed to the public, and that at
least two offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct and the harm
caused by two or more offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term
adequately reflected the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct.
{¶8} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raises the following sole
assignment of error:
{¶9} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ONLY GIVING CURSORY ATTENTION
TO THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN R.C. 2929.12; WHILE BASING SENTENCING ON
UNCHARGED AND DISMISSED ALLEGED CONDUCT.”
I.
{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial court
erred by giving only cursory attention to the seriousness and recidivism factors and by
basing its sentence on uncharged and dismissed conduct. We disagree. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶11} We review felony sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). An appellate court
may vacate or modify a felony sentence only if it clearly and convincingly finds either that
the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under the enumerated
statutes, or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-
1002, ¶23. “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is
more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty
as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).
{¶12} A sentence is not contrary to law when it falls within the statutory range.
The trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11,
and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and the trial court has
complied with all applicable sentencing requirements. State v. Morris, 2021-Ohio-2646,
¶90 (5th Dist.), rev’d on other grounds, 2022-Ohio-4609.
ANALYSIS
{¶13} The appellant argues that the trial court gave only cursory attention to R.C.
2929.12 and improperly sentenced him based upon uncharged or dismissed conduct. The
appellant focuses on the trial court’s statement at sentencing that the kidnapping was “for
the purpose of engaging in sexual activity.” The appellant notes the kidnapping count had
been amended, and the rape charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. He
therefore maintains that the trial court relied upon an improper sentencing factor.
{¶14} The trial court expressly stated in its sentencing entry that it considered the
record, all statements, any victim-impact statement, the plea recommendation, the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and
recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. A trial court’s statement that it considered R.C.
2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 is sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the statutes. State
v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶20.
{¶15} The sentencing transcript also demonstrates that the trial court gave more
than cursory attention to R.C. 2929.12. The trial court stated it reviewed the PSI
thoroughly, the plea form, the appellant’s possible sentencing ranges, the official version
in the PSI, the appellant’s letter, family history, work history, relationship history,
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[Cite as State v. Catlin, 2026-Ohio-2380.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0127
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0378 BRYAN L. CATLIN, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 23, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee; KRISTOPHER K. HILL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Bryan L. Catlin, appeals his sentence following his plea in the
Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. The appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On October 24, 2025, the appellant entered pleas of guilty to one count of
Kidnapping, as amended, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), one count of Domestic
Violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) with an accompanying firearm specification
under R.C. 2941.145(A), one count of Obstructing Official Business in violation of R.C.
2921.31(A) with an accompanying firearm specification, one count of Improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1), and one count of
Using Weapons while Intoxicated in violation of R.C. 2923.15(A). Pursuant to plea negotiations, the State moved to dismiss the Rape charges. The trial court granted the
State’s motion to dismiss.
{¶3} On November 5, 2025, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The trial court
allowed the victim to read a victim-impact statement on the record. The court also advised
the appellant of his violent-offender registration duties based on the kidnapping
conviction.
{¶4} The trial court stated on the record that it had received and thoroughly
reviewed the presentence-investigation report. The court further stated it reviewed the
plea form and the appellant’s possible minimum and maximum sentences; the official
version of the offense as reflected in the PSI; the appellant’s letter; the appellant’s family,
work, relationship, substance-use, and mental-health history; the appellant’s criminal
history, the victim’s written letter and oral statement; letters submitted on the appellant’s
behalf; and the appellant’s assistance to correction officers while he was incarcerated in
the Licking County Jail.
{¶5} During sentencing, the trial court stated: “And I agree with Mr. Hill, you
have not been convicted, you’re not being sentenced for any of the rape charges or any
sexual assault, but you are being convicted of domestic violence and kidnapping.” The
trial court then stated that the kidnapping was “for the purpose of engaging in sexual
activity.” The prosecutor immediately corrected the court, explaining that the kidnapping
charge had been amended to involve terrorizing the victim. The trial court thanked the
prosecutor and continued with its sentencing comments.
{¶6} The trial court ordered Counts Four, Six, and Seven to be served
consecutively, and ordered the firearm specification to be served consecutively to the
remaining counts. Counts Five and Eight were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and concurrently with the remaining counts. The aggregate sentence was a
minimum prison term of sixteen years, four years of which were mandatory, with an
indefinite maximum term of twenty-one and one-half years.
{¶7} In its sentencing entry, the trial court stated it considered the record, all
statements, any victim-impact statement, the plea recommendation, the principles and
purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors
under R.C. 2929.12. The trial court also made consecutive-sentence findings under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4), finding that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public
from future crime or to punish the appellant, were not disproportionate to the seriousness
of the appellant’s conduct and the danger the appellant posed to the public, and that at
least two offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct and the harm
caused by two or more offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term
adequately reflected the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct.
{¶8} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raises the following sole
assignment of error:
{¶9} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ONLY GIVING CURSORY ATTENTION
TO THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN R.C. 2929.12; WHILE BASING SENTENCING ON
UNCHARGED AND DISMISSED ALLEGED CONDUCT.”
I.
{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial court
erred by giving only cursory attention to the seriousness and recidivism factors and by
basing its sentence on uncharged and dismissed conduct. We disagree. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶11} We review felony sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). An appellate court
may vacate or modify a felony sentence only if it clearly and convincingly finds either that
the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under the enumerated
statutes, or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-
1002, ¶23. “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is
more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty
as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).
{¶12} A sentence is not contrary to law when it falls within the statutory range.
The trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11,
and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and the trial court has
complied with all applicable sentencing requirements. State v. Morris, 2021-Ohio-2646,
¶90 (5th Dist.), rev’d on other grounds, 2022-Ohio-4609.
ANALYSIS
{¶13} The appellant argues that the trial court gave only cursory attention to R.C.
2929.12 and improperly sentenced him based upon uncharged or dismissed conduct. The
appellant focuses on the trial court’s statement at sentencing that the kidnapping was “for
the purpose of engaging in sexual activity.” The appellant notes the kidnapping count had
been amended, and the rape charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. He
therefore maintains that the trial court relied upon an improper sentencing factor.
{¶14} The trial court expressly stated in its sentencing entry that it considered the
record, all statements, any victim-impact statement, the plea recommendation, the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and
recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. A trial court’s statement that it considered R.C.
2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 is sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the statutes. State
v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶20.
{¶15} The sentencing transcript also demonstrates that the trial court gave more
than cursory attention to R.C. 2929.12. The trial court stated it reviewed the PSI
thoroughly, the plea form, the appellant’s possible sentencing ranges, the official version
in the PSI, the appellant’s letter, family history, work history, relationship history,
substance-use history, mental-health history, criminal history, the victim’s written and
oral statements, letters submitted on the appellant’s behalf, and the appellant’s conduct
while incarcerated in the Licking County Jail. The record, therefore, does not support the
appellant’s contention that the trial court gave only cursory attention to the relevant
statutory considerations.
{¶16} Nor do we find the sentence contrary to law based upon the trial court’s brief
misstatement concerning the amended kidnapping count. The trial court expressly
acknowledged, before making the challenged statement, that the appellant had not been
convicted of rape or sexual assault and was not being sentenced for those offenses. When
the trial court misstated the purpose of the kidnapping count, the prosecutor immediately
corrected the record and explained that the count had been amended to involve
terrorizing the victim. The trial court thanked the prosecutor for the correction and
proceeded with sentencing. The sentencing entry correctly identifies the kidnapping
conviction as a violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3) and does not state that the appellant was
sentenced for a sexual offense. {¶17} We are mindful that a sentence imposed upon impermissible considerations
may be contrary to law. State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶22. But this is not a record in
which the trial court punished the appellant for an acquitted, dismissed, or uncharged
offense rather than for the offenses of conviction. The trial court imposed a sentence after
reviewing the PSI, the victim-impact materials, the appellant’s mitigation materials, the
appellant’s lack of prior criminal convictions, his work and law-enforcement history, his
mental-health and substance-use history, the domestic-violence and kidnapping
convictions, the firearm-related offenses, the standoff with law enforcement, the
protection-order history, and the victim’s description of harm. These are matters within
the scope of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.
{¶18} The appellant does not argue that the prison terms imposed for the offenses
of conviction were outside the authorized statutory range. The trial court imposed post-
release control and made the required consecutive-sentence findings both at the
sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry. See R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶19} Finally, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11
and R.C. 2929.12, imposed sentences within the statutory ranges, made the required
consecutive-sentence findings, and did not impose a sentence based upon an
impermissible consideration. The appellant’s sentence is not contrary to law.
{¶20} The appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION
{¶21} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶22} Costs to the appellant.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Popham, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.