State v. Carston

891 P.2d 1366, 133 Or. App. 494, 1995 Ore. App. LEXIS 516
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMarch 22, 1995
Docket93-CR-0259-TM 93-CR-0260-TM 93-CR-0261-TM and 93-CR-0229-ST CA A82360 (Control) CA A82363 CA A82364 and CA A82626
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 891 P.2d 1366 (State v. Carston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Carston, 891 P.2d 1366, 133 Or. App. 494, 1995 Ore. App. LEXIS 516 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

*497 De MUNIZ, J.

Defendants were charged with various counts of manufacture and delivery of controlled substances. ORS 475.992. The state appeals the pretrial orders granting defendants’ motions to suppress evidence. We reverse and remand.

On March 19,1993, Officer Koertje of the Redmond Police Department received a telephone call from a private citizen in Eugene who wanted to report a drug transaction that was to take place during the early morning hours of March 20. The informant did not at first identify himself, but later called again and gave the police a name and telephone number. The informant reported that he had tuned his scanner to the frequency of 46.730 and overheard a cordless telephone conversation. From the conversation, the informant had the impression that a drug buyer and seller were being introduced to each other over the phone, because one party told the other that the “stuff’ cost a little bit more, but it was “really good stuff,” and the buyer stated that he wanted to purchase an amount totalling $300.

The informant learned that the buyer, whose name was either “Phil” or “Bill,” would come to Redmond from Eugene in his girlfriend’s four-door Suzuki, arriving about 2:00 a.m. He would go to the home of the seller, “Ed,” on S.W. Indian Avenue in Redmond. The house could be identified by a cherry picker, black Ranchero and Alcoa Aluminum wheel in the front.

Based on that information, Redmond police went to Indian Avenue and found a black Camaro and a cherry picker in front of 1548 S.W. Indian Avenue. They obtained the license numbers of the vehicles parked near the house, one of which was a flatbed pickup truck registered to a Wendy Wray of Crooked River Ranch. They learned that Wray was the girlfriend of defendant Gralla (referred to as Ed in the phone call), who was suspected of being a supplier in some narcotics cases under police investigation at that time.

After verifying the above, an officer returned to the Indian Avenue house about 3:00 a.m. On the way, he saw a Suzuki like the one described by the informant. It was registered to Cheryl Sage of Coburg, a town just north of Eugene. Another officer later saw the Suzuki parked in the lot of a *498 Redmond bank; a person was at the ATM teller. The windows of the Suzuki were so heavily tinted that it was almost impossible to see inside the car, but the officer thought there were three occupants. The Suzuki left the bank, but the police saw it again and followed it to the house on Indian Avenue. One of the car’s occupants got out of the car and went into the house. About 20 minutes later, the Suzuki left. At about 3:40 a.m., the police initiated a traffic stop, based on a violation of ORS 815.220 for having tinted windows, and because all of the information provided by the informant to that point had been accurate.

The stop involved five officers in three marked patrol units. Defendant Carston was driving the Suzuki, and defendants Arlen Sage and Cheryl Sage were passengers. According to the state’s evidence at the suppression hearing, after the stop, the police saw the pistol grip of a semi-automatic pistol between the right front passenger seat and the center console. The police patted down the occupants of the car and asked Carston for permission to search for more weapons. Carston agreed. The search of the car revealed drugs and drug paraphernalia. Cheryl Sage also consented to the search of her purse, in which was found a paper bindle with one-half of a Safeway advertisement on it and the address of the Indian Avenue house. The substance in the bindle was tested and determined to be methamphetamine. According to defendants, the police began the search before requesting consent. Cheryl Sage testified that a policeman dumped the contents of her purse on the hood of the car before asking if he could search.

Later that morning, the police contacted a person at the Indian Avenue house who gave them permission to search the house. They discovered drug paraphernalia, a bindle of methamphetamine and the other half of the Safeway advertisement found in Cheryl Sage’s purse. The occupant of the house told them that he had been drinking at a bar with Gralla most of the previous night and that Gralla had received a phone call, after which Gralla had asked to be taken to the house. The occupant took Gralla there, returned to the bar, and later, when the occupant returned to the Indian Street house, Gralla was gone. The occupant told the police that Gralla always had “crank” on him. The police then placed the *499 home at Crooked River Ranch under surveillance, and arrested Gralla there later that morning. During a search incident to Gralla’s arrest, the police found a bindle of methamphetamine.

At the suppression hearing, an electronic technician for Deschutes County testified that a telephone conversation picked v. on a scanner at the frequency of 46.730 must be from a cordless phone. The technician testified that it was common to pick v. conversations from one’s next-door neighbors on such phones. Carston testified that he intended his conversation on the cordless phone to be private and did not know that anyone else could be listening in.

The trial court held that the search was unlawful, because the police relied on information obtained in violation of ORS 165.540, which provides, in pertinent part:

“(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 133.724 or subsections (2) to (7) of this section, no person shall:
“(a) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a telecommunication or a radio communication to which such person is not a participant, by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, unless consent is given by at least one participant.
“ * * * *
“(d) Obtain the whole or any part of a conversation, telecommunication or radio communication from any person, while knowing or having good reason to believe that such conversation, telecommunication or radio communication was initially obtained in a manner prohibited by this section.
“(e) Use or attempt to use, or divulge to others any conversation, telecommunication or radio communication obtained by any means prohibited by this section.
“ * * * *
“(4) The prohibitions in subsection (l)(a) of this section do not apply to the receiving or obtaining of the contents of any radio or television broadcast transmitted for the use of the general public.” 1

*500

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Related

State v. Carston
913 P.2d 709 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
891 P.2d 1366, 133 Or. App. 494, 1995 Ore. App. LEXIS 516, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-carston-orctapp-1995.