An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-911
Filed 1 April 2026
Sampson County, Nos. 18CR051405-810, 19CR000196-810
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
LAJONA DEMARRIAS CARR, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 11 June 2024 by Judge Augustus
D. Willis IV in Sampson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29
January 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Taylor H. Crabtree, for the State.
Carolina Appeal Legal Services, by Drew Nelson, for Defendant–Appellant.
MURRY, Judge.
Lajona D. Carr (Defendant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of first-degree murder.1 Defendant contends
the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury that it could find him guilty of
felony murder despite the insufficiency of the short-form indictment used by the State
1 Defendant does not appeal the jury’s additional verdicts finding him guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and possession of firearm by a felon. STATE V. CARR
Opinion of the Court
to charge him with felony murder. For the reasons below, this Court holds that the
trial court did not err, much less plainly err, by giving the felony-murder jury
instruction.
I. Background
On 22 April 2019, a Sampson County grand jury indicted Defendant for the
murder of Jamaris Pridgen. The indictment alleged that Defendant “unlawfully,
willfully, and feloniously did of malice aforethought kill and murder” Jamaris
Pridgen. See N.C.G.S. § 15-144 (2025).
The matter came on for trial on 3 June 2024. At trial, the State proceeded
under theories of first-degree murder and felony murder with robbery with a
dangerous weapon as the underlying felony. Police officers from the scene testified to
excavating Pridgen’s body from a shallow grave in which they found a cigarette butt
that tested positive for Defendant’s DNA. Data from Defendant’s phone records
showed that he was in the area where the officers recovered Pridgen’s body just a few
days prior, and Defendant’s text messages from that time referred to “digging” and
“need[ing] two shovels,” instructing the recipient, “Don’t tell nobody.” The police
officers also found a gold necklace and a watch belonging to Pridgen when processing
Defendant at the jail. Defendant did not testify or otherwise present evidence in his
own defense.
During the charge conference, the State informed the trial court of its intention
to submit a jury instruction for first-degree murder under both theories permitted by
-2- STATE V. CARR
N.C.G.S. § 14-17: (1) malice, premeditation, and deliberation and (2) felony murder
with robbery with a dangerous weapon as the underlying felony. Defense counsel
raised no objection to this instruction. The trial court then instructed the jury that it
could find Defendant guilty of first-degree murder on either theory or both . On 11
June 2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of first-degree murder
based solely on the felony-murder rule. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life
imprisonment without parole. Defendant timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s final
judgment under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27, 15A-1444. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) (2025) (final
judgment of a trial court); id. § 15A-1444(a) (pleaded not guilty but found guilty).
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by instructing the
jury that it could find him guilty of felony murder; he characterizes the short-form
indictment as insufficient to charge him with felony murder. Although Defendant
failed to preserve this argument for review by objecting at trial, see N.C. R. App. P.
10(a)(1), we may “review unpreserved issues for plain error when they involve . . . the
judge’s instructions to the jury,” State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 584 (1996), provided
that the defendant “specifically and distinctly” argues plain error on appeal, see State
v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 496 (1995) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4)). To establish plain
error, a defendant must show that (1) “a fundamental error occurred at trial” that (2)
-3- STATE V. CARR
“had a probable impact on the outcome, meaning that absent the error, the jury
probably would have returned a different verdict,” and that (3) the error would
“seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 158 (2024) (quoting State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518–
19 (2012)). For the reasons below, we hold that the trial court did not err, much less
plainly err, by instructing the jury on felony murder.
A. Inapplicability of Rule of Lenity
We first determine that Defendant’s request for this Court to apply the rule of
lenity in construing N.C.G.S. § 15-144 is misplaced. “The principle of statutory
construction referred to as the ‘rule of lenity’ forbids a court to interpret a statute so
as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when the Legislature has
not clearly stated such an intention.” State v. Boykin, 78 N.C. App. 572, 577 (1985).
The rule of lenity only applies to ambiguous language in a challenged statute. See
State v. Conley, 374 N.C. 209, 216 (2020) (Because there were “two reasonable
constructions of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b),” which governed the prohibition of firearms
on school property, “with regard to the intended allowable unit of prosecution,” the
case was “precisely the type of scenario for which the rule of lenity exists.”). Here,
N.C.G.S. § 15-144 states the specific allegations necessary to charge a defendant with
murder in a short-form indictment. The statutory language contains no ambiguity
about the required elements; indeed, Defendant himself accurately conveys the
statute’s “require[ment] that each indictment allege that the murder was committed
-4- STATE V. CARR
with malice aforethought.” Defendant’s argument that N.C.G.S. § 15-144 requires the
allegation of an element that is “not part of felony murder” does not address the type
of statutory ambiguity to which the rule of lenity applies. Thus, we decline to invoke
the rule of lenity and dismiss Defendant’s argument on this ground.
B. No Plain Error
Defendant argues that the indictment is “insufficient” to charge him with
felony murder because any “properly drafted” murder indictment under N.C.G.S.
§ 15-144 “must include an allegation of malice aforethought,” an essential element of
first-degree murder but not of felony murder. We disagree.
A short-form homicide indictment “sufficient[ly] . . . describe[s] murder” if it
“allege[s] that the accused . . . feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought,
did kill and murder” a named victim. N.C.G.S. § 15-144. A defendant commits felony
murder by killing another “in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-911
Filed 1 April 2026
Sampson County, Nos. 18CR051405-810, 19CR000196-810
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
LAJONA DEMARRIAS CARR, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 11 June 2024 by Judge Augustus
D. Willis IV in Sampson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29
January 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Taylor H. Crabtree, for the State.
Carolina Appeal Legal Services, by Drew Nelson, for Defendant–Appellant.
MURRY, Judge.
Lajona D. Carr (Defendant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of first-degree murder.1 Defendant contends
the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury that it could find him guilty of
felony murder despite the insufficiency of the short-form indictment used by the State
1 Defendant does not appeal the jury’s additional verdicts finding him guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and possession of firearm by a felon. STATE V. CARR
Opinion of the Court
to charge him with felony murder. For the reasons below, this Court holds that the
trial court did not err, much less plainly err, by giving the felony-murder jury
instruction.
I. Background
On 22 April 2019, a Sampson County grand jury indicted Defendant for the
murder of Jamaris Pridgen. The indictment alleged that Defendant “unlawfully,
willfully, and feloniously did of malice aforethought kill and murder” Jamaris
Pridgen. See N.C.G.S. § 15-144 (2025).
The matter came on for trial on 3 June 2024. At trial, the State proceeded
under theories of first-degree murder and felony murder with robbery with a
dangerous weapon as the underlying felony. Police officers from the scene testified to
excavating Pridgen’s body from a shallow grave in which they found a cigarette butt
that tested positive for Defendant’s DNA. Data from Defendant’s phone records
showed that he was in the area where the officers recovered Pridgen’s body just a few
days prior, and Defendant’s text messages from that time referred to “digging” and
“need[ing] two shovels,” instructing the recipient, “Don’t tell nobody.” The police
officers also found a gold necklace and a watch belonging to Pridgen when processing
Defendant at the jail. Defendant did not testify or otherwise present evidence in his
own defense.
During the charge conference, the State informed the trial court of its intention
to submit a jury instruction for first-degree murder under both theories permitted by
-2- STATE V. CARR
N.C.G.S. § 14-17: (1) malice, premeditation, and deliberation and (2) felony murder
with robbery with a dangerous weapon as the underlying felony. Defense counsel
raised no objection to this instruction. The trial court then instructed the jury that it
could find Defendant guilty of first-degree murder on either theory or both . On 11
June 2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of first-degree murder
based solely on the felony-murder rule. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life
imprisonment without parole. Defendant timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s final
judgment under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27, 15A-1444. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) (2025) (final
judgment of a trial court); id. § 15A-1444(a) (pleaded not guilty but found guilty).
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by instructing the
jury that it could find him guilty of felony murder; he characterizes the short-form
indictment as insufficient to charge him with felony murder. Although Defendant
failed to preserve this argument for review by objecting at trial, see N.C. R. App. P.
10(a)(1), we may “review unpreserved issues for plain error when they involve . . . the
judge’s instructions to the jury,” State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 584 (1996), provided
that the defendant “specifically and distinctly” argues plain error on appeal, see State
v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 496 (1995) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4)). To establish plain
error, a defendant must show that (1) “a fundamental error occurred at trial” that (2)
-3- STATE V. CARR
“had a probable impact on the outcome, meaning that absent the error, the jury
probably would have returned a different verdict,” and that (3) the error would
“seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 158 (2024) (quoting State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518–
19 (2012)). For the reasons below, we hold that the trial court did not err, much less
plainly err, by instructing the jury on felony murder.
A. Inapplicability of Rule of Lenity
We first determine that Defendant’s request for this Court to apply the rule of
lenity in construing N.C.G.S. § 15-144 is misplaced. “The principle of statutory
construction referred to as the ‘rule of lenity’ forbids a court to interpret a statute so
as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when the Legislature has
not clearly stated such an intention.” State v. Boykin, 78 N.C. App. 572, 577 (1985).
The rule of lenity only applies to ambiguous language in a challenged statute. See
State v. Conley, 374 N.C. 209, 216 (2020) (Because there were “two reasonable
constructions of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b),” which governed the prohibition of firearms
on school property, “with regard to the intended allowable unit of prosecution,” the
case was “precisely the type of scenario for which the rule of lenity exists.”). Here,
N.C.G.S. § 15-144 states the specific allegations necessary to charge a defendant with
murder in a short-form indictment. The statutory language contains no ambiguity
about the required elements; indeed, Defendant himself accurately conveys the
statute’s “require[ment] that each indictment allege that the murder was committed
-4- STATE V. CARR
with malice aforethought.” Defendant’s argument that N.C.G.S. § 15-144 requires the
allegation of an element that is “not part of felony murder” does not address the type
of statutory ambiguity to which the rule of lenity applies. Thus, we decline to invoke
the rule of lenity and dismiss Defendant’s argument on this ground.
B. No Plain Error
Defendant argues that the indictment is “insufficient” to charge him with
felony murder because any “properly drafted” murder indictment under N.C.G.S.
§ 15-144 “must include an allegation of malice aforethought,” an essential element of
first-degree murder but not of felony murder. We disagree.
A short-form homicide indictment “sufficient[ly] . . . describe[s] murder” if it
“allege[s] that the accused . . . feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought,
did kill and murder” a named victim. N.C.G.S. § 15-144. A defendant commits felony
murder by killing another “in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any
arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed
or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon.” Id. § 14-17(a); see State v. Garcia, 358
N.C. 382, 731–32 (2004).
Contrary to Defendant’s argument, our Supreme Court has consistently held
that a short-form homicide indictment complies with the requirements of N.C.G.S.
§ 15-144 by sufficiently charging first-degree murder on “any theory set forth in
N.C.G.S. § 14-17”—including felony murder. Garcia, 358 N.C. at 731; see, e.g., State
v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 14 (1985) (upholding indictment as compliant with N.C.G.S.
-5- STATE V. CARR
§ 15-144 when it “charge[d] first[-]degree murder without specifically alleging
premeditation and deliberation or felony murder”); State v. Norwood, 303 N.C. 473,
479 (1981) (holding indictment that “tracked the language” of N.C.G.S. § 15-144
“allow[ed] the State to prove both premeditated murder and felony murder”); State v.
Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 372 (1983) (holding that short-form murder indictment
complying with N.C.G.S. § 15-144 supports a conviction of first-degree murder). Thus,
binding precedent compels this Court to conclude that the short-form homicide
indictment in this case, which complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15-144,
was sufficient to charge Defendant with both felony murder and first-degree murder.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by giving the felony-murder jury
Defendant fails to demonstrate that a “fundamental error occurred at trial.”
Reber, 386 N.C. at 158. Even assuming error arguendo, he shows no resulting
prejudice or probability that the jury “would have returned a different verdict.” Id.
Considering the ample evidence at trial of Defendant’s guilt, we conclude that any
potential error in the trial court’s felony-murder jury instruction was nonprejudicial
to Defendant. See id. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err, much less plainly
err, by instructing the jury on felony murder.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that the trial court did not
err, much less plainly err, by giving the felony-murder jury instruction.
-6- STATE V. CARR
NO ERROR.
Judges COLLINS and FLOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
-7-