[Cite as State v. Cannon, 2026-Ohio-1867.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Nos. 115640 and 115641 v. :
LARRY CANNON, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 21, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-696630-B
Appearances:
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew E. Moretto and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:
In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff-appellant the State of Ohio
(“State”) appeals the trial court’s termination of defendant-appellee Larry Cannon’s (“Cannon”) parole in previous cases.1 For the reasons stated below, the trial court’s
order terminating Cannon’s parole in previous cases is vacated.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
On September 24, and October 18 and 19, 2024, Cannon and Leroy
Glass (“Glass”) unlawfully entered occupied structures and committed theft of
laptops, money, and other items. Cannon and Glass were later indicted on charges
related to these incidents. On September 2, 2025, in CR-24-696630-B, Cannon
pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree felony burglary, three counts of fifth-
degree felony theft, and two counts of third-degree felony burglary.
The trial court held the sentencing hearing immediately after the plea
hearing. Prior to accepting Cannon’s plea, the trial court stated that it had “the
ability to terminate whatever post-release control or parole you’re on, and I’ve
indicated I would do that in handing down my new sentence.” The trial court did
not make further mention of Cannon’s postrelease control or parole from previous
cases during the plea and sentencing hearing. On September 2, 2025, the trial court
issued two separate journal entries. The first entry terminated Cannon’s parole and
postrelease control in all of Cannon’s previous cases, stating as follows:
It is so ordered: Defendant’s parole and post release control is hereby terminated on all cases.
The second entry contained the plea and sentencing in this case.
1 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 115641 contains the State’s request for leave to file the
appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(C) and State v. McCuller, 2025-Ohio-837, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.) and 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 115640 contains the appeal. The State raises the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred in terminating parole in separate cases.
Law and Analysis
In its single assignment of error the State asserts that the trial court
erred when it terminated Cannon’s parole supervision in his previous cases. The
State does not object to the trial court’s sentencing as found in the trial court’s
second September 2, 2025 journal entry; therefore, we only address the first
September 2, 2025 entry here.
In 1996 Ohio overhauled its sentencing laws by enacting S.B. 2. S.B. 2
replaced indefinite prison terms with definite prison terms and “replace[d] parole
with post-release control.” See State v. Johnson, 2002-Ohio-4581, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).
Inmates or parolees, often referred to as “old law” inmates, that were sentenced pre
S.B. 2 are still required to complete their sentences, including parole, pursuant to
pre S.B. 2 laws.
“When a person is paroled, he or she is released from confinement
before the end of his or her sentence and remains in the custody of the state until
the sentence expires or the Adult Parole Authority grants final release.” State v.
Rembert, 2014-Ohio-300, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748,
¶ 36; R.C. 2967.02(C); 2967.13(E); 2967.15(A); 2967.16(C)(1).
“Parole” is defined by R.C. 2967.01(E) as follows:
[R]egarding a prisoner who is serving a prison term for aggravated murder or murder, who is serving a prison term of life imprisonment for rape or for felonious sexual penetration as it existed under section 2907.12 of the Revised Code prior to September 3, 1996, or who was sentenced prior to July 1, 1996, a release of the prisoner from confinement in any state correctional institution by the adult parole authority that is subject to the eligibility criteria specified in this chapter and that is under the terms and conditions, and for the period of time, prescribed by the authority in its published rules and official minutes or required by division (A) of section 2967.131 of the Revised Code or another provision of this chapter.
(Emphasis added.)
“Post-release control” is defined by R.C. 2967.01(N) as follows:
[A] period of supervision by the adult parole authority after a prisoner’s release from imprisonment, other than under a term of life imprisonment, that includes one or more post-release control sanctions imposed under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code.
The trial court does not have the authority to terminate parole from
an earlier case. R.C. 2929.141(A) provides that “[u]pon the conviction of or plea of
guilty to a felony by a person on post-release control at the time of the commission
of the felony, the court may terminate the term of post-release control[.]” The
subsection allows the trial court to terminate postrelease control “regardless of
whether the sentencing court or another court of this state imposed the original
prison term for which the person is on post-release control[.]” Id. However, the
statute does not grant authority to the trial court to terminate parole from an earlier
case. See State v. Ricks, 2006-Ohio-4268, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), State v. McCuller, 2025-
Ohio-837, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). Cannon conceded during oral argument that he is still subject to parole
from a previous case or cases and that the trial court erred when it terminated his
parole from his previous case or cases.2
Cannon asserts that any error was invited error because the State
agreed to the termination of parole. “Under the invited-error doctrine, a party will
not be permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced
the trial court to make.” State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith, 68 Ohio St.3d 357, 359 (1994),
citing Ctr. Ridge Ganley, Inc. v. Stinn, 31 Ohio St.3d 310, 313 (1987). This court has
previously found that “‘invited error’ is error of commission.” State v. Smith, 2002-
Ohio-3114, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). Further, the doctrine requires that “counsel is ‘actively
responsible’ for the trial court's error.” Id., citing State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d
320, 324 (2000).
Cannon asserts that the State did not object to the termination of
parole during in-chambers discussions. Cannon’s assertions that this court should
consider the trial court’s in-chambers discussion with counsel is not supported by
any legal authority. “It is well-settled that a court ‘speaks through its journal
entries.’” State v. Thompson, 2025-Ohio-1547, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.
Johnson, 2024-Ohio-72, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Lugo, 2016-Ohio-2647, ¶ 3
2 App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) mandates that the court of appeals shall “[d]etermine the
appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under App.R. 16, the record on appeal under App.R. 9, and, unless waived, the oral argument under App.R. 21[.]” (Emphasis added.) (8th Dist.).
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[Cite as State v. Cannon, 2026-Ohio-1867.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Nos. 115640 and 115641 v. :
LARRY CANNON, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 21, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-696630-B
Appearances:
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew E. Moretto and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:
In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff-appellant the State of Ohio
(“State”) appeals the trial court’s termination of defendant-appellee Larry Cannon’s (“Cannon”) parole in previous cases.1 For the reasons stated below, the trial court’s
order terminating Cannon’s parole in previous cases is vacated.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
On September 24, and October 18 and 19, 2024, Cannon and Leroy
Glass (“Glass”) unlawfully entered occupied structures and committed theft of
laptops, money, and other items. Cannon and Glass were later indicted on charges
related to these incidents. On September 2, 2025, in CR-24-696630-B, Cannon
pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree felony burglary, three counts of fifth-
degree felony theft, and two counts of third-degree felony burglary.
The trial court held the sentencing hearing immediately after the plea
hearing. Prior to accepting Cannon’s plea, the trial court stated that it had “the
ability to terminate whatever post-release control or parole you’re on, and I’ve
indicated I would do that in handing down my new sentence.” The trial court did
not make further mention of Cannon’s postrelease control or parole from previous
cases during the plea and sentencing hearing. On September 2, 2025, the trial court
issued two separate journal entries. The first entry terminated Cannon’s parole and
postrelease control in all of Cannon’s previous cases, stating as follows:
It is so ordered: Defendant’s parole and post release control is hereby terminated on all cases.
The second entry contained the plea and sentencing in this case.
1 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 115641 contains the State’s request for leave to file the
appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(C) and State v. McCuller, 2025-Ohio-837, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.) and 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 115640 contains the appeal. The State raises the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred in terminating parole in separate cases.
Law and Analysis
In its single assignment of error the State asserts that the trial court
erred when it terminated Cannon’s parole supervision in his previous cases. The
State does not object to the trial court’s sentencing as found in the trial court’s
second September 2, 2025 journal entry; therefore, we only address the first
September 2, 2025 entry here.
In 1996 Ohio overhauled its sentencing laws by enacting S.B. 2. S.B. 2
replaced indefinite prison terms with definite prison terms and “replace[d] parole
with post-release control.” See State v. Johnson, 2002-Ohio-4581, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).
Inmates or parolees, often referred to as “old law” inmates, that were sentenced pre
S.B. 2 are still required to complete their sentences, including parole, pursuant to
pre S.B. 2 laws.
“When a person is paroled, he or she is released from confinement
before the end of his or her sentence and remains in the custody of the state until
the sentence expires or the Adult Parole Authority grants final release.” State v.
Rembert, 2014-Ohio-300, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748,
¶ 36; R.C. 2967.02(C); 2967.13(E); 2967.15(A); 2967.16(C)(1).
“Parole” is defined by R.C. 2967.01(E) as follows:
[R]egarding a prisoner who is serving a prison term for aggravated murder or murder, who is serving a prison term of life imprisonment for rape or for felonious sexual penetration as it existed under section 2907.12 of the Revised Code prior to September 3, 1996, or who was sentenced prior to July 1, 1996, a release of the prisoner from confinement in any state correctional institution by the adult parole authority that is subject to the eligibility criteria specified in this chapter and that is under the terms and conditions, and for the period of time, prescribed by the authority in its published rules and official minutes or required by division (A) of section 2967.131 of the Revised Code or another provision of this chapter.
(Emphasis added.)
“Post-release control” is defined by R.C. 2967.01(N) as follows:
[A] period of supervision by the adult parole authority after a prisoner’s release from imprisonment, other than under a term of life imprisonment, that includes one or more post-release control sanctions imposed under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code.
The trial court does not have the authority to terminate parole from
an earlier case. R.C. 2929.141(A) provides that “[u]pon the conviction of or plea of
guilty to a felony by a person on post-release control at the time of the commission
of the felony, the court may terminate the term of post-release control[.]” The
subsection allows the trial court to terminate postrelease control “regardless of
whether the sentencing court or another court of this state imposed the original
prison term for which the person is on post-release control[.]” Id. However, the
statute does not grant authority to the trial court to terminate parole from an earlier
case. See State v. Ricks, 2006-Ohio-4268, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), State v. McCuller, 2025-
Ohio-837, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). Cannon conceded during oral argument that he is still subject to parole
from a previous case or cases and that the trial court erred when it terminated his
parole from his previous case or cases.2
Cannon asserts that any error was invited error because the State
agreed to the termination of parole. “Under the invited-error doctrine, a party will
not be permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced
the trial court to make.” State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith, 68 Ohio St.3d 357, 359 (1994),
citing Ctr. Ridge Ganley, Inc. v. Stinn, 31 Ohio St.3d 310, 313 (1987). This court has
previously found that “‘invited error’ is error of commission.” State v. Smith, 2002-
Ohio-3114, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). Further, the doctrine requires that “counsel is ‘actively
responsible’ for the trial court's error.” Id., citing State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d
320, 324 (2000).
Cannon asserts that the State did not object to the termination of
parole during in-chambers discussions. Cannon’s assertions that this court should
consider the trial court’s in-chambers discussion with counsel is not supported by
any legal authority. “It is well-settled that a court ‘speaks through its journal
entries.’” State v. Thompson, 2025-Ohio-1547, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.
Johnson, 2024-Ohio-72, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Lugo, 2016-Ohio-2647, ¶ 3
2 App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) mandates that the court of appeals shall “[d]etermine the
appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under App.R. 16, the record on appeal under App.R. 9, and, unless waived, the oral argument under App.R. 21[.]” (Emphasis added.) (8th Dist.). Further, any discussions held in chambers are not in the record and
therefore are not subject to this court’s review. See App.R. 12(1)(b).
In this case, the record does not reflect any actions by the State that
support Cannon’s assertion that the error was invited error. In addition, at the start
of the hearing the trial court stated that it had the ability to terminate Cannon’s
parole and that it “indicated [it] would do that in handing down [its] new sentence.”
However, the trial court did not terminate Cannon’s parole during the hearing in
this case. This omission prevented the State from having the opportunity to object
to the termination of Cannon’s parole on the record.
Because Cannon concedes that he was still subject to parole and that
the trial court erred, we sustain the State’s sole assignment of error. The trial court’s
order terminating Cannon’s parole in previous cases is vacated. The case is
remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue a journal entry vacating the
section of the first September 2, 2025 entry that terminates Cannon’s parole in
previous cases.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR