[Cite as State v. Candelario, 2025-Ohio-105.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113799 v. :
KRISTEL CANDELARIO, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 16, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-682211-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anna M. Faraglia and Caroline Maver, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Brian D. Kraft, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Kristel Candelario appeals her conviction arising from her pleading
guilty to aggravated murder and child endangering for purposely causing the death
of her 16-month-old daughter by leaving her unattended and locked in a crib for ten
days while Candelario vacationed. For the following reasons, we affirm. The facts of Candelario’s conduct demonstrate a level of depravity few
cases reach. The victim’s death was gruesome, slow, and — one can only imagine —
agonizing. Candelario does not dwell on the underlying facts. It suffices that
Candelario left her infant child alone in a crib while she vacationed. By the time
Candelario returned home after ten days and called authorities, her child had
suffered greatly before death. The coroner surmised that the child had died seven
to eight days after being left behind, showed signs of severe dehydration and
starvation, and had resorted to eating her own feces in the attempt to survive. At
any point during the first week of her travels, Candelario could have saved her child’s
life. Candelario initially lied to investigation officers and attempted to downplay her
actions. After investigators pieced together video footage from surveillance cameras
and through conversations with those with whom Candelario travelled, it was clear
that Candelario left her child alone in the crib for ten days with little concern. At the
same time, Candelario had inexplicably left her other child with her parents.
During the pretrial proceedings, Candelario was detained in county
jail. Local jail officers conducted a routine search of Candelario’s possessions and
discovered a glass vial of perfume, considered contraband. Candelario claimed that
one of her retained attorneys gave her the perfume in the holding cell during a
pretrial conference. Although the trial court precluded Candelario from visiting with
counsel in the court’s holding cell during pretrial conferences for a month following
the allegation, the allegations were never formally explored and remained unproven.
The prosecutors declined to charge anyone over the incident. In this appeal, Candelario presents an extremely narrow argument.
She claims her two retained attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel
based on the alleged conflict of interest between her and one of them arising from
her own allegations, and as a result of that conflict, her guilty plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered.
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective trial counsel generally
safeguards two distinct rights: “the right to reasonably competent counsel,” and
additionally, “the right to counsel’s undivided loyalty.” State v. Nikolic, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5473, *3-5 (8th Dist. Nov. 14, 1991), quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 (1970), and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
“Ordinarily, in cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a conflict
of interest, the conflict alleged exists between the interest of one defendant and the
interest of another defendant, each represented by the same counsel.” Id., citing
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
(1978). That, however, is not the only situation in which a conflict of interest can be
an issue. When the conflict is not based on dual representation, “[t]he critical
inquiry instead is whether the defendant demonstrated that counsel actively
represented conflicting interests and, secondly, whether the defendant
demonstrated that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer’s
performance.” Id., citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987), and Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). In accordance with those constitutional concerns, it has been
concluded that “‘[i]n order to satisfy a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, [an] appellant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected [their] counsel’s performance.’” State v. Sanchez, 2000
Ohio App. LEXIS 1920, *14 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514,
535 (1997), and Cuyler at 348. Courts do not begin with a presumption “that the
mere possibility of a conflict of interest resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
A possible conflict of interest is simply insufficient to challenge a criminal
conviction.” Id. State v. Manross, 40 Ohio St.3d 180 (1988).
Candelario presents several unsupported arguments in arguing that
one of her attorneys rendered ineffective assistance — claiming that he was
inexperienced to handle what was then a potential capital case and that his
providing the contraband caused an irreparable conflict of their interests. She fails
to address, discuss, or consider the fact that she retained another attorney for her
defense who was present during the entirety of the time for which she claims her
interests were not safeguarded, severely limiting our review. See State v.
Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19, citing State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 78
(O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); App.R. 16(A)(7). We need
not dwell on that issue, however, because Candelario has not presented anything
other than speculation to support her claims.
In order to demonstrate that her attorney rendered ineffective
assistance based on the alleged conflict of interest, Candelario is required to demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected the lawyer’s performance. On this
point, especially in consideration of the fact that she had retained two attorneys in
her defense, Candelario’s appellate arguments miss the mark. There is no basis
within this record to support the notion that any alleged conflict created by
Candelario’s own allegations against her attorney infected his advice in resolving a
case for which the underlying facts were, by and large, uncontested. She simply
presumes that fact of consequence based on the unproven allegation underlying her
conflict-of-interest claim. The allegation of a conflict of interest alone is insufficient
to warrant reversing a criminal conviction.
Her sole remaining claim is that because she pleaded to the
indictment, her attorney was necessarily ineffective because she received no benefit
to the guilty plea.
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[Cite as State v. Candelario, 2025-Ohio-105.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113799 v. :
KRISTEL CANDELARIO, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 16, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-682211-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anna M. Faraglia and Caroline Maver, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Brian D. Kraft, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Kristel Candelario appeals her conviction arising from her pleading
guilty to aggravated murder and child endangering for purposely causing the death
of her 16-month-old daughter by leaving her unattended and locked in a crib for ten
days while Candelario vacationed. For the following reasons, we affirm. The facts of Candelario’s conduct demonstrate a level of depravity few
cases reach. The victim’s death was gruesome, slow, and — one can only imagine —
agonizing. Candelario does not dwell on the underlying facts. It suffices that
Candelario left her infant child alone in a crib while she vacationed. By the time
Candelario returned home after ten days and called authorities, her child had
suffered greatly before death. The coroner surmised that the child had died seven
to eight days after being left behind, showed signs of severe dehydration and
starvation, and had resorted to eating her own feces in the attempt to survive. At
any point during the first week of her travels, Candelario could have saved her child’s
life. Candelario initially lied to investigation officers and attempted to downplay her
actions. After investigators pieced together video footage from surveillance cameras
and through conversations with those with whom Candelario travelled, it was clear
that Candelario left her child alone in the crib for ten days with little concern. At the
same time, Candelario had inexplicably left her other child with her parents.
During the pretrial proceedings, Candelario was detained in county
jail. Local jail officers conducted a routine search of Candelario’s possessions and
discovered a glass vial of perfume, considered contraband. Candelario claimed that
one of her retained attorneys gave her the perfume in the holding cell during a
pretrial conference. Although the trial court precluded Candelario from visiting with
counsel in the court’s holding cell during pretrial conferences for a month following
the allegation, the allegations were never formally explored and remained unproven.
The prosecutors declined to charge anyone over the incident. In this appeal, Candelario presents an extremely narrow argument.
She claims her two retained attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel
based on the alleged conflict of interest between her and one of them arising from
her own allegations, and as a result of that conflict, her guilty plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered.
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective trial counsel generally
safeguards two distinct rights: “the right to reasonably competent counsel,” and
additionally, “the right to counsel’s undivided loyalty.” State v. Nikolic, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5473, *3-5 (8th Dist. Nov. 14, 1991), quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 (1970), and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
“Ordinarily, in cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a conflict
of interest, the conflict alleged exists between the interest of one defendant and the
interest of another defendant, each represented by the same counsel.” Id., citing
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
(1978). That, however, is not the only situation in which a conflict of interest can be
an issue. When the conflict is not based on dual representation, “[t]he critical
inquiry instead is whether the defendant demonstrated that counsel actively
represented conflicting interests and, secondly, whether the defendant
demonstrated that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer’s
performance.” Id., citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987), and Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). In accordance with those constitutional concerns, it has been
concluded that “‘[i]n order to satisfy a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, [an] appellant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected [their] counsel’s performance.’” State v. Sanchez, 2000
Ohio App. LEXIS 1920, *14 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514,
535 (1997), and Cuyler at 348. Courts do not begin with a presumption “that the
mere possibility of a conflict of interest resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
A possible conflict of interest is simply insufficient to challenge a criminal
conviction.” Id. State v. Manross, 40 Ohio St.3d 180 (1988).
Candelario presents several unsupported arguments in arguing that
one of her attorneys rendered ineffective assistance — claiming that he was
inexperienced to handle what was then a potential capital case and that his
providing the contraband caused an irreparable conflict of their interests. She fails
to address, discuss, or consider the fact that she retained another attorney for her
defense who was present during the entirety of the time for which she claims her
interests were not safeguarded, severely limiting our review. See State v.
Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19, citing State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 78
(O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); App.R. 16(A)(7). We need
not dwell on that issue, however, because Candelario has not presented anything
other than speculation to support her claims.
In order to demonstrate that her attorney rendered ineffective
assistance based on the alleged conflict of interest, Candelario is required to demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected the lawyer’s performance. On this
point, especially in consideration of the fact that she had retained two attorneys in
her defense, Candelario’s appellate arguments miss the mark. There is no basis
within this record to support the notion that any alleged conflict created by
Candelario’s own allegations against her attorney infected his advice in resolving a
case for which the underlying facts were, by and large, uncontested. She simply
presumes that fact of consequence based on the unproven allegation underlying her
conflict-of-interest claim. The allegation of a conflict of interest alone is insufficient
to warrant reversing a criminal conviction.
Her sole remaining claim is that because she pleaded to the
indictment, her attorney was necessarily ineffective because she received no benefit
to the guilty plea. Candelario has presented no authority in support of her argument
that a guilty plea must necessarily result in a reduction in sentencing exposure or
the severity of the offense in order to be deemed valid.
The underlying facts are undisputed. The sole issue is applying those
facts to the elements of the charged offenses. Even if the State had a weaker case,
“‘there are a multitude of reasons why a defendant’” would willingly “‘enter a guilty
or no contest plea, including that “a defendant may want to take responsibility for
his crime, a defendant may wish to avoid the attention of a public trial or a defendant
may simply want the case to be over and spare himself (and perhaps also his family)
the time and stress of going through a trial.”’” State v. Brown, 2023-Ohio-2540,
¶ 13 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Musleh, 2017-Ohio-8166, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), and citing State v. Talley, 2018-Ohio-5065, ¶ 34-40 (11th Dist.). It is not self-evident
that Candelario received no benefit to the guilty plea merely because she pleaded
guilty to the most severe, charged offense — which nevertheless resulted in all but
one other of the counts being dismissed. Accepting Candelario’s argument would
create a bright-line rule that all guilty pleas must achieve some form of limits as to
the severity of the offense or the sentence in order to be valid. No such rule has been
cited or demonstrated to exist by the arguments presented.
Candelario’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The convictions
are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)