[Cite as State v. Campbell, 2026-Ohio-335.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO Case Nos. 2025CA00072
Plaintiff – Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry -vs- Appeal from the Massillon Municipal RANDON RAYMONE CAMPBELL Court, Case Nos. 2024-CRB-1462 & 2024 TRD 6362 Defendant – Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry:February 3, 2026
BEFORE: CRAIG R. BALDWIN, P.J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J. DAVID M. GORMLEY; Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: CHRISTOPHER PACE, for Plaintiff-Appellee; JAMES L. HARDIMAN for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Randon Raymone Campbell (“Campbell”) appeals his
convictions and sentences after a jury trial in the Massillon Municipal Court. For the
reasons below, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Charges and Pretrial Proceedings
{¶2} Following a traffic stop on June 28, 2024, Campbell was charged with three
offenses: obstructing official business, a second-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C.
2921.31(A); resisting arrest, a second-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A); and display of plates properly secured and unobstructed, a minor
misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4503.21(A)(2).
{¶3} On September 18, 2024, Campbell filed a motion to suppress. He
supplemented that motion on October 24, 2024. Campbell argued that the officer lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on an allegedly
obstructed license plate and lacked probable cause to arrest him for obstructing official
business and resisting arrest.
{¶4} On October 30, 2024, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
the motion. The following day - October 31, 2024 - the court issued a written judgment
entry overruling the motion to suppress. After hearing testimony from Officer Kyle Myers,
reviewing dash camera footage from the patrol vehicle, and considering photographs
admitted into evidence, the court found the officer’s testimony competent and credible.
Specifically, the court determined that a dark plastic cover over Campbell’s rear license
plate obstructed its visibility at night and could not be reasonably viewed by the officer or
other motorists using the roadway. The court further concluded that the officer had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Campbell’s vehicle and request his driver’s
license. State v. Dunlap, 2024-Ohio-4821.
{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial beginning on May 29, 2025 1. The
evidence presented at trial is summarized below.
Trial Evidence
Testimony of Officer Kyle Myers
1 The minor misdemeanor count in Case Number 2024TRD 06362, 5th Dist. No. 2025CA00072, was tried to the court. {¶6} Officer Kyle Myers of the Jackson Township Police Department testified that
on Friday, June 28, 2024, at approximately 12:13 a.m., he was on routine patrol when he
observed a Ford Explorer exit what he described as a “well-known drug area.” Trial
Transcript (T.) at 43. He noticed that the vehicle had a dark license plate cover. Based on
that observation, Officer Myers activated his cruiser’s overhead lights to initiate a traffic
stop for an obstructed license plate. T. at 43-44, 63.
{¶7} Officer Myers testified that after activating his lights, he could clearly see
the license plate number and radioed it to dispatch to check for outstanding warrants. T.
at 44, 62-63. The dash camera video from the cruiser was played for the jury and admitted
into evidence. T. at 54; State’s Exhibit A.
{¶8} Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Myers informed Campbell of the
reason for the stop. T. at 44. According to Officer Myers, Campbell responded that his
license plate was legal. Campbell lowered his window slightly and extended his driver’s
license but refused to release it. Officer Myers testified that he then pulled the license
from Campbell’s hand. T. at 44, 68-69.
{¶9} While waiting for the records check results from dispatch, Officer Myers
asked Campbell whether there were any weapons in the vehicle. T. at 44-46, 72.
Campbell replied that he did not have to answer the question. T. at 46, 98.
{¶10} Officer Myers testified that dispatch advised him that Campbell had prior
cautions involving firearms in vehicles and drug-related charges. T. at 46, 121-123;
State’s Exhibits. D, E. Based on those cautions, Officer Myers asked Campbell to step
out of the vehicle for officer safety. T. at 47-48, 99. Officer Myers stated that he made this
request at least ten times. T. at 118-119. He further testified that he warned Campbell multiple times that failure to comply would result in a charge of obstructing official
business. T. at 120. Officer Myers also warned Campbell that officers would break the
vehicle window and forcibly remove him if he continued to refuse. T. at 48, 69.
{¶11} Officer Myers testified that he drew his service weapon after observing
Campbell reach behind the vehicle’s center console area. T. at 82, 87, 109-110, 120.
Myers then instructed his partner to break the vehicle’s window. T. at 49-50. Campbell
argued that he was only reaching to undo his seat belt.
{¶12} Campbell was forcibly removed from the vehicle. Officer Myers described
Campbell’s resistance as passive. T. at 50. Three officers ultimately restrained Campbell
and placed him in handcuffs. Officer Myers’ body camera footage was played for the jury
and admitted into evidence. T. at 55; State’s Exhibit B.
Testimony of Officer Andrew Smith
{¶13} Officer Andrew Smith, also of the Jackson Township Police Department,
testified that he responded to Officer Myers’ call for assistance during the traffic stop. T.
at 134. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Smith heard Officers Myers and Young
repeatedly instruct Campbell to exit the vehicle. T. at 134-135.
{¶14} Officer Smith testified that he observed Campbell reach toward the area
behind the center console. At that point, he saw Officer Myers draw his duty weapon. T.
at 134-135, 141. Officer Myers directed Smith to break the vehicle window, which Smith
did. T. at 135, 138-139. Officer Smith’s body camera video was played for the jury and
admitted into evidence. T. at 139-140; State’s Exhibit C. Defense Evidence
{¶15} The defense presented no witnesses. Defendant’s Exhibit 1, a screenshot
depicting the license plate with its cover, was admitted into evidence. T. at 154, 198.
Campbell moved for a jury view of the actual license plate, but the trial court denied the
request. T. at 194-196.
Verdict
{¶16} The jury found Campbell guilty of obstructing official business and not guilty
of resisting arrest. The trial court separately found Campbell guilty of failing to display
plates properly secured and unobstructed, a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C.
4503.21(A)(2).
Assignments of Error
{¶17} Campbell raises five assignments of error for our consideration,
{¶18} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RENDERING A VERDICT OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF OBSTRUCTED LICENSE
PLATE IN THAT THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
PROVE APPELLANT'S GUILT, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.”
{¶19} “II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING
OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF OBSTRUCTED LICENSE PLATE.”
{¶20} “III. THE FINDING OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF HAVING AN
OBSTRUCTED LICENSE PLATE WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.”
{¶21} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FAILNG TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTNG OFFICIAL BUSINESS PURSUANT TO REVISED
CODE 2921.31 (A) A MISDEMEANOR OF THE SECOND DEGREE.”
{¶22} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
IMPOSING A SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION FOR THE MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE
OF OBSTRUCTION OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS, A MISDEMEANOR OF THE SECOND
DEGREE.”
I.
{¶23} In his first assignment of error, Campbell argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his request for a view of the actual license plate and prohibiting
the jury from viewing the license plate. According to Campbell, a physical inspection of
the plate was necessary—and constituted the “best evidence”—to determine whether the
license-plate cover obstructed its visibility. The record does not support this claim.
Standard of Review
{¶24} The decision to permit a jury view lies within the trial court’s sound
discretion. Calloway v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St.2d 128 (1965); State v. Bryan, 1987 Ohio App.
LEXIS 7823, *3 (5th Dist. July 8, 1987). That decision will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion. State v. Zuern, 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 58 (1987); State v. Hanna, 2002-
Ohio-2221, ¶ 34; see also R.C. 2945.16.
{¶25} An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Tennant v. Gallick, 2014-Ohio-477, ¶ 35 (9th
Dist.); State v. Firouzmandi, 2006-Ohio-5823, ¶ 54 (5th Dist.). A reviewing court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Analysis
{¶26} Measured against this standard, Campbell’s argument fails. The trial court
reviewed dash-camera video depicting the traffic stop as it occurred and considered
additional photographic evidence introduced by both parties. Based on that evidence, the
court expressly found that the license plate was obstructed:
“It was definitely obstructed … it was dark, covered. You could not
see the plate on the roadway. You could see it when it was lit up….” T. at
196.
{¶27} Despite this record, Campbell asserts—without meaningful elaboration—
that the State’s videos and photographs were inadequate. He does not, however, explain
how a post hoc view of the license plate could have recreated the lighting conditions,
viewing angles, distance, and motion present when Officer Myers observed the plate from
his cruiser. A jury view conducted later, under materially different circumstances, would
not necessarily have produced a more reliable outcome. To be sure, evidence
contemporaneous with the stop does not play second fiddle to post hoc review.
{¶28} Importantly, the trial court was not required to conduct a jury view of the
license plate simply because the defense requested one. Rather, the court was entitled
to assess whether such a view would meaningfully aid its fact-finding. Given the
availability of dash-camera footage, body-camera evidence, and a defense photograph
of the plate, the trial court concluded that viewing the actual license plate was
unnecessary. {¶29} Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable. To the contrary, the court’s ruling reflects a reasoned
exercise of discretion based on the evidence presented.
Best Evidence Rule
{¶30} Campbell also contends that the trial court’s refusal to conduct a view
violated Ohio’s best evidence rule. This argument is misplaced.
{¶31} Evid.R. 1002 – colloquially known as the Best Evidence Rule - applies only
to proof of the content of a writing, recording, or photograph. It does not apply to testimony
concerning the condition or appearance of a physical object. State v. Maupin, 42 Ohio
St.2d 473 (1975), syllabus ¶ 1; Youngstown v. L. Hasley, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 11460,
*5 (7th Dist. Sept. 8, 1982).
{¶32} Officer Myers testified to what he personally observed—that a dark cover
obstructed the plate’s visibility until illuminated by his cruiser’s lights. This testimony did
not seek to prove the content of the license plate and, therefore, does not implicate
Evid.R. 1002. State v. Ruggly, 2022-Ohio-3730, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.).
Conclusion
{¶33} The trial court acted within its discretion in denying Campbell’s request for
a jury view of the license plate. Campbell’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶34} Campbell next argues that his conviction for having an obstructed license
plate is not supported by sufficient evidence. Standard of Review
{¶35} Sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law reviewed de novo.
State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30; State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 13. The
reviewing court considers whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. superseded by State constitutional amendment on other
grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997);
State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543 (2001).
Governing Law
{¶36} R.C. 4503.21(A)(2) requires that a license plate be securely fastened and
“not be covered by any material that obstructs its visibility.” Violations of this statute are
strict-liability offenses. R.C. 4503.21(C).
Analysis
{¶37} The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish each element of
the offense.
{¶38} Officer Myers testified that he observed a dark license-plate cover on the
Ford Explorer driven by Campbell and initiated a traffic stop based on that observation.
T. at 43-44, 63. Officer Myers activated his lights. T. at 63. Regarding when he was able
to read the Explorer’s license plate, Officer Myers explained “Once I lit him up, yes. Once
all my flashing lights and the bright lights to make sure people see the cruiser, I was able
to see the plate.” T. at 67. {¶39} The dash-camera video of the stop was admitted into evidence and played
for the jury. T. at 54; State’s Exhibit A. The defense also introduced a photograph of the
license plate, admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit 1. T. at 154, 198. Our review of this
evidence confirms that the license plate cover caused plate information to be obstructed
from visibility.
{¶40} Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence permits a
rational trier of fact to conclude that the license plate was covered by material that
obstructed its visibility under ordinary driving conditions. Because the offense is one of
strict liability, no additional proof was required.
{¶41} The State presented legally sufficient evidence to support Campbell’s
conviction under R.C. 4503.21(A)(2).
{¶42} Campbell’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶43} In his third assignment of error, Campbell contends that his conviction on
the charge of having an obstructed license plate is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We disagree.
{¶44} A manifest-weight challenge concerns the persuasive force of the evidence.
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. A conviction may be reversed on this ground
only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶
26. {¶45} In reviewing a manifest-weight claim, the appellate court acts as a
“thirteenth juror,” reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, and considering witness credibility. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17;
State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-2747, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). Even so, substantial deference is
afforded to the trier of fact’s credibility determinations and resolution of evidentiary
conflicts. Eastley, ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).
{¶46} Campbell reiterates his earlier argument that the trial court erred by denying
his request for a jury view, asserting again that such a view constituted the best evidence.
(Appellant’s Brief at 11-13.) As previously explained, that premise is incorrect and does
not establish that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶47} The trial judge, acting as the trier of fact, heard Officer Myers’ testimony,
observed his demeanor, and considered corroborating dash-camera and body-camera
footage. The judge credited that evidence in resolving any claimed inconsistency
regarding the visibility of the license plate.
{¶48} When two reasonable interpretations of the evidence exist, neither of which
is implausible, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder.
State v. Dyke, 2002-Ohio-1152, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.); State v. Snider, 2012-Ohio-2183, ¶ 24
(5th Dist.).
{¶49} Viewed as a whole, the evidence supports a logical and credible basis for
the verdict. There is no indication that the trier of fact lost its way or created a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Conclusion
{¶50} After independently reviewing the record and weighing the evidence, we
conclude that Campbell’s conviction under R.C. 4503.21(A)(2) for having an obstructed
license plate is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶51} Campbell’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV.
{¶52} In his fourth assignment of error, Campbell argues that the trial court failed
to properly instruct the jury on the elements of Obstructing Official Business. Specifically,
he contends the jury was not adequately instructed that the offense requires proof that he
acted without privilege and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay officers in the
performance of their lawful duties.
{¶53} A trial court must fully and correctly instruct the jury on all matters of law
necessary for the jury to perform its duty as the fact finder. State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d
206, 208 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The failure to object to a jury instruction
constitutes a waiver of any claim or error relative thereto, unless, but for the error, the
outcome of the trial would have been otherwise.” State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12
(1983), syllabus, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978); State v. Lang, 2011-Ohio-
4215, ¶ 145.2
2 We recognize that “waiver” is the knowing, voluntary, and intentional relinquishment of a known
right, issue, or claim, and that to “forfeit” is to lose a right by some [involuntary] error, fault, or neglect. See, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). {¶54} Here, although Campbell did not submit proposed written jury instructions,
he objected to the instruction on Obstructing Official Business. Accordingly, any
instructional error is reviewed for harmless error under Crim.R. 52(A).
Background
{¶55} In his objection to the jury instruction on Obstructing Official Business,
Campbell argued that conviction requires proof of an “overt act” and requested that the
term be defined for the jury. T. at 185-187. He further objected generally to the definitional
portions of the instruction. T. at 223. As Campbell preserved any error, we review the jury
instructions for harmless error under Crim.R. 52(A), rather than under plain-error (Crim.R.
52(B)).
{¶56} The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The Defendant, Randon Raymone Campbell, is charged with
Obstructing Official Business. Before you can find the Defendant guilty, you
must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on June 28th of 2024, in
Jackson Township, Stark County, Ohio, the Defendant, without privilege to
do so and with purpose to prevent and obstruct the performance by a
Jackson Township police officer, refused to exit his vehicle after multiple
verbal commands during a legal traffic stop, and had to be removed by force
after his window was broken.
T. at 8-9.
{¶57} Ohio Jury Instructions for Obstructing Official Business recommend
instructing the jury that the defendant, without privilege and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a public official, committed an act that hampered or impeded the official
in the performance of lawful duties. Ohio Jury Instructions, CR § 521.31 (Rev. Nov. 7,
2020) (emphasis added). The instruction further suggests defining the terms “privilege,”
“purposely,” and “hamper or impede.”
{¶58} The failure to properly instruct a jury does not ordinarily constitute structural
error. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Rather, such errors are subject to
harmless-error analysis under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Id.
{¶59} Crim.R. 52 affords appellate courts limited power to correct errors that
occurred during the trial court proceeding. The rule distinguishes between errors to which
a defendant objected at trial [Harmless Error - Crim.R. 52(a)] and errors that a defendant
failed to raise at trial. [Plain Error - Crim.R. 52(b)]. The main distinction between plain-
error review and harmless-error review is the party bearing the burden. See State v.
Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 17-18.
{¶60} Under Crim.R. 52(A), preserved errors require reversal only if they affect
substantial rights. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did not
affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶¶ 17-18; State v. Bond,
2022-Ohio-4150, ¶ 7. An error does not affect substantial rights of a defendant when the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not contribute to the verdict in any
meaningful way. State v. Rahman, 23 Ohio St.3d 146, 151 (1986).
{¶61} Campbell’s argument rests largely on the premise that the jury should have
been permitted to decide whether the underlying traffic stop was lawful and whether he
acted “purposely” in refusing to exit his vehicle. That premise is flawed. {¶62} Prior to trial, Campbell filed a motion to suppress challenging the legality of
the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the dark plastic license-plate
cover obstructed visibility at night and provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for the
stop. Campbell did not assign error to that ruling on appeal. See App.R. 16(A)(3).
{¶63} A suppression ruling, once made, is binding at trial. State v. French, 72 Ohio
St.3d 446, 449 (1995); State v. Edwards, 2005-Ohio-6180, ¶ 12; State v. Henry, 2009-
Ohio-434, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.). Accordingly, the legality of the stop was not a question for the
jury, nor is it an issue before this Court.
{¶64} Once a traffic stop is lawful, officers may order the driver to exit the vehicle
without violating the Fourth Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111
(1977); State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993); State v. Jackson, 2022-Ohio-
4365, ¶ 13. No additional justification for the order is required. Id.
{¶65} At trial, the jury heard testimony from Officer Myers and Officer Smith
describing repeated commands for Campbell to exit the vehicle. The jury also viewed
body-camera footage depicting Campbell’s refusal in real time. This evidence supported
the conclusion that Campbell acted with purpose and without privilege to impede the
officers’ lawful duties.
{¶66} Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court could have provided additional
definitional instructions, the State met its burden to demonstrate that any such error did
not affect Campbell’s substantial rights. The evidence overwhelmingly established the
elements of the offense, and there is no reasonable probability that a more detailed
instruction would have altered the verdict. Conclusion
{¶67} Based on the entire record, we conclude that any error in the jury
instructions on Obstructing Official Business was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
and did not affect Campbell’s substantial rights.
{¶68} Campbell’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
V.
{¶69} In his fifth assignment of error, Campbell argues that the trial court erred by
imposing a jail sentence for his conviction for Obstructing Official Business. We disagree.
{¶70} A trial court has broad discretion in misdemeanor sentencing, and an
appellate court will not disturb a sentence that falls within the statutory range absent an
abuse of that discretion. State v. Thadur, 2016-Ohio-417, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.), citing State v.
Smith, 2006-Ohio-1558, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.); State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-4596, ¶ 20 (5th
Dist.).
{¶71} An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies
that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably—such as by
applying an incorrect legal standard, relying on facts not supported by the record, or
imposing a sentence that results in a manifest injustice. See Tennant v. Gallick, 2014-
Ohio-477, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.); In re Guardianship of S.H., 2013-Ohio-4380, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.);
State v. Firouzmandi, 2006-Ohio-5823, ¶ 54 (5th Dist.); State v. Roman-Navarre, 2025-
Ohio-3156, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.); State v. Gibson, 2025-Ohio-5497, ¶ 49 (5th Dist.).
{¶72} In exercising its sentencing discretion, the trial court must be guided by the
purposes of misdemeanor sentencing—to protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender. R.C. 2929.21(A). The court must also consider the factors
enumerated in R.C. 2929.22(B)(1) and may consider any additional relevant factors. R.C.
2929.22(B)(2). When the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, a reviewing court
presumes that the trial court considered these statutory directives unless the record
affirmatively demonstrates otherwise. State v. Inman, 2021-Ohio-1573, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.),
quoting State v. Downie, 2009-Ohio-4643, ¶ 48 (7th Dist.); State v. Mosser, 2025-Ohio-
5536, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).
{¶73} Measured against these principles, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing Campbell.
{¶74} The trial court imposed a sentence of ninety days in jail, with thirty days
suspended and credit for two days served. Sentencing T., June 13, 2025, at 2. That
sentence is within the statutory maximum for a misdemeanor of the second degree. R.C.
2929.24(A)(2). Accordingly, the sentence is presumed valid.
{¶75} The record further reflects that Campbell was represented by retained
counsel at sentencing and did not request a presentence investigation report, seek to
present mitigating evidence, or object to the sentence imposed. Nothing in the record
suggests that the trial court failed to consider the relevant sentencing factors or otherwise
acted outside the bounds of its discretion.
{¶76} Campbell nevertheless asserts error based on the trial court’s failure to
personally address him and inquire whether he wished to make a statement before
sentencing. R.C. 2929.19 and Crim.R. 32(A)(1) impose a mandatory duty on the trial court
to afford counsel an opportunity to speak and to personally address the defendant at sentencing. State v. Jackson, 150 Ohio St.3d 362 (2016); State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio
St.3d 320, 326 (2000). Ordinarily, a failure to comply with this requirement necessitates
resentencing unless the error is invited or harmless. State v. Morgan, 2022-Ohio-4576, ¶
30 (5th Dist.). Here, however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶77} The jury returned a guilty verdict on the Obstructing Official Business charge
and acquitted Campbell of Resisting Arrest. The trial court did not reference any prior
criminal history, victim impact statements, or sentencing recommendations by the State.
Rather, the sentence was grounded exclusively in the evidence presented at trial.
{¶78} Equally significant, the sentencing judge was the same judge who presided
over the jury trial and personally observed the testimony and reviewed the dash-camera
and body-camera footage admitted into evidence. The court was therefore intimately
familiar with the facts, the circumstances of the offense, and Campbell’s conduct
throughout the encounter. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability
that an additional statement by Campbell would have altered the sentence imposed.
{¶79} Although the trial court did not expressly cite R.C. 2929.21 or R.C. 2929.22
at sentencing, it was not required to do so, and the record affirmatively demonstrates that
the court considered the nature of the offense and the evidence presented at trial in
fashioning an appropriate sentence.
{¶80} Because the sentence imposed was within the statutory range, supported
by the record, and the product of the trial court’s reasoned discretion, no abuse of
discretion occurred. Any error arising from the trial court’s failure to personally address
Campbell at sentencing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. {¶81} Campbell’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Massillon Municipal
Court, Stark County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to Appellant, Randon Raymone Campbell.
By: Popham, J.
Baldwin, P.J. and
Gormley, J., concur