State v. Campbell

2023 Ohio 1831

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Campbell, 2023-Ohio-1831.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29633 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 1991 CR 01583 : WILLIAM CAMPBELL : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on June 2, 2023

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Pro Se Appellant

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant William Campbell appeals from the trial court’s order

denying his September 2022 motion to strike, which challenged his designation as a

sexual predator in March 2000. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background -2-

{¶ 2} In October 1991, Campbell was convicted of rape, robbery, and kidnapping

and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 28- to 65-years in prison. While Campbell

was still incarcerated, and following the enactment of Megan’s Law in Ohio, the trial court

scheduled a sex offender determination hearing on March 3, 2000, and Campbell was

brought before the court for the hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court designated

Campbell as a sexual predator and filed the explanation of duties for Campbell to register

as a sex offender. Campbell did not appeal from the trial court’s sexual predator

designation.

{¶ 3} In August 2022, Campbell filed a motion to dismiss, asking the trial court to

deny the State’s request for a sexual predator determination and to dismiss further

proceedings. The trial court overruled Campbell’s motion to dismiss, finding that more

than 22 years had passed since Campbell was designated as a sexual predator and that

the issues raised by Campbell were barred by res judicata. In September 2022, Campbell

filed a motion to strike, again requesting that the trial court vacate his sexual predator

designation because it was unconstitutional. In his motion to strike, Campbell argued that

the sex offender registry law (Megan’s Law) — which related to his sexual predator

designation and was applied during his sex offender determination hearing in 2000 —

was not in effect at the time of his sentencing in 1991 and was therefore incorrectly

applied to him in violation of the retroactivity and ex post facto clauses of the Ohio and

United States Constitutions. The trial court overruled Campbell’s motion to strike; it again

found that the issues Campbell raised should have been raised on direct appeal at the

time of his sexual predator designation and thus were barred by res judicata. Campbell -3-

now appeals.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 4} Campbell’s sole assignment of error is as follows:

PLAINTIFF’S [SIC] VIOLATED THE EX POST FACTO LAW WHICH

WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO PLACE UNDER THE LAW THAT WAS

NOT IN EFFECT WHEN PETITIONER WAS TRIED AND CONVICTED

BACK IN 1991.

{¶ 5} A brief history of the sex offender laws to which Campbell refers is worth

noting. In 1963, Ohio enacted a sex offender registration statute codified under Chapter

2950 of the Ohio Revised Code. State v. Gall, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26245 and

26240, 2016-Ohio-1562, ¶ 9, citing State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 406, 700 N.E.2d

570 (1998), citing former R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Laws 669. In 1994, Megan’s Law, N.J.

Stat.Ann. 2C:7-1 et seq., was first enacted in New Jersey in response to the rape and

murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka. Cook at 405-406. In 1996, the Ohio General

Assembly enacted Megan’s Law pursuant to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, which rewrote R.C.

Chapter 2950 and created Ohio’s first comprehensive registration, classification, and

community notification system for convicted sex offenders. Cook at 406. The classification

provision in Megan’s Law under former R.C. 2950.09 became effective on January 1,

1997, while the registration and notification requirements became effective on July 1,

1997. Id. Accordingly, at the time of Campbell’s sex offender determination hearing in

March 2000, the sex offender registration laws in Ohio were set forth pursuant to H.B.

180 under Megan’s Law in R.C. Chap. 2950. -4-

{¶ 6} Under Megan’s Law, the new classification system in Ohio for convicted sex

offenders required a sentencing court to determine whether sex offenders fell into one of

the following classifications: (1) sexually oriented offender; (2) habitual sex offender; or

(3) sexual predator. Cook at 407. Former R.C. 2950.01(E) defined sexual predator as “a

person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented

offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses.”

Id.

{¶ 7} Campbell contends that he should be relieved of the sex offender registry

obligations and that his designation as a sexual predator should be removed because the

registry did not apply to him. Specifically, Campbell argues that, at the time he was

sentenced in 1991, the sex offender law at issue was not in place and, therefore, his 2000

sexual predator designation was unconstitutional because it was retroactively applied to

him in violation of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. In response, the State argues

that the issues Campbell now raises are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We agree.

{¶ 8} It is well established that res judicata bars the consideration of issues that

could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-

1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 17. “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of

conviction bars the convicted defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding,

except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process

that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial which resulted in

that judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio

St. 2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). Additionally, “[w]here an alleged constitutional -5-

violation could have been raised on direct appeal, and was not, the doctrine of res

judicata bars further consideration of the error.” State v. Ogletree, 2d. Dist. Montgomery

No. 11664, 1990 WL 12685, *2 (Feb. 15, 1990).

{¶ 9} The basis of Campbell’s assignment of error is that the application of

Megan’s Law at his sex offender determination hearing was ex post facto as to Campbell

in violation of his constitutional rights because he was convicted of a sexually oriented

offense in 1991 and Megan’s Law was not enacted in Ohio until 1996. In March 2000,

Campbell was designated by the trial court as a sexual predator and was provided with

an explanation of duties requiring him to register as a sex offender. At that time, Campbell

did not appeal the trial court’s order. Instead, he waited more than 22 years to file a

motion to dismiss, requesting that the court deny his sexual predator determination and,

when that failed, he filed a motion to strike, arguing that the sex offender law did not apply

to him. However, this alleged error, even if meritorious, should have been raised by

Campbell on the direct appeal of his sexual predator designation following the 2000

hearing. In other words, Campbell had the opportunity to raise constitutional concerns

about his sexual predator designation on appeal but failed to do so, and the doctrine of

res judicata bars further consideration of the error at this stage.

{¶ 10} Even if the concerns that Campbell now raises were not barred by res

judicata, the alleged error raised by Campbell is not meritorious because Megan’s Law

was remedial in nature and could have been applied retroactively to Campbell without

running afoul of the Ohio or United States Constitutions.

{¶ 11} After the enactment of Megan’s Law, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the -6-

retroactive application of the law on multiple occasions against claims that it violated the

ban on retroactive laws in Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution and the ban on

ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. Gall, 2d Dist.

Montgomery Nos. 26245 and 26240, 2016-Ohio-1562, at ¶ 10, citing Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d

404, 406, 700 N.E.2d 570; State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 516, 728 N.E.2d 342

(2000); State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110. We

explained in Gall:

In Cook, the Supreme Court found a clear legislative intent for

Megan’s Law to be applied retroactively and explained that purely remedial

statutes, such as Megan’s Law, may be applied retroactively without

running afoul of the constitutional ban against retroactive and ex post facto

laws. Id. at 410-423. Despite the fact that Megan’s Law increased the

frequency and duration of reporting beyond what was required by prior law,

the Supreme Court determined its provisions only “us[ed] past events to

establish current status” and constituted “de minimis procedural

requirements” that were necessary to achieve the legislature’s remedial

purpose of protecting the public from sexual offenders. (Emphasis deleted.)

Id. at 412. Accordingly, the court concluded that because the retroactive

application of Megan’s Law was not punitive, but remedial, it did not violate

the constitutional ban on retroactive and ex post facto laws.

In Ferguson, the Supreme Court considered the same claims in Cook

that were made in light of amendments to the law in 2003. Despite -7-

significant changes wrought by the amendments, the Supreme Court

rejected the claim that the amendments were punitive and once again

concluded that Megan’s Law established a remedial, regulatory scheme

that did not violate the ban on retroactive and ex post facto laws. Ferguson

at ¶ 32-39 (finding “an offender’s classification as a sexual predator is a

collateral consequence of the offender’s criminal acts rather than a form of

punishment” and “[t]he more burdensome registration requirements and the

collection and dissemination of additional information about the offender as

part of the statute’s community notification provisions were not born of a

desire to punish[;]” rather, “it is a remedial, regulatory scheme designed to

protect the public rather to punish the offender”).

Id. at ¶ 11-12.

{¶ 12} Relying on the foregoing precedent, this court has repeatedly recognized

that the retroactive application of Megan’s Law was not a constitutional violation. We

have consistently held that the sex offender classification, registration, and notification

provisions under Megan’s Law applied to defendants who committed their offense prior

to the enactment of Megan’s Law. Gall at ¶ 15, citing State v. Lay, 2d Dist. Champaign

No. 2012-CA-7, 2012-Ohio-4447, ¶ 6–8; State v. Grimes, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

25375, 2013-Ohio-2569, ¶ 4; State v. Czaplicki, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25252, 2013-

Ohio-1366, ¶ 4-6. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in applying Megan’s Law at

Campbell’s sex offender determination hearing even though Campbell had committed his

sexually-oriented offense before Megan’s Law went into effect. The law is clear that -8-

Megan’s Law could be applied retroactively and that it was not an ex post facto law.

{¶ 13} Campbell’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 14} Having overruled Campbell’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

WELBAUM, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.