An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-892
Filed 1 July 2026
Guilford County, Nos. 23CR456535-400, 23CR456539-400, 23CR456532-400, 24CR028051-400
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ALLEN ANTHONY CAMPBELL
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 12 December 2024 by Judge
Jason E. Ramey in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
3 June 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Joonu-Noel Andrews Coste, for the State.
Blass Law, PLLC, by Danielle Blass, for defendant.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Allen Anthony Campbell (“defendant”) appeals from judgment entered after
jury trial. Defendant was convicted of felony possession of a firearm by a felon, felony
speeding to elude arrest, driving while impaired, transporting an open container of
alcohol, and driving while license revoked, and he pleaded guilty to having attained STATE V. CAMPBELL
Opinion of the Court
the status of habitual felon. For the following reasons, we affirm the court’s
judgment.
I. Introduction
At 7:34 p.m. on 10 November 2023, workers at the McDonald’s on Randleman
Road called the Greensboro Police Department after finding a stopped car in the
drive-thru lane with an unconscious man inside. Corporal Wright arrived, followed
shortly thereafter by Officer Speller, and the McDonald’s employees pointed out the
car, a black Ford Taurus with the driver’s side window open. Corporal Wright
approached the driver’s side while Officer Speller shined his light into the car,
revealing a dog in the back seat and an alcoholic beverage at the driver’s feet.
Corporal Wright’s bodycam footage was entered into evidence and is included
in the record. It captures him repeating, “Sir, sir, sir,” attempting to rouse the
unconscious man in the driver’s seat, later identified as defendant. Corporal Wright
testified that “the vehicle was still in drive” and defendant was unconscious with “his
hands in his front pocket.” He described the smell of alcohol emanating from the car,
the open bottle of Hennessy cognac at defendant’s feet, and a dog in the back seat
covered in blood.
When the driver stirred, Corporal Wright identified himself as a police officer
and asked if defendant was okay. He directed defendant to put the car’s transmission
in park, “because you’re asleep in the drive-thru.” Looking into the car, he pointed
out the open container to defendant and asked if the dog was okay, and defendant
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replied that a stray dog had attacked his dog. Corporal Wright told defendant again
to put the car in park, but defendant pointed his hand forward and replied, “I’m
going.” With his hand on the Ford’s door, Corporal Wright told him, “Put it in park.
Put it in park. Put it in park. Stop driving.” As defendant pulled ahead slowly,
Corporal Wright directed him to a row of empty parking spaces and toldu him, “Pull
over to the right.” However, defendant steered the car toward the parking lot’s exit
onto Randleman Road.
During this interaction, Officer Segarra-Colon arrived on the scene and exited
his patrol car, leaving his blue lights flashing. His bodycam footage was also
introduced in evidence and included in the record. When the Ford exited the parking
lot, he followed it onto Randleman Road in his patrol car and reactivated his siren.
Defendant drove on Randleman Road, reaching approximately ten miles per hour.
After about 11 seconds on Randleman Road, defendant re-entered the McDonald’s
parking lot through an exit, and Officer Segarra-Colon used a “precision
immobilization technique” PIT maneuver to stall the Ford after defendant did not
immediately pull into a parking spot. Officer Segarra-Colon placed defendant under
arrest. While searching defendant, he found a small amount of marijuana.
While waiting for Animal Control to take custody of defendant’s injured dog,
Officers Asbury and Segarra-Colon observed the open bottle of Hennessy cognac, cash
on the Ford’s floor, and a black handgun between the driver’s door and seat. Once
they were able to search the vehicle, Officer Segarra-Colon seized the firearm and
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noticed its serial number.
While defendant was seated in the patrol vehicle, Sergeant Luper tested his
breath with a portable device which registered the presence of alcohol. No field
sobriety test was performed, but Officers Segarra-Colon and Corporal Wright both
testified that they believed defendant was intoxicated. Corporal Wright testified: “I
knew he had an open container. I knew he had slurred speech. He had already tried
to flee one time.” He explained that he did not perform a field sobriety test because
“animals can try to protect their owners. So I felt for the safety of the officers and
him that I had enough to . . . charge him with driving while impaired.” Both Officers
Speller and Segarra-Colon accompanied defendant to jail, where he vomited on the
jail floor and continued to smell of alcohol.
Corporal Wright is certified to use the Intoxilyzer to analyze breath for the
presence of alcohol and he made defendant aware of his rights as to the test’s
administration, including his right to refuse the test, which would require a one-year
revocation of his driver’s license and allow his refusal to be admitted as evidence.
Defendant refused the test. Corporal Wright testified: “[Defendant] uttered jokingly
I could have at least let him finish his bottle of Hennessy, and he kind of laughed a
little bit and said, ‘Hennessy and 1800 will land you in jail.’ ”
The State charged defendant with felony possession of a firearm by a felon,
felony speeding to elude arrest, driving while impaired, transporting an open
container of alcoholic beverage, driving while license revoked, and later with having
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attained the status of habitual felon.
At trial, the State presented fifteen exhibits, including videos captured by
cameras mounted on Officer Speller’s and Officer Segarra-Colon’s patrol cars and by
Officer Asbury’s and Corporal Wright’s body cams. Evidence also established that
defendant’s driver’s license was already revoked at the time of the incident and that
he was previously convicted of a felony in North Carolina.
At the close of State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charges of
possession of a firearm by a felon and fleeing to elude DWI. Defendant argued that
the vehicle’s speed did not exceed ten miles per hour, that the vehicle was stopped by
Officer Segarra-Colon’s PIT maneuver, and that there was no evidence of a blood
alcohol level over 0.14. After the motion was denied, defendant put on no evidence
and then unsuccessfully moved to dismiss again.
On the charge of fleeing to elude arrest, the State indicted defendant with three
of eight possible aggravating factors: reckless driving as defined by N.C.G.S. § 20-
140; driving while license revoked; and gross impairment. During the charge
conference, the Court declined to include either instruction on the aggravating factor
of “speeding in excess of 15 miles per hour of the legal speed limit” or refer to blood
alcohol level on the aggravating factor of gross impairment. Defendant objected to
the latter exclusion, but the court heard arguments and determined that it could not
“permit the jury to speculate on what his blood alcohol content would have been”
because no evidence was introduced on the question and the issue was outside the
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jury’s competence. Defendant did not object to the instructions about the aggravating
factor of driving with a revoked license.
Defendant also objected to the court’s instruction on the aggravated factor of
reckless driving, arguing again that the State’s evidence was insufficient. After
watching video evidence again, the court found that there was “enough there for the
jury to decide,” referring to the officers’ testimony that defendant seemed impaired,
that defendant drove the car while Corporal Wright was holding onto the Ford’s
window, and evidence that defendant drove with people around his car and entered
the McDonald’s through an exit.
The court’s instruction on the definition of reckless driving was as follows:
Reckless driving is defined as any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway or any public vehicular area carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others or a person who drives any vehicle upon a highway or any public vehicular area without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property.
The court’s instructions on the requirements to find defendant guilty of a felony were
as follows:
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the alleged date the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area, while attempting to elude a law enforcement officer who was in the lawful performance of his duties and two or more of the following factors were present: (1) gross impairment of the defendant’s faculties due to consumption of an impairing substance; (2) reckless driving; (3) driving while his license
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-- while his driver’s license is revoked, and the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to know that the officer was a law enforcement officer, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of felonious operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest.
After the jury left the courtroom, both parties declined to present requests,
additions, or objections to the jury instructions. Defendant was found guilty on all
substantive charges, pled guilty to having attained the status of habitual felon, and
properly entered notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss
and in crafting its jury instructions. We discuss his two arguments in turn.
A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
charge of felony speeding to elude arrest due to insufficiency of the State’s evidence.
We review de novo whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss. State
v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62 (2007) (citing State v. McKinnon, 306 N.C. 288, 298
(1982)). To survive a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, the State
must present substantial evidence for each essential element of the charged offense
and that the defendant was the perpetrator. State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378 (2000)
(citation omitted). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Winkler, 368 N.C.
572, 574 (2015) (citation omitted). The evidence “must be considered in the light most
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favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference
therefrom.” In re A.N.C., Jr., 225 N.C. App. 315, 324 (2013) (quotation omitted).
The essential elements of misdemeanor speeding to elude arrest are: (1)
operating a motor vehicle (2) on a street, highway, or public vehicular area (3) while
fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer (4) who is in the lawful
performance of his duties. N.C.G.S. § 20-141.5(a); State v. Boykin, 275 N.C. App. 187,
189 (2020). A violation of this statute is felonious if the jury finds the existence of at
least two statutory aggravating factors out of eight. See N.C.G.S. § 20-141.5(b). Here,
the State’s indictment alleged three: reckless driving, driving while license revoked,
and gross impairment.
It is unchallenged that defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public road
and that the officers were acting lawfully, but defendant argues that the state
presented insufficient evidence that he was fleeing or attempting to elude police.
Defendant asserts that he drove very slowly and “never exceeded 10 mph” when the
Ford exited the drive-thru and parking lot, turned right and accelerated on
Randleman Road, and returned through the McDonald’s exit. He argues that the
statute is titled “Speeding to elude arrest” and this “demonstrates the legislature’s
intent to define the crime to require proof of speeding.”
We disagree. The inclusion of “speeding” in the title does not thereby render
the statute ambiguous and in need of statutory construction. Whether its title
accurately reflects an unambiguous statute’s contents has no effect on the law’s
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validity. See In re Chisholm’s Will, 176 N.C. 211, 213 (1918) (“Though the caption of
a statute may be called in aid of construction, it cannot control the text when it is
clear.”); accord In re Appeal of Forsyth County, 285 N.C. 64, 71 (1974). This statute’s
plain meaning is crystal clear: the State must present substantial evidence of the
vehicle’s speed if defendant is charged with the first of eight aggravating factors:
“Speeding in excess of 15 miles per hour over the legal speed limit.” N.C.G.S. § 20-
141.5(b)(1). No such requirement exists where this aggravating factor is not charged,
as in the instant case.
Defendant asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he
had the requisite intent to evade police, because sufficiency would have been
“impossible or nearly impossible . . . without evidence of speeding, and particularly
with uncontroverted evidence of a ‘very slow’ speed over a very short amount of time.”
Defendant points to evidence that the Ford “was moving for a maximum total of 43
seconds” during which it “was only on Randleman Road for 11 out of those 43
seconds.” Finally, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was
“aware that police were attempting to arrest or apprehend him.”
The State was not required to present evidence of any individual circumstance
such as speeding or the duration of the attempt to evade. Instead, survival of a
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence requires analysis of the totality of
the circumstances. State v. Montgomery, 299 N.C. App. 124, 127–28 (2025).
Accordingly, we examine whether the State presented enough relevant evidence to
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lead a reasonable mind to conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances,
defendant intended to attempt evasion of apprehension or arrest by police.
Here, there is no question that, under the totality of the circumstances,
defendant had the requisite knowledge that police were attempting to apprehend
him. Corporal Wright’s bodycam footage alone is sufficient on this point. The video
captures the officer waking defendant while he is asleep with his foot on the brake,
announcing that he is a police officer, and expressly describing the open container in
plain sight. We hear Corporal Wright giving clear, repeated instructions to put the
car in park, and after defendant fails to comply, Corporal Wright instructs him to pull
over to the right of the drive-thru lane, where there is a row of empty parking spots.
Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant had knowledge of
his predicament.
Therefore, we next ask whether the State’s evidence about what transpired
while defendant had this knowledge could lead a reasonable juror to find the requisite
intent. “Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must
ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.” State v.
Jackson, 289 N.C. App. 424, 427 (2023) (quotes and citations omitted). “[I]f the trial
court determines that a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt may be drawn
from the evidence, it must deny the defendant’s motion and send the case to the jury
even though the evidence may also support reasonable inferences of the defendant’s
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innocence.” State v. Boyd, 154 N.C. App. 302, 305 (2002) (citing State v. Matias, 354
N.C. 549, 551 (2001)).
Here, the evidence was arguably sufficient to support the reasonable inference
that defendant was drunkenly confused about Corporal Wright’s instructions but did
not intend to flee the scene: the Ford did not accelerate on its way onto Randleman
Road, and when it did so, it was only for a few seconds before the Ford turned back
into the parking lot. However, the evidence also supports the contrary reasonable
inference: that when defendant said, “I’m going” and the Ford left the parking lot, he
intended to flee until he realized escape was unlikely with Officer Segarra-Colon’s
patrol car right on his tail with a blasting siren and flashing lights.
Because this inference was possible, even though defendant’s intent was short-
lived, the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion and submitting the case to
the jury. Indeed, where the evidence supports two contrary factual inferences,
“[c]ontradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant
dismissal.” Jackson, 289 N.C. App. at 427 (quoting State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142, 150
(1995)). Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence of all essential elements
of misdemeanor speeding to elude arrest.
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence as to two of the
charged aggravating factors: gross impairment and reckless driving. As to the
former, the State was required to present sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that defendant’s faculties were grossly impaired due to either the
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consumption of an impairing substance or a blood alcohol concentration over 0.14
within a relevant time after driving. See N.C.G.S. § 20-141.5(b) (emphasis added).
We consider the facts of the individual case, for there is no “bright line which will
mark once and for all where ‘impairment’ ends and ‘gross impairment’ begins.” State
v. Stokes, 174 N.C. App. 447, 454 (2005) (quote and citation omitted).
On this issue, the State’s evidence was overwhelming. Defendant was
unconscious behind the wheel of a car with his foot on the brake and the gear in drive.
The car was stationary in the drive-thru of a McDonald’s during dinner hours while
the restaurant was serving customers. Officers testified to the strong smell of alcohol,
the open bottle of cognac, defendant’s unconsciousness and vomiting during the
arrest, and defendant’s own statements about his intoxication. Moreover, defendant
refused his breathalyzer test. The bodycam footage shows that Corporal Wright had
to repeatedly greet defendant to wake him and that defendant’s words were slurred.
The statute does not require the State to present a breathalyzer result showing blood
alcohol concentration over 0.14. However, the other evidence presented would indeed
suffice to support a reasonable juror’s conclusion that defendant was grossly
intoxicated due to alcohol throughout these events.
Reckless driving is defined as follows:
(a) Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway or any public vehicular area carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others shall be guilty of reckless driving.
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(b) Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway or any public vehicular area without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property shall be guilty of reckless driving.
N.C.G.S. § 20-140. Under G.S. § 15A-1340.16(d), “[e]vidence necessary to prove an
element of the offense shall not be used to prove any factor in aggravation, and the
same item of evidence shall not be used to prove more than one factor in aggravation.”
Setting aside the evidence supporting either the primary offense or gross
impairment, the following admitted evidence supported this aggravating factor alone:
that the McDonald’s was open and serving; that defendant rolled away while Corporal
Wright stood in the narrow space between the vehicle and the restaurant with his
hand on his car window; that other drivers were on Randleman Road; that he re-
entered the McDonald’s parking lot through its exit; and that Officer Segarra-Colon
executed a PIT maneuver when defendant did not stop.
However, this statute punishes not the fact that a defendant is driving but the
quality of his driving. The bodycam videos show that, in the short time the car was
in motion, defendant did not drive on Randleman Road “in a manner so as to endanger
or be likely to endanger any person or property.” Defendant correctly points out his
slow speed and that no pedestrians or drivers were affected by his driving. Although
he may have briefly attempted to evade the officers, his slow speed and quick decision
to return to the McDonald’s parking lot ensured that no one was likely to be
endangered. Further, Officer Segarra-Colon testified that he judged it necessary to
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initiate the PIT maneuver “believing that there might be a pursuit[.]” In other words,
the officer’s decision was not due to the quality of defendant’s driving, but because
defendant had not stopped driving.
This leaves us with evidence that defendant entered through the McDonald’s
exit while no other drivers were attempting to leave the lot, and that Corporal Wright
was standing close to the vehicle while defendant took his foot off the brake and the
Ford began to creep forward. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this
evidence would have been insufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that
defendant’s conduct behind the wheel of the Ford was “carelessly and heedlessly in
willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others” or “in a manner so as to
endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property[.]” Accordingly, the court
erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss with regard to the aggravating
factor of reckless driving.
Nevertheless, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only
two or more of the aggravating factors to support defendant’s conviction for felonious
speeding to elude arrest. N.C.G.S. § 20-141.5(b); see also State v. Funchess, 141 N.C.
App. 302, 310 (2000). The State offered sufficient substantial evidence permitting
the jury to reach its conclusions as to the essential elements of the offense and the
aggravating factors of gross impairment and driving while license revoked.
Therefore, we must not disturb either the jury’s guilty verdict as to the primary
offense or its elevation from a misdemeanor to a felony.
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As to the court’s error, any further action by this Court is appropriate if and
only if the error ultimately prejudiced defendant. N.C.G.S. § 15A‑1442(4)(b). If the
sentence imposed fell within the presumptive range and therefore could have been
the same with or without the erroneous third aggravating factor, defendant will be
unable to show that prejudice befell him as a direct result of the error.
At sentencing, defendant pled guilty to having attained the status of habitual
felon. As a result, the court was obligated to sentence defendant at a felony class
level four classes higher than the statutory class level for the principal felony, and
the sentence was to run consecutively with any other sentence. See N.C.G.S. § 14-
7.6. Here, the Class H level was raised to Class D, and defendant’s prior convictions
required a Prior Record Level VI for felony sentencing. The court could have selected
from the prescribed presumptive range of minimum durations of between 103 and
128 months. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17(c). The court selected, in its discretion, a
minimum sentence of 128 months. Because this was within the presumptive range,
the court was not obligated to make any written findings as to the aggravating or
mitigating factors affecting its decision. N.C.G.S. § 15A‑1340.16(c). Therefore,
nothing in the record allows defendant to show that the third aggravating factor left
any prejudicial effect at the sentencing phase.
While it appears that the court’s sentence of almost 23 years for these offenses
was out of proportion to the conduct resulting in defendant’s conviction, based upon
defendant’s prior convictions and the relevant statutes, we are unable to find that
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defendant has met the high bar to establish an abuse of discretion during the
sentencing phase.
B. Jury Instructions
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in charging the jury as to felony
speeding to elude arrest based on reckless driving and gross impairment. However,
defendant’s brief discusses only the court’s reckless driving instruction and includes
no argument in support of his claim regarding the court’s gross impairment
instructions. “Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason
or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.” N.C. R. App. P. Rule 28(b)(6).
Accordingly, we are unable to review the court’s jury instructions as to gross
impairment. As to reckless driving, because we have found that the court erred in
submitting this factor to the jury, it is unnecessary to address the argument as to the
instruction.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we conclude that the court’s denial of defendant’s
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence as to the aggravating factor of reckless
driving was erroneous but not prejudicial. Therefore, we find defendant received a
trial free from prejudicial error.
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Judges STROUD and COLLINS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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