State v. Cameron

152 So. 3d 196, 2014 La.App. 4 Cir. 0168, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2499, 2014 WL 5285759
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 15, 2014
DocketNo. 2014-KA-0168
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 152 So. 3d 196 (State v. Cameron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Cameron, 152 So. 3d 196, 2014 La.App. 4 Cir. 0168, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2499, 2014 WL 5285759 (La. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge.

h Michael Cameron, the Defendant, seeks this Court’s review of his conviction and sentence. He was charged with a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, second degree murder. A jury found him guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment, at hard labor, without benefits.

Statement of the Case

On November 29, 2010, Eric Roy was attending a concert at the Republic nightclub in New Orleans. While in the V.I.P. section of the club, Mr. Roy was attacked and stabbed in the head and neck. After an extended hospital stay and several surgical procedures, Mr. Roy was taken off of life support.

On April 11, 2011, the Defendant was charged by bill of information with one count of second degree murder. He filed motions to suppress evidence, statements, and identification which were denied by the trial court. Subsequently, the case was heard by a twelve person jury from September 23, 2013 until September 26, 2013. Upon completion of the trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty as charged with second degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, at hard labor, without benefits, to run concurrent and coterminous with any other sentence. At that time, he motioned the trial court for an appeal.

| .¿Errors Patent

A review of the record reveals no errors patent.

Assignments of Error

In his sole assignment of error, the Defendant maintains that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to reach a verdict finding him guilty of second degree murder.

Standard of Review

In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, this Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.1 However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier’s view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The factfinder’s discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.2 A factfinder’s credibility decision should not be disturbed unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence.3

[198]*198l-jln addition, “[a]s a general matter, when the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the state is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification.”4 A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction.5 The reviewing court must examine the reliability of an identification according to the test set out in Manson v. Brathwaite: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the assailant at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the assailant; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.6

The Defendant does not argue that the State failed to prove the elements of second degree murder, but rather, that the State failed to produce a witness that identified him as the murderer. He maintains that the witnesses were only able to identify him from his clothing, and one witness, Caroline Koerner, contradicted her testimony when she initially stated that she saw his features and that he had short hair and khaki pants.

The Defendant submits that in light of Jackson v. Virginia, he is not seeking this Court’s substitution of judgment for that of the jury; however, he contends that a review of the record will reveal that a rational trier of fact would not have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he killed Mr. Roy.

I/The State argues that the Defendant’s assignment of error is without merit because it was able to establish that the police, staff from Republic, and others, chased and apprehended the defendant after the stabbing, and those events were corroborated by eyewitnesses.

Trial Witnesses

At trial, the State called several witnesses who were present at Republic on the night that Mr. Roy was stabbed. Through those witnesses, the State provided the jury with a detailed description of the stabbing incident and subsequent arrest and identification of Cameron.

Detective Tindell Murdock testified that he remembered being called to Republic on November 29, 2010, to investigate a stabbing. He arrived at approximately 3:30 a.m., and he located two witnesses while assisting the lead detective. He identified the witnesses as Seneca Johnson and Nicole Age. Det. Murdock testified that he interviewed Ms. Johnson about what she witnessed and that once he learned the Defendant was in custody in the back of a police car, he asked if she would identify a suspect. From there, Det. Murdock contacted Det. Willie Jenkins, who was also assisting in the matter. According to Det. Murdock, Det. Jenkins removed the Defendant from the vehicle and shined a light on him, and Ms. Johnson positively identified him as the suspect. Although the defense objected to any statements Det. Murdock said were made by Nicole Age, the court allowed Det. Murdock to testify that Nicole Age identified the Defendant that evening as the suspect.

On cross-examination Det. Murdock testified that the police conducted a “show-up [199]*199procedure” because he felt from what he learned from Ms. Johnson that she could identify the suspect regardless of Ms. Johnson stating that she never saw |sthe suspect’s face. He testified that he never spoke to the Defendant, nor did he check his hands for blood or bruising. The Detective admitted that he had no written reports from that night because he was not the lead detective.

Ms. Johnson testified at trial that she knew Mr. Roy from going out to nightclubs and that she saw him on November 29, 2010 at Republic. She further testified that she was upstairs in the V.I.P. section of the nightclub during the time that Mr. Roy was attacked. Ms. Johnson stated that she and Mr. Roy went to the bar to buy her friend a drink, and when she turned around she saw a “guy with a bald head, a red jacket” hit Mr. Roy. She claimed that everyone started to scream as he fell to the floor bleeding from his head. Ms. Johnson further stated that Mr. Roy was breathing while he was on the floor, and that she was pushed out of the way by security. She also testified that approximately thirty to forty-five minutes after the incident an NOPD officer asked her if she could identify the person who struck Mr. Roy, and she identified a male in handcuffs, dressed as she earlier described, as the perpetrator.

On cross-examination Ms. Johnson was able to remember names of her friends who were also in proximity to the stabbing so that the defense could call them as witnesses.

Also at trial, Caroline Koerner testified that she knew Mr. Roy, and she was in Republic on November 29, 2010. She testified that the Defendant pushed his way through a crowd of people as if he wanted to instigate a fight. She said that she witnessed the Defendant push Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
152 So. 3d 196, 2014 La.App. 4 Cir. 0168, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2499, 2014 WL 5285759, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-cameron-lactapp-2014.