State v. Caldwell

2025 Ohio 2827

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 11, 2025
• Docket: 3-24-17
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Caldwell, 2025-Ohio-2827.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 3-24-17 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

BRIAN CALDWELL, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 24-CR-0112

Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded

Date of Decision: August 11, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Christopher Bazeley for Appellant

Daniel J. Stanley for Appellee Case No. 3-24-17

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Brian Caldwell (“Caldwell”) brings this appeal

from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County finding him

guilty of seven counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs and one count of

manufacturing drugs. The trial court then sentenced Caldwell to an aggregate prison

term of 11 to 16.5 years plus 36 months. On appeal Caldwell claims that his

convictions in six of the counts were not supported by the evidence and that the trial

court erred in finding him guilty of levels of the offense higher than that listed on

the verdict forms. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed in part

and reversed in part.

{¶2} On April 23, 2024, the Crawford County Grand Jury indicted Caldwell

on ten counts: 1) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2),

(C)(1)(e), a felony of the first degree; 2) illegal manufacture of drugs in violation of

R.C. 2925.04(A), (C)(3)(a), a felony of the second degree; 3) aggravated trafficking

in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(d), a felony of the second degree;

4) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(d), a

felony of the second degree; 5) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(d), a felony of the second degree; 6) aggravated trafficking

in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(d), a felony of the second degree;

7) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(d), a

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felony of the second degree; 8) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(e), a felony of the first degree; 9) aggravated trafficking in

drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(e), a felony of the first degree; and

10) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(c), a

felony of the third degree. The trial court arraigned Caldwell and Caldwell entered

a plea of not guilty to all counts. A jury trial was held on May 9 and 10, 2024. The

trial court granted a Crim.R. 29 motion as to Counts 5 and 8. The jury returned

guilty verdicts on the remaining counts.

{¶3} On June 21, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial

court sentenced Caldwell to serve a prison terms as follows: Count 1 = six years;

Count 2 = 8 years; Count 3 = 24 months; Count 4 = 24 months; Count 6 = 6 years;

Count 7 = 6 years; Count 9 = 11 years; and Count 10 = 36 months. Counts 1, 2, 6,

7, and 9 were ordered to be served concurrent to each other for an indefinite sentence

of 11 to 16.5 years. Counts 3, 4, and 10 were ordered to be served concurrent to

each other for a definite sentence of 36 months. These two sentence groupings were

ordered to be served consecutive to each other for an aggregate prison term of 11

years to 16.5 years plus 36 months. Caldwell appeals from this judgment and raises

the following assignments of error on appeal.

First Assignment of Error

The State failed to prove that the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas was the proper venue for the trial of counts one through eight.

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Second Assignment of Error

Caldwell’s sentences on counts one, three, four, six, seven, nine, and ten are contrary to law.

Venue

{¶4} In the first assignment of error, Caldwell claims that the State failed to

prove venue for counts one, two, three, four, six, and seven. “Although it is not a

material element of the offense charged, venue is a fact which must be proved in

criminal prosecutions unless it is waived by the defendant.” State v. Headley, 6

Ohio St.3d 475, 477 (1983). Establishment of venue is controlled by R.C. 2901.12

which states in relevant part as follows.

A) The trial of a criminal case in this state shall be held in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, and, except in cases of emergency under section 1901.028, 1907.04, 2301.04, or 2501.20 of the Revised Code, in the territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was committed.

...

G) When it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense or any element of an offense was committed in any of two or more jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdiction the offense or element was committed, the offender may be tried in any of those jurisdictions.

(H) When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses occurred. Without limitation on the evidence that may be used to establish the course of criminal conduct, any of the following is prima-facie evidence of a course of criminal conduct:

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(3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or chain of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective.

R.C. 2901.12. “[V]enue need not ‘be proven in express terms’ as long as it can ‘be

established by all the facts and circumstances in the case’”. State v. Brown, 2024-

Ohio-627, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.).

{¶5} Caldwell claims that since there was no evidence that the messages

were sent or received in Crawford County, the State did not establish venue.

However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a defendant may be indicted and

tried in a county for offenses that occurred outside that county “provided that the

offenses are part of the same course of conduct that took place in the county in which

the grand jury resides.” State v. Jackson, 2014-Ohio-3707, ¶ 131. “The question of

venue is ultimately resolved by determining whether the defendant had a ‘significant

nexus’ with the jurisdiction in which he was tried.” Brown, supra at ¶ 24.

{¶6} Caldwell argues that the state failed to prove venue in counts one, three

four, six, and seven because they were all based solely upon cell phone messages.

Venue is established in the counties in which the messages were sent or received

via a telecommunication device. R.C. 2901.12(I)(1). However, Detective Tyler

Winkleman (“Winkleman”) admitted that there was no evidence that the messages

were either sent from or received in Crawford County. Nevertheless, this was not

all the evidence that was presented.

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{¶7} Deputy David Rowland testified that he stopped Caldwell’s vehicle in

Crawford County on February 5, 2024. A search of the vehicle found a large bag

of what was later identified as methamphetamine hidden inside a loose speaker in

the vehicle. Detective Craig Moser (“Moser”) testified that Caldwell claimed he

had found the speaker on the side of the road. However, when Moser later searched

Caldwell’s home in Crawford County, he found a nearly identical speaker.

Additionally, the search of the apartment found an additional 12.95 grams of

methamphetamine and a digital scale.

{¶8} Winkleman testified that he searched Caldwell’s cellphone and found

conversations discussing drug deals. Although Winkleman did not know where

exactly the phone was located when the text messages were sent and received, he

knew that Caldwell had been living in the same location since the beginning of the

investigation in January of 2024.

{¶9} A review of the evidence shows that a reasonable juror could conclude

that Caldwell was engaged in a course of criminal conduct with a significant nexus

to Crawford County. Caldwell was bringing the drugs into Crawford County and

was apparently storing at least some of them at his apartment in Crawford County.

The phone messages showed that he had engaged in the sale of the drugs on various

occasions with multiple people. The “headquarters” of the operation appeared to be

Caldwell’s home in Crawford County as that was where there was multiple grams

of meth found along with scales for measuring it. Some of the text messages

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discussed the sales price where Caldwell indicated that he needed to charge a certain

price “or I make nothing”. Given this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude

that Caldwell’s possession of the drugs and sale of the drugs was all in furtherance

of the same objective – to make money – and were part of a “course of criminal

conduct.” Since there was a significant nexus with Crawford County, the evidence

supports a conclusion that these charges could, pursuant to R.C. 2901.12(H)(3),

rightfully be tried in Crawford County. Thus, the first assignment of error is

overruled.

Sentencing

{¶10} In his second assignment of error, Caldwell claims that the trial court

erred in convicting him of more than the lowest form of the offense because the

verdict forms do not specify the level of the offense. “A guilty verdict shall state

either the degree of the offense of which the offender is found guilty, or that such

additional element or elements are present. Otherwise a guilty verdict constitutes a

finding of guilty of the least degree of the offense charged.” R.C. 2945.75. The

Supreme Court of Ohio has addressed this issue in multiple cases.

{¶11} In State v. Pelfrey (2007-Ohio-256), the defendant was charged with

tampering with records in violation of R.C. 2913.42, which required an enhanced

charge of third degree felony when the tampering involves government records. Id.

at ¶ 3. The verdict form did not indicate either the degree of the offense or that the

records in question were government records. Id. at ¶ 4. The defendant appealed

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claiming he could only be convicted of a misdemeanor because the verdict form did

not contain the necessary statements as required by R. C. 2945.75. Id. Despite

defendant’s failure to raise the issue prior to appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio

determined that the statute was “unambiguous and definite”. Id. at ¶ 11. Despite the

facts that the verdict form incorporated the indictment, the conviction was supported

by clear evidence, the jury had been properly instructed, and that Pelfrey had failed

to raise an objection, the Court held that the trial court had erred and that Pelfrey

could only be convicted of the least degree of the offense. Id. at ¶ 14-15.

Because the language of R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) is clear, this [C]ourt will not excuse the failure to comply with the statute or uphold Pelfrey’s conviction based on additional circumstances such as those present in this case. The express requirement of the statute cannot be fulfilled by demonstrating additional circumstances, such as that the verdict incorporates the language of the indictment, or by presenting evidence to show the presence of the aggravated element at trial or the incorporation of the indictment into the verdict form, or by showing that the defendant failed to raise the issue of the inadequacy of the verdict form. We hold that pursuant to the clear language of R.C. 2945.75, a verdict form signed by a jury must include either the degree of the offense of which the defendant is convicted or a statement that an aggravating element has been found to justify convicting a defendant of a greater degree of a criminal offense.

Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio then appeared to be reconsidering its

position in State v. Eafford. 2012-Ohio-2224. In Eafford, the defendant was

charged and convicted of possession of cocaine. Id. at ¶ 1. On appeal, the appellate

court held that since the verdict form did not state the degree of the offense or

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specify that Eafford had possessed cocaine, he could only be convicted of the least

degree of the charged offense and reversed the verdict. The Supreme Court of Ohio

reversed the appellate court finding that since Eafford was indicted with possession

of cocaine, the verdict form referenced the indictment, the testimony showed that it

was cocaine, and Eafford did not raise the issue before appeal, the trial court’s error

did not rise to the level of plain error. Eafford, however did not address how its

holding complied with the statute or how it affected the ruling in Pelfrey as it

contained no reference to Pelfrey.

{¶13} Next, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of compliance

with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) in the case of State v. McDonald, 2013-Ohio-5042. In

McDonald, the defendant was charged and convicted of a third degree felony count

of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. Id. at ¶ 3. The verdict

form indicated that McDonald was guilty of failure to comply with order or signal

of police officer and caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to a person

or property. Id. at ¶ 6. McDonald claimed on appeal that the verdict form did not

comply with R.C. 2945.75, thus preventing him from being convicted of a felony

rather than a misdemeanor. Id. at ¶ 9. The appellate court affirmed the judgment

of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 11. The Supreme Court of Ohio took the case to determine

whether the inclusion of the “substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or

property” language was sufficient to support the third degree felony conviction

when the verdict did not specify the degree of the offense or the additional elements.

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Id. at ¶ 10. The Court discussed the facts in McDonald in light of the holding in

Pelfrey, but did not address the holding in Eafford. In McDonald, the Court noted

that R.C. 2945.75 was “a clear and complete statute” and that no unreasonable

burden was imposed on lawyers or trial judges by the statute. Id. at ¶ 14. “It’s

dictates are simple, and the resolution of cases that do not meet its requirements is

also straightforward” – the guilty verdict is deemed to be a finding of guilty of the

least degree of the offense charged. Id. The Court indicated that nothing outside of

the verdict form should be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the

verdict form is sufficient to support a conviction for anything greater than the least

degree of the offense. Id. at ¶ 19.

{¶14} Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio again addressed this issue in

State v. Mays. 2024-Ohio-4616. In Mays, the verdict form stated that the defendant

had violated a protection order and cited to the statutory subsections that elevated

the conviction from a misdemeanor to a felony. Because the verdict form specified

the statutory subsections, the Court determined that the verdict form complied with

R.C. 2945.75(A)(2).

{¶15} Here, we note that this is not a plain error challenge. Caldwell

objected to being sentenced for more than a fourth degree felony and the matter was

considered by the trial court. Additionally, we note that the State and the trial court

conceded that the verdict forms did not comply with R.C. 2945.75, instead arguing

that since the indictment and the jury instructions included the elevating elements,

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it is sufficient under the holding in Eafford. However, the holding in Eafford is not

the sole holding in effect and McDonald was decided after Eafford. McDonald

indicated that a verdict form should contain 1) the degree of the offense, 2) the

essential elements which would elevate the degree of the offense, or 3) the relevant

statutory provisions providing the degree of the offense. Mays at ¶ 10 (citing the

concurring opinion). The verdict forms in this case did not contain any of these

things. Although the indictment did contain the necessary statutory subsections to

raise the degree of the offense, the verdict forms did not. The verdict forms only

specified the statutory section for the general offense. The clear and definite

language of the statute requires more. The statute also provides that if the guilty

verdict does not include the degree of the offense or the necessary additional

elements, the “guilty verdict is only a finding of guilty of the least degree of the

offense charged.” Given the statutory language and the interpretations of the

language by the Supreme Court of Ohio, Caldwell can only be convicted of the least

degree of the offenses, which are felonies of the fourth degree.1 The second

assignment of error is sustained.

{¶16} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford

1 We note that the second assignment of error does not challenge the sentence in count two.

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County is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The matter is remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.

Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded

ZIMMERMAN J., concurs.

MILLER, J., concurring separately.

{¶17} I concur in full with the majority opinion but write separately to

elaborate on one issue. Plain error does not apply to the second assignment of error

because Caldwell objected at the appropriate time to the error he complains about

in this appeal.

{¶18} The apparent error in the jury verdict form benefitted Caldwell during

the trial by failing to identify the quantity of drugs in some manner that would

establish the higher degree of the offenses. “When a trial court’s error results in a

lesser punishment for the defendant and accordingly prejudices the State, the State

bears the burden of objecting and calling the trial court’s attention to the error.”

State v. Mays, 2024-Ohio-4616, ¶ 25. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), the apparent

error would result in a lesser punishment for Caldwell. Compare id. at ¶ 26 (“the

verdict form’s alleged failure to comply with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), if true, would

have prejudiced Mays, as the verdict form elevated his offense from a first-degree

misdemeanor to a fifth-degree felony”). Consequently, Caldwell had no reason to

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object to the apparent error in the jury verdict form prior to the case being submitted

to the jury.

{¶19} Plain error review applies to obvious defects that “were not brought to

the attention of the court.” (Emphasis added.) Crim.R. 52(B). The error Caldwell

is appealing relates to his being sentenced to a higher degree of offense than allowed

by R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). The time for Caldwell to raise an objection to that error—

or otherwise bring it to the trial court’s attention—would only be prior to sentencing

when the trial court would still be able to correct the error. Critically, Caldwell did

so. Prior to the trial court sentencing him, Caldwell requested the court impose a

sentence in accordance with a finding of guilty on the least degree of the offenses

charged, pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(A)(2). This contrasts with, for example, the

scenario where the issue of sentencing a defendant contrary to R.C. 2945.75(A)(2)

is first presented on appeal.

{¶20} Thus, plain error review does not apply because Caldwell brought the

issue to the trial court’s attention and allowed the trial court the opportunity to avoid

or correct such an error in sentencing him. E.g., State v. Sanchez, 2014-Ohio-2263,

¶ 26 (8th Dist.) (plain error review did not apply because the defendant moved for

leave to withdraw his guilty plea, thus bringing the validity of the guilty plea to the

trial court’s attention); State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-1235, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.) (plain error

review did not apply because appellant brought the issue to the trial court’s attention

through a motion that the trial court effectively denied).

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{¶21} Finally, it is worth noting that the verdict form in this case is

distinguishable from the verdict form discussed in State v. Eafford, 2012-Ohio-

2224, upon which the trial court relied in overruling Caldwell’s motion and

sentencing him on the higher degree of each offense.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, it is the judgment and

order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed

in part with costs assessed equally between Appellant and Appellee for which

judgment is hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for

further proceedings and for execution of the judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

John R. Willamowski, Judge

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

Mark C. Miller, Judge Concurring Separately

DATED: /hls

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