05/05/2026
DA 24-0667 Case Number: DA 24-0667
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 98N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CODY ANN CARAVEO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADC-22-363 Honorable David J. Grubich, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ryan P. Archibald, Attorney at Law, Corpus Christi, Texas
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Michele R. Levine, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 15, 2026
Decided: May 5, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Cody Ann Caraveo appeals her September 2024 sentence on revocation in the
Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. The only issue she presents is
whether the court erroneously denied credit for elapsed time without violations
under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA (2023).1 Caraveo claims she was entitled to 130 days
elapsed-time credit—93 days from August 30 through December 1, 2023, and 37 days from
April 30 through June 6, 2024. The State disputes the first period but concedes she was
entitled to 37 days for the second period. We agree with the State and remand for entry of
an amended judgment crediting Caraveo with 37 days elapsed-time credit.
¶3 In May 2023, a jury found Caraveo guilty of felony burglary. On August 23, 2023,
the court sentenced Caraveo to two years to the Montana Department of Corrections
(DOC), all suspended. The court imposed probation conditions, requiring, as pertinent
here, that Caraveo abstain from illegal drugs and seek and maintain employment or
probation-approved programming.
1 All references to § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, are to the 2023 version of that statue. 2 ¶4 In March 2024, the State petitioned to revoke Caraveo’s suspended sentence based
on a Report of Violation (ROV) alleging that Caraveo had been charged with new crimes,
tested positive for methamphetamine, and failed to obtain or maintain employment or
programming. In April 2024, Caraveo denied the allegations. The court continued
disposition twice while Caraveo sought drug treatment, eventually setting a hearing date
for mid-September 2024.
¶5 In early August 2024, Caraveo’s probation officer submitted an addendum to his
ROV alleging that, while Caraveo had entered inpatient drug treatment on July 16, 2024,
she left just five days later, weeks ahead of her projected August 14, 2024 discharge date
and against her treatment provider’s advice. The probation officer also alleged a new
violation for Caraveo’s failing to report any employment or programming.
¶6 At the scheduled September 18, 2024 hearing, Caraveo changed her responses to
the March 2024 revocation petition allegations and answered the separate, additional
August 2024 allegations, admitting all alleged violations under oath, including that she
failed to obtain or maintain employment or programming and failed to report any
employment to her probation officer.
¶7 At the September 2024 dispositional hearing, Caraveo’s probation officer,
consistent with the allegations in the ROV and addendum, testified that, since signing her
probation conditions in August 2023, Caraveo had continued to struggle with drug use and
had failed to maintain employment or programming. He denied that Caraveo was entitled
to any credit from August 30 through December 1, 2023, because she never reported any
employment or programming during that timeframe. He said he twice utilized a “job
3 development” case management response to no avail. However, the probation officer
acknowledged that Caraveo reported employment beginning April 30, 2024, and that his
last note reflecting reported employment was June 6, 2024.
¶8 The District Court revoked Caraveo’s probationary sentence and sentenced her to a
two-year DOC commitment with no time suspended and denied any credit for elapsed time.
Caraveo argues this was error because she sought elapsed-time credit for 93 days from
August 30 through December 1, 2023, and 37 days from April 30 through June 6, 2024, on
the ground that there was no record or recollection of any specific probation violation
during those periods.
¶9 Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, governs elapsed-time credit on revocation. The
statute requires the sentencing court to consider elapsed time, consult the records and
recollection of the probation and parole officer, and allow credit for elapsed time served
without any record or recollection of violations. State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178, ¶ 8,
410 Mont. 67, 517 P.3d 146. “Violations may be continuous or ongoing, so long as the
record or recollection of the supervising probation or parole officer points to specific,
actual instances of offender conduct constituting a violation of the terms of a sentence.”
State v. Powell, 2025 MT 218, ¶ 14, 424 Mont. 180, 577 P.3d 150. Because credit for
elapsed time is mandatory to the extent required by statute, we review a court’s
determination regarding elapsed-time credit for legality. Gudmundsen, ¶ 8.
¶10 Caraveo argues she was not in violation from August 30 through December 1, 2023,
because, at sentencing on August 23, 2023, defense counsel represented that she was
employed by her landlord and, in her view, the record does not clearly show when that
4 employment ended. That point does not carry the day. Even if the record suggested some
employment at sentencing, the relevant question under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, is
whether the probation officer’s records or recollection demonstrated a specific violation
during the period for which credit is sought. Here, Caraveo later admitted under oath that
the employment/programming allegations were true, and the probation officer testified
that Caraveo did not maintain or report employment or programming during the relevant
earlier period. On this record, the District Court did not err in concluding that Caraveo
remained in violation of the employment/programming condition during the August 30 to
December 1, 2023 period.
¶11 Based on the probation officer’s records and recollection, together with Caraveo’s
admissions, the District Court had a sufficient basis to find a continuous violation of the
employment/programming condition from August 30 through December 1, 2023. Section
46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, does not require multiple violations or separate proof of condition
violations during every portion of the period in question. A specific, continuous violation
of a probation condition is enough. See State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81, ¶ 12, 399 Mont. 459,
461 P.3d 108. Because the District Court relied on the violation of a specific condition,
supported by the probation officer’s records and recollections, rather than on a generalized
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05/05/2026
DA 24-0667 Case Number: DA 24-0667
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 98N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CODY ANN CARAVEO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADC-22-363 Honorable David J. Grubich, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ryan P. Archibald, Attorney at Law, Corpus Christi, Texas
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Michele R. Levine, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 15, 2026
Decided: May 5, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Cody Ann Caraveo appeals her September 2024 sentence on revocation in the
Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. The only issue she presents is
whether the court erroneously denied credit for elapsed time without violations
under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA (2023).1 Caraveo claims she was entitled to 130 days
elapsed-time credit—93 days from August 30 through December 1, 2023, and 37 days from
April 30 through June 6, 2024. The State disputes the first period but concedes she was
entitled to 37 days for the second period. We agree with the State and remand for entry of
an amended judgment crediting Caraveo with 37 days elapsed-time credit.
¶3 In May 2023, a jury found Caraveo guilty of felony burglary. On August 23, 2023,
the court sentenced Caraveo to two years to the Montana Department of Corrections
(DOC), all suspended. The court imposed probation conditions, requiring, as pertinent
here, that Caraveo abstain from illegal drugs and seek and maintain employment or
probation-approved programming.
1 All references to § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, are to the 2023 version of that statue. 2 ¶4 In March 2024, the State petitioned to revoke Caraveo’s suspended sentence based
on a Report of Violation (ROV) alleging that Caraveo had been charged with new crimes,
tested positive for methamphetamine, and failed to obtain or maintain employment or
programming. In April 2024, Caraveo denied the allegations. The court continued
disposition twice while Caraveo sought drug treatment, eventually setting a hearing date
for mid-September 2024.
¶5 In early August 2024, Caraveo’s probation officer submitted an addendum to his
ROV alleging that, while Caraveo had entered inpatient drug treatment on July 16, 2024,
she left just five days later, weeks ahead of her projected August 14, 2024 discharge date
and against her treatment provider’s advice. The probation officer also alleged a new
violation for Caraveo’s failing to report any employment or programming.
¶6 At the scheduled September 18, 2024 hearing, Caraveo changed her responses to
the March 2024 revocation petition allegations and answered the separate, additional
August 2024 allegations, admitting all alleged violations under oath, including that she
failed to obtain or maintain employment or programming and failed to report any
employment to her probation officer.
¶7 At the September 2024 dispositional hearing, Caraveo’s probation officer,
consistent with the allegations in the ROV and addendum, testified that, since signing her
probation conditions in August 2023, Caraveo had continued to struggle with drug use and
had failed to maintain employment or programming. He denied that Caraveo was entitled
to any credit from August 30 through December 1, 2023, because she never reported any
employment or programming during that timeframe. He said he twice utilized a “job
3 development” case management response to no avail. However, the probation officer
acknowledged that Caraveo reported employment beginning April 30, 2024, and that his
last note reflecting reported employment was June 6, 2024.
¶8 The District Court revoked Caraveo’s probationary sentence and sentenced her to a
two-year DOC commitment with no time suspended and denied any credit for elapsed time.
Caraveo argues this was error because she sought elapsed-time credit for 93 days from
August 30 through December 1, 2023, and 37 days from April 30 through June 6, 2024, on
the ground that there was no record or recollection of any specific probation violation
during those periods.
¶9 Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, governs elapsed-time credit on revocation. The
statute requires the sentencing court to consider elapsed time, consult the records and
recollection of the probation and parole officer, and allow credit for elapsed time served
without any record or recollection of violations. State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178, ¶ 8,
410 Mont. 67, 517 P.3d 146. “Violations may be continuous or ongoing, so long as the
record or recollection of the supervising probation or parole officer points to specific,
actual instances of offender conduct constituting a violation of the terms of a sentence.”
State v. Powell, 2025 MT 218, ¶ 14, 424 Mont. 180, 577 P.3d 150. Because credit for
elapsed time is mandatory to the extent required by statute, we review a court’s
determination regarding elapsed-time credit for legality. Gudmundsen, ¶ 8.
¶10 Caraveo argues she was not in violation from August 30 through December 1, 2023,
because, at sentencing on August 23, 2023, defense counsel represented that she was
employed by her landlord and, in her view, the record does not clearly show when that
4 employment ended. That point does not carry the day. Even if the record suggested some
employment at sentencing, the relevant question under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, is
whether the probation officer’s records or recollection demonstrated a specific violation
during the period for which credit is sought. Here, Caraveo later admitted under oath that
the employment/programming allegations were true, and the probation officer testified
that Caraveo did not maintain or report employment or programming during the relevant
earlier period. On this record, the District Court did not err in concluding that Caraveo
remained in violation of the employment/programming condition during the August 30 to
December 1, 2023 period.
¶11 Based on the probation officer’s records and recollection, together with Caraveo’s
admissions, the District Court had a sufficient basis to find a continuous violation of the
employment/programming condition from August 30 through December 1, 2023. Section
46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, does not require multiple violations or separate proof of condition
violations during every portion of the period in question. A specific, continuous violation
of a probation condition is enough. See State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81, ¶ 12, 399 Mont. 459,
461 P.3d 108. Because the District Court relied on the violation of a specific condition,
supported by the probation officer’s records and recollections, rather than on a generalized
pattern of poor adjustment, its denial of elapsed-time credit for this period satisfied the
requirements of § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, and was not error.
¶12 Conversely, Caraveo’s probation officer’s testimony established that
Caraveo reported employment during the 37-day period from April 30 through
June 6, 2024, and the record identified no probation violation during that interval.
5 Because § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, requires credit for elapsed time served without any
record or recollection of violations, the court’s blanket denial of elapsed-time credit for
this violation-free period was error. Therefore, we reverse in part and remand for entry of
an amended judgment awarding Caraveo credit for 37 days of elapsed-time credit under
§ 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA.
¶13 We decide this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c)
of our Internal Operating Rules because the case presents a question controlled by settled
law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE