State v. Butler

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Butler, 2026-Ohio-2560.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-26-01

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v. OPINION AND JORDAN DANIEL BUTLER, JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 24-CR-0046

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: July 6, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Alison Boggs for Appellant

Andrew M. Bigler for Appellee Case No. 14-26-01

ZIMMERMAN, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jordan Daniel Butler (“Butler”), appeals the

December 16, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of

Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} Stemming from conduct that occurred in October 2013, the Union

County Grand Jury indicted Butler on March 8, 2024 on Count One of rape in

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), (B), a first-degree felony, and Count Two of

disseminating matter harmful to juveniles in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(1), (F), a

fourth-degree felony. On May 2, 2024, Butler appeared for arraignment and pleaded

not guilty to the indictment.

{¶3} On January 15, 2025, Butler withdrew his pleas of not guilty and

entered a guilty plea, under a negotiated plea agreement, to Count One of the

indictment. In exchange for his change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss Count

Two. The trial court accepted Butler’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and ordered a

pre-sentence investigation.

{¶4} On April 2, 2025, the trial court sentenced Butler to a mandatory

minimum term of 11 years to a maximum term of 16 years and 6 months in prison.

The trial court ordered the sentence imposed in this case to run consecutively to the

sentence imposed in a Champaign County case. The trial court also classified Butler

as a Tier III sex offender.

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{¶5} Butler appealed his sentence on May 2, 2025. On November 17, 2025,

this court determined that the trial court erred by imposing an indefinite prison term

because the rape offense was committed in 2013, prior to the enactment of the

Reagan Tokes Law. See State v. Butler, 2025-Ohio-5176 (3d Dist.).

{¶6} Following remand for resentencing, the trial court sentenced Butler to

11 years in prison, ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the Champaign

County case, and again classified Butler as a Tier III sex offender.

{¶7} Butler filed his notice of appeal on January 7, 2026. He raises one

assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The Trial Court Erred When It Ordered The Sentence To Be Served Consecutive To A Sentence Appellant Is Already Serving, Creating A Sentence That Is Contrary To Law.

{¶8} In his assignment of error, Butler argues that the trial court erred by

ordering that he serve the sentence imposed in this case consecutively to the

sentence imposed in another county. Specifically, he contends that his sentence is

contrary to law because the trial court improperly fashioned his penalty around

subsequent, unrelated convictions rather than the 2013 offense at issue.

Standard of Review

{¶9} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

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otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. When

reviewing the imposition of consecutive sentences, “[t]he plain language of R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court’s consecutive-

sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be upheld unless those findings

are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v. Gwynne, 2023-

Ohio-3851, ¶ 5. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.’” Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),

paragraph three of the syllabus.

Analysis

{¶10} “Except as provided in . . . division (C) of section 2929.14, . . . a prison

term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any

other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this

state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)

provides, in its relevant part, that

the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

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(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

{¶11} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on

the record before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 2012-Ohio-1892,

¶ 11 (3d Dist.); State v. Peddicord, 2013-Ohio-3398, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.). Specifically,

the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect

the public or punish the offender; (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate

to the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b),

or (c) applies. Id.; Id.

{¶12} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing

hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into

its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), citing State v.

Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to

support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the

words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record

and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.

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{¶13} The requirement to make statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

applies equally whether the trial court is imposing consecutive sentences on multiple

counts within a single case or ordering a sentence to be served consecutively to a

prison term imposed in an entirely separate case. See State v. Carner, 2026-Ohio-

1131, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.); State v. James, 2024-Ohio-4567, ¶ 52 (7th Dist.).

{¶14} In this case, the trial court made the three statutorily required findings

before imposing consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing and it incorporated

those findings into its sentencing entry. Accord State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-5274,

¶ 17 (5th Dist.). See also State v. Kunzer, 2019-Ohio-1042, ¶ 24-25 (3d Dist.).

Specifically, at Butler’s sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that

consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and to punish Butler, and

that the sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct or the

danger that he poses. Applying R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), the trial court further found

that Butler committed multiple offenses as part of a course of conduct—explicitly

pointing to the separate offenses in Union and Champaign counties—and that the

resulting harm was so great or unusual that a single prison term would not

adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct. Alternatively, pursuant to R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(c), the trial court determined that Butler’s criminal history

demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from

future crime. The trial court subsequently incorporated all of these findings into its

sentencing entry.

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{¶15} Despite the trial court’s compliance with these statutory requirements,

Butler argues that his consecutive sentences are contrary to law because the trial

court’s findings under both R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c) improperly relied on

conduct that occurred after his October 2013 offense. In essence, Butler asserts that

a trial court is strictly bound by the chronological timeline of events as they existed

at the exact moment that the crime was committed, which would render his 2013

criminal history insufficient to justify consecutive sentences. However, because a

trial court need only find one of the alternative factors under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-

(c) to impose consecutive sentences, this court need not address Butler’s arguments

regarding his “course of conduct” under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). See State v.

Robinson, 2017-Ohio-2703, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.) (noting that the factors under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) operate as alternatives and a trial court need only find one to

impose consecutive sentences).

{¶16} Consequently, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court possessed

the legal authority to consider Butler’s subsequent convictions when determining

that his overall criminal history warranted consecutive sentences under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(c) in this case. We conclude that it could. Indeed, Ohio law requires

a trial court to make the statutorily mandated consecutive-sentencing findings based

on the record as it stands at the time of sentencing. See State v. Hiles, 2021-Ohio-

1622, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.) (noting that “R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) does not contain any

temporal limitation prohibiting a trial court from considering an offender’s history

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of criminal conduct”). “Furthermore, ‘it is settled law that a sentencing judge can

take into account facts relating to other charges, even charges that have been

dismissed or which resulted in an acquittal.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Esmail,

2014-Ohio-2297, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.). See also State v. Steele, 2017-Ohio-7605, ¶ 10

(8th Dist.) (addressing the broad scope of material that a sentencing court may take

into consideration, including a defendant’s complete criminal history and

information addressed in the presentence investigation report). Therefore, since the

Champaign County conviction was an established part of Butler’s record when he

stood before the trial court for resentencing in December 2025, the trial court

properly considered it as part of his “history of criminal conduct” under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(c). Compare State v. Feller, 2012-Ohio-6016, ¶ 40-41 (1st Dist.)

(holding that a trial court errs by ordering a sentence to run consecutively to a

sentence that has not yet been imposed, illustrating that a court’s consecutive-

sentencing authority hinges on the sentences actively in existence at the time of the

hearing).

{¶17} Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court made the

appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing consecutive sentences and

incorporated those findings in its sentencing entry. Based on our review of the

record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are not clearly and convincingly

unsupported by the record and that Butler’s consecutive sentences are not contrary

to law.

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{¶18} Butler’s assignment of error is overruled.

{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

DATED: /hls

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