[Cite as State v. Burns, 2025-Ohio-5442.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 25CA7
v. :
CHRISTOPHER A. BURNS, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for appellant1.
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Adam J. King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee. ________________________________________________________________ CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:11-25-25 ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas
Court judgment of conviction and sentence. Christopher Burns,
defendant below and appellant herein, raises one assignment of
error for review:
“DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
1Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court proceedings. HIGHLAND, 25CA7 2
{¶2} A Highland County Grand Jury returned an indictment
that charged appellant with (1) one count of aggravated
trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(1), and (2) one count of aggravated possession of
methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), both third-
degree felonies. Appellant entered not guilty pleas.
{¶3} At appellant’s February 24, 2025 jury trial, Robert
Gibson testified that in 2024 he offered to work undercover for
the Highland County Task Force to “work off charges.” On June
29, 2024, Gibson set up a meeting with codefendant Joey Fender.
After officers searched him, they dropped Gibson near Fender’s
home with money to buy narcotics. At Fender’s home, Gibson
found Fender and appellant. Fender “asked someone to get the
scales,” and to “get [her] dope.” Appellant “handed her [Joey
Fender] the dope. But he didn’t - - well, he didn’t buy
nothing from me. He just gave her hers and she bought it from
me. It was Joey. I handed her the money and everything.”
After Joey weighed the drugs, she gave the methamphetamine to
Gibson, who “tied it up . . . and left and met the dude across
the way there at the - - the car, and give it to [the officer].”
Gibson explained that officers searched him again and
interviewed him after the drug deal. Gibson testified that law
enforcement paid him $200 and because he thought he “was under HIGHLAND, 25CA7 3
indictment,” he decided to work with the Task Force to avoid
further trouble.
{¶4} Appellant’s codefendant Joey Fender testified that she
had a recent conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, had
not yet been sentenced, and law enforcement gave her
“consideration” in her case for her cooperation in appellant’s
case. Fender explained that Robert Gibson visited her house on
June 24, 2024 “to purchase two 8-balls” [methamphetamine] for
$120. When Gibson arrived, appellant, a friend and neighbor who
frequently visits her home was present. When Gibson arrived, he
“asked me did I have the stuff. And he said, ‘where’s the stuff
at?’.” Fender explained that the methamphetamine “was on my
dresser,” and she asked “C-Bow [appellant] to hand it to me.”
When asked if appellant handed the narcotics to her, Fender
initially said, “I’m not sure.” Fender explained that she is
unsure whether appellant handed her the scales or the
methamphetamine, but later agreed that, if appellant handed her
something before he handed her the scales, that would have been
the methamphetamine. Fender also acknowledged that she
regularly sold narcotics and that appellant frequently assisted.
When asked directly, “on June 29th of ‘24, did you knowingly
sell meth to Bobby Gibson,” Fender replied, “Yes.” When asked,
“on June 29th of 2024, did the Defendant help you by handing you
the meth and the scales,” Fender replied, “Yes.” HIGHLAND, 25CA7 4
{¶5} Highland County Drug Task Force Investigator Justin
Brewer testified that he has assisted with hundreds of covert
drug operations over the past three years by serving as a
Confidential Informant (CI) handler and conducting surveillance.
Brewer, familiar with the drug trade language, explained that an
“8-ball” is 3.5 grams of methamphetamine.
{¶6} On June 29, 2024, Investigator Brewer assisted with
the controlled drug buy that involved appellant. Brewer drove
Gibson to the area where Joey Fender lived, and once Gibson
exited the vehicle, Brewer stayed in the area and to conduct
surveillance. Brewer explained that Task Force agents maintain
a conference call and at least one officer watches a live video
feed as the transaction occurs and agents instruct one another
when the transaction is completed. In the present case,
Detective Butler watched the live feed and Brewer stayed on a
conference call during the transaction. After the deal’s
completion, Brewer picked up Gibson and “immediately took
possession of the narcotics that he purchased.” Brewer
recognized the narcotics as methamphetamine and placed it in the
evidence locker at the Highland County Sheriff’s Office. Ohio
Bureau of Criminal Investigation Forensic Scientist Pamela
Farley testified that the tested substance contained 5.9 grams
of methamphetamine.
{¶7} Hillsboro Police Detective Brian Butler testified that HIGHLAND, 25CA7 5
he is assigned to the Highland County Drug Task Force and has
assisted with thousands of covert drug operations where the Task
Force coordinates with confidential informants:
They’ll sign them up, brief them, ask them who they can buy drugs off of, and we will supervise them. We will provide them with the money, the audio recorder, and follow them to the person that either we say, hey, who - who can you buy off of, or we tell them somebody who is a known drug dealer. Can you buy off of them? And they get a hold of them. It happens one of two ways. We supervise them at the going and meeting with this person in various locations. And monitoring the deal visually and through audio recorder. After the deal or the transaction is complete, we meet with the confidential informant and recover the narcotics and the audio/video recorder. And then we have a brief and interview the confidential informant afterwards.
{¶8} Detective Butler explained that a “ball” is “an 8-ball
or an eighth of an ounce of . . . methamphetamine.” Butler
further explained that the task force pays confidential
informants for their work and after a drug deal with a
confidential informant, the task force does not immediately
arrest the suspect because it would reveal the confidential
informant’s identity. Butler added that before each deal they
either photograph or record the serial numbers of the buy money.
{¶9} Detective Butler worked with Confidential Informant
Gibson on June 29, 2024. Gibson advised the task force that he
could purchase methamphetamine from Joey Fender because Gibson
had already visited Gibson’s home and made arrangements “to
purchase two 8-balls of methamphetamine which would equal 3.5 HIGHLAND, 25CA7 6
grams a piece, 7 grams total, for $120.” The task force met
with Gibson, searched him, and “gave Bobby $120 of recorded cash
money.” Investigator Brewer provided Gibson with the
audio/video recorder and drove Gibson to the area of Fender’s
home while Butler followed and viewed the audio/video recorder
through a live feed on his phone. After Brewer dropped off
Gibson, Gibson entered Fender’s home and spoke with Fender and
appellant. Butler then searched Gibson after the encounter.
The Task Force intended to purchase 7 grams of methamphetamine,
but the narcotics weighed less than 7 grams and Butler said he
had experienced dealers shorting buyers. Butler added that BCI
does not test baggies for fingerprints and that Gibson’s
fingerprints would have been on the bag as well because Gibson
did not wear gloves. Butler explained that officers obtained a
$200 informant payment cash voucher for Gibson and a $120 cash
expenditure voucher to document the money used to purchase the
illegal narcotics.
{¶10} Appellee played the video for the jury and Butler
testified that in the video he could see the CI, Joey Fender and
appellant “all handling the bags.” Butler narrated the video:
I see Bobby Gibson. He goes into the house. He makes contact with Joey Fender and Chris Burns. Bobby Gibson said he wanted two 8-balls. Joey Fender said it’s right there. At which point, Chris Burns reaches over toward the dresser area. He hands Joey two items. One seemed like it was a little baggie in his right hand. The other one was like a pouch, like a dark-colored pouch. Hands HIGHLAND, 25CA7 7
them to Joey.
Joey walks on the other side of the bed, and turns around the corner. She starts that - talking about scales. And she said, “There they are, C-Bow, right there,” referring to Chris Burns.
Chris Burns goes over to the dresser area again. Under some clothes, I believe, you can see him with the scales in his hands and hands them in Joey’s direction.
Later, you see Joey with the same dark-colored pouch pulling the methamphetamine in and out of it. And from this baggie that she gives part of it to Bobby Gibson.
Then Bobby Gibson leaves and meets up with Investigator Brewer.
{¶11} At the close of appellee’s evidence, the trial court
overruled appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of
acquittal.
{¶12} On February 25, 2025, the jury found appellant guilty
of (1) aggravated trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), and (2) aggravated possession of
methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), both in an
amount equal to or exceeding bulk amount but less than five
times bulk amount.
{¶13} The trial court held a sentencing hearing immediately
after the trial and sentenced appellant to: (1) serve a definite
determinate 24-month prison term, (2) optional postrelease
control, and (3) pay $120 in restitution (joint and several with
codefendant Joey Fender). This appeal followed. HIGHLAND, 25CA7 8
I.
{¶14} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts
that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶15} A court may conclude that the judgment is against the
weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387 (1997). “The question to be answered when a manifest weight
issue is raised is whether ‘there is substantial evidence upon
which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v.
Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio
St.3d 180, 193–194 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d
169 (1978), syllabus. A court that considers a manifest weight
challenge must “ ‘review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of
witnesses.’ ” State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 208, quoting
State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328. However, the
reviewing court must bear in mind that credibility generally is
an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Issa, 93
Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001); State v. Murphy, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31
(4th Dist.). “ ‘Because the trier of fact sees and hears the
witnesses and is particularly competent to decide “whether, and
to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular HIGHLAND, 25CA7 9
witnesses,” we must afford substantial deference to its
determinations of credibility.’ ” Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-
Ohio-2420, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Konya, 2006-Ohio-6312, ¶ 6 (2d
Dist.), quoting State v. Lawson, 1997 WL 476684 (2d Dist. Aug.
22, 1997).
{¶16} Thus, an appellate court will generally defer to the
trier of fact on issues of evidence weight and credibility, as
long as a rational basis exists in the record for the fact-
finder's determination. State v. Picklesimer, 2012-Ohio-1282, ¶
24 (4th Dist.); accord State v. Howard, 2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (4th
Dist.) (“We will not intercede as long as the trier of fact has
some factual and rational basis for its determination of
credibility and weight.”). Accordingly, if the prosecution
presented substantial credible evidence upon which the trier of
fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the essential elements of the offense had been established, the
judgment of conviction is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Accord Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12,
quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990) (a judgment is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence when “ ‘ “the greater amount of
credible evidence” ’ ” supports it).
{¶17} Consequently, when an appellate court reviews a
manifest weight of the evidence claim, the court may reverse a HIGHLAND, 25CA7 10
judgment of conviction only if it appears that the fact-finder,
when it resolved the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ”
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983); accord McKelton at ¶ 328.
Finally, a reviewing court should find a conviction against the
manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d
at 175; accord State v. Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 166; State v.
Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483 (2000).
{¶18} In the case sub judice, appellant contends that his
aggravated trafficking conviction is against the manifest weight
of the evidence because (1) two of the five witnesses, the
informant and co-defendant, “stood to gain from their testimony,
which fact impeaches their credibility to the point where it is
useless,” and (2) the two officers could not identify the
substance appellant took from Fender’s dresser. Appellee,
however, argues that (1) direct and circumstantial evidence
supports appellant’s convictions, (2) a conviction may rest in
whole or in part on the uncorroborated testimony of a co-
defendant or accomplice if the jury finds it credible, and (3) a
confidential informant’s testimony is not per se unreliable. HIGHLAND, 25CA7 11
{¶19} R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) defines trafficking in
methamphetamine:
(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.
{¶20} Appellant argues that his conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, primarily because his
conviction is based on a confidential informant’s testimony.
However, a confidential informant's testimony and credibility
are generally matters for the trier of fact to weigh and
determine, and the trier of fact is free to accept or reject any
and all of the evidence. State v. Smith, 2011-Ohio-997, ¶ 20
(3d Dist.), citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
{¶21} In State v. Anderson, 2018-Ohio-2013 (4th Dist.), this
court considered whether Anderson’s charges were against the
manifest weight of the evidence when Anderson asserted that a
confidential informant with a criminal history, financial
incentive, and incentive to mitigate punishment for his own drug
offense, lacked credibility. We observed:
[T]his court and others generally have rejected manifest-weight challenges based upon a confidential informant's alleged lack of credibility. State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA3, 2009-Ohio-6143, 2009 WL 4021149, ¶ 25; accord State v. Bachman, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-17-006, 2018-Ohio-1242, 2018 WL 1567641; State v. Bradley, 2015-Ohio-5421, 55 N.E.3d 580 (8th Dist.), ¶¶ 26–28; State v. Fisher, 3rd Dist. Hardin No. 6-13-03, 2014-Ohio-436, 2014 WL 538642, ¶¶ 10–11; State v. Altman, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 12 CO 42, 2013-Ohio- HIGHLAND, 25CA7 12
5883, 2013 WL 6921497, ¶¶ 33–37; State v. Price, 3rd Dist. Logan No. 8-13-03, 2013-Ohio-3984, 2013 WL 5230326, ¶ 24; State v. Smith, 193 Ohio App.3d 201, 2011- Ohio-997, 951 N.E.2d 469 (3rd Dist.), ¶ 20; State v. Moore, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008-CA-00228, 2009-Ohio- 4958, 2009 WL 3003996, ¶ 23. In Bachman, for instance, the court concluded that the defendant's trafficking charge was not against manifest weight of the evidence, even though the defendant asserted that the confidential informant's testimony lacked credibility due to the informant's “drug addiction and previous bad acts.” Id. at ¶ 18. The court pointed out that the defendant's “trial counsel thoroughly explored the various credibility issues relating to” the confidential informant. The court noted that the jury was aware of the informant's credibility issues and was entitled to weigh it accordingly. The court did not believe “that the jury's credibility determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id., citing State v. Neal, 5th Dist. Stark No. 1998CA00288, 1999 WL 744148, *2–3, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2863, *5–6 (June 21, 1999) (rejecting defendant's manifest weight argument challenging the credibility of identification testimony based upon the witness's credibility upon a determination that defense counsel thoroughly cross- examined the witness and explored the credibility issue at trial.
Id. at ¶ 41.
{¶22} In Anderson, we observed that, in Bachman, supra, the
court also observed that the officers who monitored the
informant’s controlled buy with the defendant substantiated the
informant’s testimony. “The officers testified at length as to
the procedures they employ to ensure that [the informant] was
not in possession of any drugs prior to the transaction, which
included searching [the informant] and his vehicle.” Id. at ¶
19. Further, in Bachman and in the case subjudice, after the HIGHLAND, 25CA7 13
informant’s contact with the defendant, the officers
rendezvoused with the informant who advised the officers that
the defendant sold him narcotics and gave the officers the
narcotics. Anderson at ¶ 42.
{¶23} Moreover, other Ohio courts have rejected similar
manifest-weight challenges based upon a confidential informant’s
alleged lack of credibility. In State v. Jefferson, 2021-Ohio-
281, (3d Dist.), the defendant argued that the confidential
informant not a credible witness because he testified in
exchange for case consideration and had a motive to ensure
defendant’s conviction. The court, however, held:
“[T]he jury is not precluded from relying on a witness's testimony simply because the witness has a criminal history or a motivation to provide testimony favorable to the prosecution.” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-26, 2020-Ohio-427, ¶ 44, citing State v. Nitsche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103174, 2016-Ohio-3170, ¶ 44. “Instead, a witness's criminal history, prior drug use, or potential bias are factors that the jury may consider in determining whether to credit the witness's testimony and in assigning weight to the witness's testimony.” Id., citing State v. Price, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-13-03, 2013-Ohio-3984, ¶ 23-24. Here, the jury was informed of the agreement between the confidential informant and law enforcement officers, specifically that he assisted law enforcement in his capacity as a confidential informant in exchange for case consideration for his pending drug- related charges. See State v. Kammeyer, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-48, 2020-Ohio-3842, ¶ 51. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest injustice by finding the confidential informant's testimony credible. See State v. Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-44, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 26 (“In the end, a ‘[m]ere disagreement over the credibility of witnesses is not a sufficient reason to reverse a judgment on manifest weight grounds.’ ”), quoting State HIGHLAND, 25CA7 14
v. Cervantes, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-505, 2019- Ohio-1373, ¶ 28.
Jefferson at ¶ 36.
{¶24} In the case sub judice, appellant’s trial counsel
thoroughly cross-examined co-defendant Fender and confidential
informant Gibson about their criminal records and incentives to
testify. The jury heard testimony that Fender awaited
sentencing in her case and that Gibson received compensation and
an opportunity to avoid criminal charges. See Anderson at ¶ 43
(jury heard ample testimony about the confidential informant’s
criminal history and did not lose its way when it credited the
informant’s testimony and rejected the defendant’s testimony).
Here, the jury sitting as the trier of fact was “free to believe
or disbelieve any or all of the testimony the confidential
informant “presented” at trial. State v. Crump, 2010-Ohio-5263,
¶ 26 (10th Dist.).
{¶25} In addition, appellant argues that the officers who
testified could not specifically identify the substance
appellant retrieved from Fender’s dresser from the video and
these alleged weaknesses in appellee’s case left “only the
videotape and the BCI&I testing and report to prove the above
elements.” As appellee points out, however, direct and
circumstantial evidence including the testimony of five
witnesses and eight exhibits supported appellant’s convictions. HIGHLAND, 25CA7 15
{¶26} We observe that all courts have concluded that a
defendant may be convicted solely on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 151 (1988); State
v. Anderson, 2018-Ohio-2013, ¶ 40 (4th Dist.). “Circumstantial
evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same
probating value.” State v. Jenks, paragraph one of the
syllabus. “Circumstantial evidence is defined as ‘[t]estimony
not based on actual personal knowledge or observation of the
facts in controversy, but of other facts from which deductions
are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought ot be proved. .
.’” Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d at 150, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 221. Thus, a lack of direct evidence is
not dispositive of a manifest-weight challenge. State v.
Bradford, 2017-Ohio-8481, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.); Anderson at ¶ 40.
{¶27} Importantly, in the case at bar appellee played a
video recording of the transaction for the jury that showed
during the controlled buy appellant retrieve the scales and
handle the methamphetamine in coordination with codefendant
Fender. Although appellant contends that the video does not
show what exactly appellant handed to Fender, in Anderson,
supra, 2018-Ohio-2013, we noted that while we recognized that
none of the video or audio evidence crystalized the moment the
defendant handed drugs to the confidential informant in exchange HIGHLAND, 25CA7 16
for money, the evidence did record the informant and the
defendant engaged in conversations that trained law enforcement
officers testified constituted drug transactions. Id. at ¶ 45.
Moreover, we noted that direct evidence of a hand-to-hand drug
transaction is not necessarily required to sustain a drug-
trafficking conviction. Id., citing State v. Chafin, 2017-Ohio-
7622, ¶ 36-38 (4th Dist.)(rejecting similar argument that drug-
trafficking conviction against manifest weight of the evidence
when video failed to document hand-to-hand drug transaction);
State v. McLemore, 2000 WL 422368, *2 (9th Dist.)(defendant’s
conviction not against the manifest weight of the evidence even
though officers who observed controlled buy did not see what
transpired between appellant and informant, and even though
defendant asserted that informant lacked credibility because she
cooperated with police in exchange for the dismissal of criminal
charges against her).
{¶28} As noted above, in the case sub judice, the co-
defendant and confidential informant’s testimony are
substantially consistent and two officers corroborated their
testimony and provided photos and the video surveillance.
Therefore, like Anderson, even if none of the video or
documentary evidence clearly shows that appellant exchanged
drugs for money, Gibson and Fender’s testimony, along with the HIGHLAND, 25CA7 17
officer’s corroborating observations, provides ample competent
credible evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that
appellant committed the offense aggravated drug trafficking.
Anderson at ¶ 45.
{¶29} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant's assignment of error and affirm the trial
court's judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. HIGHLAND, 25CA7 18
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.