[Cite as State v. Burnap, 2012-Ohio-2047.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. -vs- Case No. 11CAC090086 CHRISTOPHER BURNAP
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from Delaware Municipal Court, Case No. 11-TRC-06680
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Dismissed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 7, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ELIZABETH A. MATUNE WILLIAM T. CRAMER Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 470 Olde Worthington Road, Suite 200 Delaware City Prosecutor Westerville, Ohio 43082 70 North Union Street Delaware, Ohio 43015 Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 2
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Christopher Burnap appeals the August 8, 2011
Judgment Entry entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denying his
motion to suppress evidence. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On June 4, 2011, an employee of a gas station called the Delaware Police
Department reporting a customer at the gas station appeared to be intoxicated. The
caller related the customer was driving a white truck, and provided a license plate
number, indicating the truck was travelling north on Route 23.
{¶3} Officer James Ailes of the Delaware Police Department responded to the
call. Ailes then spotted a white truck with the matching license plate number at a carry-
out window of a McDonald’s Restaurant. The truck’s engine was running. A second
officer arrived at the scene, as did the gas station employee, who indicated the white
truck was the customer she had called to report.
{¶4} Officer Ailes then caught the attention of the truck’s driver, indicating to the
driver to pull over to an area in the parking lot. The driver was alone in the vehicle and
promptly complied. Following the incident, Appellant was charged with operating a
vehicle while intoxicated.
{¶5} Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence flowing from his
encounter with Officer Ailes, claiming the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify
the stop. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress, ultimately
overruling the motion. Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 3
{¶6} Appellant entered a plea of no contest to the charge. The trial court
accepted the plea, finding Appellant guilty of the charge and imposing a sentence
accordingly.
{¶7} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:
{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED
DURING A TRAFFIC STOP AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC,
ARTICULABLE FACTS TO SUPPORT A REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY.”
{¶9} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See: State v. Klein, 73
Ohio App.3d 486 (1991), State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592 (1993). Second, an
appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the correct law to the findings of fact.
In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law.
See: State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's
findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly
identified the law, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly applied the law
in deciding the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. In reviewing this
type of claim, an appellate court must give deference to the trial court and is governed
by an abuse of discretion standard; i.e., it must determine whether the trial court's
subjective determination of the ultimate issue in the case was unreasonable, arbitrary or Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 4
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983). It is with this
framework in mind that we address the appellant's first and second assignments of
error.
{¶10} “An investigative stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution if the police have reasonable suspicion “the person stopped
is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez (1981), 449
U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. Reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Alabama v.
White (1990), 496 U .S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301. But it requires
something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’.” Terry v.
Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. “[T]he Fourth Amendment
requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v.
Wardlow (2000), 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.
{¶11} “Where the information possessed by the police before the stop was solely
from an informant's tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion will be limited to an
examination of the weight to be given the tip and the reliability of the tip.” Id. at 299, 720
N.E.2d 507. Courts have generally identified three classes of informants: the
anonymous informant, the known informant from the criminal world who has provided
previous reliable tips, and the identified citizen informant. Id. at 300, 720 N.E.2d 507. An
identified citizen informant may be highly reliable, and therefore a strong showing as to
other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary. Id. Thus, courts have routinely credited
the identified citizen informant with greater reliability. Id. Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 5
{¶12} The Tenth District Court of Appeals addressed the issue presented herein
in State v. Brant, 2001-Ohio 3994:
{¶13} “In this case, we must determine if Officer Fraley had a reasonable
suspicion, based on articulable facts, to stop Brant's vehicle. Brant argues that Officer
Fraley lacked sufficient information to justify a Terry stop. In particular, Brant argues that
the officer had no personal knowledge which would lead him to believe that Brant was
violating the law. Specifically, Brant contends that the facts provided by Mr. Bunting,
even if known to Officer Fraley, were not sufficient enough to demonstrate a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that Brant was engaged in unlawful behavior. We agree.
{¶14} “This court has previously held that ‘the simple corroboration of neutral
details describing the suspect or other conditions existing at the time of the tip, without
more, will not produce reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.’ State v. Ramsey
(Sept. 20, 1990), Franklin App No. 89AP-1298, unreported. ‘A tip which standing alone
would lack sufficient indicia of reliability may establish reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop if it is sufficiently corroborated through independent police work.’ Id;
Adams v.
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[Cite as State v. Burnap, 2012-Ohio-2047.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. -vs- Case No. 11CAC090086 CHRISTOPHER BURNAP
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from Delaware Municipal Court, Case No. 11-TRC-06680
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Dismissed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 7, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ELIZABETH A. MATUNE WILLIAM T. CRAMER Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 470 Olde Worthington Road, Suite 200 Delaware City Prosecutor Westerville, Ohio 43082 70 North Union Street Delaware, Ohio 43015 Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 2
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Christopher Burnap appeals the August 8, 2011
Judgment Entry entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denying his
motion to suppress evidence. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On June 4, 2011, an employee of a gas station called the Delaware Police
Department reporting a customer at the gas station appeared to be intoxicated. The
caller related the customer was driving a white truck, and provided a license plate
number, indicating the truck was travelling north on Route 23.
{¶3} Officer James Ailes of the Delaware Police Department responded to the
call. Ailes then spotted a white truck with the matching license plate number at a carry-
out window of a McDonald’s Restaurant. The truck’s engine was running. A second
officer arrived at the scene, as did the gas station employee, who indicated the white
truck was the customer she had called to report.
{¶4} Officer Ailes then caught the attention of the truck’s driver, indicating to the
driver to pull over to an area in the parking lot. The driver was alone in the vehicle and
promptly complied. Following the incident, Appellant was charged with operating a
vehicle while intoxicated.
{¶5} Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence flowing from his
encounter with Officer Ailes, claiming the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify
the stop. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress, ultimately
overruling the motion. Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 3
{¶6} Appellant entered a plea of no contest to the charge. The trial court
accepted the plea, finding Appellant guilty of the charge and imposing a sentence
accordingly.
{¶7} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:
{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED
DURING A TRAFFIC STOP AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC,
ARTICULABLE FACTS TO SUPPORT A REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY.”
{¶9} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See: State v. Klein, 73
Ohio App.3d 486 (1991), State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592 (1993). Second, an
appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the correct law to the findings of fact.
In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law.
See: State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's
findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly
identified the law, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly applied the law
in deciding the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. In reviewing this
type of claim, an appellate court must give deference to the trial court and is governed
by an abuse of discretion standard; i.e., it must determine whether the trial court's
subjective determination of the ultimate issue in the case was unreasonable, arbitrary or Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 4
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983). It is with this
framework in mind that we address the appellant's first and second assignments of
error.
{¶10} “An investigative stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution if the police have reasonable suspicion “the person stopped
is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez (1981), 449
U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. Reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Alabama v.
White (1990), 496 U .S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301. But it requires
something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’.” Terry v.
Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. “[T]he Fourth Amendment
requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v.
Wardlow (2000), 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.
{¶11} “Where the information possessed by the police before the stop was solely
from an informant's tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion will be limited to an
examination of the weight to be given the tip and the reliability of the tip.” Id. at 299, 720
N.E.2d 507. Courts have generally identified three classes of informants: the
anonymous informant, the known informant from the criminal world who has provided
previous reliable tips, and the identified citizen informant. Id. at 300, 720 N.E.2d 507. An
identified citizen informant may be highly reliable, and therefore a strong showing as to
other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary. Id. Thus, courts have routinely credited
the identified citizen informant with greater reliability. Id. Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 5
{¶12} The Tenth District Court of Appeals addressed the issue presented herein
in State v. Brant, 2001-Ohio 3994:
{¶13} “In this case, we must determine if Officer Fraley had a reasonable
suspicion, based on articulable facts, to stop Brant's vehicle. Brant argues that Officer
Fraley lacked sufficient information to justify a Terry stop. In particular, Brant argues that
the officer had no personal knowledge which would lead him to believe that Brant was
violating the law. Specifically, Brant contends that the facts provided by Mr. Bunting,
even if known to Officer Fraley, were not sufficient enough to demonstrate a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that Brant was engaged in unlawful behavior. We agree.
{¶14} “This court has previously held that ‘the simple corroboration of neutral
details describing the suspect or other conditions existing at the time of the tip, without
more, will not produce reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.’ State v. Ramsey
(Sept. 20, 1990), Franklin App No. 89AP-1298, unreported. ‘A tip which standing alone
would lack sufficient indicia of reliability may establish reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop if it is sufficiently corroborated through independent police work.’ Id;
Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 147 (when a tip lacks an indicia of reliability,
further investigation is required before an investigatory stop of the suspect's vehicle will
be authorized).”
{¶15} “***
{¶16} “Careful review of the record indicates that although the tip was reliable, it
lacked sufficient information to provide reasonable suspicion that Brant was operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Bunting provided the Grove City
Police Department dispatcher with the color of Brant's vehicle along with the license Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 6
plate number. Mr. Bunting also indicated that Brant was honking his horn for ten
minutes, his shirt was on backwards and inside out and his speech was very slow.
While it is not clear if the dispatcher relayed all of this information to Officer Fraley, Mr.
Bunting nonetheless failed to indicate that he witnessed any traffic violations, unlawful
behavior, or evidence of impaired driving. Additionally, even though Officer Fraley
attempted to further investigate the tip, his independent police work proved to be
fruitless. If Officer Fraley had observed erratic driving, then sufficient indicia of reliability
would have been present to conduct the investigatory stop. Under the totality of the
circumstances, Officer Fraley lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop
Brant's vehicle. Ramsey, supra. Since Officer Fraley's personal observations failed to
confirm Mr. Bunting's belief that Brant was intoxicated, we believe that Brant's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated and, as such, Brant's sole assignment of error is well-
taken and is sustained.”
{¶17} In the case sub judice, on cross-examination at the suppression hearing,
Officer Ailes testified:
{¶18} “Q. Officer, when you - - you indicated that you received information from
a caller directly to you, correct?
{¶19} “A. No, the caller called dispatch. Dispatch did send me.
{¶20} “Q. Okay. And the information was that there was not [sic] an intoxicated
person at the Sunoco, correct?
{¶21} “A. Correct.
{¶22} “Q. That’s the only information that you got?
{¶23} “A. I got - - I got the report that an intoxicated driver was leaving Sunoco. Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 7
{¶24} “Q. Okay. And that’s it, right, they described the person as intoxicated?
{¶25} “A. That’s it.
{¶26} “Q. No information what they had to drink or anything about them, correct?
{¶27} “A. Correct.
{¶28} “Q. Okay. So actually it was the dispatcher who talked to this caller,
correct?
{¶29} “A. Correct.
{¶30} “Q. And the dispatcher is an officer with your department, correct?
{¶31} “A. I’m sorry, say that again.
{¶32} “Q. The dispatcher would be an officer with your police department?
{¶33} “A. Yes, the dispatcher works for the police department, yes.
{¶34} “Q. Delaware city Police Department?
{¶35} “A. Delaware City Police.”
{¶36} “* * *
{¶37} “Q. And you never directly talked to the person from Sunoco, correct?
{¶38} “A. Correct.”
{¶39} Tr. at 9-10, 15.
{¶40} Here, the gas station attendant reported to the police dispatch her opinion
a driver was intoxicated. The attendant did not indicate bad driving or inappropriate
activity or behavior in Appellant while operating his motor vehicle. The attendant did not
indicate any personal interaction with the driver or establish any personal experience as
foundation for forming an opinion the driver was intoxicated. While the citizen informant
was reliable, we find the conclusory information provided was insufficient to justify an Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 8
investigatory stop in the absence of any observations by Officer Ailes to demonstrate
Appellant was committing an offense.
{¶41} Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
motion to suppress.
{¶42} The judgment of the Delaware Municipal Court is reversed and the charge
ordered dismissed.
By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. concurs,
Farmer, J. dissents
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________ HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin_____________________ HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
___________________________________ HON. SHEILA G. FARMER Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 9
Farmer, J., dissents
{¶43} I respectfully dissent from the majority's view that the information from the
citizen informer was insufficient to justify an investigatory stop of appellant.
{¶44} Despite the majority's reliance on the dicta in the Brant case, I would find
the information provided by a neutral and unbiased observer of an intoxicated person
driving a specific vehicle was sufficient for the police to initiate an investigatory stop. I
find no difference between this stop and a DUI checkpoint stop and I would affirm the
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.
s/ Sheila G. Farmer________________ HON. SHEILA G. FARMER Delaware County, Case No. 11CAC090086 10
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : CHRISTOPHER BURNAP : : Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 11CAC090086
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Delaware Municipal Court is reversed and the charge against Appellant is ordered
dismissed. Costs waived.
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________ HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________ HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
___________________________________ HON. SHEILA G. FARMER